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South Asia: The Irrelevance of Classical Nuclear Deterrence Theory

2005; Routledge; Volume: 4; Issue: 2 Linguagem: Inglês

10.1080/14736480500225640

1557-3036

Bharat Karnad,

Global Peace and Security Dynamics

Abstract Notes 1. For a recent piece of writing along this line, see Mitchell B. Reiss, “The Nuclear Tipping Point: Prospects for a World of Many Nuclear Weapons States,” in Kurt M. Campbell, Robert J. Einhorn, and Mitchell B. Reiss, eds., The Nuclear Tipping Point: Why States Reconsider Their Nuclear Choices (Washington, DC: Brookings Institution Press, 2004), p. 10. The US National Intelligence Council in its most recent report pertaining to South Asia has rated the risk of war in the next 15 years between India and Pakistan triggered by the Kashmir dispute, as “fairly high.” See “Threat of war looms in S. Asia,” The Asian Age, February 23, 2005. 2. George H. Quester, Deterrence Before Hiroshima (New York: John Wiley, 1966). 3. See the essays by Brodie and other well-known American political scientists like William T. R. Fox and Arnold Wolfers in Bernard Brodie, ed., The Absolute Weapon: Atomic Power and World Order (New York: Harcourt Brace, 1946). 4. Hans J. Morgenthau, Politics Among Nations (New York: Knopf, 1948). 5. Kenneth N. Waltz, Man, State and War: A Theoretical Analysis (New York: Columbia University Press, 1959). See also John J. Mearsheimer, “Back to the Future: Instability in Europe After the Cold War,” International Security Vol. 15, No. 1 (Fall 1990), pp. 5–56. 6. Pierre Gallois, The Balance of Terror: Strategy for the Nuclear Age, English ed. translated by Richard Howard (Boston: Houghton-Mifflin, 1961); and Andre Beaufre, Deterrence and Strategy, translated by Major General RH Barry (London: Faber & Faber, 1965) 7. For the relevant quotes from President de Gaulle's seminal speech outlining the reasons for “The defense of France by the French” at L’École Militaire on November 3, 1959, see McGeorge Bundy, Danger and Survival: Choices About the Bomb in the First Fifty Years (New York: Random House, 1988), p. 480. 8. Cited in Albert Wohlstetter, Thomas A. Brown, Gregory S. Jones, David McGarvey, Henry Rowen, Vince Taylor, and Roberta Wohlstetter, Swords from Plowshares: The Military Potential of Civilian Nuclear Energy (Chicago and London: The University of Chicago Press, 1977), p. 130. 9. Prime Minister Winston Churchill in 1954 justified Britain's acquiring the Hydrogen Bomb because, he said, “It's the price we pay to sit at the top table.” See Peter Hennessy, The Secret State: Whitehall and the Cold War (London: Penguin Books, 2003), pp. 44, 52, 58. 10. Hennessy, The Secret State, pp. 49, 55. 11. Hennessy, The Secret State, pp. 45–46. 12. Inclusive of the Howard quote, see Hennessy, The Secret State pp. 46–47. 13. Hennessy, The Secret State, p. 59. 14. Hennessy, The Secret State, p. 63. 15. Peter Catterall, ed., The Macmillan Diaries: The Cabinet Years 1950–1957 (London: Pan Books, 2003), p. 367. 16. Bharat Karnad, Nuclear Weapons and Indian Security: The Realist Foundations of Strategy, 2d ed. (New Delhi: Macmillan India Ltd., 2005), pp. 147–48 17. Karnad, Nuclear Weapons and Indian Security, pp, 147–48. 18. K. Subrahmanyam, “Nuclear Policy Perspective,” in Security in a Changing World (New Delhi: B. R. Publishing Corp, 1990), p. 126. 19. See Zafar Nawaz Jaspal, “Assessment of Indian and Pakistani Nuclear Doctrines,” in Pervaiz Iqbal Cheema and Imtiaz H. Bokhari, eds., Arms Race and Nuclear Developments in South Asia (Islamabad: Islamabad Policy Research Institute, 2004), p. 88. 20. See Abdul Sattar, “Nuclear Issues in South Asia: A Pakistani Perspective,” in Tarik, ed., Pakistan's Security and the Nuclear Option (Islamabad: Institute of Policy Studies, 1995), p. 59. Sattar, a former diplomat and Foreign Secretary, was Foreign Minister of Pakistan in the Caretaker Government in 1993. In the same book, for similar views on possible Indian “nuclear blackmail” by a senior Pakistan Army officer and ex-chief of the Inter-Services Intelligence Lieutenant General Asad Durrani, see his “Nuclear Deterrence and its Implications,” p. 94. 