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Preference Evolution and Reciprocity

2001; Elsevier BV; Volume: 97; Issue: 2 Linguagem: Inglês

10.1006/jeth.2000.2683

1095-7235

Rajiv Sethi, E. Somanathan,

Game Theory and Applications

This paper provides an evolutionary theory of reciprocity as an aspect of preference interdependence. It is shown that reciprocal preferences, which place negative weight on the payoffs of materialists and positive weight on the payoffs of sufficiently altruistic individuals can invade a population of materialists in a class of aggregative games under both assortative and nonassortative matching. In comparison with simpler specifications of preference interdependence (such as pure altruism or spite), the survival of such preferences is therefore less sensitive to details of the evolutionary selection process. Journal of Economic Literature Classification Numbers: C72, D62.