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Does Counterinsurgency Theory Apply in Northeast India?

2007; Routledge; Volume: 6; Issue: 3 Linguagem: Inglês

10.1080/14736480701493054

1557-3036

Bethany Lacina,

Indian History and Philosophy

Abstract The author thanks three anonymous reviewers and the editorial staff of India Review for their ideas and guidance on this article. Notes 1. “Blast in Market in India Kills 1,” The New York Times, January 23, 2007; Hari Kumar, “Separatists Blamed for Attacks Killing 67 People in Indian State,” The New York Times, January 9, 2007. 2. Tapan Bose, “A Breach of Trust,” The Telegraph, May 20, 2006; Sajal Nag, Contesting Marginality: Ethnicity, Insurgency and Subnationalism in North-East India (New Delhi: Manohar, 2002); Bibhu Prasad Routray, “Fuelling Dissent: Anti-Terror Laws in India's Northeast,” Peace and Conflict Vol. 6, No. 5 (2003). Retrieved from http://www.icps.org. 3. Jyotirindra Dasgupta, “Community, Authenticity and Autonomy: Insurgence and Institutional Development in India's Northeast,” The Journal of Asian Studies Vol. 56, No. 2 (1997), pp. 345–70. 4. Praveen Kumar, “Tripura: Beyond the Insurgency–Politics Nexus,” Faultlines Vol. 14 (2003). 5. Ajai Sahni and J. George, “Security and Development in India's Northeast: An Alternative Perspective,” in K. P. S. Gill, ed., Terror and Containment Perspectives of India's Internal Security (New Delhi: Gyan Publishing, 2001). 6. Maya Chadda, Minority Rights and Conflict Prevention: Case Study of Conflicts in Indian Jammu and Kashmir, Punjab and Nagaland (London: Minority Rights Group International, 2006). 7. Mandy Turner, The Impact of Armed Violence in Northeast India: A Mini Case Study for the Armed Violence and Poverty Initiative (Bradford: University of Bradford and the Centre for International Cooperation and Security, 2004). 8. For richer historical accounts see Sanjib Baruah, India against Itself: Assam and the Politics of Nationality (Philadelphia, PA: University of Pennsylvania Press, 1999); Sanjoy Hazarika, Strangers in the Mist: Tales of War and Peace from India's Northeast (New Delhi: Viking, 1994); Sajal Nag, Contesting Marginality: Ethnicity, Insurgency and Subnationalism in North-East India (New Delhi: Manohar); and B. P. Singh, The Problem of Change: A Study of North-East India (New Delhi: Oxford University Press, 1987). For up-to-date information on the Northeast from a variety of political perspectives see http://mha.nic.in/nemail.htm, www.c-nes.org, www.neportal.org, www.satp.org, and www.pcr.uu.se/database. 9. Bhupinder Singh, Autonomy Movements and Federal India (Jaipur: Rawat, 2002). 10. Lt. General J. R. Mukherjee, An Insider's Experience of Insurgency in India's North-East (London: Anthem Press, 2005). 11. Myron Weiner, Sons of the Soil: Migration and Ethnic Conflict in India (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1978). 12. Lawrence E. Cline, “The Insurgency Environment in Northeast India,” Small Wars and Insurgencies Vol. 17, No. 2 (2006), pp. 126–47. The name NSCN (I&M) refers to the leaders of this faction, Isak Chisi Swu and Thuingaleng Muivah. NSCN (K) refers to that group's leader, S. S. Khaplang. 13. Uppsala Department of Peace and Conflict Research, Armed Conflict Database (Uppsala: Uppsala University, 2004). 14. Cline, “The Insurgency Environment in Northeast India.” 15. Paul Brass, The Politics of India since Independence, Vol. 1: The New Cambridge History of India (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1994). 16. Arunachal Pradesh became a state in 1987. 17. R. K. Satapathy, “Mizoram: Positive Vote for the State Government,” Economic and Political Weekly Vol. 39, No. 51 (2004), pp. 5527–8. 