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System Structure and State Strategy: Adding Hedging to the Menu

2012; Taylor & Francis; Volume: 21; Issue: 2 Linguagem: Inglês

10.1080/09636412.2012.679203

1556-1852

Brock F. Tessman,

International Relations and Foreign Policy

Abstract This paper presents "strategic hedging" as a way to conceptualize much of the strategic behavior currently employed by second-tier states like China, Russia, Brazil, and France. Hedging is an alternative to strategies like balancing, bandwagoning, and buck-passing. Like those other strategies, hedging is driven by structural incentives associated with the current polarity of the international system and power concentration trends within it. Hedging will be most prevalent in international systems that are defined by a leading state that, while in a position of power preponderance, is also in the process of relative decline. Strategic hedging behavior is effective for second-tier states in such deconcentrating unipolar systems because it avoids outright confrontation with the system leader in the short term, while still increasing the hedging state's ability to survive such a direct military confrontation should it occur in the long run. Strategic hedging behavior can also be used to insure the hedging state against security threats that might result from the loss of public goods or subsidies that are currently being provided by the system leader. In this article, I define strategic hedging behavior, present a mechanism for identifying empirical evidence of strategic hedging, and apply that mechanism to three case studies: the Sino-Russian strategic partnership, Brazil's approach to regional leadership, and French opposition to the 2003 us invasion of Iraq. Acknowledgments Brock F. Tessman is an assistant professor of International Affairs and associate director of the Center for the Study of Global Issues (Globis) at the University of Georgia. He has published work on the foreign policy strategies and conflict behavior of major powers in a number of journals, including International Studies Review, Foreign Policy Analysis, the Journal of Strategic Studies, Asian Security, and the Journal of Conflict Resolution. He is also interested in political simulations and has published a simulation textbook under the title International Relations in Action: A World Politics Simulation (Boulder, Colorado: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 2007). The author would like to thank Patricia Sullivan, Darius Ornston, Markus Crepaz, T. V. Paul, William Wohlforth, Robert Pape, and other members of the "Soft Balancing and International Relations" panel at the 2010 Meeting of the International Studies Association in New Orleans (17–20 February 2010) for their valuable comments on earlier versions of this paper. The author is also grateful to the careful feedback provided by anonymous reviewers at Security Studies and for the research assistance provided by Sarah Fisher, Holger Meyer, and Leah Carmichael. Notes For the purpose of this analysis, "second-tier states" are those countries (with the exception of the system leader) that enjoy major power or regional power status. The role of conditioning factors may be similar to the domestic and individual-level variables that neoclassical realists use as complements to power-based explanations of foreign policy. For more on neoclassical realism as a theory of foreign policy, see Gideon Rose, "Neoclassical Realism and Theories of Foreign Policy," World Politics 51, no. 1 (October 1998): 144–72; and Steven E. Lobell, Norrin M. Ripsman, and Jeffrey W. Taliaferro, Neoclassical Realism, the State, and Foreign Policy (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2009). This might be even more likely if the second-tier state "B" considers the current system leader "A" to be relatively benign in contrast to threatening, rising power "C". This hypothetical scenario might be particularly relevant to the actual strategic choices made by second-tier states like Japan, which may very well perceive greater threat from a rising China than from the United States. Of course, some conditioning factors may serve to reinforce the core strategy. It is also important to note that multiple conditioning factors are likely to influence strategic choice simultaneously in any given situation. If those factors act as countervailing vectors, they will offset each other and the state will continue to find the core