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Much Ado About Nothing: Terrorism, Intelligence, and the Mechanics of Threat Exaggeration

2013; Taylor & Francis; Volume: 25; Issue: 3 Linguagem: Inglês

10.1080/09546553.2012.667018

1556-1836

Rory Cormac,

Maritime Security and History

Abstract Through its ability to transcend not only national boundaries but so too departmental jurisdictions and the traditional public-private security divide, the rise of international terrorism in the late 1960s and early 1970s posed a number of challenges to the British intelligence machinery which remain relevant today. This article focuses on the dangers and mechanics of threat exaggeration and the importance of intelligence coordination to ensure that threats are assessed and reports are disseminated in a realistic manner. Using the over-emphasised threat of maritime terrorism in 1970 as a case study, this article is able to examine the intelligence cycle as a whole and consider the importance of source validation, the dangers of incremental analysis, and the need for coordinated advice disseminated coherently to consumers both inside and outside of the government. Keywords: Foreign Officeintelligencemaritime terrorismPFLPthreat assessment Acknowledgments The author would like to thank Dr. Michael S. Goodman for reading an earlier draft of this article. Notes William Hague, Securing our Future (London: Foreign and Commonwealth Office, November 16, 2011), http://www.fco.gov.uk/en/news/latest-news/?view=Speech&id=692973282. David Omand, “Learning from the Secret Past,” in Robert Dover and Michael Goodman, eds., Learning from the Secret Past: Cases in British Intelligence History (Washington, DC: Georgetown University Press, 2011), 1. This case study is particularly valuable because of the amount of material which has escaped the censors' net. It includes documents which are classified elsewhere such as JIC current intelligence, MI5 reports, and discussion of sources used. Early research for example included Richard Betts, “Analysis, War and Decision: Why Intelligence Failures are Inevitable,” World Politics 31, no. 1 (1978): 61–89. More recent research has focused on the lack of warning before the terrorist attacks in September 2001. See for example, Amy Zegart, Spying Blind: The CIA, the FBI, and the Origins of 9/11 (Oxford and Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2007). For research more specifically on intelligence analysis see Erik Dahl, “Warning of Terror: Explaining the Failure of Intelligence Against Terrorism,” Journal of Strategic Studies 28, no. 1 (2005): 31–55. Lord Butler, Review of Intelligence on Weapons of Mass Destruction Report (London: The Stationery Office, 2004), 146. John Mueller has argued that the terrorist threat is dangerously overestimated and that this is in line with government reactions to previous threats such as the Cold War. Yet he does not consider in any detail exactly how and why this was the case. See John Mueller, “Simplicity and Spook: Terrorism and the Dynamics of Threat Exaggeration,” International Studies Perspective 6 (2005): 208–234; For an article considering the exaggeration of a threat for political purposes see Alan Doig and Mark Phythian, “The National Interest and the Politics of Threat Assessment: The Blair Government's Case for the War Against Iraq,” The Political Quarterly 76, no. 3 (2005): 368–376. Mueller, “Simplicity and Spook” (see note 6 above), 220. Dahl, “Warning of Terror” (see note 4 above), 36. Gerard Chaliand and Arnaud Blin, “From 1968 to Radical Islam,” in G. Chailand and A. Blin, eds., The History of Terrorism: From Antiquity to Al Qaeda (London and Los Angeles: University of California Press, 2007), 225–241. Ariel Merari, “Attacks on Civil Aviation: Trends and Lessons,” Terrorism and Political Violence 10, no. 3 (1998): 9–26, 10. “RAND Database of Worldwide Terrorist Incidents,” http://smapp.rand.org/rwtid/incident_detail.php?id=704. Ibid. Ibid. Christopher Andrew, The Defence of the Realm: The Authorized History of MI5 (London: Allen Lane, 2009), 600, 614. Ibid.; For the correspondence and detailed negotiations leading up to this decision see the JIC Secretariat file “Terrorists (at Home and Abroad),” June 1970 to January 1973, CAB 163/196 (all primary sources are from the National Archives, London, unless otherwise stated). Richard Aldrich, GCHQ: The Uncensored Story of Britain's Most Secret Intelligence Agency (London: HarperCollins, 2010), 299. Andrew, The Defence of the Realm (see note 14 above), 600. Robin Hooper to Burke Trend, “Guerrilla Threats to