Portal de Periódicos da CAPES

Making Sense of North Korea: Pyongyang and Comparative Communism

2005; Taylor & Francis; Volume: 1; Issue: 3 Linguagem: Inglês

10.1080/14799850500341932

1555-2764

Andrew Scobell,

Korean Peninsula Historical and Political Studies

Abstract Highly repressive, heavily militarized, strongly resistant to reform, and ruled by a dynastic dictatorship that adheres to a hybrid ideology, North Korea might be “the strangest political system in existence.” While distinctive, North Korea is an orthodox communist party-state best classified as an eroding totalitarian regime. Although weakening, Pyongyang remains durable and could survive for many more years. Absent “regime change,” North Korea is unlikely to demilitarize—including relinquishing its nuclear program—and will continue to reject thoroughgoing economic reform, cling to ideology for legitimacy, and make every effort to engineer a successful dynastic succession. The views expressed here are those of the author and do not represent those of the US Army, Department of Defense, or US Government. Notes 1. For some of the most noteworthy books focused on the security dimension that offer explicit policy prescriptions, see Victor D. Cha and David C. Kang, Nuclear North Korea: A Debate on Engagement Strategies (New York: Columbia University Press, 2003); Michael Mochizuki and Michael M. O'Hanlon, Crisis on the Korean Peninsula: How to Deal with a Nuclear North Korea (New York: McGraw-Hill, 2003); and Selig Harrison, Korean Endgame: A Strategy for Reunification and U.S. Disengagement (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2002). 2. Marcus Noland, Avoiding the Apocalypse (Washington, DC: International Institute for Economics, 2000), p. 347. 3. See, for example, William C. Triplett, II, Rogue State: How a Nuclear North Korea Threatens America (Washington, DC: Regenery Publishing, 2004). 4. See, for example, Charles K. Armstrong, The North Korean Revolution, 1945–1950 (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 2004) and Bruce Cumings, North Korea: Another Country (New York: The New Press, 2004). 5. For some notable exceptions, see Robert A. Scalapino and Chong-Sik Lee, Communism in Korea (Berkeley and Los Angeles, CA: University of California Press, 1972); Bruce Cumings, “The Corporate State in North Korea,” in Hagen Koo, ed., State and Society in Contemporary Korea (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1993), pp. 197–230; Kongdan Oh and Ralph C. Hassig, North Korea Through the Looking Glass (Washington, DC: Brookings Institution, 2000); and Stephen Bradner, “North Korea's Strategy,” in Henry Sokoloski, ed., Planning for a Peaceful Korea (Carlisle Barracks, PA: US Army War College, 2001), pp. 23–82. 6. Of course, these are the oft-quoted words of long-time North Korea watcher Ambassador Donald Gregg. 7. See Stephen White, “What is a Communist System?” Studies in Comparative Communism Vol. 16 (Winter 1983). The DPRK Constitution requires “all activities [to be conducted] under the leadership of the Korean Workers Party” (article 11). “Socialism” is Pyongyang's guiding ideology (Preface, ff.), a “planned economy” (article 34) guides economic development, while the “means of production are owned only by the state and social cooperative organizations” (article 25). 8. Adrian Buzo calls North Korea the “Kimist system” in his The Guerilla Dynasty (Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1999). Stephen Bradner labels it the “Kim Family Regime;” see “North Korea's Strategy,” p. 28. Juan Linz and Alfred Stepan dub the regime “sultanistic;” Juan J. Linz and Alfred Stepan, Problems of Democratic Consolidation (Baltimore, MD: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1996), p. 51. Linz later suggested North Korea is totalitarian but “with sultanistic elements.” See Linz, Totalitarian and Authoritarian Regimes (Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner, 2000), p. 35. 