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The PLA and Diplomacy: unraveling myths about the military role in foreign policy making

2013; Routledge; Volume: 23; Issue: 86 Linguagem: Inglês

10.1080/10670564.2013.832526

1469-9400

You Ji,

International Development and Aid

AbstractThe PLA's role in Beijing's foreign policy-making process is a closed book but it is a key research topic in our study of Chinese diplomacy. This paper argues that generally the PLA abides by a fine division of labor with the Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MoFA) in managing Beijing's international pursuits. The civilians are in charge of China's generic foreign affairs and daily diplomacy. The Central Military Commission (CMC) is responsible for security/military-related foreign affairs and defines the bottom-line for employing force in conflicts. Institutionally the PLA's role is more directional than detailed and is often behind the scenes. This complicates our research of the subject matter, as the line between this division of labor is thin over many diplomatic issues. Often times it is hard to demarcate where Beijing's normal diplomacy ends and where security/military dynamics begin. This paper adopts a two-layered analysis on civil–military interaction on foreign and security affairs: the broad consensus of CCP–PLA leaders on CCP regime stability at a time of drastic domestic change and world pressure; and the PLA's directional role in China's security/military-related foreign affairs under a generic civilian guidance. Notes 1. On the PLA's influence on foreign policy, see Lai Hongyi and Su-Jeong Kang, ‘Domestic bureaucratic politics and Chinese foreign policy’, Journal of Contemporary China 23(86), (2014) ; Ellis Joffe, ‘How much does the PLA make foreign policy’, in David Goodman et al., eds, China Rising: Interdependence and Nationalism (London: Routledge, 1997). 2. The NSLG was created in September 2000 in parallel with the FALG but with identical membership. It is one body with two name plates (合署办公). As members are all from top Party, state and military agencies with whole or partial responsibility for external affairs, meetings are arranged under either name according to the themes, and attended by different functional clusters to decide on relevant matters. 3. A typical case is the PLA's key role in Taiwan affairs which is still in a state of war. See You Ji, ‘The anti-secession law and the risk of war in the Taiwan Strait’, Contemporary Security Policy 27(2), (2006); and Shuisheng Zhao, ‘Military coercion and peaceful offence: Beijing's strategy of national reunification with Taiwan’, Pacific Affairs 72(4), (2000). 4. Gong Li et al., ‘The evolution of China's foreign policy decision-making mechanism—1949–2009’, World Economy and Politics no. 11, (2009), p. 48. 5. A small number of academic papers deal with the topic either from the political angle or in the light of crisis management. See for instance, Linda Jakobson et al., New Foreign Policy Actors in China, SIPRI Policy Paper No. 26, (2010); and Andrew Scobell et al., eds, Chinese National Security Decisionmaking under Stress (Carlisle, PA: US Army War College Press, 2005). 6. According to my informant only Dai Binguo had a direct telephone line to Hu (Wang Yi was not a diplomat then) but over a dozen PLA generals were allowed to call Hu directly. Xi has a wide range of direct contacts with both diplomats and generals and both formally and informally. In the Hu era, if we identify the 100 most powerful men in China, probably only one or two diplomats would enter the count but no fewer than ten generals can be easily identified. 7. For instance, the PLA follows Party policy on civil–defense conversion, see Dongmin Lee, ‘Swords to ploughshares: China's defense-conversion policy’, Defense Studies 11(1), (2011). 8. You Ji, ‘The 17th Party Congress and the CCP's changing elite politics’, in Yang Dali et al., eds, China's Reform at 30 (Singapore: World Scientific, 2009). 