The Question of Realism:
2003; Taylor & Francis; Volume: 13; Issue: 1 Linguagem: Inglês
10.1080/09636410490493877
ISSN1556-1852
Autores Tópico(s)Political Conflict and Governance
ResumoClick to increase image sizeClick to decrease image size Acknowledgments The author would like to thank Dale Copeland, Alexander George, Robert Jervis, Sean Lynn-Jones, John Mearsheimer, Andrew Moravcsik, Richard Rosecrance, Stephen Van Evera, Stephen Walt, and anonymous reviewers for Security Studies for the comments they made on earlier drafts of this article. Notes 1. Alexander Wendt, Social Theory of International Politics (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1999), 262–66. Hobbes's original argument, an argument that dealt specifically with international politics, was laid out in the Leviathan, pt. 1, chap. 13. 2. Stephen Van Evera, "The Hard Realities of International Politics," Boston Review 17 (November–December 1992): 19; Joseph Grieco, "Anarchy and the Limits of Cooperation: A Realist Critique of the Newest Liberal Institutionalism," International Organization 42, no. 3 (summer 1988): 485; and John J. Mearsheimer, review of Roger Spegele, Political Realism in International Theory, in International History Review 20, no. 3 (September 1998): 776. Note also John J. Mearsheimer, "The False Promise of International Institutions," International Security 19, no. 3 (winter 1994/95): 9; John J. Mearsheimer, The Tragedy of Great Power Politics (New York: Norton, 2001), chap. 2; and Kenneth N. Waltz, "The Origins of War in Neorealist Theory," in The Origin and Prevention of Major Wars, ed. Robert Rotberg and Theodore Rabb (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1989), 43. See also the sources cited in note 7 below. I say "prevailing assumption" because there are exceptions. See, for example, Charles L. Glaser, "Realists as Optimists: Cooperation as Self-Help," International Security 19, no. 3 (winter 1994/95): 50–90; Randall L. Schweller, "Neorealism's Status-Quo Bias: What Security Dilemma?" Security Studies 5, no. 3 (spring 1996): 90–121; and Andrew Kydd, "Sheep in Sheep's Clothing: Why Security Seekers Do Not Fight Each Other," Security Studies 7 no. 1 (autumn 1997): 114–55. 3. Mearsheimer, Tragedy of Great Power Politics, 3, 21, 34. 4. Indeed, the defensive realists have been criticized for placing increasing emphasis on such nonsystemic factors. See esp. Jeffrey Legro and Andrew Moravcsik, "Is Anybody Still a Realist?" International Security 24, no. 2 (fall 1999): 5–55. 5. Waltz, "Origins of War in Neorealist Theory," 40. In context, however, the assumption here was still that rational states would seek to maximize relative power. "Excessive strength" was to be avoided because it might lead "other states to increase their arms and pool their efforts against the dominant state"—that is, because it might actually weaken a state's position in the system. Other defensive realists, however, take a clearer position and say explicitly that states "satisfice"—that they are not necessarily power maximizers but seek only the level of power sufficient for their purposes. See Barry R. Posen, "The Best Defense," National Interest, no. 67 (spring 2002): 119. 6. Waltz, "Origins of War in Neorealist Theory," 43–44. 7. James Fearon, "Rationalist Explanations for War," International Organization, 49, no. 3 (summer 1995): 384. It is in fact taken for granted in the scholarly literature that this view is held by neorealists of all stripes. Dale Copeland, for example, refers in passing to the "core neorealist premise that anarchy forces states into recurrent security competitions"; the assumption here is that this view is by no means limited to the offensive realists. Stephen Walt says that "the central conclusion of all realist theories—what might be termed the 'realist problematique'—is that the existence of several states in anarchy renders the security of each one problematic and encourages them to compete with each other for power or security." Andrew Kydd says that "structural realists"—and he has both offensive and defensive realists in mind—"argue that international anarchy renders states insecure, and that the search for security is the main task of states, and the