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Beyond the Dirty Bomb: Re-thinking Radiological Terror

2007; Taylor & Francis; Volume: 49; Issue: 3 Linguagem: Inglês

10.1080/00396330701564760

1468-2699

James M. Acton, M. Brooke Rogers, Peter D. Zimmerman,

Radioactive contamination and transfer

Click to increase image sizeClick to decrease image size Notes 1 Richard A. Meserve, Statement Before the Committee on Foreign Relations of the United States Senate, 6 March 2002, in Dirty Bombs and Basement Nukes: The Terrorist Nuclear Threat (Washington, DC: US Government Printing Office, 2002), pp. 8–11, http://frwebgate.access.gpo.gov/cgi-bin/getdoc.cgi?dbname=107_senate_hearings&docid=f:80848.pdf. 2 Gen Roessler, 'Why 210Po?' [interview with Raymond Guilmette], Health Physics News, February 2007, pp. 1–9, http://hps.org/documents/polonium_210_story.pdf. Guilmette cites studies in dogs, cats and rabbits which found that after 20 days 50% of animals injected with polonium-210 at a concentration of 0.07mCi per kg body mass died. In a 70kg human this translates to 5mCi or 1μg. At times longer than 20 days the lethal dose is smaller. 3 See, for instance, 'Al-Qaeda Plotter Jailed for Life', BBC News Online, 7 November 2006, http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/uk/6123236.stm. 4 Peter D. Zimmerman with Cheryl Loeb, Dirty Bombs: The Threat Revisited, Defense Horizons no. 38 (Washington DC: US National Defense University's Center for Technology and National Security Policy, 2004), pp. 4–5, http://www.ndu.edu/ctnsp/defense_horizons/DH38.pdf. For a detailed description of the effects of a dirty bomb see Henry C. Kelly, Prepared Statement Before the Committee on Foreign Relations of the United States Senate, 6 March 2002, in Dirty Bombs and Basement Nukes, pp. 37–47. 5 Jason Bennetto, 'Mass Panic Was Aim of £70,000 Dirty Bomb', The Independent Online, 8 November 2006, http://news.independent.co.uk/uk/crime/article1962458.ece. 6 Lou Dobbs Tonight, 1 June 2004, http://transcripts.cnn.com/TRANSCRIPTS/0406/01/ldt.00.html. 7 For instance, when talking about the threat from chemical, biological, nuclear and radiological terrorism. See, for example, the UK Home Office's website http://security.homeoffice.gov.uk/cbrn-resilience/. 8 The number of deaths depends on the source strength, but so does the difficulty of handling, transporting and disseminating the isotope. If a terrorist could obtain a spent fuel rod from a power reactor, and survive the radiation, then this source – in the million-curie range – could prove lethal to thousands. However, this scenario is likely beyond the outer limits of the practical. 9 It has also been suggested that victims will be more likely to develop cancer at some point in the future. However, the evidence to support this claim at very low doses of radiation is weak. At any rate, the number of cancers induced by a dirty-bomb attack is likely to be fairly small compared to the 'background' incidence of cancer, which is about 200 in every 1,000 people. See David Bodansky, Nuclear Energy: Principles, Practices and Prospects (Woodbury, NY: American Institute of Physics Press, 1996), pp. 36–44; Steven E. Koonin, Prepared Statement Before the Committee on Foreign Relations of the United States Senate, 6 March 2002, in Dirty Bombs and Basement Nukes, pp. 19–21. 10 Zimmerman and Loeb, Dirty Bombs, pp. 6–10. 11 Ibid., p. 9. 12 Although past research has touched upon these sorts of attacks, there has been no systematic survey of their potential effects – or even an appreciation of their effectiveness as a weapon of terror. Koonin, Prepared Statement Before the Committee on Foreign Relations of the United States Senate, p. 20 and Zimmerman with Loeb, Dirty Bombs, p. 5, have flagged the danger posed by aerosolised radioisotopes. Michael A. Kelly and Henry C. Levi, 'Weapons of Mass Disruption', Scientific American, November 2002, p. 80, have also discussed them – but in the context of the increased risk of cancer that could result from the inhalation of radioactive material following a dirty-bomb attack. Moreover, there are similarities between radiological emission devices (a hidden radioactive source designed to irradiate passers-by) discussed by Charles D. Ferguson and William C. Potter with Amy Sands, Leonard S. Spector and Fred Wheling, The Four Faces of Nuclear Terrorism (London: Routlege 2005), p. 259, and the immersion scenarios presented here. 13 Bodansky, Nuclear Energy, pp. 30–31. 