21. See Shirin Mazari, “Understanding Pakistan's Nuclear Doctrine,” in Cheema and Bokhari, eds., Arms Race and Nuclear Developments in South Asia, pp. 74–75. Mazari is Director-General of the premier Pakistan government-supported think-tank, Institute of Strategic Studies in Islamabad. 22. See Air Commodore (Retd) Jamal Hussain, “Nuclear Deterrence in a Nuclear Environment,” Defence Journal (Karachi), (March 2003), pp. 86–88. 23. Durrani, “Nuclear Deterrence and its Implications.” 24. Mazari, “Understanding Pakistan's Nuclear Doctrine.” 25. The satisfaction with Pakistan's current strategy has been expressed by numerous senior members of that country's strategic elite to the author during his many visits to Pakistan since 2003. 26. Karnad, Nuclear Weapons and Indian Security, pp. 160–275. 27. For the evolution of the Indian nuclear doctrine and strategy, see Karnad, Nuclear Weapons and Indian Security, ch. IV, “Hesitant Realpolitik: 1966 To-Date,” pp. 276–451. 28. The Indian Nuclear Doctrine is reproduced as Annexure in Karnad, Nuclear Weapons and Indian Security, pp. 705–8. 29. See Bharat Karnad, “Deconstructing the Indian Nuclear Doctrine,” in Cheema and Bokhari, eds., Arms Race and Nuclear Developments in South Asia, pp. 60–70. 30. His full statement is cited in Karnad, Nuclear Weapons & Indian Security, p. 670. 31. On how nuclear terrorism may affect India, see Pran Krishan Pahwa, “The Nuclear Dimension,” in Raja Menon, ed., Weapons of Mass Destruction: Options for India (New Delhi: Sage Publications, 2004), pp. 23–28. For a news report on the international reach and the many successes of the Dr A. Q. Khan network, see Bill Powell and Tim McGirk, “The Man Who Sold the Bomb,” Time, February 14, 2005. 32. A recent report by the US Congressional Research Service has highlighted the US help to Pakistan to tighten up security around nuclear facilities, etc. in order to deny access to terrorist organizations like the Taliban and Al Qaeda to WMD (weapons of mass destruction) technologies and materials. See “US helping secure Pakistan's N-plan: report,” Dawn (Islamabad), March 14, 2005. 33. Indian Defense Minister George Fernandes in the BJP coalition government stated in a seminar in late 1999 that “War remains a possibility among Nuclear Weapon States below the nuclear threshold. But,” he added, reflecting the innate caution of Indian politicians, “the danger of escalation to nuclear exchange should make us rethink about initiating even a conventional war.” See his “Opening Address” in Air Commodore (Retd) Jasjit Singh, ed., Asia's New Dawn: The Challenges to Peace and Security (New Delhi: Institute of Defence Studies and Analyses and Knowledge World, 2000), pp. xvi–xvii. 34. “New Army doctrine: Plan for lightning wars,” The Times of India, October 30, 2004. 35. Julian Critchley, Warning and Response: A Study of Surprise Attack in the 20th Century and an Analysis of its Lessons for the Future (London: Leo Cooper, 1978), p. 87. 36. For a fairly comprehensive analysis of Operation Brasstacks, see Kanti P. Bajpai, P. R. Chari, Pervaiz Iqbal Cheema, Stephen P. Cohen, and Sumit Ganguly, Brasstacks and Beyond (New Delhi: Manohar Publishers, 1995). 37. See From Surprise to Reckoning: The Kargil Review Committee Report (New Delhi: Sage Publications, 2000), pp. 183–213. 38. For an analysis of the nuclear CBMs being discussed by India and Pakistan, see Karnad, Nuclear Weapons and Indian Security, pp. 442–43. 39. Pakistanis, including atthe senior levels in the military, also subscribe to the familial relationship. See Lieutenant General (Retd) A. I. Akram, Make Peace, Not War (Islamabad: Institute of Regional Studies, 1982). 40. Prem Shankar Jha, Kashmir 1947: Rival Versions of History (Delhi: Oxford University Press, 1996), pp. 59–73. 