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Post-1994 Politics in Rwanda: problematising ‘liberation’ and ‘democratisation’

2006; Taylor & Francis; Volume: 27; Issue: 6 Linguagem: Inglês

10.1080/01436590600842399

1360-2241

Filip Reyntjens,

Cambodian History and Society

Abstract When the Rwanda Patriotic Front (rpf) seized power in July 1994, winning the civil war and ending the genocide, this was seen by many as the succession of a bloody dictatorship by a decent government. Despite the early drift into authoritarianism, concentration of power and human rights abuse, Rwanda continued to be seen as a country in transition towards democracy. However, political transitions do not automatically lead from dictatorship to democracy, and Rwanda is but one of the illustrations of the weaknesses of the transition paradigm. Rather than liberation, inclusiveness and democracy, the rpf has brought oppression, exclusion and dictatorship. People's widespread and deep-rooted feelings of frustration, anger and despair are a fertile breeding ground for structural violence, and they are likely to again lead to acute violence. Notes 1 S Huntington, The Third Wave: Democratization in the Late Twentieth Century, Norman, OK: University of Oklahoma Press, 1991. 2 G O'Donnell & PC Schmitter, Transition from Authoritarian Rule: Tentative Conclusions About Uncertain Democracies, Baltimore, MD: John Hopkins University Press, 1986, p 6. 3 D Collier & S Levitsky, ‘Democracy with adjectives: conceptual innovation in comparative research’, World Politics, 49 (3), 1997, pp 430 – 451. 4 T Carothers, ‘The end of the transition paradigm’, Journal of Democracy, 13 (1), 2002, pp 5 – 21. 5 M Mamdani, When Victims Become Killers: Colonialism, Nativism and the Genocide in Rwanda, Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2001. 6 A Chua, World on Fire: How Exporting Free Market Democracy Breeds Ethnic Hatred and Global Instability, New York: Anchor Books, 2003, pp 6 – 7. 7 At the time of the 1994 genocide, the population comprised about 90% Hutu and about 9% Tutsi; the pygmoid Twa numbered well under 1% and were politically irrelevant. 8 This theme is developed more fully in F Reyntjens, ‘Rwanda, ten years on: from genocide to dictatorship’, African Affairs, 103 (411), 2004, pp 177 – 210. 9 On this, see F Reyntjens, ‘Constitution-making in situations of extreme crisis: the case of Rwanda and Burundi’, Journal of African Law, 40 (2), 1996, pp 236 – 239. 10 Twagiramungu was replaced by Pierre-Célestin Rwigema, also of the mdr, who was to quit his position and leave the country in 2000. 11 For a few early examples, see V Ndikumana & J Afrika, Lettre ouverte au Conseil de sécurité de l’ onu sur la situation qui prévaut au Rwanda, Nairobi, 14 November 1994; E Ruberangeyo, Mes inquiétudes sur la gestion actuelle rwandaise des fonds publics, 31 May 1995; S Musangamfura, J'accuse le fpr de crimes de génocide des populations d'ethnie hutu, de purification ethnique et appelle à une enquête internationale urgente, Nairobi, 8 December 1995; F Twagiramungu & S Sendashonga, FRD: Plate-forme politique, Brussels, March 1996; and T Lizinde, Rwanda: la tragédie, Brussels/Kinshasa, 1 May 1996. 12 This increasingly dawned upon Roméo Dallaire, the Canadian General who commanded the UN peacekeeping force in Rwanda (unamir). On several occasions he insisted that rpf troops rescue groups of Tutsi who were threatened, but to no avail. One day Kagame told him: ‘This war will cause many sacrifices. If these [threatened Tutsi] must be sacrificed for a good cause, they will be considered part of this sacrifice’. R Dallaire, J'ai serré la main du diable: La faillite de l'humanité au Rwanda, Outremont, Quebec: Libre Expression, 2003, p 451. 13 This argument was developed in a compelling fashion by a former rpa lieutenant. A Ruzibiza, Rwanda: L'histoire secrète, Paris: Editions du Panama, 2005. 14 Associated Press, Kigali, 23 March 2000. In addition, during a special parliamentary session on 24 March, Bizimungu was accused of ‘political crimes’ and of ‘serious violations of the constitution’. Panafrican News Agency, Kigali, 24 March 2000. 