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Civilian Defense Forces, State Capacity, and Government Victory in Counterinsurgency Wars

2013; Taylor & Francis; Volume: 37; Issue: 2 Linguagem: Inglês

10.1080/1057610x.2014.862904

1521-0731

Goran Peic,

Politics and Conflicts in Afghanistan, Pakistan, and Middle East

AbstractGiven the onset of a violent rebellion by an armed non-state group, how do states re-establish intra-state peace and hence fulfill their basic function as providers of internal security? In this article I argue that one way governments perform this core function is by recruiting non-combatants into local self-defense units called civilian defense forces (CDFs). By providing for local security, leveraging their superior local knowledge, and provoking insurgent reprisals against civilians, CDF units facilitate the influx of tactical intelligence as well as isolate insurgents from non-combatant populations physically as well as politically. Consistent with the argument, statistical analyses of two different cross-national data sets of insurgencies from 1944 to 2006 reveal that a state is 53 percent more likely to vanquish a guerrilla threat if the incumbent deploys CDFs. The analyses also cast doubt on a recent claim in the literature that incumbent force mechanization adversely affects the states’ ability to counter insurgent threats. Given that CDF deployment is a more easily manipulable variable than most other elements of state power, CDFs appear to be an effective instrument of counterinsurgency deserving of further academic and policy attention. AcknowledgmentsI thank Dan Reiter, Cliff Carrubba, Kyle Beardsley, Jeff Staton, Drew Linzer, Ariel Ahram, Jacob Shapiro, Stathis Kalyvas, and all participants of the Brown Bag Colloquium in the Department of Political Science at Emory University.NotesGabriella Slomp, “On Sovereignty,” in Trevor C. Salmon, ed., Issues in International Relations (New York: Routledge, 2008), p. 38.Andrew Mack, “Why Big Nations Lose Small Wars: The Politics of Asymmetric Conflict,” World Politics 27 (1975); Gil Merom, How Democracies Lose Small Wars: State, Society, and the Failures of France in Algeria, Israel in Lebanon, and the United States in Vietnam (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2003); Ivan Arreguin-Toft, How the Weak Win Wars: A Theory of Asymmetric Conflict (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2005); Richard H. Shultz and Andrea J. Dew, Insurgents, Terrorists, and Militias: The Warriors of Contemporary Combat (New York: Columbia University Press, 2006); Jason Lyall and Isaiah Wilson, “Rage Against the Machines: Explaining Outcomes in Counterinsurgency Wars,” International Organization 63 (2009).John J. McCuen, The Art of Counter-Revolutionary War: The Strategy of Counter-Insurgency (Mechanicsburg, PA: Stackpole Books, 1966); Julian Paget, Counter-Insurgency Operations: Techniques of Guerilla Warfare (New York: Walker, 1967); Jeffrey Race, War Comes to Long An: Revolutionary Conflict in a Vietnamese Province (Los Angeles, CA: University of California Press, 1973). Matthew Cooper, The Nazi War Against Soviet Partisans, 1941–1944 (New York: Stein and Day, 1979); Alistair Horne, A Savage War of Peace (New York: Penguin Books, 1987); Gregg R. Jones, Red Revolution: Inside the Philippine Guerrilla Movement (Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1989); Douglas S. Blaufarb and George K. Tanham, Who Will Win?: A Key to the Puzzle of Revolutionary War (New York: Crane Russak, 1989); Brian McAllister Linn, The US Army and Counterinsurgency in the Philippine War, 1899–1902 (Chapel Hill, NC: University of North Carolina Press, 1989); Paul Richards, Fighting For the Rain Forest: War, Youth & Resources in