9. This, for example, is the overarching theme of Chalmers Johnson, ed., Change in Communist Systems (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 1970). 10. Carl J. Friedrich and Zbigniew K. Brzezinski, Totalitarian Dictatorship and Autocracy (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1956). 11. Linz, Totalitarian and Authoritarian Regimes. This was first published as “Totalitarian and Authoritarian Regimes,” in Fred I. Greenstein and Nelson W. Polsby, eds., The Handbook of Political Science, 8 vols. (Reading, MA: Addison-Wesley, 1975). 12. Jeanne J. Kirkpatrick, Dictatorships and Double Standards (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1982). 13. Hannah Arendt, The Origins of Totalitarianism, 2nd ed. (Cleveland, OH: Meridian Books, 1958), p. 306. Linz criticizes the “static and rigid character of many conceptions” and notes totalitarianism's “dynamic element.” Linz, Totalitarian and Authoritarian Regimes, pp. 132–133. Linz wrote this in Greenstein and Polsby, eds., Handbook of Political Science in 1975. For a critique, see Bruce Cumings, “Illusion, Critique, and Responsibility,” in Daniel Chirot, ed., The Crisis of Leninism and the Decline of the Left (Seattle, WA: University of Washington Press, 1991), p. 101. 14. Linz, Totalitarian and Authoritarian, pp. 69, 245–261. 15. Arendt, The Origins of Totalitarianism, p. 306. 16. Daniel Chirot, Modern Tyrants (New York: Free Press, 1994), p. 172. 17. Arendt, The Origins of Totalitarianism, p. 408. 18. Arendt, The Origins of Totalitarianism, pp. 437–459; Linz, Totalitarian and Authoritarian, pp. 102–110. See also James Bunyan, The Origins of Forced Labor in the Soviet State, 1917–1921 (Baltimore, MD: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1967); Hongda Harry Wu, Laogai (Boulder, CO: Westview, 1992). 19. Valdimir Tismaneanu, Reinventing Politics (New York: Free Press, 1993), Chapters 4, 5 and 6. 20. Allen Kassof, “The Administered Society,” World Politics Vol. 16 (July 1964), pp.558–575. 21. Jerry F. Hough, “The Soviet System: Petrification or Pluralism?” Problems of Communism Vol. 21 (March–April 1972) pp. 25–45; H. Gordon Skilling, “Interest Groups and Communist Politics,” World Politics Vol. 18 (April 1966), pp. 435–451. 22. Linz and Stepan, Problems of Democratic Consolidation, pp. 42–51. 23. Tismaneanu, Reinventing Politics, pp. 157–158. 24. Tismaneanu, Reinventing Politics. 25. Linz, Totalitarian and Authoritarian, p. 6. 26. Carlyle A. Thayer, “Laos in 2003,” Asian Survey Vol. 44 (January/February 2004), pp.110–120. 27. Robert A. Scalapino, The Politics of Development (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1988), p. 47. 28. On the establishment of the regime, see Scalapino and Lee, Communism in Korea, Part One, and Charles K. Armstrong, The North Korean Revolution, 1945–1950 (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 2003). On page 217 Armstrong says the regime is “mono-organized” with “totalist” goals. 29. Oh and Hassig, North Koreas. 30. Nicholas Eberstadt, The End of North Korea (Washington, DC: American Enterprise Institute, 1999), pp. 8–10, Chapter 3. 31. The DPRK relied heavily on military and economic assistance from socialist countries, notably the Soviet Union and China. However, until the 1990s, it was able to produce goods to satisfy significant portions of domestic needs and for export. 32. Andrew S. Natsios, The Great North Korean Famine (Washington, DC: United States Institute of Peace, 2001); Eberstadt, The End of North Korea, p. 9. 33. Oh and Hassig, North Korea, pp. 37–38. 34. On the coercive apparatus, see Oh and Hassig, North Korea, pp. 145–147. On labor camps, see David Hawk, The Hidden Gulag (Washington, DC: United States Committee on Human Rights in North Korea, 2003). 