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Optimal Sanctions When Individuals Are Imperfectly Informed about the Probability of Apprehension

1992; University of Chicago Press; Volume: 21; Issue: 2 Linguagem: Inglês

10.1086/467910

1537-5366

Lucian A. Bebchuk, Louis Kaplow,

Law, Economics, and Judicial Systems

Previous articleNext article No AccessOptimal Sanctions When Individuals Are Imperfectly Informed about the Probability of ApprehensionLucian Arye Bebchuk, and Louis KaplowLucian Arye Bebchuk, and Louis KaplowPDFPDF PLUS Add to favoritesDownload CitationTrack CitationsPermissionsReprints Share onFacebookTwitterLinkedInRedditEmail SectionsMoreDetailsFiguresReferencesCited by The Journal of Legal Studies Volume 21, Number 2Jun., 1992 Sponsored by The University of Chicago Law School Article DOIhttps://doi.org/10.1086/467910 Views: 18Total views on this site Citations: 52Citations are reported from Crossref Copyright 1992 The University of ChicagoPDF download Crossref reports the following articles citing this article:Thomas J. 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