41. For analysis in greater detail along these lines, refer to Bharat Karnad, “Minorities, Terrorism and Democratic Politics,” in Current Domestic Policy Challenges and Prospects in South Asia: Collection of Papers presented at a South Asian Regional Seminar organised jointly by the Institute of Regional Studies, Islamabad, and the Hanns Seidel Foundation (Islamabad: Institute of Regional Studies, 2003). For analyses and commentaries about the national identity crisis, social problems and the trouble with rooting democratic norms in Pakistani society due to defining nationhood in religious terms, see the papers in this compendium by Pakistani analysts, especially Khaled Ahmed, “Rise of Religious Parties: Stakeholders in the System?,” pp. 245–73, and Manzoor Ahmad, “Conceptual Determinants of Policy Making in Pakistan,” pp. 198–211. 42. According to Pakistani newspaper reports a nearly full-fledged rebellion by the Baloch tribes in Baluchistan has taken off, putting severe military pressures on General Pervez Musharraf's regime. See Muhammad Ali Siddiqi and Shamim-u-Rahman, “Pak Baloch province rises for ‘rights,’” Dawn (Karachi) reproduced in The Asian Age (New Delhi), November 9, 2004. 43. Chairman of the Balawaristan Nationalist Front Abdul Hamid Khan has claimed that Pakistan is using Al Qaeda cadres to ruthlessly deal with the secessionist elements. See “Pak using Qaeda men to tackle Gilgit secessionists,” The Asian Age, January 17, 2005. 44. For a more detailed exposure and analysis of Blackett's role and contribution to the evolution of Indian military and nuclear policies, see Karnad, Nuclear Weapons and Indian Security, pp. 125–31. 45. For an elaboration of the arguments in the preceding and succeeding paragraphs, see Bharat Karnad, “Key to Peace in South Asia: Fostering ‘Social Links’ between the Armies of India and Pakistan,” The Round Table: The Commonwealth Journal of International Affairs No. 338 (April 1996), pp. 205–29. An updated version of this article was published as “Key to Confidence Building in South Asia: Fostering Military-to-Military Links,” USI Journal Vol. CXXVI, No. 524 (April–June 1996), pp. 168–89. Also see Karnad, Nuclear Weapons and Indian Security, pp. 565–72. 46. Indian political parties are going to quite extraordinary lengths to ingratiate themselves with the Muslim electorate. Consider the promises made to Muslims constituting 15% of the population in the Gangetic heartland province of Bihar during the recent state elections, including the installation of a Muslim Chief Minister. See Venkitesh Ramakrishnan, “Battle for Bihar Muslim vote rises to a new high,” The Hindu, February 10, 2005. This has been the pattern in both general elections and elections to the provincial legislatures since the mid-1990s. 47. The Indian Foreign Minister Natwar Singh, for instance, on a visit to Pakistan which resulted in a path-breaking agreement on various measures to render the Line of Control virtually a “soft border,” with the preceding Bharatiya Janata Party Prime Minister Atal Bihari Vajpayee's record of many peace initiatives with Pakistan in mind that won him considerable praise in Pakistan and respect from Indian Muslims, crowed that the normalization process had gathered speed under the United Progressive Alliance government led by the Congress Party in Delhi. Refer his interview in the news telecast on Pakistan Television, February 16, 2005. 48. Source: K. Subrahmanyam, in 1965 was a mid-level Indian Defense Ministry official. Subrahmanyam is the doyen among Indian civilian strategists. A senior Indian Administrative Service officer, he was secretary to the government for defense production and convenor of the National Security Advisory Board, National Security Council, Government of India. Interview: April 2000. 49. Interview, August 1991. 50. Raju G. C. Thomas, The Defence of India: A Budgetary Perspective of Strategy and Politics (Delhi: The Macmillan Company of India, 1978), pp. 176–77. 51. See Raju G. C. Thomas, Indian Security Policy (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1986), pp. 223–24. 52. According to Pakistan President Pervez Musharraf, India in 1998–2001 alone bought some seven billion dollars worth of armaments. See his “Inaugural Address,” in Peace and Security in South Asia: Proceedings of the International Conference, September 19–20, 2002 (Islamabad: Institute of Strategic Studies, 2002), p. 8. 