main cause of conflict." Robert Kaufman notes that "realists of all persuasions agree that the quest for power and the rivalries it engenders offer the most basic explanation for the origins of war." Dale Copeland, "The Constructivist Challenge to Structural Realism," International Security 25, no. 2 (fall 2000): 188; Stephen Walt, "The Enduring Relevance of the Realist Tradition," in Political Science: The State of the Discipline, ed. Ira Katznelson and Helen Milner (New York: Norton, 2002), 200 (emphasis in original); Kydd, "Sheep in Sheep's Clothing," 114; and Robert Kaufman, "On the Uses and Abuses of History in International Relations Theory: Dale Copeland's The Origins of Major War," Security Studies 10, no. 4 (summer 2001): 180. 8. See especially George Kennan, American Diplomacy, 1900–1950 (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1951), chap. 4; quote at 69. 9. Terms such as "system" and "stability" are not easy to define with any precision. For a discussion, see Robert Jervis, System Effects: Complexity in Political and Social Life (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1997), 5–10 (for "system") and 94–98, esp. 96 (for "stability"). For the purposes of this article, however, precise definitions are not necessary. These terms are used here in a fairly conventional way, and their meaning will be clear enough from context as well as from the examples given. 10. Adam Smith, An Inquiry into the Nature and Causes of the Wealth of Nations (New York: Modern Library, 1937), 423. 11. Quoted in Raymond Sontag, European Diplomatic History, 1871–1932 (New York: Appleton-Century-Crofts, 1933), 22. 12. For a general analysis, see Peter Liberman, Does Conquest Pay? The Exploitation of Occupied Industrial Societies (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1996); for a summary of Liberman's findings, see his article "The Spoils of Conquest," International Security 18, no. 2 (fall 1993): 125–53. 13. [Lord Salisbury], "The Terms of Peace," Quarterly Review 129 (1870): 540–56 (originally published anonymously). 14. Otto von Bismarck to his ambassador in Paris, 25 August 1871, cited in Allan Mitchell, Bismarck and the French Nation, 1848–1890 (New York: Pegasus, 1971), 57. Bismarck made this point many times during this period. In September 1870, for example, he told the acting French foreign minister, Jules Favre, "I am sure that very soon we will have a new war with you and we want to do so with all the advantages." Cited in Robert Giesberg, The Treaty of Frankfort: A Study in Diplomatic History (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 1966), 33. 15. Otto von Bismarck, Reflections and Reminiscences, 2 vols. (London: Smith, Elder, 1898), vol. 2: 235. 16. In trying to explain the limits on human aggressiveness, biologists have sometimes argued along similar lines. As George Williams, one of the great figures in modern evolutionary theory, once pointed out, "an individual who maximizes his friendships and minimizes his antagonisms will have an evolutionary advantage, and selection should favor those characters that promote the optimization of personal relationships." "I imagine that this evolutionary factor," Williams continued, "has increased man's capacity for altruism and compassion and has tempered his ethically less acceptable heritage of sexual and predatory aggressiveness." George Williams, Adaptation and Natural Selection: A Critique of Some Current Evolutionary Thought (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1966), 94. 17. Kenneth Waltz, Theory of International Politics (New York: McGraw Hill, 1979), 127–28. 18. "The Terms of Peace," 553. 19. See especially George Monger, The End of Isolation: British Foreign Policy, 1900–1907 (London: T. Nelson, 1963); and Christopher Andrew, Théophile Delcassé and the Making of the Entente Cordiale: A Reappraisal of French Foreign Policy 1898–1905 (London: Macmillan, 1968). Note also the tone of one very well-known document from this period: Eyre Crowe, "Memorandum on the Present State of British Relations with France and Germany," 1 January 1907, British Documents on the Origins of the War, 1898–1914, ed. G. P. Gooch and Harold Temperley, 11 vols. in 13 (London: His Majesty's Stationery Office, 1926–38), vol. 6: 397–420, esp. 416. 