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Guns First, Talks Later: Neoconservatives and the Northern Ireland Peace Process

2011; Taylor & Francis; Volume: 39; Issue: 4 Linguagem: Inglês

10.1080/03086534.2011.615609

1743-9329

Paul Dixon,

Scottish History and National Identity

The Northern Ireland peace process emerged from 'behind the scenes' when contacts between the British government and Sinn Féin were revealed in November 1993. On 31st August 1994, the Irish Republican Army (IRA) declared a ceasefire and in April 1998 the Good Friday Agreement achieved a power-sharing accommodation based on the moderate political parties. By 2003, the hardline Democratic Unionist Party was electorally dominant among unionists and Sinn Féin, the political wing of the IRA, among nationalists. Remarkably, in May 2007, the 'hardline' parties agreed to share power. The Northern Ireland peace process appears to represent an apparently successful case of two democratic governments—the British and Irish—negotiating with 'the enemy' to achieve a power-sharing accommodation. This success has led to various actors with competing political agendas claiming to have discovered 'the lessons' of Northern Ireland for other areas in conflict. The Labour government's 'Orthodox' interpretation suggests that it is always, or nearly always, a good idea to talk to the enemy. More recently, an 'orthodox Neoconservative' interpretation of the peace process has argued that Northern Ireland is the exception which proves the rule that it is almost never right to 'talk to terrorists' or 'negotiate with evil'. These contrasting interpretations of the 'Northern Ireland model' are used by analysts and policy-makers to advocate talking or not talking to groups such as Hamas, Hezbollah, the 'Sunni' militias in Iraq, Al Qaeda and the Taliban. The 'orthodox Neoconservative' interpretation of the peace process argues that the IRA were defeated, partly due to the efficacy of the 'dirty war', and in negotiating the peace process British governments did not compromise core values and democratic norms. This article argues that this account of the peace process is inaccurate and that the 'lessons' derived by Neoconservatives from the peace process are flawed.