53. See Karnad, Nuclear Weapons and Indian Security, p. 567. 54. For an analysis of India–Pakistan wars, see Karnad, “Key to Peace in South Asia,” pp. 206–11 55. For example, a Pakistan Air Force stalwart Air Marshal (Retd) Mohammad Ayaz Khan, referring to the invariable shortfalls in military supplies owing to planning only for short wars, writes “Fortunately, Indian military planners [also plan for short wars] … basically for fear of high attrition and for political reasons.” Quoted in Karnad, Nuclear Weapons and Indian Security, pp. 566–67. 56. For a sharp and succinct analysis of India–Pakistan wars, see John Keegan and Andrew Wheatcroft, Zones of Conflict: An Atlas of Future Wars (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1986), pp. 55–56. 57. For an official post-mortem on the Kargil operations by the Kargil Review Committee chaired by K. Subrahmanyam, see From Surprise to Reckoning: The Kargil Review Committee Report (New Delhi: Sage Publications, 2000). 58. For a comparison of casualties in India–Pakistan wars with those in, say, the (Israel–Egypt) Yom Kippur War, see Karnad, “Key to Peace in South Asia,” p. 207. 59. George H. Quester, “Nuclear Pakistan and Nuclear India: Stable Deterrent or Proliferation Challenge?,” in Before and After the Cold War: Using Past Forecasts to Predict the Future (London and Portland, OR: Frank Cass, 2002), p. 117. 60. For an analysis comparing India–Pakistan wars to riots, see Karnad, “Key to Peace in South Asia.” 61. Television interview, Star News, March 13, 1997, p. 207. 62. Karnad, “Minorities, Terrorism and Democratic Politics.” 63. His full statement cited in Karnad, Nuclear Weapons and Indian Security, p. 670. 64. See the Cabinet Committee on Security Reviews operationalization of India's Nuclear Doctrine, Press Release, January 4, 2003, at http://www.indianembassy.at/US/PressnuclearDoctrine2003.html. For Indian Press reports, refer to Vishal Thapar, “India's N-Command in Place,” Hindustan Times, January 5, 2003, and Rajat Pandit, “Nuke Command set-up, N-button in PM's hand,” The Sunday Times of India, January 5, 2003. 65. Karnad, “Deconstructing the Indian Nuclear Doctrine.” 66. The Congress Party Prime Minister, Dr. Man Mohan Singh, in fact, reiterated this established nuclear policy orientation when, prodded by the visiting German Chancellor Gerhard Schroeder to consider signing the Nonproliferation Treaty, declined to do so because, he said, “the time is not ripe” and added apparently by way of explanation, “We are a responsible nuclear power. We act with restraint. We have ‘no first use’ doctrine in place.” See “Time not ripe for signing NPT, says PM,” Hindustan Times, October 8, 2004. 67. This is the stock rationale offered by Pakistani officials and analysts. As an example, see Agha Shahi, Zulfikar Ali Khan, and Abdul Sattar, “Securing nuclear peace,” The News (International), October 5, 1999. Shahi and Sattar are former foreign ministers and the late Air Chief Marshal Zulfikar Ali Khan, an ex-Air Force Chief of Staff. 68. Jaswant Singh, the Indian Foreign Minister in the BJP-led NDA government said this of the subcontinental countries: “Bangladesh, India and Pakistan are born of the same womb. It is not just that we understand each other's language. Our intestines are entwined. That is reality.” But, as a Pakistani psychologist explained, “We're the same people, which is why we can't communicate with each other. It's sort of like talking to yourself in the mirror.” For the quotes, see Karnad, Nuclear Weapons and Indian Security, p. 568. 69. Tanvir Ahmad Khan, “Command and Control: A Pakistani Perspective,” in The Nuclear Debate, Strategic Issues, No. 3 (Islamabad: The Institute of Strategic Studies, March 2000), pp. 63, 65. Khan is former Pakistan Foreign Secretary. 70. See Major General (Retd) Fazal Muqeem Khan, Pakistan's Crisis in Leadership (Islamabad: National Book Foundation, 1973, 1989). 71. Lieutenant General (Retd) J. F. R. Jacob, Surrender at Dacca: Birth of a Nation (New Delhi: Manohar, 1996). General Jacob was the Chief of Staff of the Indian Eastern Army during this war. 72. John J. Mearsheimer, Conventional Deterrence (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1983), p. 206. 