14 Jesse Helms, Prepared Statement Before the Committee on Foreign Relations of the United States Senate, 6 March 2002, in Dirty Bombs and Basement Nukes, p. 6. 15 Gregory J. Van Tuyle and Evelyn Mullen, Large Radiological Source Applications: RDD Implications and Proposed Alternative Technologies, LA-UR-03-6281 (Los Alamos National Laboratory, 2003), p. 1. For other examples see T. Biro, 'Uncertainties in the Assessment of the Radiological Impact of Radiological Dispersion Devices', in IAEA, Safety and Security of Radioactive Sources: Towards a Global System for the Continuous Control of Sources throughout their Life Cycle, Bordeaux, France, 27 June–1 July 2005 (Vienna: IAEA, 2006), pp. 571–80, http://www-pub.iaea.org/MTCD/publications/PDF/Pub1262_web.pdf; and Donald D. Cobb, Prepared Statement Before the Committee on Foreign Relations of the United States Senate, 6 March 2002, in Dirty Bombs and Basement Nukes, p. 18. 16 Kelly, Prepared Statement Before the Committee on Foreign Relations of the United States Senate. 17 There are, of course, important differences between dirty bombs and nuclear explosions. The temperature in a chemical explosion is much less than that of even a small nuclear explosion and the energy release is orders of magnitude smaller. The fireball from a dirty-bomb explosion is therefore less effective at lifting radioactive material to high altitudes where winds are unaffected by buildings and terrain. 18 Apart from Dhiren Barot, Jose Padilla was also accused of plotting to manufacture and detonate a dirty bomb. These charges have, however, been dropped. See Abby Goddnough, '2 Sides Give Opening Arguments in Padilla Trial', New York Times Online, 14 May 2007, http://www.nytimes.com/2007/05/14/washington/15cnd-padilla.html?ex=1180843200&en=c33dad289fdd3f83&ei=5070. 19 The security of such sources and the means by which terrorists could acquire them has been discussed in, for example, Charles D. Ferguson, Tahseen Kazi and Judith Perera, Commercial Radioactive Sources: Surveying the Security Risks, Occasional Paper No. 11 (Monterey, CA: Centre for Nonproliferation Studies, Monterey Institute of International Studies, January 2003), http://cns.miis.edu/pubs/opapers/op11/op11.pdf. 20 Ferguson et al., The Four Faces of Nuclear Terrorism, p. 291. 21 The strength of a source is measured in curies (Ci). More specifically, the strength of a source – its activity – is the rate at which radioactive decay occurs. A source strength of 1Ci represents 37 billion decays per second (this was chosen for historical reasons, as 1Ci is the activity of 1g of radium-226). 22 Spector and Wehling, The Four Faces of Nuclear Terrorism, p. 270. 23 Ibid., p. 287. 24 IAEA, Strengthening Control over Radioactive Sources in Authorized Use and Regaining Control over Orphan Sources: National Strategies, IAEA-TECDOC-1388 (Vienna: IAEA, 2004), p. 22, http://www-pub.iaea.org/MTCD/publications/PDF/te_1388_web.pdf. 25 R. C. Martin and J. H. Miller, 'Applications of Californium-252 Neutron Sources in Medicine, Research, and Industry', American Nuclear Energy Symposium, Miami Beach, Florida, 2–6 October 2004, http://anes.fiu.edu/Pro/s7Mar.pdf. 26 IAEA, Strengthening Control over Radioactive Sources, p. 24. 27 Peter Zimmerman and James Acton, 'Radiological Lessons: Radiation Weapons beyond "Dirty Bombs"', Jane's Intelligence Review, June 2007, pp. 18–22. 