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Bricolage in action: learning about, making sense of, and discussing, issues about genetically modified crops and food

2007; Taylor & Francis; Volume: 9; Issue: 1 Linguagem: Inglês

10.1080/13698570601181623

1469-8331

Tom Horlick‐Jones, John Walls, Jenny Kitzinger,

Climate Change Communication and Perception

Abstract Making sense of new technologies and their associated risks entails lay people in utilizing various modes of reasoning and making use of a range of interpretative resources at hand to interrogate evidence. Such sense making is accomplished collectively in ways that are sometimes playfully inventive, and which have regard to ideas of accountability and morally acceptability. In practice, such bricolage-like processes appear to have certain similarities with the work of everyday scientific investigation. This paper examines these processes of lay practical reasoning by adopting an analytic stance that is concerned with examining the fine detail of what people demonstrably do in accomplishing such work. It draws on data generated by number of reconvened discussion groups, which formed a component part of the recent public debate in the UK about the possible commercialization of genetically modified crops. Keywords: Talk about riskpractical reasoningnew technologiesgenetic modification (GM)moral discoursefantasyscientific work Acknowledgements An earlier version of this paper was presented to the Society for Risk Analysis (Europe) annual conference in Como in September 2005. Some of the data and ideas were also presented to a seminar at the University of Kent at Canterbury in January 2006, and to the 4th International Communication, Medicine and Ethics (COMET) conference in Cardiff in June…July 2006. We are grateful to the audiences at these events for their constructive and stimulating questions. The research reported here was supported by the Leverhulme Trust, as part of the Understanding Risk programme, and by the ESRC SCARR programme (grant RES-336-25-0001). We thank the members of the GM Nation? debate Steering Board, the debate secretariat, and staff at COI Communications and at Corr Wilbourn Research & Development, for their co-operation and patience. We are pleased to acknowledge many useful conversations with a number of colleagues; in particular with Greg Myers, who kindly provided detailed comments on an earlier version of the manuscript, and with Graham Murdock, Tim O'Riordan, Nick Pidgeon, Wouter Poortinga and Gene Rowe. We are also grateful to Mike Lynch and Tee Rogers-Hayden, who helpfully provided us with access to unpublished material. Finally, we thank the referees for their insightful comments and suggestions. Notes 1 In this respect, the design of the GM Nation? debate reflected the influence of the social framing critique of the deficit model. 2 Access to the data utilized in preparing this paper was made possible by virtue of two of the authors being members of the team of official evaluators of GM Nation? that were appointed by the debate Steering Board. This role provided unique behind-the-scenes access to virtually all aspects of the debate process (the debate process is discussed in detail in Horlick-Jones et al. Citation2007). Sometimes this access was constrained by a combination of the organizers' wish to minimize the number of observers at the closed meetings, and by the practical logistics of whether a member of the evaluation team was free to travel to a given meeting, sometimes at relatively short notice. Extracts are reproduced with minimal dynamics added. Participants: female = Fi, male = Mj, moderator = Mod. Observer comments in double parentheses. 3 En passant, we note that the debate process failed to utilize the potentially significant capacity of the diaries to reveal rich detail of the participants' engagement with 'factual' accounts about issues concerned with genetic modification (cf. Alaszewski Citation2006). 4 Here we draw upon a limited analysis of the diaries conducted by Corr Wilbourn (Citation2003), and a detailed (but as yet unpublished) content analysis by Tee Rogers-Hayden. 5 A process in which there is careful consideration of, and discussion about, evidence for and against a measure, with a view to making a decision. 6 A detailed examination of the role of mediated knowledge in practical reasoning about new technologies and related risk issues forms part of our current programme of work on the Narrow-but-Deep data. Early findings from this work have been reported elsewhere (Horlick-Jones et al. Citation2006). 7 It should be noted that here we use the word 'fantasy' in the everyday sense of a fancy or imaginative possibility, without necessarily entailing the underlying subconscious associations corresponding to the psychodynamic notion of 'phantasy' (Rycroft Citation1972). We note that Petersen (Citation2001) has also invoked the notion of fantasy in connection with the sometimes fanciful media coverage of issues concerning medical genetics, and that Kitzinger and Williams (Citation2005) have argued that some scientists actively promote 'science fantasies.' The expressions of enthusiasm for 'fantasy' products reported here seem to have clear marketing implications. If one or more highly desirable products based on genetically modified components were indeed developed, then it is interesting to speculate about the likely impact on more general consumer attitudes towards genetic modification (cf. Townsend and Campbell Citation2004). Here comparisons with the market take-up of mobile telephones may be instructive (Walls et al. Citation2005). 8 Petts et al. (Citation2001) note that sense-making talk about risk issues is typically dependent upon the use of devices like: 'there's no smoke without fire' and 'if it's going to happen, its going to happen and you can't do anything about it.' They termed these devices lay logics. Myers (Citationsubmitted) has recognized that such lay logics are closely related to the notion of commonplaces in classical rhetoric (Myers and Macnaghten Citation1998; see also Billig Citation1996); namely what one might call 'generally accepted arguments.' In this paper we have used the term lay logical devices to encompass both these notions. In this way, we also draw a distinction between lay logical devices and the idea of lay logic as developed by Williams (Citation1983), which has a closer resemblance to the more general idea of 'informal logic,' or a sense underlying given behaviours that emerges from social interaction (see discussion in Horlick-Jones Citation2005a, Citation2005b).