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Defeated by Popular Demand: Public Support and Counterterrorism in Three Western Democracies, 1963–1998

2013; Taylor & Francis; Volume: 36; Issue: 2 Linguagem: Inglês

10.1080/1057610x.2013.747072

1521-0731

Bart Schuurman,

Religion and Society Interactions

Abstract Acquiring and maintaining public support is frequently cited as an important requirement for governments fighting non-state actors. But how exactly can public support influence the course of counterterrorism campaigns and thereby contribute to an escalation or de-escalation of violence? This article argues that public support can provide a mandate for action but that it can also set boundaries for the measures governments and their non-state adversaries can legitimately use. Fluctuations in the quantity and quality of public support for either side can expand or contract these boundaries, potentially instigating marked changes in conflict-related violence levels and affecting the efficacy of government countermeasures. Acknowledgments The author gratefully thanks Isabelle Duyvesteyn for her encouragement and tutelage and for making possible the research on which this article is based. Acknowledgments are also due to Beatrice de Graaf for her insightful feedback on an earlier draft of this piece, to the two anonymous reviewers for their constructive criticism, and to Jelle Bosch for his research assistance. Notes 1. Mao Tse-Tung, On Guerrilla Warfare, ed. and trans. by Samuel Griffith (Mineola: Dover, 2005); Headquarters Department of the Army. FM 3–24: Counterinsurgency. (Washington, DC: US Army, 2006). "Why Terrorism Subsides," "Fighting an Antaean Enemy" 2. For example: Ivan Arreguín-Toft, "How the Weak Win Wars: A Theory of Asymmetric Conflict," International Security 26(1) (Summer 2001), pp. 93–128; Christopher Paul, Colin P. Clarke, and Beth Grill, Victory Has a Thousand Fathers: Sources of Success in Counterinsurgency (Santa Monica: RAND, 2010); Bruce Hoffman, Inside Terrorism (New York: Columbia University Press, 1998), pp. 225–240; Audrey Kurth Cronin, How Terrorism Ends: Understanding the Decline and Demise of Terrorist Campaigns (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2009), pp. 33, 54–55, 107–109, 142; Martha Crenshaw, "How Terrorism Declines," Terrorism and Political Violence 3(1) (Spring 1991), pp. 80–87; Jeffrey Ian Ross and Ted Robert Gurr, "Why Terrorism Subsides: a Comparative Study of Canada and the United States," Comparative Politics 21(4) (July 1989), pp. 413–414, 417–421; Tom Parker, "Fighting an Antaean Enemy: How Democratic States Unintentionally Sustain the Terrorist Movements They Oppose," Terrorism and Political Violence 19(2) (June 2007), pp. 155–179; Andrew Silke, "Fire of Iolaus: The Role of State Countermeasures in Causing Terrorism and What Needs to be Done," in Tore Bjørgo, ed., Root Causes of Terrorism: Myths, Reality and Ways Forward (London: Routledge, 2005), pp. 241–255; Stathis N. Kalyvas, The Logic of Violence in Civil War (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2006). 3. Isabelle Duyvesteyn, "The Escalation and De-escalation of Irregular War: Setting out the Problem," Journal of Strategic Studies 35 (5) (2012), pp. 602–630. 4. M. L. R. Smith, "Strategy in an Age of Low-Intensity Warfare," in Isabelle Duyvesteyn and Jan Angstrom, eds., Rethinking the Nature of War (Abingdon: Frank Cass, 2005), pp. 51–52. 