9. For instance, the Yang brothers' intervention helped Deng change China's course of development in 1992. Support from the top generals Guo Boxiong and Xu Caihou helped Hu make a crucial decision on Bo Xilai. In the handling of the Bo affair the CMC followed Hu's nine-word order 讲政治, 顾大局, 守纪律: enhance the sense of politics (sensitive to Party elite strife); protect the Party's overall interest (constraint on one's personal ambition); and abide by Party disciplines (aware of disciplinary punishment). See Daily Military Report, CCTV-7, (15 February 2012).10. On this symbiosis, see David Shambaugh, Modernizing China's Military: Progress, Problems and Prospects (Berkeley, CA: The UC Press, 2003); and Li Nan, ed., Chinese Civil–Military Relations: The Transformation of the People's Liberation Army (London: Routledge, 2006).11. Michael Kiselycznyk et al., Civil–Military Relations in China: Assessing the PLA's Role in Elite Politics, China Strategic Perspectives Paper No. 2 (Washington, DC: The US National Defense University, 2010).12. James Dobbins, ‘War with China’, Survival 54(4), (2012), pp. 7–24.13. Xi's way of commanding the gun is through getting the PLA ready to fight and win the next war, now the top civil–military agenda in daily work. The PLA Daily, (11 December 2012).14. Ge Dongsheng, On National Security Strategy (Beijing: PLA Academy of Military Science Press, 2006), p. 226.15. Suspending military ties is a CMC decision recommended to civilians each time there is a sizeable arms sale, following Deng's precedent on US arms sales in 1982. Six suspensions have been recorded. This sets a pattern of response difficult for civilian leaders to reverse.16. When Gates wrote a letter to Liang Guanglie in March 2010, expressing his hope to visit China, the Chinese side politely replied that the time was not convenient but it extended a welcome-to-visit signal to him, in a not too distant future. In May, Gates sent another message to Liang, hoping to visit Beijing before the Shangri-la Dialogue. He may have believed that the first Chinese decline was ceremonial. Yet the PLA again said that the timing was not convenient. This time Gates was infuriated and probably helped resolve Washington's hesitation over whether to announce the pivot in the ARF meeting in July. However, from the PLA's perspective, Gates was indeed welcome but if this happened too soon, it would make the suspension of military ties a mockery, which was politically unacceptable. Information from both Beijing and Washington sources, July 2011.17. The Chinese Academy of Social Science (CASS), Japan Blue Book—2013 (Beijing: The CASS Press, 2013).18. Ma Xiaotian, ‘Thoughts on the new changes in China's current external security situation’, Study Times, (2 January 2012), p. 1.19. Qi Jianguo's speech at the 12th Shangri-la Dialogue on 2 June 2013, Singapore. He particularly mentioned that ‘the Diapyu dispute should be left to the future generations to decide on’.20. ‘Support to state reaction to Japan's purchase of Diaoyu is absolute mainstay public opinion’, Global Times, (20 September 2012), p. 1.21. The spirit of this reactive assertiveness has been well explained by Alastair Ian Johnston, ‘How new and assertive is China's new assertiveness’, International Security 37(4), (2013), pp. 7–48.22. Delegates to regional security conferences often express such a view that if they do not try to force concessions from China now, they will be impossible when China becomes really powerful. The mentality of ‘now or never’ underscores a zero-sum approach against the dispute control.23. On the impact on anti-Japanese demonstration on Chinese foreign policy making, see James Reilly, ‘A wave to worry about? Public opinion, foreign policy and China's anti-Japan protest’, Journal of Contemporary China 23(86), (2014).24. Liu Jixian, ‘New development of PLA political work: study Hu Jintao's military thought’, Political Work of the PLA no. 10, (2008), p. 2.25. Both Jiang and Hu acted upon Deng's instruction that ‘if we handle our internal affairs well, no external pressure can crash us’, which was issued with his 24-word foreign policy principle (keep a low profile) to Jiang on 4 September 1989. A few years later Deng added another four characters to it—有所作为 (dare to take initiatives). In policy terms, Deng emphasized that domestic order was more important than a ‘low external profile’. Leng Rong, Deng Xiaoping Annual Record: 1975–1997 (Part Two) (Beijing: CCP Central Literature Publisher, 2007), p. 1289.26. The concept was first raised by Jiang in 2002. Opportunity was derived from the US war against terror. Chen Xiangyang, ‘Firmly grasp the late period of China's strategic opportunity period’, Outlook Weekly, (15 August 2012).27. After the US pivot to Asia Hu issued a series of instructions to the PLA with a central theme of ‘making maximized effort to preserve China's opportunity period’. See Newspaper for Chinese National Defense, (12 January 2012), p. 3.28. ‘Interview