Japan 1979: The Second Oil Crisis
1980; University of California Press; Volume: 20; Issue: 1 Linguagem: Inglês
10.2307/2644006
ISSN1533-838X
Autores Tópico(s)Korean Peninsula Historical and Political Studies
ResumoWHEN THE HEADS OF GOVERNMENT from Japan, the United States, West Germany, France, Italy, Great Britain, and Canada met for the Tokyo Summit in mid-1979, Japan seemed to be doing as well as, and often far better than, any of these nations. It had the best record in terms of unemployment, the best economic growth, the least inflation, the most productive workers, and on and on. At that very moment, in fact, Ezra Vogel's Japan As Number One was proclaiming these points (and much more), and had become an instant best seller in Japan.' But the Japanese were not in a boastful mood. They always view the outside world with a mixture of fascination and anxiety, and in 1979 the focus was clearly toward anxiety. Perhaps more than in any recent year, there was a clear linkage between foreign and domestic affairs. If the situation could be summed up in a single word, it would be vulnerability-Japan's deeply perceived sense of its plight as a resource-shy nation. The year began with the reign of chaos in Iran, which to Japan spells oil. At the same time, serious war broke out between China and Vietnam. Would this impair the flow of Southeast Asia's abundant natural resources to Japan, or cut the sea route to Middle East oil? Might the Soviets, always distrusted in Tokyo, use the war to build bases in Vietnam? And then there was the assassination of President Park Chunghee of South Korea, a nation not only vital to Japan's security, but now among its key areas for both financial investments and foreign trade.
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