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The Rationality of Ideology

1989; University of Chicago Press; Volume: 32; Issue: 1 Linguagem: Inglês

10.1086/467171

1537-5285

William R. Dougan, Michael C. Munger,

Electoral Systems and Political Participation

Previous articleNext article No AccessThe Rationality of IdeologyWilliam R. Dougan, and Michael C. MungerWilliam R. Dougan Search for more articles by this author , and Michael C. Munger Search for more articles by this author PDFPDF PLUS Add to favoritesDownload CitationTrack CitationsPermissionsReprints Share onFacebookTwitterLinkedInRedditEmail SectionsMoreDetailsFiguresReferencesCited by The Journal of Law and Economics Volume 32, Number 1Apr., 1989 Sponsored by The University of Chicago Booth School of Business and The University of Chicago Law School Article DOIhttps://doi.org/10.1086/467171 Views: 21Total views on this site Citations: 90Citations are reported from Crossref Copyright 1989 The University of ChicagoPDF download Crossref reports the following articles citing this article:Zoltán Fazekas, Martin Ejnar Hansen Incentives for non-participation: absence in the United Kingdom House of Commons, 1997–2015, Public Choice 191, no.1-21-2 (Jan 2022): 51–73.https://doi.org/10.1007/s11127-021-00950-6Elizabeth N Simas Extremely High Quality?, Public Opinion Quarterly 84, no.33 (May 2021): 699–724.https://doi.org/10.1093/poq/nfaa042François Facchini, Louis Jaeck Ideology and the rationality of non-voting, Rationality and Society 31, no.33 (Apr 2019): 265–286.https://doi.org/10.1177/1043463119841033Michael J Ensley Donald R. 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