35. In 1975, Linz wrote: “No totalitarian system has been overthrown by force internally.” See Linz, Totalitarian and Authoritarian, p. 139. 36. Andrew C. Janos, “Social Science, Communism, and the Dynamics of Political Change,” World Politics Vol. 44 (October 1991), p. 95. 37. Alfred Stepan, The Military in Politics (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1971), pp. 273–276. 38. See, for example, Roman Kolkowicz, The Soviet Military and the Communist Party (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1967); Timothy J. Colton, Commissars, Commanders and Civilian Authority (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1979); Harlan W. Jencks, From Muskets to Missiles (Boulder, CO: Westview, 1982); Dale R. Herspring and Ivan Volgyes, eds., Civil–Military Relations in Communist Systems (Boulder, CO: Westview, 1978); David E. Albright, “A Comparative Conceptualization of Civil–Military Relations,” World Politics Vol. 32 (July 1980), pp.553–576; Amos Perlmutter and William M. LeoGrande, “The Party in Uniform,” American Political Science Review Vol. 76 (December1982), pp. 778–789. 39. See, for example, Ellis Joffe, The Chinese Army After Mao (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1987); Jerzy J. Wiatr, Soldier and the Nation (Boulder, CO: Westview, 1988); Hsiao-shih Cheng, Party-Army Relations in Taiwan and the PRC (Boulder, CO: Westview, 2000). 40. On China, see Andrew Scobell, China's Use of Military Force (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2003), Chapter 7. 41. Perlmutter and LeoGrande, “The Party,” pp. 787–788. 42. Zoltan D. Barany, “East European Armed Forces in Transition and Beyond,” East European Quarterly Vol. 26 (March 1992), pp. 1–30. 43. See William E. Odom, The Collapse of the Soviet Military (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 1998), Chapter 14. 44. Perlmutter and LeoGrande, “The Party,” pp. 784–786. One important exception was Yugoslavia. Party–military relations were symbiotic but severely frayed by ethnic civil war and dissolution of the country in the early 1990s. 45. Chung-in Moon and Hideshi Takesada, “North Korea,” in Muthiah Alagappa, ed., Coercion and Governance (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 2000), p. 373. 46. Oh and Hassig, North Korea, p. 124. 47. Kim Il Sung was posthumously enshrined in the document's preface as “eternal president.” 48. See “The State and Revolution,” and “Can the Bolsheviks Retain State Power?” in Robert C. Tucker, ed., The Lenin Anthology (New York: W. W. Norton, 1975), pp. 311–398, 399–406. 49. On China, Perlmutter and LeoGrande, “The Party,” pp. 784–785. This is also characteristic of Vietnam. 50. See generally, Nathan Leites, The Operational Code of the Politburo (New York: McGraw-Hill, 1951). On specific regimes, see Scobell, China's Use of Military Force, Chapter 2; Kim Ninh, “Vietnam,” in Muthiah Alagappa, ed., Asian Security Practice (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 1998), pp. 464–473; and Buzo, The Guerilla Dynasty. 51. Suck-Ho Lee, Party–Military Relations in North Korea: A Comparative Analysis (Seoul: Research Center for Peace and Unification of Korea, 1989), especially the conclusion. 52. Janos, “Social Science, Communism,” p. 97. 53. “[T]otalitarianism is therefore not an inappropriate description of the Stalinist political system.” Janos, “Social Science, Communism,” p. 96. Harold D. Lasswell, “The Garrison State,” The American Journal of Sociology Vol. 46 (January 1941), pp. 455–469. Odom calls communist regimes “garrison states.” Odom, The Collapse of the Soviet Military, p. ix. 54. Gregory F. T. Win, “North Korea,” in Edward A. Olsen and Stephen A. Jurika, eds., The Armed Forces in Contemporary Asian Societies (Boulder, CO: Westview, 1986), pp. 104–120; Moon and Takesada, “North Korea,” p. 336. 