20. Luigi Albertini, The Origins of the War of 1914, 3 vols. (London: Oxford University Press, 1952–57), vol. 2: 546. The Russian interior minister spoke at the time about how war would bring revolution, but "sitting at a table laden with ikons and religious lamps," crossed himself, saying "we cannot escape our fate," and then signed the mobilization decree. Ibid. See also D. C. B. Lieven, Russia and the Origins of the First World War (New York: St. Martin's, 1983), 108–9, 115. 21. Special Journal of the Russian Council of Ministers, 24 July 1914, and Sazonov to Strandtmann, 24 July 1914, in July 1914: The Outbreak of the First World War: Selected Documents, ed. Imanuel Geiss (New York: Scribner's, 1967), 186–88. For this characterization of Russia's Balkan policy, see Paul Schroeder, "Embedded Counterfactuals and World War I as an Unavoidable War," in "Unmaking the West: Counterfactual Thought Experiments in History," ed. Philip Tetlock, Richard Ned Lebow, and Geoffrey Parker, forthcoming, msp. 37, available at http://www.asu.edu/clas/polisci/cqrm/discussion.series.html. Russia's sponsorship of the Balkan League of 1912 is perhaps the most striking case in point. The treaty establishing this alliance, as French prime minister Raymond Poincaré noted at the time, "contained the seeds not only of a war against Turkey, but of a war against Austria as well." Quoted in Pierre Renouvin, La Crise européenne et la première guerre mondiale (Paris: puf, 1962), 173. 22. For a classic example, see Lord Castlereagh's famous State Paper of 5 May 1820, in Foundations of British Foreign Policy: From Pitt (1792) to Salisbury (1902), ed. Harold Temperley and Lillian Penson (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1938), 48–63. 23. François de Salignac de la Mothe Fénelon, supplement to his L'Examen de conscience sur les devoirs de la royauté, originally written around 1700, and published (under various titles) in many editions of his works—for example, in Fénelon, Oeuvres (Paris: Lebel, 1824), vol. 23. An extract from an early English translation can be found in Theory and Practice of the Balance of Power, 1486–1914, ed. Moorhead Wright (London: Dent, 1975), 43. Note also the extracts from the writings of Defoe (1706) and Hume (1752), in ibid., 48–49, 64. Rousseau also argued along these lines. See Jean Jacques Rousseau, "Abstract and Judgement of Saint-Pierre's Project for Perpetual Peace (1756)," in Rousseau on International Relations, ed. Stanley Hoffmann and David Fidler (Oxford: Clarendon, 1991), 62–64. 24. Henry Kissinger, A World Restored: Metternich, Castlereagh, and the Problems of Peace, 1812–22 (New York: Grosset and Dunlap, 1964), 144–45. 25. See especially Edward Vose Gulick, Europe's Classical Balance of Power: A Case History of the Theory and Practice of One of the Great Concepts of European Statecraft (New York: Norton, 1955), esp. pt. 2; and W. A. Phillips, The Confederation of Europe: A Study of the European Alliance, 1813–1823, as an Experiment in the International Organization of Peace (London: Longman, 1920). Kissinger's arguments, it should be noted, were developed in the context of his analysis in A World Restored of the Vienna settlement. Note, however, Paul Schroeder's discussion of the issue in "Did the Vienna Settlement Rest on a Balance of Power?" American Historical Review 97, no. 3 (June 1992): 683–706. Although Schroeder's answer to the question posed in his title is essentially "no," a careful reading of that article shows that he agrees that the peacemakers thought in terms of balance and equilibrium. His argument is that they defined those concepts rather broadly and not just in narrow balance-of-power terms, and he does not claim that balance-of-power thinking, even in the strict sense, played no role at Vienna. The sort of language that was used at the time, he writes, shows that "checking and balancing power was one element in the process of achieving an overall balance in the system" (695). 