strategy to be most appealing. Other conditioning factors may also come into play: economic interdependence with a rising system leader in a concentrating multipolar system may lead a second-tier state to favor bandwagoning over balancing. In a deconcentrating multipolar system, the same factor may push states to engage in a certain type of strategic hedging rather than buck-passing. Specific interpretations will depend on assumptions about the relationship between interdependence and war. See Dale C. Copeland, "Economic Interdependence and War: A Theory of Trade Expectations," International Security 20, no. 4 (Spring 1996): 5–41. See, for example, Kenneth N. Waltz, Theory of International Politics (New York: Random House, 1979); Ted Hopf, "Polarity, the Offense Defense Balance, and War," American Political Science Review 85, no. 2 (June 1991): 475–93; Benjamin A. Most and Harvey Starr, "Polarity, Preponderance and Power Parity in the Generation of International Conflict," International Interactions 13, no. 3 (1987): 225–62; and William R. Thompson, "Polarity, the Long Cycle, and Global Power Warfare," Journal of Conflict Resolution 30, no. 4 (December 1986): 587–615. For the purposes of this comparative analysis, I allow the conceptual umbrella of multipolarity to cover bipolar systems as well as more traditional multipolar systems with three or more concentrations of power. The tendency toward balancing behavior is highlighted as a core element of the structural realist approach to international relations. See Waltz, Theory of International Politics. Waltz went on to predict that, in the aftermath of the Cold War, new balancers would emerge to challenge the United States. See Kenneth N. Waltz, "Structural Realism After the Cold War," International Security 25, no. 1 (Summer 2000): 5–41. The distinction between internal and external balancing is originally captured by Waltz, but it is important to note that Waltz saw balancing as an automatic international outcome, not a conscious, manually driven foreign policy strategy. See Waltz, Theory of International Politics. For differences between manual and automatic balancing, see Inis Claude, Power and International Relations (New York: Random House, 1962). The security-enhancing effects of nuclear deterrence are outlined well by Kenneth Waltz. See Kenneth N. Waltz, The Spread of Nuclear Weapons: More May Be Better (London: International Institute for Strategic Studies, 1981). Stephen Walt expands upon the logic of balancing, but argues that states are unlikely to balance against capability concentration if that concentration is not threatening due to geographical, ideational, or other circumstances. See Stephen M. Walt, "Alliance Formation and the Balance of World Power," International Security 9, no. 4 (Spring 1985): 3–43; and Stephen M. Walt, The Origins of Alliances (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1987). For more recent application to us foreign policy, see Stephen M. Walt, "Alliances, Threats, and us Grand Strategy: A Reply to Kaufmann and Labs," Security Studies 1, no. 3 (1992): 448–82; and "Keeping the World Off Balance: Self-Restraint in American Foreign Policy," in America Unrivaled: The Future of the Balance of Power, ed. G. John Ikenberry (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2002), 121–54. See Thomas J. Christensen and Jack Snyder, "Chain Gangs and Passed Bucks: Predicting Alliance Patterns in Multipolarity," International Organization 44, no. 2 (Spring 2009): 137–68. Christensen and Snyder argue that balance of power theory does not account for the full range of foreign policy strategies available to states. They explain the prevalence of chain-ganging behavior prior to World War I and buck-passing strategies in the run up to World War II. The latter is more attractive when leaders perceive a defensive military advantage. Jennifer Lind applies the theory to the case of Japanese foreign policy during the Cold War. See Jennifer M. Lind, "Pacifism or Passing the Buck? Testing Theories of Japanese Security Policy," International Security 29, no. 1 (Summer 2004): 92–121. Buck-passing can also be predatory in a way that closely resembles bandwagoning. In this case, states align with the stronger side, but avoid contributing to the alliance while still seeking to share in the spoils of victory. See, Randall L. Schweller, "Bandwagoning for Profit: Bringing the Revisionist State Back In," International Security 19, no. 1 (Summer 1994): 