55. Theda Skocpol, “Social Revolutions and Mass Military Mobilization,” World Politics Vol. 42 (1988), pp. 147–168; Stephen Walt, Revolution and War (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1996). 56. Odom, The Collapse of the Soviet Military, p. 98, Chapter 1. 57. Juan Carlos Espinosa, “‘Vanguard of the State’,” Problems of Post-Communism Vol. 48 (November/December 2001), p. 20. Susan Eva Eckstein, Back From the Future (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1994), pp. 171–175. 58. Eberstadt, The End of North Korea, p. 48. 59. See David Holloway, Stalin and the Bomb (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 1996); Evan Feigenbaum, “Who's Behind China's High-Technology Revolution?” International Security Vol. 24 (Summer 1999), pp. 95–128. 60. John W. Lewis and Xue Litai, China Builds the Bomb (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 1988). 61. On North Korea's motivations, see Victor D. Cha, “North Korea's Weapons of Mass Destruction,” Political Science Quarterly Vol. 117 (2002), pp. 209–231. 62. Zoltan Barany, “The Military and Security Legacies of Communism,” in Zoltan Barany and Ivan Volgyes, eds., The Legacies of Communism in Eastern Europe (Baltimore, MD: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1995), p. 112. 63. Kenneth Lieberthal, Governing China (New York: W. W. Norton, 1995), p. 78. 64. Andrew Scobell, Going Out of Business: Divesting the Commercial Interests of Asia's Socialist Soldiers (Honolulu, HI: East–West Center, 2001), p. 14, Table 2. 65. Timothy J. Colton, The Dilemma of Reform in the Soviet Union (New York: Council of Foreign Relations, 1986), pp. 4–5. 66. Minxin Pei identifies a “sequencing problem” – successful reforms begin with the economy then shift to politics. See his From Reform to Revolution (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1994). 67. Eberstadt, The End of North Korea, p. 9. 68. Marcus Noland, Korea after Kim Jong Il (Washington, DC: Institute for International Economics, 2004), p. 28; other regimes have survived dramatic economic declines for extended periods, pp. 22–28. 69. Eckstein, Back From the Future, p. 218. 70. Harry Harding, China's Second Revolution (Washington, DC: Brookings Institution, 1987), pp. 33–39, 66–69. Harding argues that “at least some … political leaders knew their economy was facing serious, indeed chronic problems, and believed that drastic measures would be necessary” (pp. 33–34). 71. Compared to India, Indonesia, Thailand, and Brazil, China's Maoist growth rates were respectable: 4% annual Net Material Product per capita between 1953 and 1978. Barry Naughton, “The Pattern and Legacy of Economic Growth in the Mao Era,” in Kenneth Lieberthal et al., eds., Perspectives on Modern China (Armonk, NY: M. E. Sharpe, 1991), pp. 228–229. 72. Charles Harvie and Tran Van Hoa, Vietnam's Reforms and Economic Growth (New York: St. Martin's, 1997), pp. 205–206. 73. Janos Kornai, The Socialist System (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1992), pp. 171–180. 74. Frederic L. Pryor, The Red and the Green (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1992). 75. On Cambodia, see Charles H. Twining, “The Economy,” in Karl D. Jackson, ed., Cambodia 1975–1978 (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1989), pp. 149–150; on China, see Judith Bannister, China's Changing Population (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 1987), pp. 59–60, 84–85; on Mongolia, see C. R. Bawden, The Modern History of Mongolia (New York: Praeger, 1968), pp. 303–315, 345–346; on Vietnam, see Hoang Van Chi, “Collectivization and Rice Production,” in P. J. Honey, ed., North Vietnam Today (New York: Praeger, 1962), pp. 118–119. 76. Eberstadt, The End of North Korea, p. 9. 77. Natsios, The Great North Korean Famine, p. 11. 78. The Economist, March 13, 2004, pp. 41–43. 