Shipping,” October 23, 1970, CAB 163/196. Brian Stewart, to Murray Simons (PUSD), December 4, 2011, CAB 163/196. JIC Minutes, JIC(A)(73)12th Meeting, March 22, 1973, CAB 185/12. Although Northern Ireland was also rapidly becoming a priority from 1969. Andrew, The Defence of the Realm (see note 14 above), 601. Michael Herman, “Counterterrorism, Information Technology and Intelligence Change,” Intelligence and National Security 18, no. 4 (2003): 40–48, 43; Jennifer Simms, “Intelligence to Counter Terror: The Importance of All-Source Fusion,” Intelligence and National Security 22, no. 1 (2007): 38–56, 42. Matthew Aid, “All Glory is Fleeting: SIGINT and the Fight Against International Terrorism,” Intelligence and National Security 18, no. 4 (2003): 72–120, 85. Ely Karmon, “The Role of Intelligence in Counterterrorism,” Korean Journal of Defense Analysis 14, no. 1 (2002): 119–139, 132. Robert Dover and Michael Goodman, “Afterword,” in Robert Dover and Michael Goodman, eds., Spinning Intelligence: Why Intelligence Needs the Media, Why the Media Needs Intelligence (New York: Columbia University Press, 2009), 221. James Ayers (Marine and Transport Dept, FCO) to David Campbell (Marine and Transport Dept, FCO), “Arab Guerrilla Threat to British Shipping,” September 16, 1970, FCO 76/18. Handwritten note from James Ayres (FCO) to David Campbell (FCO), September 18, 1970, FCO 76/18. Harry Dudgeon (Marine and Transport Dept FCO) to Ritchie (PUSD), “Guerrilla Threat to Shipping: Intelligence Aspects,” October 16, 1970, FCO 76/18. Beirut to FCO, September 21, 1970, FCO 76/18. Paragraph attached to letter from James Ayres (FCO) to A. Prior (Shipping Policy Division, Board of Trade), September 24, 1970, FCO 76/18. Telegram from UK mission New York to FCO, October 9, 1970, CAB 163/196 and FCO 76/18. “Record of a Meeting Held at the Foreign and Commonwealth Office on Tuesday 13th October 1970,” October 14, 1970, FCO 76/18; James Ayres (FCO) to Harry Dudgeon (FCO) “Hijack Threat to Tankers,” October 13, 1970, FCO 76/18. Telegram from Bahrain to FCO, 1October 10, 1970, FCO 76/18. Enclosed in J. Frost (DTI) to J. Hope (MoD), “Brief for SDAC [Shipping Defence Advisory Committee] Meeting,” December 7, 1970, FCO 76/18. For more information see Richard Heuer, Psychology of Intelligence Analysis (Washington, DC: Center for the Study of Intelligence, 1999), 14–15. Butler, Review of Intelligence (see note 5 above), 9. R. Evans (Near East Department FCO) to Harry Dudgeon (FCO), “Palestine Guerrillas: Possible Action Against Tankers,” October 14, 1970, FCO 76/18. FCO to Washington, “Sabotage Groups,” October 15, 1970, FCO 76/18 and CAB 163/196. Washington to FCO, “Sabotage Groups,” October 16, 1970, FCO 76/18. Beirut to FCO, “Sabotage Groups,” October 16, 1970, FCO 76/18. “Arab Terrorist Threat to Western Interests (Delicate Source),” JIC Middle East Current Intelligence Group report, October 30, 1970, CAB 130/475. Omand, “Learning from the Secret Past” (see note 2 above), 2. Heuer, Psychology of Intelligence Analysis (see note 36 above), 15. Washington to FCO (see note 40 above). Michael Goodman, “Avoiding Surprise: The Nicoll Report and Intelligence Analysis,” in Robert Dover and Michael Goodman, eds., Learning from the Secret Past: Cases in British Intelligence History (Washington, DC: Georgetown University Press, 2011), 273. G. Metcalfe (DIS), “Sabotage – Merchant Shipping,” October 14, 1970, FCO 76/18. Dudgeon to Ritchie (see note 29 above). “Arab Terrorist Threat to Western Interests (Delicate Source)” (see note 42 above). Working Party on Acts of Violence Against Civil Aircraft Minutes, GEN 9(70)10th Meeting, November 2, 1970, CAB 130/475. Ibid. Cipher from FCO to Bahrain, October 12, 1970, FCO 76/18. HQ British Forces Gulf to MoD, October 20, 1970, FCO 76/18. Bahrain Residency to FCO, “Sabotage Groups,” October 10, 1970, FCO 76/18; HQ British Forces Gulf to MoD, October 20, 1970, FCO 76/18. “Hijack Fears Raise Tanker Insurance Rates,” The Financial Times, November 27 1970. A clipping of this story can be found in FCO 76/18. Enclosed in J. Frost (DTI) to J. Hope (MoD), “Brief for SDAC [Shipping Defence Advisory Committee] Meeting,” December 7, 1970, FCO 76/18. DTI, “Brief for SDAC −9 December,” December 7, 1970, FCO 76/18. Gregory Treverton, “Terrorism, Intelligence and Law Enforcement: Learning the Right Lessons,” Intelligence and National Security 18, no. 4 (2003): 123. James Ayres to Harry Dudgeon, October 20, 1970, FCO 76/18. Ibid. Dudgeon to Ritchie (see note 29 above). “Record of a Meeting Held at the Foreign and Commonwealth Office on Tuesday 13th October 1970,” October 