72–107. States may also seek to buck-pass by hiding from potential threats by removing themselves from the political fray. See, Paul Schroeder, "Historical Reality vs. Neo-Realist Theory," International Security 19, no. 1 (Summer1994): 108–48. Randall Schweller labels this phenomenon as "predatory buckpassing," and attributes a jackal-like disposition to states that are apt to engage in it. See Schweller, "Bandwagoning for Profit," 103. William Wohlforth and Stephen Brooks provide a structural understanding of balancing disincentives, focusing on the role of power preponderance (both in absolute terms and in terms of comprehensiveness), as well as coordination problems, the predominance of local threats over global threats, geographic distance, and potential aid from the system leader as factors that discourage balancing behavior. See William C. Wohlforth, "The Stability of a Unipolar World," International Security 24, no. 1 (Summer 1999): 5–41; William C. Wohlforth, "us Strategy in a Unipolar World," in America Unrivaled: The Future of the Balance of Power, ed. G. John Ikenberry (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2002): 98–118; and Stephen M. Brooks and William C. Wohlforth, World Out of Balance: International Relations and the Challenge of American Primacy (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2008). The absence of empirical support for balancing propositions is highlighted by, among others, Richard Ned Lebow, "The Long Peace, the End of the Cold War, and the Failure of Realism," International Organization 48, no. 2 (Spring 1994): 249–77; John Vasquez, "The Realist Paradigm and Degenerative Versus Progressive Research Programs: An Appraisal of Neotraditional Research in Waltz's Balancing Proposition," American Political Science Review 91, no. 4 (Winter 1997): 899–912; and T. V. Paul, "The Enduring Axioms of Balance of Power Theory and Their Contemporary Relevance," in Balance of Power: Theory and Practice in the Twenty-First Century, ed., T. V. Paul, James J. Wirtz, and Michel Fortmann (Palo Alto, ca: Stanford University Press, 2004), 1–25. Richard Rosecrance and Paul Schroeder address the historical lack of balancing. See, respectively, Richard Rosecrance, "Is There a Balance of Power?" in Realism and the Balancing of Power: A New Debate, eds., John A. Vasquez and Colin Elman (Saddle River, nj: Prentice Hall, 2003), 154–65; and Paul Schroeder, The Transformation of European Politics, 1763–1848 (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1994). An exception is Schweller's "predatory buckpassing" behavior. The idea of bandwagoning was first presented in rough terms, and only as the antithesis of balancing behavior. Among others, see Waltz, Theory of International Politics; Arnold Wolfers, "The Balance of Power in Theory and Practice," in Discord and Collaboration: Essays on International Politics, ed. Arnold Wolfers (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1962), 124; and Stephen M. Walt, "Testing Theories of Alliance Formation: The Case of Southwest Asia," International Organization 43, no. 2 (Spring 1988): 275–316. The concept is later developed more thoroughly in order to account for profit motives, domestic political incentives, regional dynamics, and the historical record from both recent and more distant periods. See, respectively, Randall L. Schweller, "Bandwagoning for Profit: Bringing the Revisionist State Back In"; Deborah Welch Larson, "Bandwagoning Images in American Foreign Policy," in Dominoes and Bandwagons: Strategic Beliefs and Great Power Competition in the Eurasian Rimland, eds., Robert Jervis and Jack Snyder (New York: Oxford University Press, 1991), 85–111; Jack S. Levy and Michael M. Barnett, "Domestic Sources of Alliances and Alignments: The Case of Egypt, 1962–1973," International Organization 45, no. 3 (Summer 1991): 369–95; Stephen R. David, Choosing Sides: Alignment and Realignment in the Third World (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1991); Robert G. Kaufman, "To Balance or to Bandwagon? Alignment Decisions in 1930s Europe," Security Studies 1, no. 3 (Spring 1992): 417–47; and Paul Schroeder, "Historical Reality vs. Neo-Realist Theory." For bandwagoning as a form of strategic surrender, see Walt, "Alliance Formation and the Balance of World Power," 7–8. This is a matter of some debate among scholars, with Edward Mansfield showing that polarity and concentration, while related, can change independently. See Edward