73. All these figures displayed in a Powerpoint presentation by Brigadier (Retd) Gurmeet Kanwal at a symposium on “Army 2020,” Observer Research Foundation, New Delhi, February 2, 2005. Brigadier Kanwal served in the Military Operations Directorate, Army Headquarters. 74. For an historical analysis of the Pakistan Amy's confidence in fighting its Indian counterpart to a draw even with 1:4 or 1:6 disparity in conventional forces, see Karnad, Nuclear Weapons and Indian Security, pp. 571–73. Further, the differential in defense spending does not seem to bother Islamabad over much. In fiscal year 2003–04, for example, India allocated some $15 billion (Rs 70,000 crores) for defense, which was slightly less than the size of the total budget of the Pakistan government. For details of the Indian defense budget, see Expenditure Budget 2003–2004, Vol. 2, Central Budget 2003–2004 (Ministry of Finance & Company Affairs, Government of India), pp. 46–47, 49–54. 75. Pakistan President, General Pervez Musharraf, repeatedly warns about the importance of conventional military “balance” with India for Pakistan's security. Recently, Musharraf in a television interview to CNN said: “We want a balance in our region to be maintained in the conventional weapons. Now, in that balance, there is some imbalance which is being created because of the purchases being done by the Indian armed forces.” See the Washington-datelined story Ashish Kumar Sen, “Musharraf for military balance with India,” The Tribune, December 7, 2004. 76. This system detailed in Bharat Karnad, “Scope for Meeting National Security by Effective Management of Available Funds,” paper presented in the 3rd session of the National Security Seminar, November 28–29, 1996, United Service Institution of India, New Delhi, published in USI-Seminar (Number Eighteen), Impact of Decreased Defence Spending on the Indian Armed Forces (New Delhi: USI, 1998). 77. Shireen Mazari writes that the Cold Start strategy “reveals Indian intent to overcome the nuclear deterrence by rapid conventional strikes in an all-out war.” See her “Understanding Pakistan's Nuclear Doctrine,” p. 80. 78. See Nuclear Safety, Nuclear Stability and Nuclear Strategy in Pakistan: A Concise Report of a Visit by the Landau Network-Centro Volta (Como: Centro Volta, January 21, 2002), p. 5. The report is available at http://lxmi.mi.infn.it/˜landnet/Doc/pakistan.pdf. 79. “No external threat to Pakistan: Pervez” (By arrangement with Dawn) The Asian Age, January 12, 2005. 80. “LoC fencing biggest Army feat,” The Asian Age, January 15, 2005. 81. Ashley J. Tellis, India's Emerging Nuclear Posture: Between Recessed Deterrent and Ready Arsenal (Santa Monica: RAND, 2001), p. 181. 82. The parity thesis is a stock explanation for the petering out of the post-1998 India–Pakistan crises. For a recent example of such writing, see Sumit Ganguly and Devin T. Hagerty, Fearful Symmetry: India-Pakistan Crises in the Shadow of Nuclear Weapons (New Delhi: Oxford University Press, 2005). 83. See, for example, Rajesh M. Basrur, “Nuclear India at the Crossroads,” Arms Control Today, September 2003, pp. 7–11. 84. For the concept of compellance, refer to Thomas Schelling, Arms and Influence (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1966), pp. 69–72. For coercion, see Lawrence Freedman, “Strategic Coercion,” and on the subject of how this concept may be used in the present day, see Gary Schaub, Jr., “Compellance: Resuscitating the Concept,” in Lawrence Freedman, ed., Strategic Coercion: Concepts and Cases (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1998). 85. Statements issued by Pakistan government ministers and officials during the 1999 Kargil conflict and 2002 Operation Parakram attest to this fact. This is a view, moreover, evidenced in Pakistani strategic literature, and confirmed by the discussions the author had with many stalwarts of the Pakistan establishment, including General (Retd) K. M. Arif, General (Retd) Mirza Aslam Beg, and former foreign ministers Agha Shahi and Abdul Sattar, in late May–early June 2003 in Islamabad. 