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Nuclear Weapons and Anticipatory Attacks: Implications for Russia and the United States

2015; Routledge; Volume: 28; Issue: 1 Linguagem: Inglês

10.1080/13518046.2015.998121

1556-3006

Stephen J. Cimbala,

International Relations and Foreign Policy

AbstractAnticipatory attacks come in two forms. Preemptive attacks are first strikes based on the assumption that the opponent has already set an attack in motion or is about to, and the purpose of the preemption is to mitigate or neutralize the effect of the enemy’s move. Preventive wars, on the other hand, are undertaken to preclude a threatening power from increasing its capabilities relative to ours, assuming that smaller differences in power will lead the challenger to become more risk acceptant. With respect to nuclear weapons, deterrence is intended to preclude both preemptive and preventive attacks, although the former is judged to be more likely than the latter. Leaders authorizing a nuclear preemption would need to have high confidence about the intentions as well as the capabilities of the other state, and the requirements for fine-grained intelligence would be considerable, prior to any actual launch of delivery systems. Seeing into the other side’s world view, regardless of its apparent rationality or lack thereof, would also be prudent before undertaking a decision of such magnitude. Notes1 Reasons for Russia’s reluctance to embrace additional nuclear arms limitations are discussed in P. Sinovets, ‘Why Russia Undermines the Norm of Nuclear Disarmament’, PONARS Eurasia, 20 December 2013, http://www.ponarseurasia.org, in Johnson’s Russia List 2014 (1), 1 January 2014, davidjohnson@starpower.net2 K. P. Mueller, J. J. Castillo, F. E. Morgan, N. Pegahi, and B. Rosen, Striking First: Preemptive and Preventive Attack in U.S. National Security Policy, RAND Corporation, Santa Monica, CA, 2006, p. 10.3 The author here is not defending preventive or preemptive attacks in general, nor the Bush version of preemption (actually preventive war).4 N. Khrushchev, cited in G. T. Allison, Essence of Decision: Explaining the Cuban Missile Crisis, Little, Brown, Boston, 1971, p. 212.5 G. T. Allison, Ibid., p. 224.6 See P. Bracken, The Second Nuclear Age: Strategy, Danger, and the New Power Politics, Henry Holt–Times Books, New York, 2012, pp. 127–211. For an examination of types of scenarios for nuclear first use, see G. H. Quester, Nuclear First Strike: Consequences of a Broken Taboo, Johns Hopkins University Press, Baltimore, MD, 2006, pp. 24–52.7 On this issue, see P. Bracken, Fire in the East: The Rise of Asian Military Power and the Second Nuclear Age, (Harper Collins, New York, 1999), pp. 95–124.8 Insightful analyses pertinent to this topic include: C. S. Gray, Making Strategic Sense of Cyber Power: Why the Sky Is Not Falling, Strategic Studies Institute, U.S. Army War College, Carlisle, PA, 2013; T. M. Chen, An Assessment of the Department of Defense Strategy for Operating in Cyberspace, Strategic Studies Institute, U.S. Army War College, Carlisle, PA, 2013; K. T. Jabbour and E. P. Ratazzi, ‘Does the United States Need a New Model for Cyber Deterrence?’, chapter 3 in A. B. Lowther (ed.), Deterrence: Rising Powers, Rogue Regimes, and Terrorism in the Twenty-First Century, Palgrave-Macmillan, New York, 2012, pp. 33–45; and M. C. Libicki, Cyberdeterrence and Cyberwar, RAND Corporation, Santa Monica, CA, 2009.9 Important theoretical perspective and policy-relevant commentary on future war (and warfare) appear in R. N. Lebow, Why Nations Fight: Past and Future Motives for War, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 2010, especially chapters 5 and 6, and in C. S. Gray, Another Bloody Century: Future Warfare, Weidenfeld and Nicolson, London, 2005, passim. See also: M. van Creveld, The Transformation of War, The Free Press, New York, 1991, pp. 1–32 and pp. 192–223.10 For contrasting perspectives on this issue, see K. N. Waltz, ‘More May Be Better’, chapter 1 in S. D. Sagan and K. N. Waltz, The Spread of Nuclear Weapons: A Debate, W.W. Norton, New York, 1995, pp. 1–45, and S. D. Sagan, ‘More Will Be Worse’, chapter 2 in Sagan and Waltz, The Spread of Nuclear Weapons, pp. 47–91.11 On the concepts of the first and second nuclear ages, see P. Bracken, The Second Nuclear Age, passim.; C. S. Gray, The Second Nuclear Age, Lynne Rienner, Boulder, CO, 1999; and K. B. Payne, Deterrence in the Second Nuclear Age, University Press of Kentucky, Lexington, KY, 1996.12 Prospective applications for deterrence theory as well as its limitations receive expert appraisal in P. M. Morgan, ‘The State of Deterrence in International Politics Today’, Contemporary Security Policy 33(1) (2012), pp. 85–107. On deterrence and rationality, see P. M. Morgan, Deterrence Now, (Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 2003), pp. 42–79.13 P. M. Morgan, ‘The State of Deterrence in International Politics Today’, p. 97.14 Grateful acknowledgment is made to Dr. James Scouras for use of his Arriving Weapons Sensitivity Model@ model for making calculations and drawing graphs in this study. Dr. Scouras is not responsible for any analysis or arguments herein. For a fuller explanation of this methodology with pertinent illustrations, see S. J. Cimbala and J. Scouras, A New Nuclear Century: Strategic Stability and Arms Control, (Praeger Publishers, Westport, CT, 