5. Jeffrey A. Sluka, Hearts and Minds, Water and Fish: Support for the IRA and INLA in a Northern Irish Ghetto (Greenwich, CT/London: JAI Press, 1989), p. 64. 6. Harmonie Toros, "'We Don't Negotiate with Terrorists!': Legitimacy and Complexity in Terrorist Conflicts," Security Dialogue 39(4) (August 2008), pp. 408–409; Andrew Silke, "The Devil You Know: Continuing Problems with Research on Terrorism," Terrorism and Political Violence 13(4) (2001), pp. 2–3. 7. Alex P. Schmid, "The Definition of Terrorism," in Alex P. Schmid, ed., The Routledge Handbook of Terrorism Research (London/New York: Routledge, 2011), p. 43; Andrew Silke, "An Introduction to Terrorism Research," in Andrew Silke, ed., Research on Terrorism: Trends, Achievements and Failures (London/New York: Frank Cass, 2004), pp. 3–4. 8. Alex P. Schmid and Albert J. Jongman, Political Terrorism: A New Guide to Actors, Authors, Concepts, Data Bases, Theories, and Literature (New Brunswick, NJ: Transaction Books, 1988), pp. 5–6. 9. Schmid, "The Definition of Terrorism," pp. 39–98. 10. Ibid., 86–87. Emphases in original. 11. James D. Kiras, "Terrorism and Irregular Warfare," in John Baylis, James Wirtz, Eliot Cohen and Colin S. Gray, eds., Strategy in the Contemporary World: An Introduction to Strategic Studies (New York: Oxford University Press, 2005), p. 211; Rupert Smith, The Utility of Force: The Art of War in the Modern World (London: Penguin Books, 2006), p. 167. 12. Schmid, "The Definition of Terrorism," pp. 62–63. 13. Gregory D. Miller, "Confronting Terrorisms: Group Motivation and Successful State Policies," Terrorism and Political Violence 19(3) (September 2007), pp. 331–350. 14. Ibid. 15. Rod Thornton, "Getting it Wrong: The Crucial Mistakes Made in the Early Stages of the British Army's Deployment to Northern Ireland (August 1969 to March 1972)," Journal of Strategic Studies 30(1) (February 2007), pp. 76–77; Louise Richardson, "Britain and the IRA," in Robert J. Art and Louise Richardson, eds., Democracy and Counterterrorism: Lessons from the Past (Washington, DC: United States Institute of Peace Press, 2007), p. 67: Peter Neumann, Britain's Long War: British Strategy in the Northern Ireland Conflict, 1969–98 (Houndmills: Palgrave Macmillan, 2003), pp. 44–46, 50–51, 80–81. 16. Thornton, "Getting it Wrong," p. 77. 17. Caroline Kennedy-Pipe, The Origins of the Present Troubles in Northern Ireland (New York: Longman, 1997), pp. 54–56; Paul Dixon, "'Hearts and Minds'? British Counterinsurgency Strategy in Northern Ireland," The Journal of Strategic Studies 32(3) (June 2009), p. 469. 18. Thornton, "Getting it Wrong," pp. 76–77. 19. Smith, The Utility of Force, p. 6. 20. Richardson. "Britain and the IRA," pp. 77–78. 21. Thornton, "Getting it Wrong," p. 77; Neumann, Britain's Long War, pp. 43–69. 22. Thornton, "Getting it Wrong," pp. 78–80; Kennedy-Pipe, The Origins of the Present Troubles in Northern Ireland, pp. 49–53; Brice Dickson, "Counter-Insurgency and Human Rights in Northern Ireland," Journal of Strategic Studies 32(3) (June 2009), pp. 485–486; Sluka, Hearts and Minds, Water and Fish, p. 157. 23. Thornton, "Getting it Wrong," pp. 79–81. 