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Stable profit sharing in a patent licensing game: general bargaining outcomes

2008; Springer Science+Business Media; Volume: 37; Issue: 4 Linguagem: Inglês

10.1007/s00182-008-0130-9

1432-1270

Naoki Watanabe, Shigeo Muto,

Pharmaceutical Economics and Policy

By considering coalition structures formed by an external licensor of a patented technology and oligopolistic firms, we investigate licensing agreements that can be reached as bargaining outcomes under those coalition structures. The following results hold in a generalized patent licensing game. The core for a coalition structure is always empty, unless the grand coalition forms. We give a necessary and sufficient condition for the nonemptiness of the core (for the grand coalition). If the number of licensees that maximizes licensees’ total surplus is greater than the number of existing non-licensees, each symmetric bargaining set for a coalition structure is a singleton, and the optimal number of licensees that maximizes the licensor’s revenue is uniquely determined.