79. Noland, Korea after Kim Jong Il, pp. 46–57. 80. For a recent concise overview of these zones, see Andrew Scobell, North Korea's Strategic Intentions (Carlisle Barracks, PA: US Army War College Strategic Studies Institute, July 2005), p. 21. 81. Oh and Hassig, North Korea, p. 77. Samuel P. Huntington, Political Order in Changing Societies (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 1968), Chapter 6. 82. On the Soviet Union, see Robert Conquest, The Harvest of Sorrow (New York: Oxford University Press, 1986), Chapter 16, and Nicholas Werth, “A State Against Its People,” Stephane Courtois et al., eds., The Black Book of Communism (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1999), p. 83. 147. For China, see Jean-Louis Margolin, “China,” p. 495 in Courtois et al., eds., The Black Book of Communism; and Jasper Becker, Hungry Ghosts (New York: Free Press, 1996), Chapter 18. 84. Gilbert Rozman, “Stages in the Reform and Dismantling of Communism in China and Soviet Union,” in Gilbert Rozman, ed., Dismantling of Communism (Baltimore, MD: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1992), pp. 28–29. 85. Jean-Louis Margolin, “Cambodia,” in Courtois et al., eds., The Black Book of Communism, p. 591. 86. Noland, Avoiding the Apocalyse, pp. 91–93. 87. Natsios, The Great North Korean Famine, pp. 6, 224. 88. Natsios, The Great North Korean Famine, pp. 97–100. 89. Eberstadt, The End of North Korea, pp. 18–19, 100, 173 note 33. 90. Stephen K. Wegren, Agriculture and the State in Soviet and Post-Soviet Russia (Pittsburgh, PA: University of Pittsburgh Press, 1998). Pryor notes that ideology is a barrier to reform for communist regimes. 91. Kornai, The Socialist System, p. 174. 92. Odom, The Collapse of the Soviet Military, Chapter 4 and p. 235. 93. Odom, The Collapse of the Soviet Military, Chapter 4 and p. 235; Kornai, The Socialist System, pp. 540–541. 94. Eckstein, Back From the Future, p. 29. 95. On the Soviet Union, see Odom, The Collapse of the Soviet Military, Chapter 11; on China, see Evan Feigenbaum, China's Techno-Warriors (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 2003); on North Korea, see Moon and Takesada, “North Korea,” pp. 276–278. 96. John W. Lewis Ana Di, and Xue Litai, “Solving the Arms Export Enigma,” International Security Vol. 15 (1991), pp. 87–109; Scobell, Going Out of Business, p. 17. 97. Noland, Avoiding the Apocalypse, p. 72. 98. Scobell, Going Out of Business, p. 14, Table 2. 99. On the impact of PLA entrepreneurship, see Scobell, Going Out of Business. 100 .Thaveeporn Vasavakul, “Vietnam,” in Alagappa, Coercion, pp. 346–354. 101 .Odom, The Collapse of the Soviet Military, p. 235. 102 .Thane Gustafson, “Conclusions,” in Timothy J. Colton and Thane Gustafson, eds., Soldiers and the Soviet State (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1990), pp. 334–364. 103 .On Gorbachev's disdain for the Red Army, the jarring effect his reforms had on doctrine, and the jolt this gave to military leaders, see Odom, The Collapse of the Soviet Military. 104 .Espinosa, “Vanguard of the State”; Frank O. Mora, “A Comparative Study of Civil–Military Relations in China and Cuba,” Armed Forces and Society Vol. 28 (Winter 2002), pp. 185–209. 105 .Nicholas Eberstadt, Korea Approaches Reunification (Armonk, NY: M. E. Sharpe, 1995), Chapter 1. 106 .While average annual growth rate in CMEA countries was more than 10% in the early 1950s, 30 years later the average growth rate was barely 3%. Stephen White, Communism and Its Collapse (New York: Routledge, 2001), p. 43, Table 5.1. 107 .See, for example, Nina Hachigian, “The Internet and Power in One-Party Asian States,” Washington Quarterly Vol. 25 (Summer 2002), pp. 44–45. 108 .Hachigian, “The Internet and Power,” pp. 44–45. Ralph C. Hassig and Kongdan Oh, “The New North Korea,” in Oh and Hassig, eds., Korea Briefing 2000–2001 (Armonk, NY: M. E. Sharpe, 2002), pp. 96–98. 