with senior colonel Chen Zhou’, China Military Science no. 1, (2012), p. 52.29. Ma Xiaotian, ‘Thoughts on the new changes in China's current external security situation’, p. 1.30. Taylor Fravel, ‘Regime insecurity and international cooperation: explaining China's compromise in territorial disputes’, International Security 30(2), (2005), p. 55.31.Ibid., p. 57.32. All the disputes are leftovers from the ROC era, not initiated by the PRC. Li Dianren, Military Transformation of Chinese Characteristics [Beijing: The PLA National University (PLA NDU) Press, 2007], p. 73.33. ‘Already world number 2, still need to keep low?’, People's Daily, (11 December 2012), p. 1.34. Shuisheng Zhao, Chinese Foreign Policy: Pragmatism and Strategic Behavior (New York: M.E. Sharpe, 2004).35. In his speech to the Politburo meeting on foreign policy on 28 January 2013 Xi used the phrase ‘strategic steadiness’ (战略定力) to express Beijing's resolve to maintain Deng's foreign policy guidance in a new global environment. ‘Politburo study session on foreign policy’, People's Daily, (29 January 2013), p. 1.36. Deng Xiaoping, Selected Work of Deng Xiaoping, Vol. 3 (Beijing: Renminchubanshe, 1993), p. 320.37. Qiang Xin, ‘Cooperation opportunity or confrontation catalyst? The implication of China's naval development for China–US relations’, Journal of Contemporary China 21(76), (2012), p. 615.38. Li Yuanpeng, ‘A debate on coastal defense or fort defence in strategic focus in the late Qing dynasty’, China Military Science no. 2, (2002), p. 57.39. Feng Liang, The Maritime Security and Chinese Peace Development (Beijing: The World Knowledge Publication House, 2010).40. Chen's speech to the US National Defense University on 18 May 2011.41. For instance, at the height of the Sino–Filipino standoff in May 2012, Ma Xiaotian promised that the PLA would not use force and would seek a diplomatic solution. See Diplomat (Japan), (17 June 2012), p. 7.42. He Fudong, ‘Flexible response to control the military initiative’, The Journal of PLA NDU no. 11, (1994), p. 54.43. Only a small number of ‘PLA TV stars’ are authorized to do the second-function jobs, i.e. Yin Zhuo from the Navy, Meng Xiangqing and Li Li from the NDU, Qiao Liang from the Air Force who are on the list approved by the PLA General Department of Political Affairs.44. Wang Wenrong, The Guideline for the PLA's Third Modernization (Beijing: The PLA Publishing House, 2005), p. 82.45. You Ji, ‘Politics in command of Beijing's military policy toward Taiwan’, in Weixing Hu, ed., New Dynamics in Cross-Taiwan Straits Relations: How Far Can the Rapprochement Go? (London: Routledge, 2013).46. Zhang Youxia, ‘War of sovereignty control: a practical kind of warfare that can be tried in war preparation’, Military Art 29(11), (2002), pp. 3–6.47. Chen Ligong, Study of Defensive Joint Land Warfare in Cold Plateau Areas along Border Lines in Response to a Chain of Wars (Beijing: The PLA NDU Press, 2005), p. 12.48.Ibid., p. 41.49. Liu Yongxin, ‘Guiding principle for counter-attack campaigns in the border regions’, Military Art no. 3, (2003), p. 39.50. Qiu Dali, ‘Strategic consideration of the development of the army’, The Journal of PLA NDU no. 3, (2003), p. 29.51. Xia Fuguo, ‘Defense as the chief principle but with limited counter attacks for the land border defense’, The Journal of PLA NDU no. 5, (2003), p. 42.52.Ibid., p. 43.53. Cheng Xiaodong, ‘A study of control in the final stage of joint operations in informatized warfare’, China Military Science no. 1, (2012), p. 122.54. Liu Yongxin, ‘Guiding principle for counter-attack campaigns in the border regions’, p. 40. Also, see Zhang Zhiyong, Military Art no. 2, (2002), p. 20.55. Chen Ligong, Study of Defensive Joint Land Warfare in Cold Plateau Areas along Border Lines in Response to a Chain of Wars, p. 48.56. Geng Yansheng, the PLA's spokesman, reiterated this in his news brief on 24 February 2012. He said that the PLA had never wanted to challenge the US military unless it had to react to certain issues that it could not avoid.57. This policy change followed Deng's 1992 formula that the Spratly dispute should be shelved so that joint resource development could be pursued.58. The Writing Group, The Textbook of National Defense Strategy (Beijing: The PLA NDU Press, 1990), p. 62.59. Secretary Powell confirmed in Beijing that the PLA had stopped tailing US spy planes in the ESCSs. See the transcript of his speech to the news conference in Beijing on 28 July 2001.60. Ku