26. Woodrow Wilson, War and Peace: Presidential Messages, Addresses, and Public Papers, 2 vols. (New York: Harper, 1927), vol. 1: 129, 133, 255, 342–43, 547–48; for another reference to the Congress of Vienna, see vol. 2: 179. The passages quoted are from speeches Wilson gave during the war and in 1919. Wilson's contemptuous references here to the peacemakers a century earlier were not mere rhetorical flourishes. His hostility to the method used at Vienna came out even in private. When the New Zealand prime minister alluded to the Vienna Congress at a meeting during the Paris Peace Conference, Wilson exploded with rage. The very subject was taboo: Wilson "hoped that even by reference no odor of Vienna would again be brought into [the Paris] proceedings." Papers of Woodrow Wilson, 69 vols. (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1966–1994), vol. 54: 314. 27. See especially Wilson, War and Peace, 1: 129. 28. Baruch diary, entry for 2 June 1919, Baruch Papers, Mudd Library, Princeton University. See also S. G. Millin, General Smuts, 2 vols. (Boston: Little, Brown, 1936), vol. 2: 232–33. Note also Wilson's defense of the peace treaty in the speeches he gave in late 1919. That treaty, he said on 4 September, "seeks to punish one of the greatest wrongs ever done in history, the wrong which Germany sought to do to the world and to civilization; and there ought to be no weak purpose with regard to the application of the punishment. She attempted an intolerable thing, and she must be made to pay for the attempt." The same note was sounded in another speech he gave four days later: "I hear that this treaty is very hard on Germany. When an individual has committed a criminal act, the punishment is hard, but the punishment is not unjust. This nation permitted itself, through unscrupulous governors, to commit a criminal act against mankind, and it is to undergo the punishment." Wilson, War and Peace, 1: 590–91, 2: 33–34. 29. The myth persists that Wilson was the champion of a peace of reconciliation with Germany, and that Britain and France insisted on much harsher terms and forced him into disastrous compromises. The terms of the Treaty of Versailles were in fact very much in line with the program Wilson had laid out in his wartime speeches, and the pre-armistice agreement with Germany was based explicitly on that program. The one point where the peacemakers clearly did violate the terms of the pre-armistice agreement had to do with the inclusion of pensions in the reparation bill. The British wanted pensions included, the French would have preferred not to include them, and Wilson sided with the British for moral reasons: he thought it was right that Germany should make amends not just for the material damage its "aggression" had caused, but for the loss of human life as well. 30. Van Evera, "Hard Realities," 19. 31. Waltz, "Origins of War in Neorealist Theory," 43–44 (for the quotations); Mearsheimer, "False Promise," 9–12; John Mearsheimer, "Back to the Future: Instability in Europe after the Cold War," International Security 15, no. 1 (summer 1990): 12; Mearsheimer, Tragedy of Great Power Politics, 3, 34; and Robert Jervis, "Realism, Neoliberalism, and Cooperation: Understanding the Debate," International Security 24, no. 1 (summer 1999): 49. 32. Mearsheimer, "Back to the Future," 12; and Mearsheimer, "False Promise," 11. 33. Mearsheimer review of Spegele, Political Realism in International Theory, 776. 34. Van Evera, "Hard Realities," 19. Note also Martin Wight, Power Politics (New York: Holmes and Meier, 1978), 139: fear is "the prime motive of international politics." In this and the following two sentences, I use qualifying phrases—"in principle," "at times," "in certain circumstances"—because the heart of the defensive realist view is its emphasis on the particular conditions, having to do most notably with the offense-defense balance, that determine the extent to which this logic comes into play. Defensive realists such as Van Evera—and this is the point on which I part company with them—accept the theoretical proposition that anarchy causes violence but stress that in practice its importance depends on the setting. The basic theoretical logic, in their view, is not very important in a defense-dominant world, or more precisely in a world where the defense is believed to have the upper hand; in such a world, people can be relatively relaxed. In a world