24. Ibid., pp. 81–88; Kennedy-Pipe, The Origins of the Present Troubles in Northern Ireland, pp. 49–53; Tim Pat Coogan, The Troubles: Ireland's Ordeal 1966–1996 and the Search for Peace (London: Arrow Books, 1996), pp. 182–183, 187; Terence Taylor, "United Kingdom," in Yonah Alexander, ed., Combating Terrorism: Strategies of Ten Countries (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 2005), p. 218; Operation Banner: An Analysis of Military Operations in Northern Ireland. Ministry of Defense (Army Code 71842: 2006), pp. 2–5, 2–6; Sluka, Hearts and Minds, Water and Fish, pp. 157–158. 25. Richardson, "Britain and the IRA," p. 69; Kennedy-Pipe, The Origins of the Present Troubles in Northern Ireland, pp. 54–55; Thornton, "Getting it Wrong," pp. 89–93; Coogan, The Troubles, p. 144; Taylor, "United Kingdom," p. 219. 26. John E. Finn, "Public Support for Emergency (Anti-Terrorist) Legislation in Northern Ireland: A Preliminary Analysis," Studies in Conflict & Terrorism 10(2) (1987), pp. 119–120. 27. Cronin, How Terrorism Ends, p. 43; Richardson, "Britain and the IRA," p. 70; Neumann, Britain's Long War, pp. 56–57; Dickson, "Counter-Insurgency and Human Rights in Northern Ireland," pp. 485–486; Parker, "Fighting an Antaean Enemy," p. 162. 28. Kalyvas, The Logic of Violence in Civil War, pp. 58–61, 99. 29. Bernadette C. Hayes and Ian McAllister, "Sowing Dragon's Teeth: Public Support for Political Violence and Paramilitarism in Northern Ireland," Political Studies 49(5) (December 2001), p. 913. 30. Christopher Hewitt, "Terrorism and Public Opinion: A Five Country Comparison," Terrorism and Political Violence 2(2) (1990), p. 160. 31. Cronin, How Terrorism Ends, p. 43; Sluka, Hearts and Minds, Water and Fish, pp. 170– 172. 32. Igancio Sànchez-Cuenca, "The Dynamics of Nationalist Terrorism: ETA and the IRA," Terrorism and Political Violence 19(3) (September 2007), p. 296; Neumann, Britain's Long War, pp. 78–79; Operation Banner, 2–8–2–9. 33. Huw Bennett, "From Direct Rule to Motorman: Adjusting British Strategy for Northern Ireland in 1972," Studies in Conflict & Terrorism 33(6) (2010), p. 520. 34. M. L. R. Smith, "Escalation in Irregular War: Using Strategic Theory to Examine from First Principles," Journal of Strategic Studies 35 (5) (2012), pp. 623, 625, 628–630. 35. Ed Moloney, A Secret History of the IRA (London: Penguin Books, 2007), pp. 116–117; Neumann, Britain's Long War, pp. 78–80; Dixon, "'Hearts and Minds' "?, pp. 459–460; Operation Banner, 2–9–2–10. 36. Kennedy-Pipe, The Origins of the Present Troubles in Northern Ireland, pp. 71–72; Neumann, Britain's Long War, pp. 72–75. 37. Hewitt, "Terrorism and Public Opinion," p. 160. 38. Ibid. 39. Hayes and McAllister, "Sowing Dragon's Teeth," p. 913. 40. Andrew Reynolds, "A Constitutional Pied Piper: the Northern Irish Good Friday Agreement," Political Science Quarterly 114(4) (Winter 1999–2000), pp. 616, 618–620; Kennedy-Pipe, The Troubles, pp. 71–72; Coogan, The Troubles, pp. 195–203; Neumann, Britain's Long War, pp. 72–75, 97. 41. Kennedy-Pipe, The Origins of the Present Troubles in Northern Ireland, pp. 122–125; Coogan, The Troubles, pp. 216–217; Neumann, Britain's Long War, pp. 132–133. 42. Paul Arthur and Keith Jeffery, Northern Ireland since 1968 (Oxford: Blackwell, 1996), p. 75; Andrew Silke, "Ragged Justice: Loyalist Vigilantism in Northern Ireland," Terrorism and Political Violence 17(3) (2005), pp. 4–5; Kennedy-Pipe, The Origins of the Present Troubles in Northern Ireland, p. 124. 43. Jennifer Todd, "Elite Intent, Public Reaction and Institutional Change," IBIS Discussion Paper No. 9 (Dublin: Institute for British-Irish Studies, University College Dublin 2011), p. 1. 