D. Mansfield, "Concentration, Polarity, and the Distribution of Power," International Studies Quarterly 37, no. 1 (March 1993): 105–28. These factors are discussed in greater depth in a wide range of literature on the rise and fall of great powers. For more on each factor see, respectively, Paul Kennedy, The Rise and Fall of the Great Powers: Economic Change and Military Conflict from 1500 to 2000 (New York: Random House, 1987); Robert Gilpin, War and Change in International Politics (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1981); George Modelski, Long Cycles in World Politics (Seattle: University of Washington Press, 1987); George Modelski and William R. Thompson, Leading Sectors and World Powers: The Coevolution of Global Politics and Economics (Columbia: University of South Carolina Press, 1996); and A. F. K. Organski, World Politics (New York: Knopf, 1958). For more on global public goods, see Joseph S. Nye, "United States Leadership and 21st Century Global Public Goods," Hampton Roads International Security Quarterly 9, no. 2 (2009): 49–52; and Inge Kaul, Isabelle Grunberg, and Marc A. Stern, Global Public Goods: International Cooperation in the 21st Century (New York: United Nations Development Program, 1999). See Evelyn Goh, "Great Powers and Hierarchical Order in Southeast Asia: Analyzing Regional Security Strategies," International Security 32, no. 3 (Winter 2007/2008): 113–57; and Robert J. Art, "Europe Hedges Its Security Bets," in Balance of Power: Theory and Practice in the 21st Century, eds., T. V. Paul, James J. Wirtz and Michel Fortmann (Palo Alto, ca: Stanford University Press, 2004). See John D. Ciorciari, The Limits of Alignment: Southeast Asia and the Great Powers since 1975 (Washington, dc: Georgetown University Press, 2010). Joseph Grieco and Daniel Deudney explore institutional binding as a strategic choice in modern Europe and the post-independence United States, respectively. See Daniel H. Deudney, "The Philadelphian System: Sovereignty, Arms Control, and Balance of Power in the American States-Union, Circa 1787–1861," International Organization 49, no. 2 (Spring 1995): 191–228; and Joseph M. Grieco, "The Maastricht Treaty, Economic and Monetary Union and the Neo-Realist Research Programme," Review of International Studies 21, no.1 (January 1995): 21–40. Paul Schroeder highlights the ability of states to "transcend" conflict by appealing to normative or religious common ground, and to minimize threats by making themselves economically indispensable to the stronger state through specialization and interdependence. Ja Ian Chong identifies a number of other strategic options, most notably that of buffering, which closely resembles what others called soft balancing. See Ja Ian Chong, "Revisiting Responses To Power Preponderance: Going Beyond The Balancing-Bandwagoning Dichotomy," (Working Paper no. 54, Institute of Defence and Strategic Studies Singapore, November 2003); and Paul Schroeder, "Historical Reality vs. Neo-Realist Theory." See Christopher Layne, "The Unipolar Illusion Revisited: The Coming End of the United States' Unipolar Moment" International Security 31, no. 2 (Fall 2006): 7–41; Robert J. Art, "Europe Hedges Its Security Bets"; and Barry R. Posen, "European Union Security and Defense Policy: Response to Unipolarity?" Security Studies 15, no. 2 (2006): 149–86. See Art, "Europe Hedges Its Security Bets," 180. See, respectively, T. V. Paul, "Soft Balancing in the Age of u.s. Primacy," International Security 30, no. 1 (Summer 2005): 58; and Robert Pape, "Soft Balancing against the United States," International Security 30, no. 1 (Summer 2005): 36. For general soft balancing arguments, see Robert J. Art, "Correspondence: Striking the Balance," International Security 30, no. 3 (Winter 2005/2006): 177–85; Pape, "Soft Balancing against the United States," 7–45; Paul, "Soft Balancing in the Age of u.s. Primacy," 46–71; and Stephen Walt, "Keeping the World Off Balance: Self-Restraint and u.s. Foreign Policy," in America Unrivaled: The Future of the Balance of Power, ed. G. John Ikenberry (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2002). Applications of soft-balancing logic to more specific issues like East Asian security and un voting patterns can be found in Yuen Foong Khong, "Coping with Strategic Uncertainty: The Role of Institutions and Soft Balancing in Southeast Asia's Post-Cold War Strategy," in Rethinking Security in East Asia: Identity, Power and Efficiency, eds., Peter