86. The idea of Kashmir as a nuclear flashpoint was first publicly aired by CIA Director R. James Woolsey in his US congressional testimony in early 1993. It may have been rooted in the successful mission to South Asia by the US Deputy National Security Adviser, Robert Gates, to defuse the 1990 India–Pakistan crisis. For quotes from Woolsey's testimony, see “Indo-Pak N-war most likely, says CIA chief,” Agencies, Pioneer, February 26, 1993. The flashpoint thesis has been an American and Pakistani staple ever since. 87. Discussion in Islamabad with Major General (Retd) Hamid Gul, former Director-General, Pakistan Inter-Services Intelligence, June 2003. 88. See From Surprise to Reckoning, p. 183. 89. See Glenn H. Snyder, “The Balance of Power and the Balance of Terror,” in Paul Seabury, ed., Balance of Power (San Francisco: Chandler, 1965). 90. That Pakistan is sitting on a powder keg of domestic dissent and rebellion is brought out in The Final Settlement: Restructuring India–Pakistan Relations, A Report by the Strategic Foresight Group (Mumbai: International Centre for Peace Initiatives, March 2005). 91. This “solution” was suggested at the time of the Kargil War in Bharat Karnad, “Using LoC to India's Advantage,” Economic and Political Weekly, July 10, 1999. It is elaborated on in Karnad, Nuclear Weapons and Indian Security, pp. 494–512, in Bharat Karnad, “Firming up the Critical Capability Triad: Strategic Muscle, Sub-Conventional Punch and IT-enabled Network-Centricity and Electro-Magnetic Clout,” in Lieutenant General (Retd) Vijay Oberoi, ed., Army 2020: Shape, Size, Structure and General; Doctrine for Emerging Challenges (New Delhi, Centre for Land Warfare Studies and Knowledge World, 2004), pp. 245–49, and in Bharat Karnad, “Shaping the Indian Special Forces into a Strategic Asset,” paper presented at the Second National Seminar, Center for Land Warfare Studies, New Delhi, November 29–30, 2004. The Indian Army, it is reported, is now seeking to build up its strength in Special Operations Forces. See Rajat Pandit, “Army for ‘well-equipped’ special forces,” The Times of India, November 23, 2004. 92. The case that low-intensity wars can put pressure on the Indian government to escalate to the conventional level which, in turn, could compel the Pakistan government, if the situation turns very adverse, to consider the first use of nuclear weapons has been made. See Michael Krepon and Chris Gagne, eds., The Stability–Instability Paradox: Nuclear Weapons and Brinkmanship in South Asia (Washington, DC: The Henry L. Stimson Center, Report 38, June 2001), and Tellis, India's Emerging Nuclear Posture, pp. 54–55. 93. General K. M. Arif, “Retaining the Nuclear Option,” in Pakistan's Security and the Nuclear Option, pp. 124–25. 94. For a Pakistani perspective, see Kamal Matinuddin, The Nuclear Weaponization of South Asia (Karachi: Oxford University Press, 2002), pp. 233, 241–43. Matinuddin is a retired Army Lieutenant General and former Ambassador. Many Indians are plugging the same line. Among them, for instance, is Lieutenant General (Retd) V. R. Raghavan, former Director-General, Military Operations, Army Headquarters. See his “Victory at the cost of success,” Hindustan Times, October 12, 2003. 95. A few statistics to show just how morale-sapping the counter-insurgency operations have been for India: the Army has lost over 6,000 soldiers in Jammu & Kashmir since 1989 fighting guerillas, more than it did in all the wars it has fought with Pakistan. See Karnad, Nuclear Weapons and Indian Security, p. 502. Worse, there were more casualties in Operation Parakram owing mainly to deployment in the extremes of weather in the high mountains and in the desert, and because of mine-laying and mine-removing exercises, than in the entire Kargil conflict. See “Parakram killed more than Kargil,” The Times of India, August 2, 2003. 