44. Kennedy-Pipe, The Origins of the Present Troubles in Northern Ireland, pp. 123–125, 127; Coogan, The Troubles, p. 217. 45. Peter R. Neumann, "The Bullet and the Ballot Box: the Case of the IRA," The Journal of Strategic Studies 28(6) (December 2005), pp. 951–953, 964; Annemarie Adam, "Convincing the Grassroots: How Sinn Féin and the IRA Gave Up Armed Resistance," Leidschrift 23(1) (April 2008), pp. 194–197; Kennedy-Pipe, The Origins of the Present Troubles in Northern Ireland, pp. 123, 130–140; Richardson, "Britain and the IRA," p. 78; Neumann, Britain's Long War, pp. 140–141, 146; Arthur and Jeffery, Northern Ireland since 1968, pp. 110–116; Dickson, "Counter-Insurgency and Human Rights in Northern Ireland," p. 486; Moloney, A Secret History of the IRA, pp. 240–241, 392. 46. Todd, "Elite Intent, Public Reaction and Institutional Change," p. 1. 47. Fionnuala McKenns, Brendan Lynn, and Martin Melaugh, "Polls of Opinion and Attitude in Northern Ireland, 1973–2004," Conflict Archive on the Internet (CAIN) (University of Ulster 2012). Available at http://cain.ulst.ac.uk/issues/politics/polls.htm#73 (last modified 14 January 2012; accessed 3 June 2012). 48. Kennedy-Pipe, The Origins of the Present Troubles in Northern Ireland, pp. 123, 130–140; Neumann, "The Bullet and the Ballot Box," pp. 951–953, 964; Richardson, "Britain and the IRA," p. 78; Neumann, Britain's Long War, pp. 140–141, 146; Moloney A Secret History of the IRA, pp. 240–241, 392. 49. Reynolds, "A Constitutional Pied Piper," p. 614; Neumann, Britain's Long War, pp. 148–178. 50. Moloney, A Secret History of the IRA, p. 349. 51. Hayes and McAllister, "Sowing Dragon's Teeth," p. 913. 52. Ibid., 914. 53. Adrian Guelke and Frank Wright, "The Option of a 'British Withdrawal' from Northern Ireland: An Exploration of its Meaning, Influence, and Feasibility," Journal of Conflict Studies 10(4) (Fall 1990), p. 55. 54. Bernadette C. Hayes and Ian McAllister, "British and Irish Public Opinion Towards the Northern Ireland Problem," Irish Political Studies 11(1) (1996), p. 66. 55. Reynolds, "A Constitutional Pied Piper," pp. 624–625, 627–628; Neumann, "The Bullet and the Ballot Box," p. 954. 56. Peter F. Trumbore, "Public Opinion as a Domestic Constraint in International Negotiations: Two-Level Games in the Anglo-Irish Peace Process," International Studies Quarterly 42(3) (September 1998), pp. 545–565. 57. Donatella della Porta, "Left-Wing Terrorism in Italy," in Martha Crenshaw, ed., Terrorism in Context (University Park: Pennsylvania State University Press, 1995), p. 106. 58. Matthew E. Dunham, "Eliminating the Domestic Terrorist Threat in the United States: A Case Study on the Eradication of the Red Brigades," Dickinson Law Review 107(1) (Summer 2002), p. 160. 59. Bruce Hoffman and Jennifer Morrison Taw, A Strategic Framework for Countering Terrorism and Insurgency (Santa Monica, CA: RAND, 1992), p. 71; Germana Tappero Merlo and Sergio Marchisio, "Italy," in Yonah Alexander, ed., Counterterrorism Strategies: Successes and Failures of Six Nations (Washington, DC: Potomac Books, 2006), p. 104; Dunham, "Eliminating the Domestic Terrorist Threat in the United States," pp. 162–163. 60. Della Porta, "Left-Wing Terrorism in Italy," pp. 118–119. 