Sierra Leone (James Currey, 1996); Stathis N Kalyvas, The Logic of Violence in Civil War (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2006); Ben Connable and Martin Libicki, How Insurgencies End (Santa Monica, CA: RAND Corporation, 2010).Joseph H. Felter, Taking Guns to a Knife Fight: Effective Military Support to COIN (Carlisle, PA: Army War College, 2008).Stephen Biddle, Jeffrey A. Friedman, and Jacob N. Shapiro, “Testing the Surge: Why did Violence Decline in Iraq in 2007?” International Security 37 (2012).Jason Lyall, “Are Co-Ethnics More Effective Counter-Insurgents? Evidence from the Second Chechen War,” American Political Science Review 104 (2010).Patrick B. Johnston, “Does Decapitation Work? Assessing the Effectiveness of Leadership Targeting in Counterinsurgency Campaigns,” International Security 36 (2012); Kalyvas, “Logic of Violence in Civil War.”Mark Lichbach, The Rebels Dilemma (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 1995); T. David Mason and Dale A. Krane, “The Political Economy of Death Squads: Toward a Theory of the Impact of State-Sanctioned Terror,” International Studies Quarterly 33 (1989); Matthew Adam Kocher, Thomas B. Pepinsky, and Stathis N. Kalyvas, “Aerial Bombing and Counterinsurgency in the Vietnam War,” American Journal of Political Science 55 (2011).Contact author for replication data and supporting materials.Lyall, “Are Co-Ethnics More Effective Counter-Insurgents?”Gil Merom, How Democracies Lose Small Wars; Stathis N. Kalyvas, “Warfare in Civil Wars,” in Isabelle Duyvesteyn and Jan Angstrom, eds., Rethinking the Nature of War (New York: Frank Cass, 2005); John A. Nagl, David H. Petraeus, James F. Amos, and Sarah Sewall, “The US Army/Marine Corps Counterinsurgency Field Manual,” US Army Field Manual No. 3–24 (2006); Robert M Cassidy, Counterinsurgency and the Global War on Terror: Military Culture and Irregular war (Westport, CT: Praeger, 2006); David Galula, Counterinsurgency Warfare: Theory and Practice (Westport, CT: Praeger, 2006).Note that I also refer to incumbent actors as governments or counterinsurgents.Lyall and Wilson, “Rage Against the Machines,” p. 70.Merom, How Democracies Lose Small Wars, pp. 33–34; Eli Berman, Jacob N. Shapiro, and Joseph H. Felter. “Can Hearts and Minds Be Bought? The Economics of Counterinsurgency in Iraq,” Journal of Political Economy 119 (2011).H. T. Hayden, Warfighting: Maneuver Warfare in the US Marine Corps (Mechanicsburg, PA: Stackpole Books, 1995), pp. 161–162.U.S. Marine Corps, Small Wars Manual (Washington, DC: United States Government Printing Office, 1940), p. 6–2; Milton E. Osborne, Strategic Hamlets in South Vietnam: A Survey and Comparison (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1965), p. 5; Frank Kitson, Low Intensity Operations: Subversion, Insurgency, Peace-Keeping (London: Faber and Faber, 1971), p. 95; Nguyên Giáp Võ, People's War, People's Army: The Viet Cong Insurrection Manual for Underdeveloped Countries (Westport, CT: Praeger, 1962); Ernesto “Che” Guevara, Guerrilla Warfare (Thousand Oaks, CA: BN Publishing, 1969); Debray, Régis, Revolution in the Revolution?: Armed Struggle and Political Struggle in Latin America (Westport, CT: Greenwood Press, 1980).Mao Tse-Tung, The Art of War (El Paso, TX: El Paso Norte Press, 2005), p. 211.Alexander B. Downe, Targeting Civilians in War (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 2008); Henry H. Perritt, Kosovo Liberation Army: The Inside Story of an Insurgency (Champaign: University of Illinois Press, 2008); Claire Metelits, Inside Insurgency: Violence, Civilians, and Revolutionary Group Behavior (New York: New York University Press, 2009).U.S. Marine Corps, Small Wars Manual, pp. 1–6; McCuen, The Art of Counter-Revolutionary War, p. 