J. Katzenstein and J. J. Suh Allen Carlson (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2004); and Erik Voeten, "Resisting the Lonely Superpower: Responses of States in the United Nations to u.s. Dominance," Journal of Politics 66, no. 3 (May 2004): 729–54. See Keir A. Lieber and Gerard Alexander, "Waiting for Balancing: Why the World Is Not Pushing Back," International Security 30, no. 1 (Summer 2005): 109–39. Critics point out that, as currently conceived, soft balancing neglects its balance of power roots, which emphasize a structural understanding of state behavior and the systemic tendency toward balancing as a natural law of international relations. See Stephen G. Brooks and William C. Wohlforth, "Hard Times for Soft Balancing," International Security 30, no. 1 (Summer 2005): 72–108; and Lieber and Alexander, "Waiting for Balancing," 109–39. In general, strategic hedging behavior is separated from traditional hard balancing by focusing on intensity. Lieber and Alexander argue that states engage in internal balancing when they "invest heavily in defense by transforming their latent power (i.e. economic, technological, social and natural resources) into military capabilities." This behavior is observed in the form of meaningful increases in defense spending as a percentage of gdp. See Lieber and Alexander, "Waiting for Balancing," 119. That said, the behavior in question may be secondarily driven by some of the sources of "normal diplomatic friction" such as: economic interests of domestic actors, regional security concerns, policy differences between the hedging state and the system leader, and popularity with domestic political audiences. French opposition to the Iraq invasion and the Sino-Russian relationship have been labeled as an example of soft-balancing behavior by some, but others say that they are better examples of simple policy differences or action that is dictated by economic interests. Similarly, China's energy security strategy has been interpreted differently by those that perceive it as part of a coordinated effort to overtake the United States on the world stage, and those that see it as largely motivated by profit-seeking by China's National Oil Companies (nocs). Data on arms transfers are taken from the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (sipri), which maintains an online database at http://www.sipri.org. Paul and others also include India in the discussion of Sino-Russian relations, and interpret warming relations between the three countries as the emergence of a "strategic triangle" of states that may be interested in countering us strength in Asia. See Brooks and Wohlforth, "Hard Times for Soft Balancing," 83–88. The full register of Russian arms exports can be downloaded as part of the sipri Arms Transfer Database, accessible at http://www.sipri.org/research/armaments/transfers/databases/armstransfers. There is also concern in Russia that the Chinese will develop their own production capabilities and then undercut Russian arms sales on the international market. This apparently happened in 2009, when Iran turned down delivery of a Russian air defense system in favor of a cheaper Chinese system that the prc had modeled after the Russian product. For more on the shrinking arms trade between Russia and China, see Richard Weitz, "Why China Snubs Russian Arms," The Diplomat, 5 April 2010, http://the-diplomat.com/2010/04/05/why-china-snubs-russian-arms/, accessed 19 August 2010. Brooks and Wohlforth, "Hard Times for Soft Balancing," 87. India has replaced China as the largest recipient of arms exports, and has also purchased more technologically sophisticated systems like the Sukhoi-30 fighter aircraft. Yearly averages are taken from sipri. Brooks and Wohlforth, "Hard Times for Soft Balancing," 87. Analysis and quotes based on information taken from the Charter of the Shanghai Cooperation Organization, accessed at http://www.sectsco.org/EN/show.asp?id=69. Declaration found on the homepage of the Executive Committee of Regional Counter-Terrorism Structure, http://www.sectsco.org/EN/AntiTerrorism.asp. The relevant text from the sco meeting in Kazakhstan, Astana reads "Taking into account the conclusion of the active military phase of the antiterrorist operation in Afghanistan, the member states of the sco consider it essential for the appropriate participants in the antiterrorist coalition to decide on the final time frames for the temporary use of the above-mentioned infrastructure