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The challenge of monitoring biodiversity in payment for environmental service interventions

2011; Elsevier BV; Volume: 144; Issue: 12 Linguagem: Inglês

10.1016/j.biocon.2011.07.036

1873-2917

Matt Sommerville, E.J. Milner‐Gulland, Julia P. G. Jones,

Environmental Conservation and Management

Payments for environmental services (PES) aim to improve the supply of environmental services by making payments to service providers, which are conditional on the provision of those services. Payments cannot be conditional unless the service can be effectively monitored, making monitoring of service provision a central feature of PES. We introduce a framework for designing monitoring programmes in PES schemes for biodiversity conservation. We suggest that decisions must be made concerning the indicators to be used (e.g. species, threats or positive actions), how they will be monitored (e.g. using ground-based or remote-sensed data) and how the monitoring information will be used to differentiate payments (e.g. trends over time, performance relative to neighbouring sites, performance against a target). We then use this framework to examine the feasibility of monitoring species and threat indicators in a community-based biodiversity payment scheme in Menabe, Madagascar. We find that detecting population changes, differences between sites, or whether a target has been met is only feasible for the most common indicators, suggesting that it may not be possible to base payments on the species conservationists are most interested in. If payments need to be based on relatively common indicators, threat indicators may be more appropriate than common species indicators due to a stronger relationship to the service of interest (presence of a rare species). It is, however, possible to incorporate information from rare indicators using accumulation curves to compare between sites. This study highlights the impact of indicator choice on the monitoring effort required in a biodiversity PES. We urge caution in the design of payment schemes and suggest it can be detrimental to structure a scheme around an indicator that cannot be effectively monitored.