Internalism and the Good for a Person
1996; University of Chicago Press; Volume: 106; Issue: 2 Linguagem: Inglês
10.1086/233619
ISSN1539-297X
Autores Tópico(s)Psychology of Moral and Emotional Judgment
ResumoPrevious articleNext article Internalism and the Good for a PersonConnie S. RosatiConnie S. Rosati Search for more articles by this author PDFPDF PLUS Add to favoritesDownload CitationTrack CitationsPermissionsReprints Share onFacebookTwitterLinkedInRedditEmailPrint SectionsMoreDetailsFiguresReferencesCited by Ethics Volume 106, Number 2Jan., 1996 Article DOIhttps://doi.org/10.1086/233619 Views: 60Total views on this site Citations: 56Citations are reported from Crossref Copyright 1996 The University of ChicagoPDF download Crossref reports the following articles citing this article:Willem van der Deijl Can desire-satisfaction alienate our good?, The Journal of Value Inquiry 57, no.44 (Jan 2022): 687–700.https://doi.org/10.1007/s10790-021-09855-5Andrew Alwood Alienation, Resonance, and Experience in Theories of Well-Being, Philosophia 51, no.44 (Jul 2023): 2225–2240.https://doi.org/10.1007/s11406-023-00667-4Atus Mariqueo-Russell Well-being and the Problem of Unstable Desires, Utilitas 21 (Aug 2023): 1–17.https://doi.org/10.1017/S0953820823000171Teresa Bruno-Niño The Power of Belief: Cognitive Resonance, Objectivism, and Well-being, Ethical Theory and Moral Practice 26, no.11 (Nov 2022): 37–52.https://doi.org/10.1007/s10677-022-10346-0Christopher Frugé Structuring Wellbeing*, Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 105, no.33 (Aug 2021): 564–580.https://doi.org/10.1111/phpr.12830Peter Königs Why Be a Subjectivist about Wellbeing?, Canadian Journal of Philosophy 3 (Jul 2022): 1–15.https://doi.org/10.1017/can.2022.26Justin Morton Normative principles and the nature of mind-dependence, Philosophical Studies 179, no.44 (Jul 2021): 1153–1176.https://doi.org/10.1007/s11098-021-01692-3Donald W. 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