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From Friendship to Patronage: France–Israel Relations, 1958–1967

2010; Taylor & Francis; Volume: 21; Issue: 2 Linguagem: Inglês

10.1080/09592296.2010.482472

1557-301X

Gadi Heimann,

French Historical and Cultural Studies

Abstract The article has two main theses: first, that from 1958 to 1967—Charles de Gaulle's presidency—there was a typical patron-client relationship between France and Israel that lasted until the Six Day War. It challenges the frequent claim in the literature that relations between Israel and France did not essentially change after de Gaulle's rise to power. Second, it argues that the basis on which this relationship was founded was rocky from the start since as a client, Israel was not ready to accede to French demands that it restrain its security policy to conform to key French interests. Acknowledgments I wish to acknowledge the useful comments and suggestions of Uri Bialer and Binyamin Pinkus. Funding was provided by the Leonard Davis Institute for International Relations at the Hebrew University of Jerusalem and the French ministry of foreign affairs. Notes 1. S. N. Eisenstadt & L. Roniger, "Patron-Client Relations as a Model of Structuring Social Exchange," Comparative Studies in Society and History, 22(1980), pp. 49–50. 2. C. C. Shoemaker & J. Spanier, Patron-Client State Relationships: Multilateral Crisis in the Nuclear Age (New York, 1984), pp. 14–15. 3. Ibid, pp. 48–57. 4. A third characteristic is symbolic acts, in other words, a complete range of ceremonial and quasi-ceremonial norms that express and build the special relationship between the patron and its client. For want of space, however, this article will not explore this dimension of the relationship. 5. O.G. Afoaku, "U.S Foreign Policy and Authoritarian Regimes: Changes and Continuity in International Clientlism," Journal of Third World Studies, 17(2000), pp. 13–40. 6. J. Bercovitch, "Superpowers and Clients States: Analyzing Relations and Patterns," in M. Efrat and J. Bercovitch, eds., Superpowers and Client States in the Middle East: The Imbalance of Influence (London, 1991), pp. 17–18. 7. Afuak, "Authoritarian Regimes," pp. 13–40. 8. C. Carney, "International Patron-Client Relationship: A Conceptual Framework," Studies in Comparative International Development, 24(1989), pp. 42–55; M. Handel, Weak States in the International System. (Totowa, NJ, 1981), pp. 132–35. 9. On Israel–French relations in this period, see A. Crosbie, A Tacit Alliance: France and Israel from Suez to the Six-Day War (Princeton, 1974); B. Pinkus, M'ambivalentiot l'brit bilti ktuva: Tsarfat v'Israel m'suetz ad Milhemet Sheshet Hayamim, 1947–1957 (Beer Sheba, 2005). 10. On the nuclear cooperation between France and Israel, see A. Bendjebbar, "Israel, la France et l'arme Atomique," in M. Abitbol, ed., France and the Middle East: Past, Present and Future (Jerusalem, 2004), pp. 203–21; A. Cohen, Israel and the Bomb (New York, 1998); P. Péan, Les deux bombes (Paris, 1982); B. Pinkus, "Atomic Power to Israel's Rescue: French–Israeli Nuclear Cooperation, 1949–1957," Israel Studies 7(2002), pp. 104–38. 11. For example, France's broad support for Israel regarding its withdrawal from the land occupied in the Suez War. See Pinkus, M'ambivalentiot, pp. 664–65. For a survey of France's efforts and their importance, see A. Eban, An Autobiography (New York, 1977). 12. Shimon Peres, 21 October 1958, ISA [Israel State Archives], FASCK [Foreign Affairs and Security Committee of the Knesset]. 13. AG [Archives de la Guerre], SHAT [Service Historique de l'Arme de Terre, Paris, France] 10T–817. 14. See Peres's report to the Knesset Foreign Affairs and Defense Committee on this subject: 3 April 1962, ISA, FASCK. 15. M. Zur, Moka Limon (Tel-Aviv, 1988), pp. 104–07. 16. E. Eyal, From Mirage to Kfir (Hod Hasharon, 1979), pp. 6–7. 17. Zur, Moka Limon, p. 109. 18. This was the Joshua Plan discussed by the General Staffs of France and Israel. See U. Narkis, Soldier of Jerusalem (Portland, OR, 1998). 19. C. De Gaulle, Mémoires d'espoir- Le Renouveau (1958–1962) (Paris, 1970), p. 279. 20. See I. Bar-On, "Le Général de Gaulle et la Sécurité d'Israël," in De Gaulle et son siècle, tome 6 (Paris, 1990), p. 437. 21. U. Bialer, Oil and the Arab–Israeli Conflict (Oxford, 1999), p. 228. 22. Racine to CNC, 30 December 1957, ISA, FM [Foreign Ministry], Records 3121/16. 23. Gali to Kimhi, 21 February 1958, ISA, FM, 1952/11. 24. Tsur to Eshkol, 20 August 1958, ISA, FM, 3121/6. 25. Dinstein to Eshkol, 26 August 1958, ISA, FM, 3121/6. 26. For a full discussion on the function of the pipeline and its history, see Bialer, Arab–Israeli Conflict. 