96. The China–Pakistan nexus is by now well established and the internet has innumerable sources and websites with extensive information on it. To cite but one source, see “Pakistan Nuclear Weapons,” at http://www.globalsecurity.org/wmd/world/pakistan/nuke.htm. 97. See Steve Weissman and Herbert Krosney, The Islamic Bomb: The Nuclear Threat to Israel and the Middle East (New York: Times Books, 1981), pp. 176–80. A. Q. Khan, however, attributes his success in erecting the Kahuta uranium centrifuge facility to native competence, ingenuity, and hard work. Refer to his “Pakistan's Nuclear Programme: Capabilities and Potentials [sic] of Kahuta Project,” in S. Shabir Hussain and Mujahid Kamran, eds., AQ Khan on Science and Education (Lahore: Sang-e-Mil Publications, 1997), pp. 116–17 98. This process is elaborated at length in Karnad, Nuclear Weapons and Indian Security, ch. IV, “Hesitant Realpolitik: 1966 To-Date,” pp. 276–451. 99. For the case that the 1998 thermonuclear test was a “fizzle” and the thinking behind that series of tests, and that India needs further testing to enable the deployment of safe and reliable high-yield fusion weapons, see Karnad, Nuclear Weapons and Indian Security, pp. 400–411. 100. Karnad, Nuclear Weapons and Indian Security, see ch. IV, “Hesitant Realpolitik: 1966 To-Date,” pp. 276–451, and ch. V, “The Perils of Deterrence by Half-Measures: Why Grand Strategic Vision and a Thermonuclear Force are a Must,” pp. 452–704. 101. Field Marshal Ayub Khan, Pakistan's ruler (1958–68), in fact emphasized Pakistan's vulnerability owing to the exposure of this “strategic corridor” to possible Indian attacks. See Karnad, Nuclear Weapons and Indian Security, pp. 677–78. 102. See World's Nuclear Arsenals, last updated February 4, 2003, on the CDI website http://www.cdi.org/issues/nukef&f/database/nukearsenals.cfm#india. 103. See Agha Shahi, “Pakistan's Response to the Indian Nuclear Doctrine,” in The Nuclear Debate, Strategic Issues, p. 9. 104. See Rahul Mukherji, “Wary Neighbors: The Danger of Conflict and the Prospect of Cooperation in South Asia,” Harvard Asia Pacific Review (Winter 2001), p. 61. 105. See S. K. Singh, “The quest for parity: It is Pakistan which is hurting itself,” The Tribune, July 29, 2003. Singh is an ex-Indian Foreign Secretary. 106. Kenneth J. Adelman, President Reagan's director of the US Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, describes this policy in his book, The Great Universal Embrace (New York: Simon & Schuster, 1989), p. 185. 107. General Pervez Musharraf declared in a 2003 seminar at the Institute of Strategic Studies: “We do not intend to get involved in a ruinous arms race.” See Inaugural Address by General Pervez Musharraf in Peace and Security in South Asia: Proceedings of the International Conference held at the Institute of Strategic Studies, September 19–20, 2002 (Islamabad: Institute of Strategic Studies, 2002), p. 9. 108. See Mazari, “Understanding Pakistan's Nuclear Doctrine,” pp. 74–75. 109. Thus, the extreme right-wing Pakistani religious leader Maulana Fazlur Rehman, chief of the Jam`at-e-Ulema Islami (Fazlur) Party, and one of the pillars of the political dispensation headed by General Musharraf in Pakistan, on a recent visit to India, pleaded with the two governments to keep the US out of the Kashmir imbroglio – New Delhi's traditional line that Islamabad has now accepted, thereby reversing its policy of many years which sought Washington's involvement in the resolution of this dispute. See Sarbjit Dhariwal, “Pakistan's no to third party mediation,” The Tribune (NOIDA), March 17, 2005. Fazlur went so far as to publicly wonder if it was not better for the peoples of India and Pakistan to have one identity and unify as did the two Germanys! See Faizul Haque, “Fazl wants roundtable on Pak-India ‘reunion,’” The Nation (Islamabad), July 22, 2003. Indian grassroots politicians, such as Laloo Prasad Yadav, the Minister for Railways, too have reciprocated such sentiments while in Pakistan. Even a visiting hardcore Hindu rightwinger and Bharatiya Janata Party Member of Parliament Anadi Sahu exulted about the thaw in India–Pakistan relations during a luncheon with Prime Minister Zafrullah Jamali. See Sagarika Ghose, “Give us Laloo, you can take Maulana Rehman: Jamali's offer,” The Indian Express, August 12, 2003. 