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Defending the Rule of Law in Emergencies Through Checks and Balances

2009; Taylor & Francis; Volume: 5; Issue: 2 Linguagem: Inglês

10.1080/17419160903008317

1741-9166

Stefan Olsson,

International Law and Aviation

Abstract In a sudden emergency, such as a terror attack or an earthquake, the government usually assumes extra powers. These extra powers may, however, become a threat against the liberties of citizens. Most countries have tried to solve this problem by enacting special emergency laws. In this article, it is argued that we also need to focus on the system of checks and balances that is an integral part of a constitutional government. Drawing on the empirical research on crisis management and on constitutional theory, I explore how checks and balances work during emergencies. Keywords: Crisis ManagementDisaster ManagementEmergency ManagementRule of LawState of EmergencyState of Exception Notes 1.The concept of the legality principle (or principle of legality) is ambiguous, with different meanings in different countries. In this article I am using it in its German and Swedish version, representing the idea that all actions by government authorities must be based on law. Anglo-American readers would probably feel more at home with the concept of rule of law. However, rule of law is a much wider concept covering many more aspects of how the government should wield its power. The legality principle is, in this article, seen as one element of the general ideal of rule of law. 2. Ministry of Labour Anna Greta Leijon after having deported terrorists to West Germany in 1975; A-G Leijon, Alla rosor ska inte tuktas (Stockholm: Tiden, 1991), 152. 3. Council of Europe, Emergency Powers. Science and Techniques of Democracy, No. 12. Strasbourg, France: Council of Europe Publishing, 1995); O. Gross and F. N. Aolaín, Law in Times of Crisis: Emergency Powers in Theory and Practice (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 2006), 35–46. 4. Generally, the right to declare an emergency lies with the executive. The former communist states of Europe, though, have chosen to put this prerogative in the hands of the legislature. See V. I. Ganev, "Emergency Powers and the New East European Constitutions," The American Journal of Comparative Law, vol. 3 (1997): 585–612. 5. For example, Constitution de la République Française, Article 16 or Grundgesetz für die Bundesrepublik Deutschland, Articles 80a or 81. 6. For example, the U.S. Patriot Act (PL 107-56, H.R. 3162), the British Terrorism Act 2000 (c. 11). 7. For example, the U.S. Stafford Act (42 U.S.C. 5221-5206), the British Civil Contingencies Act 2004 (c. 36), or the Swedish Civil Protection Act (SFS 2003:778). 8. Gross and Aolaín, Law in Times of Crisis, ch. 1; see also D. Dyzenhaus, "The Compulsion of Legality," in V. V. Ramraj (Ed.), Emergencies and the Limits of Legality (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 2008). 9. This position also seems to have some empirical support. In an extensive study of human rights abuse, Keith and Poe find that constitutional provisions for "non derogable" rights in some instances increase the likelihood of abuse of other "derogable" rights; see L. C. Keith and S. C. Poe "Are Constitutional State of Emergency Clauses Effective? An Empirical Exploration," Human Rights Quarterly, vol. 26 (2004): 1071–1079. 10. J. Ferejohn and P. Pasquino, "The Law of the Exception: A Typology of Emergency Powers," International Journal of Constitutional Law, vol. 2 (2004): 210–239. 11. Lobel has termed this the "absolutist position," J. Lobel, "Emergency Powers and the Decline of Liberalism," Yale Law Journal, vol. 98 (1989): 1385–1433, 1386–1387; H. Jermsten, Konstitutionell nödrätt (Stockholm: Juristförlaget, 1992), 11–32. 12. For example, in 1973, when a bank robbery devolved into a hostage situation, the Swedish cabinet negotiated directly with the bank robber. The robber had demanded that a well-known and imprisoned convict should be brought to him in the bank, and the cabinet agreed to his demands. This was in direct violation of chapter 11, article 7 of the Instrument of Government stating: "No public authority, including the Riksdag and the decision-making bodies of local authorities, may determine how an administrative authority shall decide in a particular case relating to the exercise of public authority vis-à-vis a private subject or a local authority, or relating to the application of law." 13. This is identical to how emergencies were handled in the United States during the 19th century. Emergencies could justify unlawful acts. They were justified but still unlawful. Lobel, Emergency Powers, 1394–1397; E. Holmberg and N. Stjernquist, Grundlagarna (Stockholm: Norstedts förlag, 1980), 216–217). 