18. Theses offered for the success of the peace process in Mizoram are generally unsatisfactory. The peace process had a high level of civil society involvement but this has also been true of failed treaties, such as the 1960 treaty in Nagaland or the 1985 Assam Accord. Mizoram is considerably more ethnically homogenous than other states in the Northeast, but homogeneity is arguably endogenous to peace given that conflict has led to competitive ethnic mobilization of once undifferentiated groups in other states. 19. Uppsala Department of Peace and Conflict Research, Uppsala Conflict Database (Uppsala: Uppsala University, 2006). A caveat to all the arguments that will follow must be introduced here. The article goes on to argue that in the Northeast nothing resembling a true guerilla operation currently exists and, as a result, developing responses to the violent groups in the area as though they were insurgents against the state has tended to lead analysts astray. Unfortunately, the applicability of this argument to Manipur and Tripura is difficult to ascertain. Because of travel restrictions on these areas, the information available about the amount and nature of the violence in these states is of very poor quality. The pronounced inter-communal character of the violence that is reported implies that the arguments in this article are relevant, but the representative character of these incidents is indiscernible. 20. Hazarika, Strangers in the Mist. 21. Cline, “The Insurgency Environment in Northeast India.” 22. Uppsala Department of Peace and Conflict Research, Uppsala Conflict Database. 23. Uppsala Department of Peace and Conflict Research, Uppsala Conflict Database. 24. Kumar, “Tripura: Beyond the Insurgency–Politics Nexus.” 25. Cline, “The Insurgency Environment in Northeast India.” 26. Uppsala Department of Peace and Conflict Research, Armed Conflict Database. 27. Lt. General J. R. Mukherjee, An Insider's Experience of Insurgency in India's North-East (London: Anthem Press, 2005), p. 95. 28. For detailed budget analysis see Ajai Sahni, and J. George, “Security and Development in India's Northeast: An Alternative Perspective,” in Gill, ed., Terror and Containment Perspectives of India's Internal Security. For a more anecdotal but more measured account of local corruption and diversion of aid see Hazarika, Strangers in the Mist. 29. Bethany Lacina and Nils Petter Gleditsch, “Monitoring Trends in Global Combat: A New Dataset of Battle Deaths,” European Journal of Population Vol. 2–3 (2005), pp. 145–66. 30. Robert L. Hardgrave and Stanley A. Kochanek, India: Government and Politics in a Developing Nation (New York: Harcourt College Publishers, 2000). 31. Ajai Shani, Survey of Conflicts and Resolution in India's Northeast South Asia Terrorism Portal (New Delhi: Institute for Conflict Management, 2005). 32. Verinder Grover and Ranjana Arora, eds., Violence, Communalism, and Terrorism in India: Towards Criminalisation of Politics (New Delhi: Deep & Deep Publications, 1995); Atul Kohli, Democracy and Discontent: India's Growing Crisis of Governability (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1991). 33. Hazarika, Strangers of the Mist. 34. Hazarika, Strangers of the Mist. 35. Paolienial Haokip, “Counter-Insurgency in the North-East: A Counter-Perspective,” Manipur Online, January 5, 2003 (http://www.manipuronline.com). 36. Chalmers A. Johnson, “Civilian Loyalties and Guerilla Conflict,” World Politics Vol. 14, No. 4 (1962), pp. 646–61. 37. Arup Kumar Deka, “ULFA and the Peace Process in Assam,” IPCS Special Report Vol. 21 (2006); Shani, Survey of Conflicts and Resolution in India's Northeast. 38. Jeremy M. Weinstein, “Resources and the Information Problem in Rebel Recruitment,” Journal of Conflict Resolution Vol. 49, No. 4 (2005), pp. 598–624; Macartan Humphreys and Jeremy Weinstein, “Handling and Manhandling Civilians in Civil War,” American Political Science Review Vol. 100, No. 3 (2006), pp. 429–447. 39. India Army Training Command, Doctrine for Sub-Conventional Operations (Shimla: Headquarters Army Training Command, 2007). 