110. According to news reports, former Pakistan Prime Minister Jamali, at a luncheon for visiting Indian politicians, began his speech by saying that as between sovereign states “Koi chhota nahi, koi bada nahin [nobody is small or big],” but ended on the note “bade bhai ko badi qurbani deni chahiye [the older brother must make a bigger sacrifice].” See Ghose, “Give us Laloo, you can take Maulana Rehman: Jamali's offer.” 111. Karnad, Nuclear Weapons and Indian Security, pp. 509–16. 112. Discussion with Major General Hamid Gul, Islamabad; June 2003. 113. Indeed, a former Indian Member of Parliament, Syed Shahabuddin, urges Indian Muslims not to subscribe to vote bank politics, but rather to form “A Muslim based secular party … in which they occupy the driver's seat but whose doors are open to all, which stands for national unity and integrity, demands fair and proportionate participation in governance and society for all identifiable communities irrespective of religion, caste, region or language.” See his “Muslims need to establish political clout,” The Indian Express, August 29, 2003. 114. Freedman, The Evolution of Nuclear Strategy, p. 189. 115. The game of “chicken” articulated in Thomas Schelling, Strategy of Conflict (New York: Oxford University Press, 1960). 116. Freedman, The Evolution of Nuclear Strategy, p. 189. 117. See Shahi, Khan, and Sattar, “Securing nuclear peace.” A number of Indian analysts have said much the same thing. 118. In the Kargil case, for example, see the official, From Surprise to Reckoning, pp. 183–213. 119. See Thomas Schelling, Arms and Influence (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1966), p. 99. 120. Beaufre, Deterrence and Strategy; p. 71. 121. See the Islamabad-datelined story: Ken Moritsugu and Michael Dorgan, “Residents of rival nations don't fear nuclear war between India–Pakistan,” Knight-Ridder Newspapers, June 6, 2002, at http://www.realcities.com/mid/krwashington/3415023.htm. This was the URL provided by Moritsugu from which the author downloaded the story. He gave no other specific reference though, presumably, newspapers in the Knight-Ridder stable in the US carried it. 122. One of the most respected Pakistan Army officers and one-time Governor of East Pakistan, the late Lieutenant General Mohammad Attiqur Rahman had this to say: “At present our society would not be able to accept larger [number of fatalities than in the 1971 War] in spite of many warlike statements made by those who are never near shot and shell … A nuclear bomb is not just a larger variety of conventional bomb … Do we seriously imagine that the Indians … will systematically bomb ourtowns into submission, each bomb causing more casualties than most conventional weaponry?” Quote in Karnad, Nuclear Weapons and Indian Security, p. 569. 123. Manoj Joshi, “Pak gets Nanny: Virtually becomes US protectorate,” Hindustan Times, December 13, 2004. 124. Karnad, Nuclear Weapons and Indian Security, p. 462. 125. Interview with a senior Pentagon official who resigned from his post, Washington, September 2003. 126. Carol Giacomo, “US has spent millions to guard 40 Pak nuke weapons,” Reuters, The Sunday Express, February 8, 2004. 127. See Kenneth N. Waltz, “Structural Realism after the Cold War,” in G. John Ikenberry, ed., America Unrivaled: The Future of the Balance of Power (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2002), p. 62. 128. Kenneth Waltz, “Structural Realism after the Cold War,” p. 38. 129. This aspect is analyzed at length in Karnad, Nuclear Weapons and Indian Security, pp. 572–77. 130. Karnad, Nuclear Weapons and Indian Security, ch. V, “The Perils of Deterrence by Half-Measures,” pp. 452–704. Also see by Bharat Karnad, “Insensible Foreign and Military Policy,” Seminar, No. 529 (September 2003), pp. 48–51, and “Aim Low, Hit Lower,” Seminar Annual, No. 545 (January 2005), pp. 118–125. Additional informationNotes on contributorsBharat KarnadBharat Karnad is Research Professor in National Security Studies at the Centre for Policy Research, New Delhi.