34; Lichbach, The Rebels Dilemma, pp. 131–132.Kitson, Low Intensity Operations; Johnston, “Does Decapitation Work?”Lichbach, The Rebels Dilemma; Kalyvas, The Logic of Violence in Civil War; David T. Mason, Caught in the Crossfire: Revolutions, Repression, and the Rational Peasant (Lanham, MD: Rowman & Littlefield, 2004).Galula, Counterinsurgency Warfare; David Kilcullen, Counterinsurgency (New York: Oxford University Press, 2010).Although these paramilitary units bear a wide variety of designations such as self-defense militias or home guards, I follow Connable and Libicki, How Insurgencies End and adopt the term civilian defense force.For example, 10 soldiers per 1 insurgent or 20 soldiers per 1,000 civilians. See James T. Quinlivan, “Force Requirements in Stability Operations,” Parameters 25 (1995); John M. Collins, Military Strategy: Principles, Practices, and Historical Perspectives (Dulles, VA: Potomac Books, 2002), p. 188; Connable and Libicki, How Insurgencies End, p. 129.U.S. Marine Corps, Small Wars Manual, pp. 5–17. McCuen, The Art of Counter-Revolutionary War, p. 35.Galula, Counterinsurgency Warfare, p. 54.Kitson, Low Intensity Operations, p. 111; Nagl, Petraeus, Amos, and Sewall, “The US Army/Marine Corps Counterinsurgency Field Manual,” pp. 1–19; Galula, Counterinsurgency Warfare, p. 53; Kalyvas, The Logic of Violence in Civil Wars; George K. Tanham, Communist Revolutionary Warfare: From the Vietminh to the Viet Cong (Westport, CT: Greenwood Press, 2006), p. 54; David C. Gompert, Terrence K. Kelly, Brooke Stearns Lawson, Michelle Parker, and Kimberly Colloton, Reconstruction Under Fire: Unifying Civil and Military Counterinsurgency (Washington, DC: RAND Corporation, 2009), p. 2. McCuen, The Art of Counter-Revolutionary War, p. 33.James D. Fearon and David D. Laitin, “Ethnicity, Insurgency, and Civil War,” American Political Science Review 97 (2003); Paul Collier and Anke Hoeffler, “Greed and Grievance in Civil War,” Oxford Economic Papers 56 (2004); Patrick Barron, Kai Kaiser, and Menno Pradhan, Local Conflict in Indonesia: Measuring Incidence and Identifying Patterns (Washington, DC: World Bank, 2004); Quy-Toan Do and Lakshmi Iyer, “Poverty, Social Divisions, and Conflict in Nepal,” World Bank Working Paper (2007).Raymond W. Copson, Africa's Wars and Prospects for Peace (Armonk, NY: M. E. Sharpe, 1994).James Ron, Weapons Transfers and Violations of the Laws of War in Turkey (Washington, DC: Human Rights Watch, 1995), pp. 54–55; Mia Bloom, Dying to Kill: The Allure of Suicide Terror (New York: Columbia University Press, 2007), p. 111.Global IDP Database, Profile of Internal Displacement: Philippines (As of 27 March, 2001) (Norwegian Refugee Council, 2001).Anthony James Joes, Resisting Rebellion: The History and Politics of Counterinsurgency (Lexington: University Press of Kentucky, 2004), p. 115.Cassidy, Counterinsurgency and the Global War on Terror, p. 138.John A. Nagl, “Counterinsurgency in Vietnam: American Organizational Culture and Learning,” in Daniel Marston and Carter Malkasian, eds., Counterinsurgency in Modern Warfare (New York: Osprey Publishing, 2010), p. 145. Joes, Resisting Rebellion, pp. 115–116.McCuen, The Art of Counter-Revolutionary War, p. 112; John H. Badgley and John Wilson Lewis, Peasant Rebellion and Communist Revolution in Asia (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 1974), p. 94; Connable and Libicki, How Insurgencies End, p. 148; Cassidy, Counterinsurgency and the Global War on Terror, p. 138; Charles Gwynn, Imperial Policing (Macmillan and Co., Limited, 1934); Galula, Counterinsurgency Warfare.Asia Watch Report, Bad Blood: Militia Abuses in Mindanao, the Philippines (New York: Asia Watch Committee, 1992), p. 11.Geraint Hughes, “A ‘Model Campaign’ Reappraised: The Counter-Insurgency War in Dhofar, Oman, 1965–1975,” The Journal of Strategic Studies 32 (2009), pp. 292–293.Henry J. Barkey and Graham E. Fuller, Turkey's Kurdish Question (Lanham, MD: Rowman & Littlefield, 1998), p. 147; Evren Balta, Causes and Consequences of the Village Guard System in Turkey (City University of New York, unpublished manuscript, 2004), p. 10; Lydia Khalil, “Turkey and the PKK,” in James J. F. Forest, ed., Countering Terrorism and Insurgency in the 21st Century: International Perspectives (Westport, CT: Praeger, 2007), p. 392.Badgley and Lewis, Peasant Rebellion and Communist Revolution in Asia, p. 94.Kalyvas, Logic of Violence in Civil War; Kocher, Pepinsky, and Kalyvas, “Aerial Bombing and Counter-Insurgency in the Vietnam War.”Lyall, “Are Co-Ethnics More Effective Counter-Insurgents?”Caroline Elkins, Imperial Reckoning: The Untold Story of Britain's Gulag in Kenya (New York: Henry Holt and Co., 2005), p. 70; Kalyvas, Logic of Violence in Civil War, p. 109.Christian Gerlach, Extremely Violent Societies: Mass Violence in the Twentieth-Century World (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2010), p. 198.Roger Miranda and William Ratliff, The Civil War in Nicaragua: Inside the Sandinistas (New Brunswick, NJ: Transaction, 1993), p. 93.Terry Wieland, A View From a Tall Hill: Robert Ruark in Africa (Camden, ME: Countrysport Press, 2010), p. 180.Abiodun Alao, Mau-Mau Warrior (New York: Osprey Publishing, 2006), p. 48.J. Gordon Mumford, Drums of Rebellion: Kenya in Chaos (New Westminster, Canada: Zebra Publishing, 2005), p. 79.David Anderson, Histories of the Hanged: The Dirty War in Kenya and the End of Empire (New York: Norton & Company, 2005), p. 133.Stathis N. Kalyvas and Laia Balcells, “International System and Technologies of Rebellion: How the End of the Cold War Shaped Internal Conflict,” American Political Science Review 104 (2010).Lyall and Wilson, “Rage Against the Machines,” p. 70.Note also that I make two revisions to Lyall and Wilson's list: omitting France v. MDMR (1946–8) and Zimbabwe v. ZANU, ZAPU (1966–79), which appear to be duplicate observations of France v. Malagasy (1947–8) and Zimbabwe v. ZANU, ZAPU (1972–9).Kalyvas and Balcells, “International System and Technologies of Rebellion,” p. 418.Ibid., p. 423.Nicholas Sambanis, “Do Ethnic and Nonethnic Civil Wars Have the Same Causes?: A Theoretical and Empirical Inquiry (Part 1),” Journal of Conflict Resolution 45 (2001).Ibid., p. 262. Note that Kalyvas and Balcells exclude eight cases of urban uprising such as the 1979 Iranian revolution, two cases of large-scale rioting, and fold the 1991 and 1997 episodes of the civil war in Sierra Leone. I accept these modifications as well (see their online Appendix for more information). In addition, following Sambanis's (2004) suggestion, I drop three observations that most likely do not meet one or more of the civil war inclusion criteria: Burundi v. Hutus (1965–9), Uganda v. Buganda (1966), and Egypt v. Islamic Jihad (1994–7); Nicholas Sambanis, “What is Civil War?: Conceptual and Empirical Complexities of an Operational Definition,” Journal of Conflict Resolution 48 (2004).Kalyvas, “Warfare in Civil Wars.”These cases were identified using the UCDP/PRIO Armed Conflict Dataset. They include: Netherlands v. Indonesia (1946–9); France v. Viet Minh (1946–54); France v. MDMR (1947); United Kingdom v. Malayan Communists (1950–60); United Kingdom v. Mau-Mau (1952–6); France v. Tunisia (1953–6); France v. Morocco (1953–6); France v. Algeria (1954–62); France v. Cameroon (1957–9); Portugal v. Angola (1961–75); Portugal v. Guinea Bissau (1962–74); and Portugal v. Mozambique (1964–74); Nils Petter Gleditsch, Peter Wallensteen, Mikael Eriksson, Margareta Sollenberg, and