27. Tsur to Eshkol, 24 October 1958, ISA, FM, 2348/6. 28. Eshkol to Tsur, 24 October 1958, ISA, FM, 2349/1. 29. Elishar to Fischer 28 October 1958, ISA, FM, 209/6. 30. Ben Gurion diary, 29 October 1958, BGA [Ben Gurion Archives, University of the Negev, Israel] Record: 2250. 31. In the end Israel ordered a third tanker from France which was smaller than the two that it ordered previously from Japan. 32. Fischer, 31 October 1958, ISA, FM, 2349/1. 33. 5 November 1958, ISA, FM, 1952/1 (annex of the treaty). 34. Pouchard, 18 October 1960; 31 October 1960, AMAE [Archives de ministere des affaires etrangeres], (Nantes), TA [Tel Aviv]-18. 35. Ben-Gurion, 20 November 1960, ISA, PMO [Prime Minister's Office], GS [Government Session]. 36. Pouchard, 13 July 1961, AMAE (Nantes), TA-18. There was also an economic reason for this since Israel wished to gain France's good will prior to negotiations between the Israeli airline El-Al and Air France. 37. 13 February 1962, AMAE (Nantes), TA-18. 38. On other occasions Israel awarded France projects although it could get better terms elsewhere. In 1965 it decided to award the project for laying an underwater cable which cost $20 million to a French firm even though, for several reasons, the Italian alternative seemed more attractive. See 19 August 1965, 19 November 1965, p. 22 November 1965, AMAE (Nantes), TA-14. 39. Memorandum, 22 August 1961, ISA, FM, 952/1. 40. Memorandum, 16 November 1961, ISA, FM, 952/1. These figures exclude Israeli arms purchases from France. 41. Israel sought a cultural understanding with France for mainly political reasons: by signing the agreement Israel wanted to show its friendship with France and perhaps to bind itself to France more strongly. This was precisely the reason the French foreign ministry hesitated and why it delayed signing the accord for so long. 42. These points were mentioned in a detailed memo from the foreign minister on this subject in which he refers to the data he received from the ministry of education. See Protocols of the Commission for the intrusion of French Language in Israeli Schools, 21 November 1960, ISA, FM, 941/4. 43. Protocols of the inter-ministerial Commission, 22–24 June 1960, ISA, FM, 939/16. 44. Davar 13 June 1960, 8 July 1960. 45. Shlush to Shorer, 19 July 1960, ISA, FM, 939/16. 46. Yaffo to Harpaz, 15 December 1960, ISA, FM, 939/16. 47. Rapport of the Commission for the intrusion of French Language in Israeli Schools, May 1961, ISA, FM, 939/18. 48. France only announced that applicants with Israeli matriculation certificates could gain admission to French universities similar to any high school graduate from any other country. However, holders of Israeli high school certificates could not teach in France or engage in certain professions like medicine. 49. Shlush to Rinot, 4 January 1961, Harpaz to Yaffo, 19 January 1961, both ISA, FM, 939/17. 50. In late 1960, the French ambassador to Israel jokingly said something that offers insight into the mentality of the French embassy in Israel at the time: that France needed to reward Israel: "For every thousand students learning French you get one Mirage IV!" See 23 December 1960, ISA, FM, 3340/40. 51. Bendor, 13 April 1961, ISA, FM, 935/5. 52. Bendor to Meir, 16 July 1961, ISA, FM, 935/5; 24 July 1961, ISA, FM, 3340/40. 53. Shek to Bendor, 12 October 1961, ISA, FM, 935/5. 54. The commission consisted of representatives from the United States, France, and Turkey. Its role was to advise on solutions to the refugee problem and other issues such as the internationalisation of Jerusalem. It is interesting that, when formed, the commission membership was considered hostile to Israel although, as time passed, it actually proved most amenable. 55. Berard, 4 December 1959, AMAE, NU [Nations Uni]-234. 56. Shneorson to Yahil, 5 December 1959, ISA, FM, 211/13. 57. 5 December 1959, AMAE, NU-234. 58. Yahil to Schneorson, 6 December 1959, ISA, FM, 211/13. 59. Ben-Gurion, 6 December 1959, ISA, PMO-GS. 60. On the subject of this affair, see E. Barak, "On the Power of Tacit Understanding: Israel, Egypt and Freedom of Passage through the Suez Canal." Middle East Journal, 58(2004), pp. 444–68. 61. Schneorson to Tsur, 21 December 1959, ISA, FM, 208/13. 62. 24 December 1959, ISA, FM, 2349/5. 63. Seydoux, 30 August 1963; 3 September 1963; Sebilleau, 7 September 1963, AMAE, NU- p. 723. 64. Orders from Paris to the French Security Council representative show a clear desire to appease the Syrians. See Lucet, 8 December 1964, AMAE, NU-723. Israel compared the French position to that of the Soviet Union, in other words an instinctive pro-Arab stance regardless of the facts. See Shek, 22 December 1964, ISA, FM, 962/1. 