109 .Los Angeles Times, August 19, 1999, April 1, 2002. 110 .Hassig and Oh. “The New North Korea,” p. 97. 111. On China, see Nina Hachigan, “China's Cyber-Strategy,” Foreign Affairs, Vol. 80 (March/April 2001), pp. 47–51; Michael Chase and James Mulvenon, You've Got Dissent! (Santa Monica, CA: RAND, 2002). On Vietnam, see Hachigan, “The Internet and Power,” pp. 47–51. 112. Los Angeles Times, March 25, 2002. 113. Richard Lowenthal, “Development vs. Utopia in Communist Policy,” in Johnson, ed., Change, pp. 33–116. 114. Francis Fukuyama, “The End of History?” The National Interest (Summer 1989), pp. 3–18. 115. Joseph Fewsmith, “Where Do Correct Ideas Come From?” in David M. Finkelstein and Maryanne Kivlehan, eds., China's Leadership in the 21st Century (Armonk, NY: M. E. Sharpe, 2003), pp. 161–162. 116. Bruce Dickson, Red Capitalists in China (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2003). 117. David I. Steinberg, “On Patterns of Political Legitimacy in North Korea,” in Samuel S. Kim, ed., The North Korean System in the Post-Cold War Era (New York: Palgrave, 2001), pp. 87–114. 118. Buzo, The Guerilla Dynasty, p. 42. 119. Cumings, “The Corporate State,” pp. 214–215; Scott Snyder, Negotiating on the Edge (Washington, DC: United States Institute of Peace, 1999), pp. 34–35; Oh and Hassig, North Korea, p. 18. 120. Eberstadt, The End of North Korea, pp. 18–19, 100, 173 note 33. 121. Snyder, Negotiating on the Edge, pp. 34–35. 122. Kent E. Calder, “The New Face of Northeast Asia,” Foreign Affairs Vol. 80 (January/February 2001), pp. 112–114. 123. Alexander J. Motyl, Sovietology, Rationality, Nationality (New York: Columbia University Press, 1990), Chapters 5 and 6. 124. David M. Keithly, The Collapse of East German Communism (Westport, CT: Praeger, 1992), p. 81. 125. Bruce Cumings, Parallax Visions (Durham, NC: Duke University Press, 1999), p. 166. 126. Alexander J. Motyl, Will the Non-Russians Rebel? (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1987), Chapter 4 (quote on p. 57). 127. Susan L. Woodward, Balkan Tragedy (Washington, DC: Brookings Institution, 1995), pp. 29–41 (quote on p. 36). 128. Myron Rush, How Communist Regimes Change Their Rulers (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1974). 129. Rush, How Communist Regimes Change. Cuba and North Korea are his prime examples. 130. Ben Kiernan, The Pol Pot Regime, 2nd ed. (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 2002), pp. 11, 87–88, ff. 131. Arshi Pipa, Albanian Stalinism (Boulder, CO: East European Monographs, 1990), p. 121. 132. Ken Jowitt, “Moscow ‘Centre’,” East European Politics and Societies Vol. 1 (Autumn 1987), p. 320. 133. See Li Zhisui, The Private Life of Chairman Mao (New York: Random House, 1994), pp. 3–30, 629–636, 659. 134. Jorge Dominguez, “Leadership Changes, Factionalism, and Organizational Politics in Cuba Since 1960,” in Raymond Taras, ed., Leadership Change in Communist States (Boston, MA: Unwin Hyman, 1989), p. 144; Eckstein, Back From the Future, pp. 26–27. 135. Ken Jowitt, “Soviet Neotraditionalism,” Soviet Studies Vol. 35 (July 1983), p. 277. 136. Armstrong, The North Korean Revolution, p. 223. 137. Oh and Hassig, North Korea, p. 21. 138. New York Times, February 1, 2005. 139. Edward Cody, “N. Korean Demand Torpedoed Arms Talk; Diplomats Balked at Guaranteeing Right to Reactor,” Washington Post, August 8, 2005. 140. Indeed, this author believes that North Korea will never agree to give up its nuclear weapons program. See Andrew Scobell and Michael R. Chambers, “The Fallout of a Nuclear North Korea,” Current History Vol. 104 (September 2005), pp. 289–294. 141. For an analysis of these editorials, see Scobell, North Korea's Strategic Intentions, p. 18. 142. Madeleine Albright with Bill Woodward, Madam Secretary (New York: Miramax Books, 2003), p. 466.