40. K. P. Misra, “Paramilitary Forces in India,” Armed Forces and Society Vol. 6 (1980), pp. 371–88; Rajesh Rajagopalan, “‘Restoring Normalcy’: The Evolution of the Indian Army's Counterinsurgency Doctrine,” Small Wars and Insurgencies Vol. 11, No. 1 (2000), pp. 44–68; Mukherjee, An Insider's Experience of Insurgency in India's North-East. 41. On the isomorphism of counterinsurgency doctrine among democracies see Ian F. W. Beckett, ed., The Roots of Counter-Insurgency: Armies and Guerilla Warfare, 1900–1945 (London: Blandford Press, 1988); Anthony James Joes, Resisting Rebellion: The History and Politics of Counterinsurgency (Lexington, KY: The University Press of Kentucky, 2004). 42. The theoretical literature on guerilla warfare is summarized in Azeem Ibrahim, “Conceptualisation of Guerilla Warfare,” Small Wars and Insurgencies Vol. 15, No. 3 (2004), pp. 112–24; Chalmers Johnson, “The Third Generation of Guerilla Warfare,” Asian Survey Vol. 8, No. 6 (1968), pp. 435–47. 43. Frankin Mark Osanka, “Social Dynamics of Revolutionary Guerilla Warfare,” in Roger W. Little, ed., Handbook of Military Institutions (Beverly Hills, CA: Sage Publications, 1971), pp. 399–416. 44. Chalmers Johnson, “Peasant Nationalism Revisited: The Biography of a Book,” The China Quarterly Vol., No. 72 (1977), pp. 766–85; Chalmers Johnson, Autopsy on People's War (Berkeley, CA: University of California Press, 1973). 45. Samuel L. Popkin, The Rational Peasant: The Political Economy of Rural Society in Vietnam (Berkeley, CA: University of California Press, 1979). 46. Stathis Kalyvas, The Logic of Violence in Civil War (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2006). 47. Eric T. Young, “The Victors and the Vanquished: The Role of Military Factor in the Outcome of Modern African Insurgencies,” Small Wars and Insurgencies Vol. 7, No. 2 (1996), pp. 178–95. 48. Extensively-documented insurgencies whose relationship to civilians has been dominated by preventing cooperation with the government include the Lord's Resistance Army in Uganda (see Anthony Vinci, “The Strategic Use of Fear by the Lord's Resistance Army,” Small Wars and Insurgencies Vol. 16, No. 3 (2005), pp. 360–81); the Islamist insurgency in Algeria (see Stathis N. Kalyvas, “Wanton and Senseless? The Logic of Massacres in Algeria,” Rationality and Society Vol. 11, No. 3 (1999), pp. 243–85); and the Marxists in Peru (see W. Alejandro Sanchez, “The Rebirth of Insurgency in Peru,” Small Wars and Insurgencies Vol. 14, No. 3 (2003), pp. 185–98). The only internal wars in which control of intelligence coming from civilians seems not to play a critical role are cases of symmetric conflict in extremely weak states, as in sub-Saharan Africa (see Young, “The Victors and the Vanquished”) 49. Anthony James Joes, “Isolating the Belligerents: A Key to Success in the Post-Counterinsurgency Era,” in Max G. Manwaring, ed., Beyond Declaring Victory and Coming Home: The Challenges of Peace and Stability Operations (Westport, CT: Greenwood Publishing Group, 2000), pp. 55–65; Donald W. Hamilton, The Art of Insurgency: American Military Policy and the Failure of Strategy in Southeast Asia (Westport, CT: Praeger, 1998); Eliezer Ben-Rafael and Moshe Lissak, Social Aspects of Guerilla and Anti-Guerilla Warfare (Jerusalem: Hebrew University, 1979); Paul B. Rich and Richard Stubbs, “Introduction: The Counter-Insurgent State,” in Paul B. Rich and Richard Stubbs, eds., The Counter-Insurgent State: Guerilla Warfare and State Building in the Twentieth Century (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1997); US Army, US Navy, and US Marine Corps, Counterinsurgency. Army Field Manual 3–24. Marine Corps Warfighting Publication 3–33.5. (Washington, DC: Headquarters, Department of the Army, 2006); Geoffrey D. T. Shaw, “Policemen Versus Soldiers, the Debate Leading to MAAG Objections and Washington Rejections of the Core of the British Counter-Insurgency Advice,” Small Wars and Insurgencies Vol. 12, No. 2 (2001), pp. 51–78; Bard E. O'Neill, Insurgency and Terrorism: From Revolution to Apocalypse (Dulles, VA: Potomac Books, 2005). 