14. Swedish Civil Protection Act (SFS 2003:778),778. 15. Gross and Aolaín, Law in Times of Crisis, 41. 16. Constitution of the Republic of Hungary, Article 19, mentions "state of war," "state of national crisis," and "state of emergency"; Hungarian Constitution, translated in A. Tschentscher (Ed.), International Constitutional Law (last modified 5 June 2003), Constitución Espanola, Article 116, mentions "estados de alarma, de excepción y de sitio." See also Council of Europe, 7–9. 17. The concept "state of exception" is rarely used in the English language. It is, however, the main concept in other languages: German: Ausnahmezustand; Spanish: estado de excepción; Swedish: undantagstillstånd. 18. C. Schmitt, Political Theology (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 1985). 19. These scholars all argue in defense of the position that it is wrong to assume that a state of emergency is a morally empty situation. The Schmittian, or relativist position, seems to have its defenders only among government officials. N. C. Lazar, "Must Exceptionalism Prove the Rule? An Angle on Emergency Government in the History of Political Thought," Politics and Society, vol. 34 (2005): 245–275. Gross and Aolaín, Law in Times of Crisis, 110–170; D. Dyzenhaus, The Compulsion of Legality; M. V. Tushnet, "Emergencies and the Idea of Constitutionalism." In B. E. Thomas and J. F. Stack (Eds.), At War with Civil Rights and Civil Liberties (Lanham, MD: Rowman & Littlefield, 2006); G. Agamben, State of Exception (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 2005); M. Ignatieff, The Lesser Evil: Political Ethics in an Age of Terror (Edinburgh, UK: Edinburgh University Press, 2004), 25–53; K. L. Scheppele, "Law in a Time of Emergency: States of Exception and the Temptations of 9/11," Journal of Constitutional Law, vol. 6 (2004): 1001–1083; Lobel, Emergency Powers. 20. L. T. Drennan and A. McConnell, Risk and Crisis Management in the Public Sector (New York: Routledge, 2007), 14–17; A. Boin, P. 't Hart, E. Stern, and B. Sundelius, The Politics of Crisis Management: Public Leadership Under Pressure (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 2005), 2–4; E. K. Stern, "Crisis Studies and Foreign Policy Analysis: Insights, Synergies, and Challenges," International Studies Review, vol. 2 (2003): 186–189; E. K. Stern, Crisis Decisionmaking: A Cognitive Institutional Approach (Stockholm: Försvarshögskolan, 2001), 8; B. Sundelius, E. Stern and F. Bynander, Krishantering på svenska: Teori och praktik (Stockholm: Santérus Förlag, 2001), 13; A. L. George (1980) Presidential Decisionmaking in Foreign Policy: The Effective Use of Information and Advice (Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1980), 25–27. 21. G. F. Allison & P. Zelikow, Essence of Decision: Explaining the Cuban Missile Crisis, 2nd ed. (New York: Longman, 1999), 283–287; The psychological dimension has recently been highlighted by some legal scholars as well; C. R. Sunstein, Laws of Fear: Beyond the Precautionary Principle. (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 2005); C. E. Wells, "Questioning Deference," Missouri Law Review, vol. 69 (2004): 903–949; Gross and Aolaín, Law in Times of Crisis, 105–109.; Boin et al., The Politics of Crisis Management; Sundelius et al., Krishantering på svenska, 16–54. 22. United States Senate, Hurricane Katrina: A Nation Still Unprepared (Special Report of the Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs, 2006), 140–141. 23. S. Olsson and P. Narby, Justifying Hard Choices During Crisis Decision Making (forthcoming, 2009). 24. It is possible that the legal traditions of different countries may make the government officials behave differently. Officials in countries with a common law tradition will naturally be inclined to rely more on precedents than officials in countries with a civil law tradition. But this difference should not be exaggerated. In neither country would a government official be allowed toact unless he in advance can state on what laws or precedents his authority rests on. C. R. Sunstein, Legal Reasoning and Political Conflict (Oxford, UK: Oxford University Press, 1996), 21–26, 124–128. 