where the offense is believed to be dominant, however—in which conquest is thought to be easy, resources are thought to be highly cumulative, and fears about the shifting military balance run deep—that logic comes into play in a major way. The defensive realists thus do not really challenge the fundamental argument that the anarchic structure of international politics is in principle a source of instability. Since their analysis focuses on a different level, however—on the conditions that determine in practice just how much instability there is—this argument does not loom as large for them as it does for their offensive realist friends. 35. Robert Jervis, "Cooperation under the Security Dilemma," World Politics 30, no. 2 (January 1978), 167–214, esp. 187–91. The basic idea here was not unknown to theorists such as Fénelon. "We cannot abandon these towers to them without exposing ourselves to their attacks," he has one of his characters say in Télémaque, "and they regard them as citadels that we can use to subjugate them." Quoted in Françoise Gallouédec-Genuys, Le Prince selon Fénelon (Paris: puf, 1963), 267. In Fénelon's view, however, this problem was not considered of major importance. 36. Van Evera, "Hard Realities," 19. See also Mearsheimer, Tragedy of Great Power Politics, 49. 37. Mearsheimer, "False Promise," 9, 11; and Mearsheimer, Tragedy of Great Power Politics, 33. 38. Mearsheimer, Tragedy of Great Power Politics, 3, 21, 32–33, 42. 39. Ibid., 37. 40. On this latter point, see Randall Schweller and William Wolforth, "Power Test: Evaluating Realism in Response to the End of the Cold War," Security Studies 9, no. 3 (spring 2000): 60–107, esp. 88. 41. One measure of how common this kind of assumption is is the fact that two leading political scientists consider the point that cooperation is actually possible when interests overlap to be a major finding; see Robert Axelrod and Robert Keohane, "Achieving Cooperation under Anarchy: Strategies and Institutions," World Politics 38, no. 1 (October 1985), 226–54, republished first in Cooperation under Anarchy, ed. Kenneth Oye (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1986), 226–54, and again in Neorealism and Neoliberalism: The Contemporary Debate, ed. David Baldwin (New York: Columbia University Press, 1993), 85–115. The passages in question are on pp. 108 and 113 in the Baldwin book. 42. See, for example, Robert Axelrod, The Evolution of Cooperation (New York: Basic Books, 1984), 27. As Charles Lipson notes in his review of the Axelrod book, it is often assumed that there are "powerful analogies between this stylized game and the real world of international affairs." American Journal of International Law 81, no. 2 (April 1987): 470. See also Waltz, Theory of International Politics, 109n.; and Jervis, "Realism, Neoliberalism, and Cooperation," 49. 43. See, for example, Robert Jervis, "Realism, Game Theory, and Cooperation," World Politics 40, no. 3 (April 1988): 323, 329 (also citing works by Harrison Wagner and by George Downs et al.); and Joanne Gowa, "Anarchy, Egoism, and Third Images: The Evolution of Cooperation and International Relations," International Organization, 40, no. 1 (winter 1986): 169, 172 (also citing works by Russell Hardin and Bruce Russett). Note also Mancur Olson's review of Axelrod, Evolution of Cooperation, in American Journal of Sociology 91, no. 6 (May 1986): 1465–66. Olson argues that one should not expect the prisoner's dilemma logic to apply to great power politics because in the real world the "players" are able to communicate with each other, and since there is a small number of "players," collective action problems are much less likely to arise. 44. See, for example, William Langer's classic study, European Alliances and Alignments, 1871–1890 (New York: Knopf, 1931). 