Havard Strand, “Armed Conflict 1946–2001: A New Dataset,” Journal of Peace Research 39 (2002).Alan C. Stam, Win, Lose, or Draw: Domestic Politics and the Crucible of War (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 1996).In coding outcomes, I use a narrow definition of draws in that the insurgent movement must obtain either a power-sharing or autonomous arrangement. The possibility exists that a rebel organization's initial aim is limited to a power-sharing or autonomous arrangement, the subsequent achievement of which may strike some observers as a defeat for the incumbent rather than a draw. However, given that bargaining demands are endogenous to estimates of relative power and resolve, coding such cases as victories would get at a different conceptual definition—the accuracy of an incumbent's estimates.Meredith Reid Sarkees and Frank Whelon Wayman, Resort to War: A Data Guide to Inter-State, Extra-State, Intra-State, and Non-State Wars, 1816–2007 (Washington, DC: CQ Press, 2010).Charles Phillips and Alan Axelrod, Encyclopedia of Wars (New York: Infobase Publishing, 2005); Micheal Clodfelter, Warfare and Armed Conflicts: A Statistical Reference to Casualty and Other Figures, 1500–2000 (Jefferson, NC: McFarland & Company, 2002); Peter N. Stearns, The Encyclopedia of World History: Ancient, Medieval, and Modern (New York: Houghton Miin, 2001); George Childs Kohn, Dictionary of Wars (New York: Infobase Publishing, 2007).Fearon and Laitin, “Ethnicity, Insurgency, and Civil War.”Stathis N. Kalyvas, “Promises and Pitfalls of an Emerging Research Program: The Microdynamics of Civil War,” in Stathis N. Kalyvas, Ian Shapiro, and Tarek Masoud, eds., Order, Conflict, and Violence (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2008).David E. Cunningham, Kristian Skrede Gleditsch, and Idean Salehyan, “It Takes Two: A Dyadic Analysis of Civil War Duration and Outcome,” Journal of Conflict Resolution 53 (2009).Lyall and Wilson, “Rage Against the Machines,” p. 84.Cassidy, Counterinsurgency and the Global War on Terror, p. 12.Most notably, in Lyall and Wilson, “Rage Against the Machines.”James D. Fearon, “Ethnic and Cultural Diversity by Country,” Journal of Economic Growth 8 (2003).Mack, “Why Big Nations Lose Small Wars”; Horne, A Savage War of Peace; Merom, How Democracies Lose Small Wars; Jason Lyall, “Do Democracies Make Inferior Counterinsurgents? Reassessing Democracy's Impact on War Outcomes and Duration,” International Organization 64 (2010).Keith Jaggers and Ted Robert Gurr, “Tracking Democracy's Third Wave with the Polity III Data,” Journal of Peace Research 32 (1995).Lyall and Wilson, “Rage Against the Machines,” pp. 83–84.International Institute for Strategic Studies, The Military Balance (London, UK: Taylor & Francis, 2010); Stockholm International Peace Research Institute, Arms Transfer Database (Stockholm, Sweden: SIPRI Press, 2009).Note that all hypothesis tests are two-tailed.Ordinal logit assumes that the slope coefficients are identical across all outcome categories. A Wald test suggests that the parallel regression assumption has not been violated. Rollin Brant, “Assessing Proportionality in the Proportional Odds Model for Ordinal Logistic Regression,” Biometrics 46 (1990). Supplemental material available upon request.Matthew Lange and Hrag Balian, “Containing Conflict or Instigating Unrest? A Test of the Effects of State Infrastructural Power on Civil Violence,” Studies in Comparative International Development 43 (2008).Specifically, INCUMBENT MANPOWER = mean, INCUMBENT ENERGY = mean, INSURGENT MANPOWER = mean, EXTERNAL SUPPORT = 0, OCCUPATION = 0, DIVERSITY = mean, DEMOCRACY = 0, MECHANIZATION = 2, CDFs = 0.Peter Lieb, “Few Carrots and a Lot of Sticks: German Anti-Partisan Warfare