65. The case of France's response to the Samu operation is interesting. Whereas its position in the UN was rigid, France showed considerable moderation in its bi-lateral discussion with Israel. This conforms to the French strategy of showing coolness toward Israel in public whilst supporting Israel behind closed doors. 66. For example, in a letter from the Israel foreign minister to his French counterpart in November 1966, he took pains to remind him of the unstinting support in votes in the UN on issues close to France's heart. See Eban to Couve de Murville, 20 November 1966, AMAE, NU-720. 67. Eban, 1 November 1966, ISA, FASCK. 68. A vast body of literature exists on the 1958 Middle East crisis. For example N.J. Ashton, "A Great New Venture? Anglo–American Cooperation in the Middle East and the Response to the Iraqi Revolution, July 1958," Diplomacy & Statecraft, 4(1993), pp. 59–89; G. Heimann, "A Hot Summer: France, Israel and the Middle East Crisis in 1958," in C. Nuenlist, A. Locher and G. Martin, Globalizing de Gaulle: International Perspectives on French Foreign Policies, 1958–1969. (Harvard, 2010); D. Little, "His Finest Hour? Eisenhower, Lebanon, and the 1958 Middle East Crisis," Diplomatic History, 20(1996), pp. 27–54; J.M. Nadaner, "Strife Among Friends and Foes: The 1958 Anglo–American Military Interventions in the Middle East," UCLA Historical Journal, 17(1997), pp. 82–123; M.B. Oren, "The Test of Suez: Israel and the Middle East Conflict of 1958," Studies in Zionism, 12(1991); N.D. Tal, "Seizing Opportunities: Israel and the 1958 Crisis in the Middle East," Middle Eastern Studies, 37(January 2001), pp. 142–58. 69. Oren, "Test of Suez," p. 77. 70. In a conversation with director of Afrique-Levant at French Foreign Ministry on 27 July, with Couve on July 28, and with the director of the Israel Desk at the French Foreign Ministry on 1 August 1958. See Schneorson to Fischer, ISA, FM, 208/11. 71. 19 July 1958, AMAE, AL [Afrique Levant], Is [Israel]-50. 72. Conversation Meir-Couve de Murville, 5 August 1958, Documents Diplomatiques Français [DDF], 1958, Volume 2. 73. Conversation: De-Gaulle-Fanfani, 7 August 1958, Ibid.. 74. Boisseson, 25 September 1962, AMAE, AL, Lib [Liban]-950. 75. Bucco, 3 October 1962, AMAE, AL-Lib-950. 76. Bourdeillette, 26 October 1962, AMAE, AL, Is-110. 77. On the Johnston Plan and water diversion, see E. Kafkafi, "Ben-Gurion, Sharett and the Johnston Plan," Studies in Zionism, 13(1992), 165–85; M. Shemesh, "Prelude to the Six-Days War: The Arab–Israeli Struggle over Water Resources," Israel Studies, 9(2004), pp. 18–19. 78. Kahana to Herzog, 28 December 1964, Kahana to Maroz, 30 December 1964, Maroz to Kahana, 5 January 1965, all ISA, FM, 979/13. 79. Israel's decision-makers decided to respond in this case although they know that the terrorists' goal was to embroil her with Lebanon and via Lebanon with France. In practice, Israel's insistence on action stemmed largely from her desire to demonstrate to the terrorist organisations that Lebanon's relationship with France would not give it sanctuary status and prevent Israel from attacking. See 19 July 1966, ISA, FASCK, Levi Eshkol quotation. 80. Soutou, 6 November 1965, AMAE, NU-718. 81. Maroz, 10 November 1965, ISA, FM, 967/6. 82. Several times during this period, the United States called on France to use its influence to restrain Israel. With regard to the Johnson Plan, for example, see 26 April 1962, AMAE (Nantes), NU-50, 14 June 1962, AMAE, Am [Amerique], EU [Etats Uni]-432. Intelligence that reached the Israeli Foreign Ministry also showed this effort occurring in the May 1967 crisis: 17 May 1967, ISA, FM, 4084/2. Soviet illusions regarding France's ostensible influence over Israel were evident in the period preceding the Six Day War and in the post-war period. See Wormser, 20 May 1967, AMAE (Nantes), Mos [Moscue]-464; 28 May 1967, AMAE (Nantes), Mos-464. 83. A. Peyrefitte, C'était de Gaulle (Paris, 2002), p. 1492. 84. The patron-client model was much more congruent with de Gaulle's philosophy of political realism than the ideal of friendship between nations. De Gaulle used to say that a self-respecting nation had no friends—echoing Palmerston's famous dictum. According to de Gaulle, there were two types of nations: Great Powers and dependent states. The relationship between the former and the latter was not a relationship between equals. Moreover, nations are not obligated by the same ethical system that governs humans as individuals. See H. E. Kolodziej, French International Policy under de Gaulle and Pompidou: The Politics of Grandeur (Ithaca, NY, 1974), pp. 47–48.