Plato's Phaedo 74b7-c6, part 2
1958; Brill; Volume: 3; Issue: 1 Linguagem: Inglês
10.1163/156852858x00048
ISSN1568-5284
Autores Tópico(s)Philosophy, Science, and History
ResumoS INCE, then, we may now regard it as established beyond any doubt that Plato's semantics committed him to the view that every Form is a perfect instance of itself, we must examine the consequences of this view for the Forms of Likeness, Plurality, and Equality. Mr. P. T. Geach, following a suggestion of Wittgenstein's, has argued that if the Form of Equality is to be a paradigm instance of equality, it will have to be not one thing but a pair of things exactly equal to each other (for it is of the essence of equality to be a relation that hol(ds between things, and it makes no sense to apply the predicate 'equal' to a single thing taken in isolation from everything else); and he maintains that in the same way the Forms of Likeness and Plurality will each be a set of things and not just one thing (Philosophical Rcview, Vol. 65 (I956), p. 76). Professor Vlastos has accepted Geach's view on these matters (Philosophical Review, vol. 6g (I956), p. 9I), and has urged that Geach, in making it clear how the plural mu'-r& rO but if the proviso is not fulfilled, the conclusion will not follow). To the argument adduced by Vlastos in regard to the Phacdo passage we may add the conclusion at which we arrived as a result of our examination of Parmenides I 2 8 e I 3 o a 2, viz. that to take av`r rt 64ot ocas synonymous with G4LoL6trj and -rok itoXXc as synonymous with 7)?0Oo; is the only way of rendering Socrates' exposition coherent and his particular illustrations genuinely relevant. But Bluck (Phronesis, vol. 2 (I9S7), pp. 117-I20) has adduced a series of arguments against the Geach-Vlastos view of the nature of the Forms of Equality, Likeness, and Plurality; and some at least of his arguments are too weighty to be ignored. Bluck is prepared to admit (p. I I 9) that rt 7to?X&M at Parmenides I 2 9 b 7 and d S may refer to the
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