15 La Libre Belgique, 11 June 1999. 16 International Crisis Group (icg), Rwanda at the End of the Transition: A Necessary Political Liberalisation, Brussels: icg, 13 November 2002, p 2. 17 Agence France Press, Kigali, 7 March 2001. 18 Concertation chrétienne pour l'Afrique centrale, Rapport sur l'observation des élections communales au Rwanda, nd (2001). 19 Human Rights Watch (hrw), No Contest in Rwandan Elections: Many Local Officials Run Unopposed, New York: hrw, 9 March 2001. 20 icg, ‘Consensual Democracy’ in Post Genocide Rwanda: Evaluating the March 2001 District Elections, Brussels: icg, 9 October 2001. 21 lgdl, La problématique de la liberté d'expression au Rwanda, Kigali, December 2001. 22 hrw, Rwanda: Parliament Seeks to Abolish Rights Group, New York: hrw, 2 July 2004; Amnesty International, Rwanda: Deeper into the Abyss—Waging war on Civil Society, London: Amnesty International, 6 July 2004. 23 icg, Rwanda at the End of the Transition, p 6. 24 The opposition groups abroad unanimously condemned the whole process. 25 ap, ‘Rwandans endorse new constitution’, Kigali, 27 May 2003. 26 Mission d'observation électorale de l'Union Européenne, Rwanda: Référendum constitutionnel 26 mai 2003. Rapport final, 2003, pp 6 – 7, 10, 19 (translated from French). 27 For an analysis, see F Reyntjens, ‘Les nouveaux habits de l'empereur: analyse juridico-politique de la constitution rwandaise de 2003’, in S Marysse & F Reyntjens (eds), L'Afrique des grands lacs. Annuaire 2002 – 2003, Paris: L'Harmattan, 2003, pp 71 – 87. 28 Mission d'observation électorale de l'Union Européenne, Rwanda: Election présidentielle 25 aoÛt 2003, élections législatives 29 et 30 septembre, 2 octobre 2003. Rapport final, Brussels, nd (2004) (translated from French). 29 J-H Bradol & A Guibert, ‘Le temps des assassins et l'espace humanitaire, Rwanda, Kivu, 1994 – 1997’, Hérodote, 86 – 87, 1997, p 119 (translated from French). 30 Details of this calculation can be found in Reyntjens, ‘Rwanda, ten years on’, p 189. 31 M Dorsey, ‘Violence and power-building in post-genocide Rwanda’, in R Doom & J Gorus (eds), Politics of Identity and Economies of Conflict in the Great Lakes Region, Brussels: VUB University Press, 2000, pp 311 – 348. 32 Le Tribun du Peuple, 97, August 1997. For an overview of other criticisms in the national press, see Dialogue, 200, September – October 1997, pp 75 – 86. 33 ‘Memo des membres de [sic]fpr (Rwanda, Afrique du Sud, Canada, Etats-Unis)’, Michigan, 31 August 1997. 34 This term, literally meaning ‘little house’, was first used to refer to President Habyarimana's inner circle. See F Reyntjens, L'Afrique des grands lacs en crise: Rwanda, Burundi 1988 – 1994, Paris: Karthala, 1994, pp 189 – 190. 35 ‘Analyse politique du phénomène Akazu’, document signed by ‘a disappointed patriot’ (ie a member of the rpf). 36 See hrw, Rwanda: The Search for Security and Human Rights Abuses, New York: hrw, April 2000. 37 Examples can be found in Dorsey, ‘Violence and power-building’. 38 Sénat de Belgique, Session ordinaire 2001 – 2002, Commission d'enquête parlementaire ‘Grands Lacs', Auditions, vendredi 1er mars 2002, Compte-rendu, Doc. GR14. 39 The expression is from C Dietrich, The Commercialisation of Military Deployment in Africa, Pretoria: iss, 2001. 40 For a summary survey, see F Reyntjens, ‘The privatisation and criminalisation of public space in the geopolitics of the Great Lakes region’, Journal of Modern African Studies, 43, 2005, pp 587 – 607. 41 Africa Watch, Rwanda: Talking Peace and Waging War. Human Rights since the October 1990 Invasion, 27 February 1992. 42 Fédération internationale des droits de l'homme, Africa Watch, Union interafricaine des droits de l'homme et des peuples & Centre international des droits de la personne et du développement démocratique, Rapport de la commission internationale d'enquête sur les violations des droits de l'homme au Rwanda depuis le 1 er octobre 1990, March 1993, pp 66 – 75. 