objects and the maintenance of military contingents on the territory of sco member states." See Sergie Blagov, "Shanghai Cooperation Organization Summit Suggests New Russia-China Ties," Eurasia Daily Monitor 2, no. 130 (July 2005). Medvedev ratified the convention on 4 October 2010. See Office of the Russian President, Speeches and News, http://eng.kremlin.ru/news/1055,. accessed 27 October 2010. See "Executive Director, Regional Counter-Terrorism Structure of Shanghai Cooperation Organization Call on Foreign Minister," Pakistan Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 19 May 2010, http://www.mofa.gov.pk/Press_Releases/2010/May/PR_110.htm, accessed 19 August 2010. Pakistani criticism picked of the drone strikes increased in late 2010, as the frequency and intensity of attacks picked up. See cnn South Asia, "Pakistan Criticizes 'Unjustified' us Drone Strikes," 7 October 2010, http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-south-asia-11490722, accessed 26 October 2010. See Stephen Blank, "Interest in sco Membership Grows Among Observers and Outsiders," Eurasianet, 7 June 2010, http://www.eurasianet.org/node/61235, accessed 14 August 2010. Skeptics point out that the sco was slow to react to the summer 2010 violence in Kyrgyzstan. This cast doubt upon the ability of the organization to take on stabilizing operations in the region, especially because the violence broke out while sco members and observers were all meeting in Tashkent, Uzbekistan. Although sco observers were on hand to witness the 27 June constitutional referendum, the initial reaction from the sco was passive, stressing only the "mutual support of state sovereignty, independence and territorial integrity," and general "willingness to provide the Kyrgyz Republic with necessary support and assistance in solving this problem." For full text of the sco statement, see "Tashkent Declaration of sco Heads of State Council Meeting," http://www.sectsco.org/EN/show.asp?id = 224. See Lieber and Alexander, "Waiting for Balancing," 118–22. Data on Russian military expenditures as a percentage of gdp are taken from the World Bank's 2010 World Development Indicators: Russia, http://www.worldbank.org, accessed 26 September 2010. World Bank, 2010 World Development Indicators: China, http://www.worldbank.org. See "Security Alliances Led by Russia, China Link Up," Daily Times, 6 October 2007, http://www.dailytimes.com.pk/default.asp?page=2007%5C10%5C06%5Cstory_6-10-2007_pg4_3, accessed 24 October 2010. After signing a treaty that linked the sco and the csto in 2007, then-sco General Secretary Nikolai Bordyuzha claimed that "We have no plans to compete with nato; on the contrary, we are striving to cooperate with nato." See Vladimir Putin, "sco: A New Model of Successful International Cooperation," Moscow, 14 June 2006, http://www.kremlin.ru/eng/sdocs/speeches.shtml, accessed 22 August 2010. Dmitry Medvedev, "Speech at Meeting of Shanghai Cooperation Organization Council of Heads of "State," 11 June 2010, Tashkent, Uzbekistan, http://eng.kremlin.ru/transcripts/419, accessed 25 August 2010. For reactions of Putin and Hu to the military exercises, see Le Tian, "sco Members Tackle Terrorism," China Daily, 18 August 2007, http://www.chinadaily.com.cn/china/2007-08/18/content_6032772.htm, accessed 24 August 2010. The construction of overland pipelines in Central Asia and Myanmar, the development of a strategic petroleum reserve, and the cultivation of energy agreements with a wide range of countries like Iran, Venezuela, and Angola are all designed to maintain energy access in the event that the Malacca and/or Lombok Straits are closed. This could either result from a us blockade (in this sense it is Type A hedging) or from an uptick in terrorist or pirate activity that accompanied the withdrawal of us naval strength from the region (in this sense it is Type B hedging). A complete analysis of Chinese energy security strategy as an example of both Type A and Type B strategic hedging behavior can be found in Brock F. Tessman and Woj Wolfe, "Great Powers and Strategic Hedging: The Case of Chinese Energy Security," International Studies Review 13, no. 2 (June 2011): 214–40. The secondary role of the csdp is epitomized by former Secretary of State Madeleine Albright's "Three Ds" declaration: the csdp will not duplicate the nato role, decouple from nato, or discriminate against non-eu nato members. See Samuel W. Bodman, James D. Wolfensohn, and Julia E. Sweig, "Global Brazil