Guishen, ‘The socialist market economy and the military development’, The Journal of the PLA NDU no. 6, (1993), p. 46.61. Peng Guangqian, Research of Strategic Issues in Chinese Military (Beijing: The PLA NDU Press, 2007), p. 256. Also, see The Chinese Defense White Paper—2012.62. You Ji, ‘Hu Jintao's succession and power consolidation strategy’, in John Wong and Lai Hongyi, eds, China's Political and Social Change in Hu Jintao Era (Singapore: World Scientific, 2006).63. Bonnie Glaser and Philip Saunders, ‘Chinese civilian foreign policy research institute: evolving roles and increasing influence’, China Quarterly no. 171, (2002), pp. 597–616.64. Exchange of views between the delegation of overseas Chinese political scientists and general Xiong Guangkai on 14 September 2008 in Beijing.65. For instance, Ashley Tellis, ‘China's military space strategy’, Survival 49(3), (2007); Craig Covault, ‘Chinese test anti-satellite weapon’, Aviation Week & Space Technology, (17 January 2007).66. Talk with officers in the Foreign Affairs Office, Ministry of National Defense (MoND), July 2010 in Beijing.67. Information from my interviews in Beijing in June 2009.68. ‘Test of stealth fighter clouds Gates visit to China’, New York Times, (11 January 2011).69. This information is based on talks with senior staff at the foreign affairs office of the MoND in Singapore in June 2011.70. Liu Huaqing, The Memoirs of Liu Huqing (Beijing: PLA Publishing House, 2004), pp. 324–345.71. You Ji, ‘The PLAN's Gulf of Aden mission as capability building against NTS threats’, in Lyle Goldstein, ed., Not Congruent but Quite Complementary: Chinese and American Approaches to Non-traditional Security (New Ports: US Naval War College Press, 2012).72. Beijing retaliated against Manila's use of their navy to arrest Chinese fishermen by setting de facto control over the Huanyan Islet and Tokyo's nationalization of Diaoyu by realizing routine patrols of the disputed areas.73. Xu Yan, ‘Several decades of Sino–Pilipino disputes in the South China Sea’, Study Times, (21 May 2012), p. 8.74. Yin Zhuo stated that the PLA would not fire the first shot but was ready for retaliation. See Chinese National Defense Newspaper, (7 February 2012), p. 1.75. Major general Jin Yinan's interview with People.Net, (14 August 2012).76. Rear admiral Yin Zuo's speech to the People's Forum in People.Net, (31 July 2013).77. When the so-called core national interests were referenced, it was about the SCS, but the Hainan part of it. The Western media confused it with the Spratlys part.78. After Wang Wei's plane was down, his winger reportedly sought approval from the Air Base command to shoot down the EP-3. Then the order came directly from the CMC, which was ‘strictly no action’. Oral sources from a PLAN researcher in Beijing in July 2002.79. Chinese defense minister Liang Guanglie told his Vietnam counterpart in the 2011 Shangri-la Dialogue that the PLA was not aware of this event. It was done by civilians. Information I obtained indicated that the order came from the Navy's Xisha Surveillance District after consulting its superiors. The reason was that the Chinese boat was already hooked to the Vietnam ship for two hours. This could cause the boat to capsize and endanger the Chinese crew. It was a last resort rather than a preferred option.80. Li Mingjing, ‘Local liberalism: China's provincial approaches to relations with southeast Asia’, Journal of Contemporary China 23(86), (2014).81. Hu Dongxia, ‘An analysis of Hu Jintao's important instruction on maritime defence’, Chinese Military Science no. 3, (2012), p. 63.82. On this assertiveness, see Mingjiang Li, ‘Reconcile assertiveness and cooperation? China's changing approach to the South China Sea dispute’, Security Challenges 6(2), (2010), pp. 49–68.83. You Ji, ‘CCP power transition in the 18th Congress and Xi Jinping's command of the gun’, in Philip Hsu and Tengshen Chan, eds, The CCP's 18th Congress and Political Succession (Taipei: INK Publishing, 2012).84. Although Xi rejected a PLA request to dispatch combat aircraft to escort civilian surveillance planes to patrol the Diaoyu area in response to Japan's practice of using several F-15s to intercept one Chinese civilian plane, he approved PLAAF aircraft to enter Japan's self-imposed Air Defense Identification Zone on 10 January 2013. Western analysts see this as a turn in the Diaoyu standoff. Michael Cole, ‘Japan, China scramble military jet in the East China Sea’, The Diplomat, (11 January 2013).