28 Ibid. 29 M. Brooke Rogers, Richard Amlôt, G. James Rubin, Simon Wessely and Kristian Krieger, 'Mediating the Social and Psychological Impacts of Terrorist Attacks: The Role of Risk Perception and Risk Communication', International Review of Psychiatry, vol. 19, no. 3, June 2007, pp. 279–88. 30 Marsha L. Vanderford, 'Breaking New Ground in WMD Risk Communication: The Pre-event Messages Development Project', Biosecurity and Bioterrorism: Biodefense Strategy, Practice, and Science, vol. 2, no. 3, August 2004, pp. 193–4; Ricardo Wray and Keri Jupka, 'What Does the Public Want to Know In the Event of a Terrorist Attack Using Plague?', Biosecurity and Bioterrorism: Biodefense Strategy, Practice and Science, vol. 2, no. 3, July 2004, pp. 208–18; Steven M. Becker, 'Emergency Communication and Information Issues in Terrorist Events involving Radioactive Material', Biosecurity and Bioterrorism: Biodefense Strategy, Practice and Science, vol. 2, no. 3, August 2004, pp. 195–207. 31 Baruch Fischhoff, 'Assessing and Communicating the Risks of Terrorism', in Albert H. Teich, Stephen. D. Nelson and Stephen J. Lita (eds), Science and Technology in a Vulnerable World (Washington DC: AAAS, 2002), pp. 51–64; Baruch Fischhoff, Wändi Bruine de Bruin, Wendy Perrin and Julie Downs, 'Travel Risks in a Time of Terror Judgements and Choices', Risk Analysis, vol. 24, no. 5, October 2004, pp. 1301–09. 32 Rogers et al., 'Mediating the Social and Psychological Impacts of Terrorist Attacks'. 33 Carol S. Fullerton, Robert J. Ursano, Ann E. Norwood and Harry H. Holloway, 'Trauma, Terrorism and Disaster', in Robert J. Ursano, Carol S. Fullerton and Ann E. Norwood (eds), Terrorism and Disaster: Individual and Community Mental Health Interventions (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2003), pp. 1–21; Carol. S. North, 'Exploring the Myths of Coping with a National Trauma: A Longitudinal Study of Responses to the September 11th Attacks', in Yael Danieli, Danny Brom and Joe Sills (eds), The Trauma of Terrorism: Sharing Knowledge and Shared Care, An International Handbook (New York: The Haworth Maltreatment and Trauma Press, 2005), pp. 143–55. 34 IAEA, The Radiological Accident in Goiâna (Vienna: IAEA, 1998), p. 36. 35 Fullerton et al., 'Truama, Terrorism and Disaster'. 36 Eurobarometer 59, Spring 2003, p. 9, http://ec.europa.eu/public_opinion/archives/eb/eb59/eb59_rapport_final_en.pdf. 37 Paul Slovic, Melissa L. Finucane, Ellen Peters and Donald G. MacGregor, 'Risk as Analysis and Risk as Feelings: Some Thoughts about Affect, Reason, Risk and Rationality', Risk Analysis, vol. 24, no. 2, 2004, p. 311. 38 Peter W. Beck, 'Nuclear Energy in the Twenty-First Century: Examination of a Contentious Subject', Annual Review of Energy and the Environment, vol. 24, 1999, pp. 113–37; Malcolm Grimston and Peter Beck, Double or Quits: The Global Future of Civil Nuclear Energy (London: Earthscan, 2002), pp. 1–237; Rogers et al., 'Mediating the Social and Psychological Impacts of Terrorist Attacks'. 39 Simon Wessely presentation at the Health Protection Agencies conference, 'Polonium-210: The Public Health Response', 27 March, 2007, the Royal College of Surgeons, London, http://www.hpa-events.org.uk/hpa/templates/sub/titem.csp?pageID=8253&eventID=31. 40 Wessely, 'Polonium-210'. 41 See, for example, Ferguson et al., The Four Faces of Nuclear Terrorism, pp. 284–9. 42 IAEA, Categorization of Radioactive Sources, IAEA-TECDOC-1344 (Vienna: IAEA, 2003), http://www-pub.iaea.org/MTCD/publications/PDF/te_1344_web.pdf. 43 In calculating the quantity of a radioactive source that could be dangerous when ingested or inhaled (referred to as a source's 'D2 value'), the IAEA considered 'unintentional dispersion, inadvertent ingestion and intentional contamination of the water'. As discussed elsewhere, this last scenario is one of the most inefficient types of ingestion attacks. D2 values should be revised, taking into account some of the more effective types of I3 attack. See IAEA, Method for Developing Arrangements for Response to a Nuclear or Radiological Emergency (Vienna: IAEA, 2003), Appendix 8, http://www-pub.iaea.org/MTCD/publications/PDF/Method2003_web.pdf. 44 'Los Alamos at Work – Science and Technology Initiatives for Countering Nuclear and Radiological Threats', Los Alamos National Laboratory, 5 September 2003, http://www.lanl.gov/news/index.php/fuseaction/home.story/story_id/1484. 