61. Leonard Weinberg, "The Red Brigades," in Robert J. Art and Louise Richardson, eds., Democracy and Counterterrorism: Lessons from the Past (Washington, DC: United States Institute of Peace Press, 2007), p. 53. 62. Dunham, "Eliminating the Domestic Terrorist Threat in the United States," pp. 162–163. 63. Alison Jamieson, "Identity and Morality in the Italian Red Brigades," Terrorism and Political Violence 2(4) (1990), pp. 509–510; Cronin, How Terrorism Ends, p. 103. 64. David Bonner, "Combating Terrorism: Supergrass Trials in Northern Ireland," Modern Law Review 51(1) (January 1988), pp. 20, 30–34; Kennedy-Pipe, The Origins of the Present Troubles in Northern Ireland, pp. 114–115; Hoffman and Taw, A Strategic Framework for Countering Terrorism and Insurgency, p. 47. 65. Jamieson, "Identity and Morality in the Italian Red Brigades," pp. 509–510. 66. Ibid., pp. 510–513. 67. Ibid., pp. 513–516; Weinberg, "The Red Brigades," p. 47; Dunham, "Eliminating the Domestic Terrorist Threat in the United States," pp. 157–158. 68. Cronin, How Terrorism Ends, p. 109. 69. Ibid., p. 109. 70. Beatrice de Graaf, Evaluating Counterterrorism Performance: A Comparative Study (London: Routledge, 2011), p. 111. 71. Crenshaw, "How Terrorism Declines," p. 82. 72. Joseph L. Albini, "Dealing with the Modern Terrorist: The Need for Changes in Strategies and Tactics in the New War on Terrorism," Criminal Justice Policy Review 12(4) (December 2001), p. 269; Vittorfranco S. Pisano, The Red Brigades: A Challenge to Italian Democracy (London: The Institute for the Study of Conflict, 1980), pp. 6–7; Walter Laquer, The New Terrorism: Fanaticism and the Arms of Mass Destruction (London: Phoenix Press, 2001), p. 29; De Graaf, Evaluating Counterterrorism Performance, p. 111; Della Porta, "Left-Wing Terrorism in Italy," pp. 114–115; Weinberg, "The Red Brigades," p. 36. 73. Hewitt, "Terrorism and Public Opinion," pp. 158–159. 74. Ibid., p. 158. 75. Robert C. Meade, Jr., Red Brigades: The Story of Italian Terrorism (Basingstoke: Macmillan, 1990), pp. 215–217, 237; De Graaf, Evaluating Counterterrorism Performance, pp. 111–113; Hoffman and Taw, A Strategic Framework for Countering Terrorism and Insurgency, pp. 72–73; Weinberg, "The Red Brigades," p. 56. 76. Steven Greer, Supergrasses: A Study in Anti-Terrorist Law Enforcement in Northern Ireland (New York: Oxford University Press, 1995), pp. 238–239; Hoffman and Taw, A Strategic Framework for Countering Terrorism and Insurgency, p. 48; Bonner, "Combating Terrorism," pp. 30–35; Kennedy-Pipe, The Origins of the Present Troubles in Northern Ireland, pp. 131–132. 77. Sluka, Hearts and Minds, Water and Fish, pp. 9, 115–116. 78. Finn, "Public Support for Emergency (Anti-Terrorist) Legislation in Northern Ireland," p. 123. 79. Ibid., 121. 80. E. Moxon-Browne, "The Water and the Fish: Public Opinion and the Provisional IRA in Northern Ireland," Terrorism: An International Journal 5(1–2) (1981), pp. 57–59. 81. Ibid., pp. 57–58. 82. Hewitt, "Terrorism and Public Opinion," p. 160. 83. Sean M. Maloney, "A 'Mere Rustle of Leaves': Canadian Strategy and the 1970 FLQ Crisis," Canadian Military Journal 1(2) (Summer 2000), pp. 72–82; Jeffrey Ian Ross, "The Rise and Fall of Québecois Separatist Terrorism: A Qualitative Application of Factors from Two Models," Studies in Conflict and Terrorism 18(4) (July 1995), pp. 285–297; Ross and Gurr, "Why Terrorism Subsides," p. 411; Parker, "Fighting an Antaean Enemy," pp. 168–170. 