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Understanding congressional foreign policy innovators: Mapping entrepreneurs and their strategies

2010; Taylor & Francis; Volume: 47; Issue: 2 Linguagem: Inglês

10.1016/j.soscij.2009.12.003

1873-5355

Ralph G. Carter, James M. Scott,

Electoral Systems and Political Participation

AbstractSince World War II, a small group of assertive MCs have chosen to lead on foreign policy issues about which they care, without waiting on the administration to take action. Significant foreign policy innovation has been the result. From the coldest days of the Cold War to the changed circumstances after 9/11, important congressional initiatives attributable to a few key individuals can be found. Drawing on an original quantitative dataset of post-World War II congressional foreign policy activity, interviews with members and their staffs, and primary and secondary research, this paper: (a) discusses the characteristics and impact of these policymakers; (b) develops categories of entrepreneurs, drawn from issues to which entrepreneurs have devoted their attention; and (c) derives strategies of entrepreneurship drawn from the activities and avenues utilized by the entrepreneurs. Notes1 Tel.: +1 817 257 6398.1 Others use the terms "political entrepreneurs" (Schneider & Teske, 1992), "strategic entrepreneurs" (Riker, 1980), "public entrepreneurs" (Polsby, 1984; Walker, 1981), or even "policy champions" (DeGregorio, 1997; Roberts, 1992) to describe the same phenomenon. We recognize, as do these scholars, that such members can help create constituency opinion by their own actions, and that they know that bold policy innovations may help their reelection.2 Detailed discussions of the data and evidence underlying this analysis may be found in Carter and Scott (2009, 2004), Carter, Scott, and Rowling (2004), and Scott and Carter (2002).3 A random sequence generator produced a Cold War Consensus subsample comprised of the years 1946, 1950, 1954, 1958, 1959, 1960, 1961, 1962, 1963, and 1965; a Cold War Dissensus subsample comprised of the years 1968, 1970, 1972, 1973, 1975, 1979, 1984, 1985, 1986, and 1987; a post-Cold War subsample comprised of the years 1992, 1994, 1996, 1997, and 1999; a post9/11 subsample comprised of the years 2003 and 2005. The random sequence generator was found at http://www.random.org/. Author 1 coded 11 years (1946, 1950, 1954, 1958, 1959, 1960, 1961, 1962, 1975, 1987, 1997); Author 2 coded 12 years (1963, 1965, 1970, 1973, 1979, 1984, 1985, 1986, 1992, 1994, 1996, 1999, 2003, 2005); both coded 1972 and 1968 as intercoder reliability test years. See Carter and Scott (2009) for details and elaboration.4 Intercoder reliability was measured with the widely used Scott's pi, which, as Holsti (1969, 140) shows, is computed as: pi = % observed agreement − % expected agreement/1 − % expected agreement. Intercoder reliability needed to be determined for the identification of entrepreneurial cases from the year selected and for three key variables in each case: the issue category, the activity used, and the access point used. To be considered reliable, the value of Scott's pi needed to be 0.70 or higher. The initial test year coded by both authors was 1968. The value for Scott's pi for the identification of entrepreneurial cases was unacceptable (−0.27). After conferring, both authors coded the cases from 1972. That produced a better but still unacceptable value (−0.07). Following further consultation between the two coders, a second try for 1972 produced an acceptable value of Scott's pi (0.77). From that point on, any time either coder had doubts about whether a case represented entrepreneurship, rather than just congressional assertiveness, that coder contacted the other to resolve the matter of case identification. Thus for the entire dataset, the value of 0.77 is a conservative one, as any ambiguities or questions were continually resolved between the two coders. Intercoder reliability measures for the other variables clearly exceeded the 0.70 threshold for 1968. Those measures were 0.88 for the Brecher et al. issue categorization, 0.91 for the activity employed, and 1.00 for the access point used.5 We are obliged to each of these public servants for the time and insights they provided to us. We are grateful to both those who were willing to talk to us only on the condition of anonymity and those prepared to go on the record. These include Representatives Charlie Wilson (D-TX), Barney Frank (D-MA), Jim Leach (R-IA), Curt Weldon (R-PA), former House Speaker Jim Wright (D-TX), Senator Chuck Hagel (R-NE), and staff members Bill Tate (Leach), Bill Johnstone (Senator Max Cleland, D-GA), Ken Meyer (Senator Richard Lugar, R-IN), Lester Munson (Senator Jesse Helms, R-NC), and Andrew Parasiliti (Hagel). Although we have honored the requests for anonymity, which prohibits us from identifying the names of the staff aides or their positions in Congress, we have, of course, kept extensive, carefully detailed records of each interview, along with a transcript (for those who allowed us to tape the interview) or detailed interview notes (for those who did not) for each meeting. Our use of this evidence reflects those materials, attributed when possible, and credited to "anonymous" when necessary.6 For a full discussion of these eras, the quantitative evidence, entrepreneur case studies, and interviews, see the authors' Choosing to Lead: Understanding Congressional Foreign Policy Entrepreneurs (Durham, NC: Duke University Press, 2009).