and us-Brazil Relations," Independent Task Force Report No. 66 (New York: Council on Foreign Relations, 2011). For more information on the ibsa triad, see Gladys Lechini, "Middle Powers: ibsa and the New South-South Cooperation," nacla Report on the Americas 40, no. 5 (September-October 2007): 28–32. McCall Breuer, "Brazil and unasur: Regional Security and the Nation's World Standing in the Era of Rousseff's Rule," Council on Hemispheric Affairs, 2 November 2010, http://www.coha.org/brazil-and-unasur-regional-security-and-the-nation's-world-sanding-in-the-era-of-rousseff's-rule/, accessed 29 August 2011. unasur came into force on 11 March 2011, when Uruguay became the ninth member state to ratify the treaty. The organization emerged as a consolidation of two regional trading blocs: The Andean Pact and The Southern Common Market (Mercosur). For further detail on the sources of us decline in the region, see John Kellogg, "Regional Integration in Latin America: Dawn of an Alternative to Neoliberalism?" New Political Science 29, no. 2 (June 2007): 187–209. It should be noted that, during the Lula administration, Brazil was critical of the us role in the Middle East, arguing that the un should oversee negotiations between Israel and the Palestinians and emerging powers should be more involved. Brazil hosted the presidents of Israel and the Palestinian National Authority and suggested that it might be able to act as a mediator in the conflict. See Iuri Dantas and Fabiola Moura, "Lula Says u.s. Shouldn't Broker Middle East Talks," Bloomberg, 20 November 2009, http://www.bloomberg.com/apps/news?pid=newsarchive&sid=aH7EJ9IB9XVI, accessed 28 August 2011; and Sean Goforth, "Brazil's Middle East Roadmap," World Politics Review, 20 January 2011, http://www.worldpoliticsreview.com/articles/7612/brazils-middle-east-roadmap, accessed 29 August 2011. Peter Hakim, "Rising Brazil: The Choices of a New Global Power," Politica Externa, 1 July 2010, http://www.thedialogue.org/page.cfm?pageID=32&pubID=2273, accessed 28 August 2011. This quote is taken from Parag Khanna's treatise on "Second World" politics. See Parag Khanna, The Second World: Empires and Influence in the New Global Order (New York: Random House, 2008), 152. Venezuela's significantly more confrontational approach to challenging us leadership is epitomized by Hugo Chavez's proposal for a "Bolivarian Alternative for the Americas" (alba). Indeed, Venezuela's strategy seems to be much more in line with soft balancing than strategic hedging. Barack Obama, The National Security Strategy of the United States of America, May 2010, 44. Samuel W. Bodman, James Wolfensohn, and Julia E. Sweig, "Global Brazil and us-Brazil Relations," Independent Task Force Report No. 66 (New York: Council on Foreign Relations, 2011). Russell Crandall, "The Post-American Hemisphere: Power and Politics in an Autonomous Latin America," Foreign Affairs 90, no. 3 (May/June 2011): 83–95. According to some, assertive global leadership by the United States has been (and will be) desirable because it will ensure that certain global public goods are more readily provided. See Niall Ferguson, Colossus: The Price of America's Empire (New York: Penguin Press, 2004); and Deepak Lal, In Praise of Empires: Globalization and Order (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2004). Of course, us interventions (both military and economic) result not only in the provision of public goods, but also some significant public "bads" such as income inequality, increased corruption, and rent-seeking. See Kris James Mitchener and Marc Weidenmier, "Empire, Public Goods, and the Roosevelt Corollary," The Journal of Economic History 65, no. 3 (September 2005): 658-92; and Christopher J. Coyne and Matt E. Ryan, "Foreign Interventions and Global Public Bads," unpublished manuscript, 2008. Of course, the us military interventions in countries such as Cuba, Nicaragua, Dominican Republic, Grenada, and Panama have generated a great deal of instability as well. For an overview of the negative consequences stemming from us involvement in Latin America, see Greg Grandin, Empire's Workshop: Latin America, the United States, and the Rise of New Imperialism (New York: Metropolitan Books, 2006). See Michael Mandelbaum, The Case for Goliath: How America Acts as the World's Government in the Twenty-First Century (New York: Basic Books, 2005). For more on the Brazilian approach to foreign policy under Lula, see Georges D. Landau, "The Decision Making Process in Foreign Policy: The Case of Brazil," Center for Strategic and International Studies, Washington, dc, March 2003. Peter J. Meyer, "Brazil-u.s. Relations," Congressional Research Service Report, 29 July 2011. 