84. Dominique Clément, "The October Crisis of 1970: Human Rights Abuses Under the War Measures Act," Journal of Canadian Studies 42(2) (Spring 2008), p. 163; David A. Charters, "The Amateur Revolutionaries: A Reassessment of the FLQ," Terrorism and Political Violence 9(1) (Spring 1997), pp. 139–140, 145, 147, 150; Ronald D. Crelinsten, "The Internal Dynamics of the FLQ During the October Crisis of 1970," in David C. Rapoport, ed., Inside Terrorist Organizations (London: Frank Cass, 2001), pp. 66–67; Louis Fournier, F.L.Q.: the Anatomy of an Underground Movement (Trans. Edward Baxter) (Toronto: NC Press, 1984), pp. 183–184, 196–198; Maloney, "A 'Mere Rustle of Leaves,'" p. 75; Ross, "The Rise and Fall of Québecois Separatist Terrorism," p. 292. 85. H. D. Munroe, "The October Crisis Revisited: Counterterrorism as Strategic Choice, Political Result, and Organizational Practice," Terrorism and Political Violence 21(2) (April 2009), p. 299; Parker, "Fighting an Antaean Enemy," p. 169; Clément, "The October Crisis of 1970," pp. 165–166; Maloney, "A 'Mere Rustle of Leaves,'" pp. 77–79; Crelinsten, "The Internal Dynamics of the FLQ During the October Crisis of 1970," p. 63. 86. Raphael Cohen-Almagor, "The Terrorists' Best Ally: The Quebec Media Coverage of the FLQ Crisis in October 1970," Canadian Journal of Communication 25(2) (2000), pp. 12–15; Clément, "The October Crisis of 1970," pp. 165–167; Charters, "The Amateur Revolutionaries," pp. 157–162; Crelinsten, "The Internal Dynamics of the FLQ During the October Crisis of 1970," pp. 62–63; Parker, "Fighting an Antaean Enemy," p. 169. 87. Richard M. Sorrentino, Neil Vidmar, and Michael S. Goodstadt, "Opinion Change in a Crisis: Effects of the 1970 Canadian Kidnapping Crisis on Political and Ethnic Attitudes," Canadian Journal of Behavioural Science 6(3) (1974), pp. 199–218. 88. Ibid., p. 206. 89. Ibid. 90. Canadian Institute of Public Opinion (CIPO), "November 1970 (#344)." Available at http://www.library.carleton.ca/sites/default/files/find/data/surveys/ascii_files/gllp-70-sep343-doc (accessed 3 June 2012). 91. Ibid. 92. Ibid. 93. Ibid. 94. Ibid. 95. Ross and Gurr, "Why Terrorism Subsides," p. 414. 96. Clément, "The October Crisis of 1970," p. 175; Cohen-Almagor, "The Terrorists' Best Ally," p. 16; Ross, "The Rise and Fall of Québecois Separatist Terrorism," pp. 293–294; Charters, "The Amateur Revolutionaries," p. 162; Ross and Gurr, "Why Terrorism Subsides," pp. 413–414; Fournier, F.L.Q., pp. 268–271. 97. Weinberg, "The Red Brigades," pp. 44, 46–47; Hoffman and Taw, A Strategic Framework for Countering Terrorism and Insurgency, pp. 27, 115; Dunham, "Eliminating the Domestic Terrorist Threat in the United States," pp. 155–156. 98. Meade, Red Brigades, pp. 58–60; Ralf Steenbeek, "De Bestrijding van de Rode Brigades in Italië, 1974–1975. De Methode van Generaal Carlo Alberto Dalla Chiesa," Leidschrift 23(1) (April 2008), pp. 115–119. 99. Tom Welschen, Het Italiaanse Complex: Partijen en Bewegingen van 1970 tot 1990 (Bussum: THOTH, 1996), pp. 76, 239–241; Weinberg, "The Red Brigades," p. 47; Della Porta, "Left-Wing Terrorism in Italy," p. 114. 100. Della Porta, "Left-Wing Terrorism in Italy," pp. 114–115; Paul J. Smith, "The Italian Red Brigades (1969–1984): Political Revolution and Threats to the State," in Jeffrey H. Norwitz, ed., Armed Groups: Studies in National Security, Counterterrorism, and Counterinsurgency (Newport: U.S. Naval War College, 2008), p. 19. 