Biopolitics and the Homonormative Subject; Epistemic Values and Epistemologies of the Eye; Individualization and the Play of Memories
2010; Taylor & Francis; Volume: 16; Issue: 1 Linguagem: Inglês
10.1080/13534640903478841
ISSN1460-700X
AutoresCelia Jameson, Sandra Robinson, Yuk Hui,
Tópico(s)Foucault, Power, and Ethics
ResumoClick to increase image sizeClick to decrease image size Notes 1 Michel Foucault, Society Must be Defended: Lectures at the Collège de France, 1975-76 [1997], ed. Mauro Bertani and Alessandro Fontana, trans. David Macey (London: Penguin, 2003), pp.242-44. 2 Michel Foucault, Society Must be Defended, p.252. 3 Michel Foucault, Society Must be Defended, p.257. 4 Nikolas Rose, The Politics of Life Itself: Biomedicine, Power and Subjectivity in the Twenty-first Century (Princeton, NJ and Oxford: Princeton University Press, 2007), p.57. 5 Judith Butler, Precarious Life: The Powers of Mourning and Violence (London and New York: Verso, 2004), p.xv. 6 Judith Butler, Precarious Life, p.56. 7 Judith Butler, Precarious Life, p.56. 8 Lisa Blackman, ‘Is Happiness Contagious?’, New Formations 63:1 (2007), pp.15-32 (p.20). 9 Nikolas Rose, The Politics of Life Itself, p.57. 10 Michel Foucault, Society Must be Defended, p.260. 11 Nikolas Rose, The Politics of Life Itself, p.58. 1 Lorraine Daston and Peter Galison, ‘The Image of Objectivity’, Representations 40 (1992), pp.81-128 (p.118). 2 Elizabeth Eisenstein, The Printing Press as an Agent of Change: Communications and Cultural Transformation in Early Modern Europe (Cambridge, MA: Cambridge University Press, 1979). 3 Elizabeth Eisenstein, The Printing Press as an Agent of Change. See also Stillman Drake, ‘Early Science and the Printed Book: The Spread of Science Beyond the Universities’, in Essays on Galileo and the History and Philosophy of Science (Toronto, New York and London: University of Toronto Press, 1999) pp.118-30. 4 Brad Sherman and Lionel Bently, The Making of Modern Intellectual Property Law (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 1999) pp.161-65. 5 Mark Rose, Authors and Owners: The Invention of Copyright (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1993). 6 Michel Foucault, ‘What Is an Author?’, in Textual Strategies: Perspectives in Post-Structural Criticism, ed. Josue V. Harari (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1979), pp.141-60. 7 Michel Foucault, ‘What Is an Author?’, p.148. 8 Jan Goldstein, ‘Mutations of the Self in Old Regime and Postrevolutionary France’, in Biographies of Scientific Objects, ed. Lorraine Daston (Chicago and London: University of Chicago Press, 2000), pp.86-116 (p.90). 9 Foucault also makes this point in ‘What Is an Author?’, p.149. See also Scott Lash, Critique of Information (London, Thousand Oaks, and New Delhi: Sage, 2002), pp.193-94. Lash outlines the impact of intellectual property on science and technology following closely Donna Haraway's many explorations in this area. See for example, Donna Haraway, Modest Witness@Second Millenium. FemaleMan Meets OncoMouse: Feminism and Technoscience (London and New York: Routledge, 1997). 10 David Baird, ‘Scientific Instrument Making, Epistemology and the Conflict Between Gift and Commodity Economies’, Philosophy and Technology 2, 3-4 (1997), pp.25-45. Baird makes a related argument regarding scientific instrument making as a gift economy thriving in a small, collaborative techno-scientific collective. 11 Lewis Hyde cited in Mark Osteen, ‘Introduction’, in The Question of the Gift: Essays Across Disciplines, ed. Mark Osteen (London and New York: Routledge, 2002), pp.28-29. Osteen also suggests that Foucault's ‘author-function’ may operate as a gift in the same way when an ‘appreciative reader increases the value of a text by exposing what wasn't previously apparent in it’ (p.29). 1 Martin Heidegger, On Time and Being [1969], trans. Joan Stambaugh (New York and London: Harper & Row, 1972), p.82. 2 See the interview with Martin Heidegger by Maria Alter and John D. Caputo conducted on 23 September 1966 and published in Der Spiegel on 31 May 1976 under the title ‘Nur noch ein Gott kann uns retten’. 3 See Naturalizing Phenomenology: Issues in Contemporary Phenomenology and Cognitive Science, ed. Jean Petitot et al. (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 1999). 4 Individuation and individualization are two different concepts. For Simondon and Stiegler, individualization is the product or end result, while individuation is always a process or becoming in which the subject tends to achieve the in-divisibility of the self which could never be realized. 5 For the concept of après-coup, see Jean Laplanche and Jean-Bertrand Pontalis, The Language of Psychoanalysis [1967], trans. Donald Nicholson-Smith (London: Karnac Books, 1988. pp.111-14. 6 For the concept of hyponemesis and its relation to technology, see Bernard Stiegler, Technics and Time 1: The Fault of Epimetheus [1994], trans. Richard Beardsworth and George Collins (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 1998). 7 See Pierre Hadot, Philosophy as a Way of Life: Spiritual Exercises from Socrates to Foucault [1981], ed. and intr. Arnold I. Davidson, trans. Michael Chase (Malden: Blackwell, 1995). 8 Bernard Stiegler, Acting Out, p.20. 9 Bernard Stiegler, Acting Out, p.24. 10 Bernard Stiegler, Acting Out, p.19. 11 Bernard Stiegler, Acting Out, p.22. 12 Bernard Stiegler, Acting Out, p.19. 13 See Martin Heidegger, ‘Das Problem der Bezeugung einer eigentlichen existenziellen Möglichkeit’, §54, in Sein und Zeit (Tübingen: Max Niemeyer Verlag, 2006), pp.267-70. 14 Bernard Stiegler, Acting Out, p.80. 15 Bernard Stiegler, Acting Out, p.49. 16 For a detailed critique on Husserl's phenomenology of Time-Consiousness, please see Stiegler's chapter ‘Temporal Object and Retentional Finitude’ in his Technics and Time 2: Disorientation [1996], trans. Stephen Barker (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 2009), pp.188-243. 17 Michel Henry, Material Phenomenology [1990], trans. Scott Davidson (New York: Fordham University Press, 2008). 18 Following Stiegler, synchronization also implies diachronization, which is to say différance, but hypersynchronization means synchronization without diachrony. 19 According to Husserl, these are two different concepts; the former is the subject of psychology, and the latter is the subject of phenomenology. See Edmund Husserl, The Phenomenology of Internal Time-Consciousness, ed. Martin Heidgegger, trans. James S. Churchill (Bloomington and London: Indiana University Press, 1964). 20 Bernard Stiegler, Acting Out, p.56.
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