45 Gregory J. Van Tuyle and Evelyn Mullen, Large Radiological Source Applications: RDD Implications and Proposed Alternative Technologies, p. 8. 46 For instance, details of the UK's regulatory scheme are available from the Environment Agency's website at http://www.environment-agency.gov.uk/business/444304/945840/1064273/. 47 Nick Hopkins and Suzanne Goldenberg, 'MI5 says Dirty Bomb Attack is Inevitable', 19 June 2003, Guardian Unlimited, http://www.guardian.co.uk/terrorism/story/0,12780,979696,00.html. 48 Zimmerman and Loeb, Dirty Bombs, p. 6. 49 For a review of the current state of treatment for radiation poisoning see D.G. Jarrett, R.G. Sedlak and W.E. Dickerson, 'Current Status of Treatment of Radiation Injury in the United States', http://www.afrri.usuhs.mil/www/outreach/pdf/jarrett_NATO_2005.pdf. 50 IAEA, The Radiological Accident in Goiâna, p. 43. 51 Yael Danieli, Danny Brom and Joe Sills (eds), The Trauma of Terrorism: Sharing Knowledge and Shared Care, An International Handbook, pp. 1–20. 52 Boaz Ganor, 'Terrorism as a Strategy of Psychological Warfare', in Danieli, Brom and Sills, The Trauma of Terrorism, p. 34. 53 See for instance Levi and Kelly, 'Weapons of Mass Disruption', p. 81. 54 Paul Slovic, 'Perception of Risk', Science, vol. 236, no. 4799, 1987, pp. 280–85; Paul Slovic, 'Beyond Numbers: A Broader Perspective on Risk Perception and Risk Communication', in Deborah G. Mayo and Rachelle D. Hollander (eds), Acceptable Evidence (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1991), pp. 48–65; Paul Slovic, Baruch Fischhoff and Sarah Lichtenstein, 'Perceived Risk: Psychological Factors and Social Implications, Proceedings of the Royal Society of London, A376, 1981, pp. 17–34; Yasumasa Tanaka, 'Psychological Dimensions of Risk Assessment: Risk Perception and Risk Communication', Progress in Nuclear Energy, vol. 32, no. 3–4, 1998, pp. 243–53. For a full description of the social amplification of risk framework see C.W. Trumbo and Shanahan, 'Social Research on Climate Change: Where Have We Been, Where We Are, and Where We Might Go', Public Understanding of Science, vol. 9, 2000, pp. 199–204; Nick Pidgeon, Roger E. Kasperson and Paul Slovic, The Social Amplification of Risk (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2003). 55 Slovic, 'Perception of Risk'; Slovic, 'Beyond Numbers'; Paul Slovic, Baruch Fischhoff and Sarah Lichtenstein, 'The Psychometric Study of Risk Perception', in Vincent T. Covello, Joshua Menkos and Jeryl Mumpower (eds), Risk Evaluation and Management (New York: Pienum Publishing Corporation, 1986), pp. 3–24. Additional informationNotes on contributorsJames M. Acton James M. Acton is a lecturer in science and security in the Department of War Studies at King's College London. Prior to commencing this position he was the science and technology researcher at the Verification, Research Training and Information Centre. He holds a PhD in theoretical physics from the University of Cambridge. M. Brooke Rogers M. Brooke Rogers is a Research Fellow in the King's Centre for Risk Management at King's College London. A social psychologist by training, specialising in the study of social groups, group interaction, attitude formation and change, and belief systems, she holds a PhD in the Psychology of Religion from Royal Holloway, University of London. Peter D. Zimmerman Peter D. Zimmerman, a nuclear physicist, is Professor and Chair of Science & Security at King's College London. He was chief scientist of the US Senate Committee on Foreign Relations, science adviser for arms control at the US State Department, and the last chief scientist of the US Arms Control and Disarmament Agency. He has a PhD in physics from Stanford University.