101. Weinberg, "The Red Brigades," p. 47; Dunham, "Eliminating the Domestic Terrorist Threat in the United States," pp. 157–158; Pisano, The Red Brigades, p. 7; Meade, Red Brigades, p. 183. 102. Hoffman and Taw, A Strategic Framework for Countering Terrorism and Insurgency, pp. 116–117; Weinberg, "The Red Brigades," p. 47. 103. Parker, "Fighting an Antaean Enemy," p. 168; Dunham, "Eliminating the Domestic Terrorist Threat in the United States," p. 162; Weinberg, "The Red Brigades," pp. 36–37, 54–55; Della Porta, "Left-Wing Terrorism in Italy," pp. 136–137, 157; Albini, "Dealing with the Modern Terrorist," pp. 269–270; Meade, Red Brigades, pp. 104–105, 168, 187–188. 104. Hewitt, "Terrorism and Public Opinion," p. 158. 105. Bill Rolston, "'An Effective Mask for Terror': Democracy, Death Squads and Northern Ireland," Crime, Law & Social Change 44(2) (September 2005), p. 192; Neumann, Britain's Long War, pp. 106–107; Kennedy-Pipe, The Origins of the Present Troubles in Northern Ireland, pp. 91–92; Hoffman and Taw, A Strategic Framework for Countering Terrorism and Insurgency, pp. 99–101; Richardson, "Britain and the IRA," p. 80; Operation Banner, 2–13, 3–6–3–7; Arthur and Jeffery, Northern Ireland since 1968, pp. 76–77; Moloney, A Secret History of the IRA, pp. 318–319. 106. James Dingley, "Terrorist Strategy and Tactics," in James Dingley, ed., Combating Terrorism in Northern Ireland (New York: Routledge, 2009), p. 67; Moloney, A Secret History of the IRA, p. 305. 107. Moloney, A Secret History of the IRA, p. 308. 108. Kennedy-Pipe, The Origins of the Present Troubles in Northern Ireland, pp. 131–132, 136–138; Moloney, A Secret History of the IRA, pp. 304–305, 329–332. 109. Steve Bruce, The Red Hand: Protestant Paramilitaries in Northern Ireland (Oxford, Oxford University Press, 1992), pp. 65, 208–209, 274, 276; Richardson, "Britain and the IRA," pp. 88–90; Kennedy-Pipe, The Origins of the Present Troubles in Northern Ireland, pp. 111–112, 144–145; Rolston, "'An Effective Mask for Terror,'" pp. 181–182, 193–195; Sluka, Hearts and Minds, Water and Fish, pp. 54–55, 223–224. 110. Rolston, "'An Effective Mask for Terror,'" p. 192; Kennedy-Pipe, The Origins of the Present Troubles in Northern Ireland, p. 89; Moloney, A Secret History of the IRA, p. 119. 111. Kennedy-Pipe, The Origins of the Present Troubles in Northern Ireland, p. 88. 112. Hewitt, "Terrorism and Public Opinion," p. 145. 113. Kevin Bean, The New Politics of Sinn Féin (Liverpool: Liverpool University Press), pp. 1, 9; Moloney, A Secret History of the IRA, pp. 324–325. 114. Hewitt, "Terrorism and Public Opinion," p. 160. 115. Mark L. Bowlin, "British Intelligence and the IRA: The Secret War in Northern Ireland, 1969–1988" (Unpublished Master of Arts Thesis, Naval Postgraduate School 1998), pp. 122–123; Kennedy-Pipe, The Origins of the Present Troubles in Northern Ireland, pp. 131–132, 136–138; Moloney, A Secret History of the IRA, pp. 304–305, 329–332. 116. Dingley, "Terrorist Strategy and Tactics," p. 67; Moloney, A Secret History of the IRA, pp. 318–319. 117. Paul, Clarke, and Grill, Victory Has a Thousand Fathers, pp. xxii, xxvi. 118. James M. Lutz and Brenda J. Lutz, "How Successful is Terrorism?," Forum on Public Policy (2009), p. 7. 119. Arreguín-Toft, "How the Weak Win Wars," pp. 105, 121–122. 120. Kalyvas, The Logic of Violence in Civil War, pp. 91–104.