14, 1970, FCO 76/18; Dudgeon to Ritchie (see note 29 above). Dudgeon to Ritchie (see note 29 above); Michael Edes (Arabian Department FCO) to Michael Weir (Political Residency Bahrain), November 12, 1970, FCO 76/18. Ayres to Dudgeon (see note 59 above). Dudgeon to Ritchie (see note 29 above). Murray Simons (PUSD) to John Thomson, “Guerrilla Threat to Shipping: Intelligence Aspects,” October 20, 1970, CAB 163/196. Brian Stewart, to Murray Simons (PUSD), December 4, 2011, CAB 163/196. Dudgeon to Ritchie (see note 29 above). NATO version of “Arab Terrorist Activities,” JIC(A)(70)(SA)162, October 26, 1970, CAB 163/196. Robin Hooper to Burke Trend, “Guerrilla Threats to Shipping,” October 23, 1970, CAB 163/196. Handwritten note from Summerscale (Assessments Staff) to John Thomson, “Guerrilla Threat to Shipping,” October 26, 1970, CAB 163/196. “Arab Terrorist Threat to Western Interests (Delicate Source)” (see note 42 above). Lord Butler, Review of Intelligence on Weapons of Mass Destruction Report (London: The Stationery Office, 2004), 14. “Arab Terrorist Threat to Western Interests (Delicate Source)” (see note 42 above). Ibid. M. Pike (FCO Near Eastern Dept), “NATO Telegram No. P.05123OZ (from NATO Brussels): Report on Arab Terrorist Activities,” November 19, 1970, FCO 76/18. D. Dain (Assessments Staff) to M. Pike (Near Eastern Dept FCO), November 11, 1970, CAB 163/196. Working Party on Acts of Violence Against Civil Aircraft Minutes, GEN 9(70) 10th Meeting, November 2, 1970, CAB 130/475; Harry Dudgeon, “Arab Terrorist Threat to Shipping and Oil Installations,” November 25, 1970, FCO 76/18. Working Party on Acts of Violence Against Civil Aircraft Minutes (see note 78 above). For example see FCO 76/198. J. Frost (DTI) to J. Hope (MoD), November 10, 1970, FCO 76/18. “Hijacking of Merchant Ships—Revised Draft,” March 26, 1971, FCO 76/198. Directorate of Naval Operations and Trade, “Hijacking and Sabotage of Merchant Ships —Draft,” December 2, 1970, FCO 76/18. “Hijacking of Merchant Ships” (see note 82 above). “Hijacking of Merchant Ships” (see note 83 above). Harry Dudgeon, “Arab Terrorist Threat to Shipping and Oil Installations,” November 25, 1970, FCO 76/18. “Draft Amendments on DDNOT's Paper of 7 December 1970,” December 1970, FCO 76/18. “Hijacking of Merchant Ships” (see note 82 above). “Hijacking of Merchant Ships,” Annex A to DOP 540/71(Final), September 1971, FCO 76/198. J. Faux (MI5) to J. Hope (DTI), December 1, 1970, FCO 76/18. “Hijacking of Merchant Ships” (see note 83 above). For detailed discussion see the relevant documents in CAB 130/653; CAB 130/636; CAB 148/122; PREM 15/1755. Interestingly, despite assessments of the terrorist threat it has since emerged that it was Colonel Gaddafi of Libya who came closest to launching an attack on the QE2. He was driven by revenge against Israeli for shooting down a Libyan airliner in February 1973. Clearly, effective intelligence can only do so much and it is nearly impossible to warn of certain bolts from the blue. Uzi Mahnaimi, “Desire for Revenge Drove Gadaffi to Order Sinking of the QE2,” The Sunday Times, March 6, 2011, 26; John Wright, Libya: A Modern History (London: Croom Helm, 1981), 162. Martin Murphy, “Contemporary Piracy and Maritime Terrorism,” The Adelphi Papers 47/388 (2007): 7, 45. Herman, “Counterterrorism” (see note 23 above), 42. Ibid., 45. Murphy, “Contemporary Piracy” (see note 93 above), 74. Butler (see note 2 above), 26. Walter Laqueur, World of Secrets (London: Widenfeld and Nicolson, 1985), 297. Goodman, “Avoiding Surprise” (see note 46 above), 273. David Omand, Securing the State (London: Hurst, 2010), 158. Butler (see note 73 above), 10–11. James Bruce, “The Missing Link: The Analyst-Collector Relationship,” in R. George and James Bruce, eds., Analyzing Intelligence: Origins, Obstacles, and Innovations (Washington DC: Georgetown University Press, 2008), 203–206. CPNI, Who We Work With, Centre for the Protection of National Infrastructure, http://www.cpni.gov.uk/about/Who-we-work-with/. Butler (see note 2 above), 14. Treverton, “Terrorism, Intelligence and Law Enforcement” (see note 58 above), 126. CPNI, Risk Delivery Management Group, Centre for the Protection of National Infrastructure, http://www.cpni.gov.uk/about/Who-we-work-with/rmdg/. Christopher Andrew, “Intelligence Analysis Needs to Look Backwards Before Looking Forwards,” History and Policy (June 2004), http://www.historyandpolicy.org/papers/policy-paper-23.html. Additional informationNotes on contributorsRory Cormac Rory Cormac is a lecturer in international relations at the University of Nottingham.