2002), pp. 25–73.15 Unfortunately the old Cold War-style recipes for nuclear decapitation are now complicated by the possibility of cyberwar and related information operations. US government and other definitions for cyberspace and related concepts are reviewed in D. T. Kuehl, ‘From Cyberspace to Cyberpower: Defining the Problem’, chapter 2 in F. D. Kramer, S. H. Starr, and L. K. Wentz (eds.), Cyberpower and National Security, (National Defense University Press–Potomac Books, Washington, DC, 2009), pp. 24–42. See also M. C. Libicki, Cyberdeterrence and Cyberwar, RAND Corporation, Santa Monica, CA, 2009; T. L. Thomas, Cyber Silhouettes: Shadows Over Information Operations, (Foreign Military Studies Office, Fort Leavenworth, KS, 2005); and D. S. Alberts, J. J. Garstka, R. E. Hayes, and D. T. Signori, Understanding Information Age Warfare, 3rd ed., (DOD Command and Control Research Program, U.S. Department of Defense, Washington, DC, 2004). On influence operations, see J. Arquilla, Worst Enemy: The Reluctant Transformation of the American Military, (Ivan R. Dee, Chicago, 2008), chapter 6. On the role of information operations in Russian military policy, see T L. Thomas, Recasting the Red Star: Russia Forges Tradition and Technology through Toughness, (Foreign Military Studies Office, Fort Leavenworth, KS, 2011), chapter 6 and Appendix One.16 On this topic, see A. Wilner and A. Cordesman, U.S. and Iranian Strategic Competition: The Gulf Military Balance, Center for Strategic and International Studies, Washington, DC, 2011, pp. 102–128, and D. Albright, P.Brannan, and J. Shire, Can Military Strikes Destroy Iran’s Gas Centrifuge Program? Probably Not, Institute for Science and International Security, ISIS Report, Washington, DC, 2008, isis@isis-online.org. For US intelligence community thinking on Iran, see Director of National Intelligence J. Negroponte, DNI Annual Threat Assessment 2006, cited in A. H. Cordesman, Iran’s Nuclear and Missile Programs: A Strategic Assessment, (Center for Strategic and International Studies, Washington, DC, 2006), p. 23. For force projections and scenarios for the Middle East, see A. H. Cordesman, Warfighting and Proliferation in the Middle East, Center for Strategic and International Studies, Washington, DC, 2007.17 For pertinent estimates, see P. Podvig, ‘New START Treaty in Numbers’, from his blog, Russian Strategic Nuclear Forces, 9 April 2010, http://russianforces.org/blog/2010/03/new_start_treaty_in_numbers.shtml. The author also gratefully acknowledges a draft briefing by J. R. Howe, Current and Future Russian Strategic Nuclear Forces and Implications for US Policy, Strategy, and Force Structure (Draft: Work in Progress, Vision Centric, Inc., 3 June 2013).18 On the issue of Japan as a nuclear-weapons state, see P. Bracken, The Second Nuclear Age, pp. 239–241.19 See World Nuclear Association, Fukushima Accident of 2011, http://www.world-nuclear.org/info/Safety-and-Security/Safety-of-Plants/Fukushima-Accident.html, updated 2 April 2013 (accessed 8 April 2013).20 On minimum deterrence, see H. M. Kristensen, R. S. Norris, and I. Oelrich, From Counterforce to Minimal Deterrence: A New Nuclear Policy on the Path Toward Eliminating Nuclear Weapons, Federation of American Scientists and Natural Resources Defense Council, Washington, DC, 2009.21 J. W. Forsyth, Jr., B. C. Saltzman, and G. Schaub, Jr., ‘Minimum Deterrence and Its Critics’, Strategic Studies Quarterly 4(4) (2010), pp. 3–12. Paul Bracken warns that it may be misleading to characterize South or East Asian nuclear forces as minimum deterrents because that designation understates the range of scenarios for making political use of these forces, and, in addition, insufficiently appreciates the effects of combining regional nuclear forces with advanced technology for information warfare, stealth, and precision strike. See P. Bracken, The Second Nuclear Age, chapters 6–7 especially p. 188.22 McG. Bundy, ‘To Cap the Volcano’, Foreign Affairs 48(1) (1969), pp. 1–20, citation p. 10, http://www.jstor.org/stable/20039419 (accessed 21 October 2011).23 For pertinent illustrations, see P. Bracken, The Second Nuclear Age, pp. 144–148.24 This point is made in the larger context of an argument for further Russian and American nuclear arms reductions, and for strengthening the nuclear nonproliferation regime, by W. K. H. Panofsky, ‘Nuclear Insecurity’, Foreign Affairs, 86(5) (2007), p. 109, in Johnson’s Russia List 2007 (180), 23 August 2007, davidjohnson@starpower.net25 Gen. (Ret.) J. Cartwright, Chair, Global Zero Nuclear Policy Commission, Modernizing U.S. Nuclear Strategy, Force Structure and Posture, (Global Zero, Washington, DC, 2012), www.globalzero.org26 L. J. Korb and A. Rothman, ‘No First Use: The Way to Contain Nuclear War in South Asia’, Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, 68(2) (2012), pp. 34–42.27 P. Bracken, The Second Nuclear Age, pp. 262–267.Additional informationNotes on contributorsStephen J. CimbalaStephen J. Cimbala is Distinguished Professor of Political Science at Penn State Brandywine. An award winning Penn State teacher, he is the author of numerous works in the fields of nuclear strategy and arms control and US national security policy. His recent publications include Arms for Uncertainty (Ashgate, 2013) and U.S. National Security (with Sam C. Sarkesian and John Allen Williams) (Lynne Rienner, 2013).