45. Churchill, in his account of the 1911 Agadir crisis, explained how the adjustment process worked before the First World War, and in particular how the sorts of agreements that were reached reflected even subtle shifts in the structure of power—a view at variance with the notion that cooperative outcomes are grossly insensitive to the structure of power and interest. "The great powers marshalled on either side," he wrote, preceded and protected by an elaborate cushion of diplomatic courtesies and formalities, would display to each other their respective arrays. In the forefront would be the two principal disputants, Germany and France, and echeloned back on either side at varying distances and under veils of reserves and qualifications of different density, would be drawn up the other parties to the Triple Alliance and to what was already now beginning to be called the Triple Entente. At the proper moment these seconds or supporters would utter certain cryptic words indicative of their state of mind, as a consequence of which France or Germany would step back or forward a very small distance or perhaps move slightly to the right or to the left. When these delicate rectifications in the great balance of Europe, and indeed of the world, had been made, the formidable assembly would withdraw to their own apartments with ceremony and salutations and congratulate or condole with each other in whispers on the result." (Winston Churchill, The World Crisis [New York: Scribner's, 1923], 40–41). 46. Waltz, Theory of International Politics, 105. 47. Kenneth Waltz, Man, the State, and War (New York: Columbia University Press, 1959), quotation on 231. Jervis, one should note in this context, begins his "Security Dilemma" article by discussing Rousseau's argument about the problem of collective action. Stanley Hoffmann co-edited a book of Rousseau's writings on international relations, wrote an important article on Rousseau, and titled a collection of his writings The State of War, which was also the title of one of Rousseau's most interesting pieces on international politics (see note 49). 48. Quoted in F. H. Hinsley, Power and the Pursuit of Peace: Theory and Practice in the History of Relations between States (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1963), 51. 49. Rousseau, "The State of War," in Hoffmann and Fidler, Rousseau on International Relations, 38–41; and Hinsley, Power and the Pursuit of Peace, 51. Note the echo in Waltz, "Origins of War in Neorealist Theory": "so too will a state of war exist if all states seek only to ensure their own safety" (44). 50. Rousseau admired Fénelon, the most important and certainly the most widely read of the classical balance-of-power writers. See Judith Shklar, Men and Citizens: A Study of Rousseau's Social Theory (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1969), 4. 51. Rousseau, in Hoffmann and Fidler, Rousseau on International Relations, 62–64, 77–78. 52. Ibid., 56, 62, 64–65. 53. Ibid., 62, 77–78. 54. Ibid., 79–80. The discussion here is based on the analysis in Hinsley, Power and the Pursuit of Peace, 58. 55. Hans Morgenthau, In Defense of the National Interest: A Critical Examination of American Foreign Policy (Washington: University Press of America, 1982), 50, 52. This book was originally published in 1951. Even as late as 1979, Morgenthau was still arguing that the world was "moving ineluctably towards a third world war—a strategic nuclear war." See Francis A. Boyle, World Politics and International Law (Durham: Duke University Press, 1985), 73. 56. Waltz, "Origins of War in Neorealist Theory," 52; and also Kenneth N. Waltz, "Structural Realism after the Cold War," International Security 25, no. 1 (summer 2000): 39; Aron cited in Jervis, "Was the Cold War a Security Dilemma?" Journal of Cold War Studies 3, no. 1 (winter 2001): 44; and Butterfield cited in Jervis, Perception and Misperception in International Politics, 66. Note also Aron's 1951 claim that "the bipolar structure of world politics is, in itself, unfavorable for stability," earlier published in Raymond Aron, Les Guerres en chaine (Paris: Gallimard, 1951), and republished in Raymond Aron, Une Histoire du vingtième siècle, ed. Christian Bachelier (Paris: Plon, 1996), 255. Actually Aron's views were more subtle than such quotations might suggest. In his interpretation of the cold war ideological factors loomed large, but he could still see a security dilemma-type dynamic at work. The United States and the Soviet Union, he wrote in 1948, would never accept as final a division of Europe into spheres of influence. "There is no need," he said, "to assume that