43 Though impossible to establish precisely, this high death toll is now accepted even by those who initially put forward lower figures. See, for example, G Prunier, Rwanda 1959 – 1996: Histoire d'un génocide, Paris: Dagorno, 1996, p 427. 44 Ruzibiza, Rwanda: L'histoire secrete. 45 By late 1997 compelling evidence was available through a large number of reports and testimonies. See, for example, hrw, Democratic Republic of the Congo. What Kabila is Hiding: Civilian Killings and Impunity in Congo, New York: hrw, October 1997; and Amnesty International, Democratic Republic of Congo: Deadly Alliances in Congolese Forests, London: Amnesty International, 3 December 1997. A list of sources can be found in F Reyntjens, La guerre des grands lacs: Alliances mouvantes et conflits extraterritoriaux en Afrique centrale, Paris: L'Harmattan, 1999, pp 113 – 116. 46 United Nations Security Council, Report of the Investigative Team charged with investigating serious violations of human rights and international humanitarian law in the Democratic Republic of Congo, S/1998/581, 29 June 1998, § 96. 47 Médecins sans frontières, Refugee Numbers Analysis, 9 May 1997. Several victims' accounts offer moving testimony to these atrocities. See MB Umutesi, Fuir ou mourir au Zaïre: Le vécu d'une réfugiée rwandaise, Paris: L'Harmattan, 2000; M Niwese, Le peuple rwandais un pied dans la tombe: récit d'un réfugiéétudiant, Paris: L'Harmattan, 2001; M Mpayimana, Réfugiés rwandais entre marteau et enclume: Récit du calvaire au Zaïre (1996 – 1997), Paris: L'Harmattan, 2004; and B Rugumaho, L'hécatombe des réfugiés rwandais dans l'ex-Zaïre: témoignage d'un survivant, Paris: L'Harmattan, 2004. 48 Amnesty International, Democratic Republic of Congo. Rwandese-controlled East: Devastating Human Toll, London: Amnesty International, 19 June 2001. 49 J Migabo Kalere, Génocide au Congo? Analyse des massacres de populations civiles, Brussels: Broederlijk Delen, 2002. 50 Amnesty International, Rwanda: Ending the Silence, London: Amnesty International, 25 September 1997. 51 Amnesty International, Rwanda. Civilians trapped in armed conflict: ‘The dead can no longer be counted’, London: Amnesty International, 19 December 1997. 52 A number of these massacres are detailed in Ruzibiza, Rwanda: L'histoire secrète, pp 405 – 415. 53 Republic of Rwanda, Etude sur les conditions de vie des déplacés vivant dans les camps du Nord-Ouest du Rwanda, Kigali, March 1999. 54 Reporters sans frontières, Rwanda. Discrete and Targeted Pressure: President Kagame is a Predator of Press Freedom, 7 November 2001. 55 lgdl, La problématique de la liberté d'expression au Rwanda. 56 icg, Rwanda at the End of the Transition, pp 14 – 16. 57 This desire to closely control the non-governmental sector was by no means new: already in December 1995 the government had decided to expel 38 ngos and to suspend the activities of 18 additional ones. 58 hrw, ‘Rwanda’, in World Report 2002, New York: hrw, 2002. 59 lgdl, La problématique de la liberté d'expression au Rwanda. 60 The strength of the state tradition also showed in the refugee communities in Zaire and Tanzania, where quasi-state organisations and practices were immediately put in place in the camps: extraterritorial creation of cells, sectors, municipalities and préfectures; keeping of registers of all sorts; emergence of political – administrative authorities; ‘war tax’ collection; and maintenance of the structures of the former Forces Armées Rwandaises, much more effective in combat than the Zairean army in 1996 – 97. 61 This is convincingly argued in J Pottier, Re-Imagining Rwanda: Conflict, Survival and Disinformation in the late Twentieth Century, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2002. 62 P Uvin, Aiding Violence: The Development Enterprise in Rwanda, West Hartford, CT: Kumarian Press, 1998, p 110. An attempt to understand the factors that led to genocide in 1994, the analysis and observations made by Uvin also seamlessly apply to post-genocide Rwanda.