in World War Two,” in Daniel Marston and Carter Malkasian, eds., Counterinsurgency in Modern Warfare (New York: Osprey Publishing, 2010), pp. 76–77.Ibid., p. 80; Wendy Lower, Nazi Empire-Building and the Holocaust in Ukraine (Chapel Hill: The University of North Carolina Press, 2005), p. 173; Ian Frederick William Beckett, Modern Insurgencies and Counter-Insurgencies: Guerrillas and their Opponents since 1750 (New York: Routledge, 2001), p. 63.Hans-Heinrich Nolte, “Partisan War in Belorussia, 1941–1944,” in Roger Chickering, Stig Förster, and Bernd Greiner, eds., A World at Total War: Global Conflict and the Politics of Destruction, 1937–1945 (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2005), p. 266; Gerlach, Extremely Violent Societies, p. 190.Lieb, “Few Carrots and a Lot of Sticks,” p. 82.María Elena García, Making Indigenous Citizens: Identities, Education, and Multi-cultural Development in Peru (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 2005).Christopher Paul, Colin P. Clarke, and Beth Grill, Victory Has a Thousand Fathers: Sources of Success in Counterinsurgency (Santa Monica, CA: RAND Corporation, 2010), p. 14.Sally Bowen, “Peru Enlists Civil Groups in War Against Guerrillas,” Christian Science Monitor, 7 June 1991.See Biddle, Friedman, and Shapiro, “Testing the Surge.”Barkey and Fuller, Turkey's Kurdish Question, 148; Peter Finn, “Turkey (1984–1999 and 2004–Present),” in Karl R. DeRouen and Uk Heo, eds., Civil Wars of the World: Major Conflicts Since World War II (Santa Barbara, CA: ABC-CLIO, 2007), p. 783.Americas Watch, Civil Patrols in Guatemala (New York: Americas Watch Committee, 1986), p. 48.Kees Koonings and Dirk Kruijt, Armed Actors: Organized Violence and State Failure in Latin America (New York: St. Martin's Press, 2004), p. 69; Bard E. O’Neill, Insurgency and Terrorism: Inside Modern Revolutionary Warfare (New York: Macmillan, 1990), p. 130.Gerlach, Extremely Violent Societies, p. 195.James Ron, Weapons Transfers and Violations of the Laws of War in Turkey (Washington, DC: Human Rights Watch, 1995), p. 55; David Romano, The Kurdish Nationalist Movement: Opportunity, Mobilization, and Identity (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2006), p. 95; Joost Jongerden, The Settlement Issue in Turkey and the Kurds: An Analysis of Spatial Policies, Modernity and War (Leiden, The Netherlands: Brill, 2007), p. 270.Asia Watch Report, The Philippines: Violations of the Laws of War By Both Sides (New York: Asia Watch Committee, 1990), p. 122; Bruce Berman, Control & Crisis in Colonial Kenya: The Dialectic of Domination (Athens: Ohio University Press, 1990), p. 365; Asia Watch Report, Bad Blood: Militia Abuses in Mindanao, the Philippines, p. 10.Merom, How Democracies Lose Small Wars; Lyall and Wilson, “Rage Against the Machines”; Lyall, “Are Co-Ethnics More Effective Counter-Insurgents?”; Lyall, “Do Democracies Make Inferior Counterinsurgents?”Connable and Libicki, How Insurgencies End; Biddle, Friedman, and Shapiro, “Testing the Surge.”Havard Hegre, “Disentangling Democracy and Development as Determinants of Armed Conflict.” Paper presented at the 44th Annual Convention of the International Studies Association, 26 February–1 March 2003. 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Jentleson, and Larry Berman, Foreign Military Intervention: The Dynamics of Protracted Conflict (New York: Columbia University Press, 1994); Rotberg, State Failure and State Weakness in a Time of Terror; Lyall and Wilson, “Rage Against the Machines.”Lyall, “Are Co-Ethnics More Effective Counter-Insurgents?”; Lyall, “Do Democracies Make Inferior Counterinsurgents?”Fearon and Laitin, “Ethnicity, Insurgency, and Civil War”; Lange and Balian, “Containing Conflict or Instigating Unrest?”