11–15. See Breuer, "Brazil and unasur." Omar Cordero, "unasur and its Future Impact on the Americas," Strategic Research Project, us Army Air War College, 2009. John Chipman and James Lockhart Smith, "South America: Framing Regional Security," Survival 51, no. 6 (December 2009-January 2010): 88. For more on ibsa, and Brazil's drive for South-South Cooperation, see Lechini, "Middle Powers," 28–32; and Lyal White, "Understanding Brazil's New Drive for Africa," South African Journal of International Affairs 17, no. 2 (August 2010): 221–42. For more on Brazil's approach to mediation, see Breuer, "Brazil and unasur." For a synopsis of the unasur summit held in response to the second crisis, see "unasur Summit Condemned Attempt of Coup d'Etat in Ecuador and Reasserted Commitment to Democratic Institutions," National News Agency of Argentina, 1 October 2010. "unasur Foreign Affairs Ministers Meet in Buenos Aires to Address Global Crisis," Mercopress, 23 August 2011, http://en.mercopress.com/2011/08/23/unasur-foreign-affairs-ministers-meet-in-buenos-aires-to-address-global-crisis, accessed 30 August 2011. "unasur Agrees to Greater Economic Coordination but Remains Divided on Libya," Mercopress, 25 August 2011, http://en.mercopress.com/2011/08/25/unasur-agrees-to-greater-economic-coordination-but-remains-divided-on-libya, accessed 29 August 2011. Even more speculative talk was based on the creation of a common South American currency, which would be called the sucre. See Roger Scher, "unasur and Banco del Sur," Foreign Policy Blogs (Foreign Policy Association), 25 August 2011, http://foreignpolicyblogs.com/2011/08/24/unasur-and-banco-del-sur/, accessed 30 August 2011. See Scher, "unasur and Banco del Sur." For a wide-ranging analysis of tension between the United States and its allies over the Iraq issue, see Jeremy Shapiro, Allies At War: America, Europe, and the Crisis over Iraq (New York: McGraw-Hill, 2004). Evidence and analysis of the French position in particular can be found in the proceedings of a 2003 conference. See "The United States and France after the War in Iraq," Washington, dc, Center for the United States and France at the Brookings Institution, 12 May 2003, http://www.brookings.edu/events/2003/0512france.aspx, accessed 10 October 2010. These interpretations of German and Russian motivation can be found in Brooks and Wohlforth, "Hard Times for Soft Balancing," 93–97. T. V. Paul discusses these examples in "Soft Balancing in the Age of u.s. Primacy," 66-67. For additional details see, respectively, Bradley Graham, "u.s. Official Appeals to nato for Military Support," Washington Post, 17 January 2003; Keith B. Richburg, "E.U. Unity on Iraq Proves Short-lived; France Again Threatens to Veto u.n. Resolution Mandating Force," Washington Post, 12 February 2003; and Glen Frankel, "Chirac Fortifies Antiwar Caucus," Washington Post, 22 February 2003. Alliances that emerge largely based on wartime objectives will see the highest rate of strategic hedging among member states. United States and British planning for a second front during World War II, for example, reflected a desire to increase post-war leverage against the Soviet Union. For more on the esdp as an insurance policy against the withdrawal of us forces, see Robert J. Art, "Europe Hedges Its Security Bets"; and Barry Posen, "esdp and the Structure of World Power," 5–17; and as part of the soft balancing debate, see Brooks and Wohlforth, "Hard Times for Soft Balancing," 91–93; Lieber and Alexander, "Waiting for Balancing," 123–24; and Robert J. Art, "Correspondence: Striking the Balance," 180–83. See Elaine Sciolino, "French Struggle Now with How to Coexist with Bush," New York Times, 8 February 2005. Were French behavior to meet the first criterion and thus be applied to the latter criteria, it would clearly meet both. Paris' use of international institutions to oppose the United States was not a case of internal or external hard balancing, but it was clearly strategic in the sense that it was initiated and implemented by the highest levels of government. This of course plays off of Inis Claude's distinction between manual, automatic, and semi-automatic balancing. See Inis Claude, Power and International Relations (New York: Random House, 1962).