25. The idea that all hard cases have a solution is, of course, questionable, but I think it is fair to say that the vast majority of all cases do make their way through the court system. For a discussion on legal indeterminacy, see R. Dworkin, Taking Rights Seriously (London: Duckworth, 1977), 81–130; Sunstein, Legal Reasoning and Political Conflict, 35–61. K. Kress, "Legal Indeterminacy," California Law Review, vol. 2 (1989): 283–337. 26. D. J. Galligan, Discretionary Powers: A Legal Study of Official Discretion (Oxford, UK: Clarendon, 1990), 12–13; Dworkin, Taking Rights Seriously, 31–39; F. Sterzel, Författning i utveckling. Rättsfondens Skriftserie 33 (Uppsala, Sweden: Iustus Förlag, 1998), 107–129. 27. I. Omar, Rights, Emergencies and Judicial Review (The Hague: Kluwer Law International, 1996), Chapter IX; W. B. Fisch, "Emergency in the Constitutional Law of the United States," The American Journal of Comparative Law, vol. 38, Supplement, (1990), U.S. Law in an Era of Democratization; Lobel, Emergency Powers, 1409–1412; D. C. Kramer, "The Courts as Guardians of Fundamental Freedoms in Times of Crisis," Universal Human Rights, vol. 4 (1980): 1–23; A. L. Sturm, "Emergencies and the Presidency," The Journal of Politics, vol. 1 (1949): 121–144; J. P. Clark, "Emergencies and the Law," Political Science Quarterly, vol. 2 (1934): 268–283; W. H. Rehnquist, All the Laws but One: Civil Liberties in Wartime (New York: Vintage Books, 1998), 218–225; B. Ackerman, "The Emergency Constitution," The Yale Law Journal,vol. 5 (2004): 1056, 1066; Sunstein, Laws of Fear, 204–223; Keith and Poe, "Are Constitutional State of Emergency Clauses Effective?"; C. E. Wells, "Questioning Deference," 903–949; Gross and Aolaín, Law in Times of Crisis, 78. 28. An introduction to the discussion on how to use bills of rights in emergencies can be found in S. R. Chowdhury, Rule of Law in a State of Emergency: The Paris Minimum Standards of Human Rights Norms in a State of Emergency (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1989) and J. Fitzpatrick, Human Rights in Crisis: The International System for Protecting Rights During States of Emergency (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 1994). 29. C. L. Rossiter, Constitutional Dictatorship: Crisis Government in the Modern Democracies (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1948), 300, 303; C. J. Friedrich, Constitutional Government and Democracy: Theory and Practice in Europe and America (Waltham, MA: Blaisdell Publishing Company, 1968), 566–570; Chowdhury, Rule of Law in a State of Emergency, 36, 41–55, 57; J. Hatchard "The Implementation of Safeguards on the Use of Emergency Powers: A Zimbabwean Perspective," Oxford Journal of Legal Studies, vol. 1 (1989): 127; Ganev, "Emergency Powers," 595; H. Tingsten, Konstitutionella Fullmaktslagar I Modern Parlamentarism, Skrifter utgivna av Fahlbeckska stiftelsen VI. (Lund, Sweden: Gleerup, 1926), 130–131; H. Tingsten, Regeringsmaktens expansion under och efter världskriget: Studier över konstitutionell fullmaktslagstiftning. Skrifter utgivna av Fahlbeckska stiftelsen XV. (Lund, Sweden: Gleerup, 1930), 203; H. Tingsten, Les Pleins Pouvoirs: L'expansion des Pouvoirs Gouvernementaux Pendant et Après la Grande Guerre (Paris: Stock, 1934); Gross and Aolaín, Law in Times of Crisis, 56–58. 30. All of these statutes, except a few, were revoked by the National Emergency Act (50 U.S.C. 1601–1651) of 1976, H. C. Relyea, National Emergency Powers. CRS Report for Congress, 2001, Order Code 98–505 GOV, http://www.opencrs.com/document/98-505/, cited: 17/11 2005; H. C. Relyea, A Brief History of Emergency Powers in the United States (Honolulu, HI: University Press of the Pacific, 2005), v. 31. C. L. Rossiter, Constitutional Dictatorship, 299; Omar, Rights, Emergencies, 94–103. 32. Boin et al. The Politics of Crisis Management, 45–51; Stern, Crisis Decisionmaking, 38–29, 63; Allison and Zelikow, Essence of Decision; I. L. Janis, Groupthink: Psychological Studies of Policy Decisions and Fiascos (Boston: Houghton Mifflin Company, 1982); George, Presidential Decisionmaking, 23–24, 81–108; O. R. Holsti, "Crisis Decision Making," in P. H. Tetlock et al. (Eds.), Behaviour, Society, and Nuclear War (New York: Oxford University Press, 1989), 28–34; R. N. Lebow, Between Peace and War: The Nature of International Crisis (Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 1981), 103–114. 