50. R. Sean Randolph and W. Scott Thompson, Thai Insurgency: Contemporary Developments Vol. 9 The Washington Papers (Washington, DC: Center for Strategic and International Studies, Georgetown University, 1981). 51. J. Ruane and J. Todd, The Dynamics of Conflict in Northern Ireland: Power, Conflict and Emancipation (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996). 52. Caroline Hartzell and Matthew Hoddie, “Institutionalizing Peace: Power Sharing and Post-Civil War Conflict Management,” American Journal of Political Science Vol. 47, No. 2 (2003), pp. 318–32; C. Hartzell, M. Hoddie and D. Rothchild, “Stabilizing the Peace after Civil War,” International Interactions Vol. 55, No. 1 (2001), pp. 183–208. 53. The primary liability in the Northeast for state security is weak borders rather than powerful insurgencies. There is no question Delhi should continue to see its borders as a particularly sensitive security concern, but the northeastern border will be extremely problematic regardless of the level of political violence in the region because of the combination of difficult geography, world demand for opiates, and the weakness of neighbors' territorial control. 54. Amnesty International, “India: Amnesty International Renews Its Call for an Unconditional Repeal of the Armed Forces (Special Powers) Act, 1958,” Amnesty International Public Statements Vol. AI Index: 20/034/2006, News Service No. 325 (2006). 55. Baruah, “Journey to Nowhere.” The Times of India. 16 January 2007. 56. Baruah, India against Itself; Darshan Balwally, Growth of Totalitarianism in Arunachal Pradesh, Mizoram, and Nagaland (New Delhi: Spectrum Publications, 2003); Girin Phukon, and N. L. Dutta, eds., Politics of Identity and Nation Building in Northeast India (Denver, CO: iAcademicBooks, 1997); Joyotpaul Chaudhuri, ed., India's Beleaguered Federalism: The Pluralist Challenge (Tempe, AZ: Arizona State University, 1992); Myron Weiner, The Indian Paradox: Essays in Indian Politics (New Delhi: Sage Publications, 1989); Singh, Autonomy Movements and Federal India; Chadda, Minority Rights and Conflict Prevention; Maya Chadda, “Integration through Internal Reorganization: Containing Ethnic Conflict in India,” The Global Review of Ethnopolitics Vol. 2, No. 1 (2002), pp. 44–61. 57. Steven I. Wilkinson, Votes and Violence: Electoral Competition and Ethnic Riots in India (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2004). 58. Amnesty International, “India: Amnesty International Renews Its Call for an Unconditional Repeal of the Armed Forces (Special Powers) Act, 1958.” 59. For empirical work on curbing organized crime in a variety of settings see Louise Shelley, “Corruption and Organized Crime in Mexico in the Post-PRI Transition,” Journal of Contemporary Criminal Justice Vol. 17, No. 3 (2001), pp. 213–31; Felia Allum and Renate Siebert, Organized Crime and the Challenge to Democracy (New York: Routledge, 2003). For more theoretical treatments see R. T. Naylor, Wages of Crime: Black Markets, Illegal Finance, and the Underworld Economy (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 2004); Stephen Mastrofski and Gary Potter, “Controlling Organized Crime: A Critique of Law Enforcement Policy,” Criminal Justice Policy Review Vol. 2, No. 3 (1987), pp. 269–301. 60. Michael Levi and Alaster Smith, A Comparative Analysis of Organised Crime Conspiracy Legislation and Practice and their Relevance to England and Wales (London: Home Office Online Report, 2002). Maharashtra's Control of Organised Crime Act is also controversial, as human rights advocates argue that the law is unnecessarily restrictive of civil rights. See Suhas Chakma, ed., Indian Human Rights Report 2005 (New Delhi: Jain Book Depot, 2005).