33. A. L. George and E. K. Stern, "Harnessing Conflict in Foreign Policy Making: From Devil's to Multiple Advocacy," Presidential Studies Quarterly, vol. 3 (2002): 484–508; George, Presidential Decisionmaking, 169–174. 34. Boin et al., The Politics of Crisis Management, 55; Sundelius et al., Krishantering på svenska, 35, 153–157. 35. S. Olsson, Constitutional Crisis Management: Defending the Rule of Law Whitout Rules (Stockholm: Krisberedskapsmyndigheten, 2005), 27–29. 36. Rules of Procedure for the Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence, United States House of Representatives, 108th Congress. 37. Rossiter, Constitutional Dictatorship, 299; Friedrich, Constitutional Government and Democracy, 566–570; Sturm, "Emergencies and the Presidency", 135–136; Ganev, "Emergency Powers," 590. 38. The presidential decrees were issued by the Reichspräsident and the Reichskansler jointly, but could be vetoed by the Reichstag (Paragraph 48). 39. J. E. Finn, Constitutions in Crisis: Political Violence and the Rule of Law (New York: Oxford University Press, 1991), 161–170. 40. D. P. Franklin, Extraordinary Measures: The Exercise of Pregorative Powers in the United States (Pittsburgh, PA: University of Pittsburgh Press, 1991), 124–137. 41. Finn, Constitutions, 28–35; C. F. Ignatieff, The Lesser Evil, 49. 42. O. Gross, "Chaos and Rules: Should Responses to Violent Crises Be Constitutional?" The Yale Law Journal, vol. 5 (2003): 1127. 43. S. Olsson, Så fungerar författningen vid kriser: En studie av hur statsmakterna hanterat morden på olof palme och Anna Lindh (Stockholm: Krisberedskapsmyndigheten, 2006). 44. S. Chesterman, "Deny Everything: Intelligence Activities and the Rule of Law." In V. V. Ramraj (Ed.), Emergencies and the Limits of Legality (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 2008). 45. I have searched the archives of The London Times and The Guardian/The Observer between 7 July and 30 September 2005, using the database Factiva.com. Only a handful of articles describe the actions of the cabinet and its terrorist response committee COBRA. The descriptions are brief and none of them address the question of whether the cabinet had deemed it necessary to resort to "extraordinary measures." Another study, performed by one of my students, about what type of information the cabinet and its agencies give out during press conferences shows a similar result. The focus is almost entirely on the police investigation or the measures taken by the government to ensure public safety. Constitutional matters are not discussed. See K. Nygren, Krishantering i offentlighetens ljus?: En Studie av terrorattentaten i london, D-level Essay (Department of Government, Uppsala University, 2005); (These findings are consistent with the findings from Sweden, Olsson, Så Fungerar Författningen, 2006.) 46. D. Bonner, Emergency Powers in Peacetime (London: Sweet and Maxwell, 1985), 44–47, 64. 47. M. J. Rozell, Executive Privilege: Presidential Power, Secrecy, and Accountability (Lawrence: University Press of Kansas, 2002); L. Fisher, The Politics of Executive Privilegie (Durham, NC: Carolina Academic Press, 2004). 48. Olsson, Så fungerar författningen, 2006. 49. Boin et al., The Politics of Crisis Management, 109. 50. The 9/11 Commission Report, 325–334. Available at: http://www.9-11commission.gov/report/911Report.pdf. 51. Boin et al., The Politics of Crisis Management, 91–114. 52. A. Laursen, "Israel's Supreme Court and International Human Rights Law: The Judgement on 'Moderate Physical Pressure,'" Nordic Journal of International Law, vol. 69 (2000): 413–447. 53. See also, A. P. Simester, "Necessity, Torture, and the Rule of Law." In V.V. Ramraj (Ed.), Emergencies and the Limits of Legality (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press); G. Lübbe-Wolff, "Rechtsstaat und Ausnahmerecht," Zeitschrift für Parlamentsfragen, vol. 1 (1980): 110–125; H. Jermsten, Konstitutionell nödrätt (Stockholm: Juristförlaget, 1992), 85–92. A very strong argument against using the doctrine of necessity as an ex ante justification is found in Gross and Aolaín, Law in Times of Crisis, 134–142.