either contender is striving consciously for hegemony. It is enough to assume that each is suspicious of the other's intentions, that each regards the uncertainties of the future with anxiety, and allows itself to be convinced bit by bit that sooner or later" one side or the other was bound to prevail. Ibid., 229–30: earlier published in Raymond Aron, Le Grand Schisme (Paris: Gallimard, 1948). Arthur Schlesinger also interprets the cold war in ideologically rooted security dilemma terms. See Arthur Schlesinger, "Chapter 2," in Lloyd Gardner, Arthur Schlesinger, and Hans Morgenthau, The Origins of the Cold War (Waltham: Ginn, 1970), 41–77, esp. 68; this well-known essay was originally published in Foreign Affairs in October 1967. For an argument cut from a very different cloth, but bearing on a different historical period, see Donald Kagan, The Outbreak of the Peloponnesian War (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1969), esp. chap. 19. Kagan very effectively attacks the view that the bipolar structure of international politics in Greece in the fifth century B.C. was bound to lead to war; see esp. pp. 349–50. 57. Fourth plenary meeting of Potsdam conference, 20 July 1945, Documents on British Policy Overseas, series I, vol. 1: 466. For the British diplomat's comment see Hayter to Howard, 25 July 1945, in ibid., 903. "One had always known" that this was Stalin's basic view, that diplomat said, "but it was nice to get it from the horse's mouth." 58. Forrestal diary entry for 28 July 1945, Forrestal Diaries, vol. 2, Forrestal Papers, Mudd Library, Princeton University. The result of Hitler's egomania, according to Truman, was that "we shall have a Slav Europe for a long time to come. I don't think it is so bad." 59. "Realism," as E. H. Carr pointed out (in a passage quoted by Mearsheimer), "tends to emphasize the irresistible strength of existing forces and the inevitable character of existing tendencies, and to insist that the highest wisdom lies in accepting, and adapting oneself to these forces and these tendencies." E. H. Carr, The Twenty Years' Crisis, 1919–1939, 2nd ed. (London: Macmillan, 1962), 10, quoted in Mearsheimer, Tragedy of Great Power Politics, 17. 60. See in particular Geoffrey Blainey, The Causes of War, 3rd ed. (New York: Free Press, 1988), esp. 114–24; Fearon, "Rationalist Explanations for War," esp. 380–81, 390–401; Stephen Van Evera, Causes of War: Power and the Roots of Conflict (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1999), esp. 9, 11, and chap. 2; and above all Jervis, Perception and Misperception in International Politics. 61. Carl von Clausewitz, On War, ed. and trans. Michael Howard and Peter Paret (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1976), 75–77. 62. Ibid., 605. 63. In addition to the passages from Rousseau referred to above, note especially the extracts in Wright, Theory and Practice, from Fénelon (42), Defoe (47–48), and Hume (64). For useful discussions of the history of balance-of-power thinking, see Herbert Butterfield, "The Balance of Power," in Herbert Butterfield and Martin Wight, Diplomatic Investigations: Essays in the Theory of International Politics (London: George Allen and Unwin, 1966), 132–48; Martin Wight, "The Balance of Power and International Order," in The Bases of International Order, ed. Alan James (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1973), 85–115; and M. S. Anderson, "Eighteenth-Century Theories of the Balance of Power," in Studies in Diplomatic History, ed. Ragnhild Hatton and M. S. Anderson (London: Longman, 1970), 183–98. For the most thorough account of the early writings on this question, see Ernst Kaeber, Die Idee des europäischen Gleichgewichts in der publizistischen Literatur vom 16. bis zur Mitte des 18. Jahrhunderts [The idea of the European balance of power in the publicist literature from the sixteenth to the middle of the eighteenth century] (Berlin: Duncken, 1906). Note also the bibliographical essay in Gulick, Europe's Classical Balance of Power, 311–25. 64. David Hume, "Of the Balance of Power" (1752), in Wright, Theory and Practice, 64. 65. Ibid. 66. Fénelon in Wright, Theory and Practice, 42. 67. See the well-known extracts from Fénelon (c. 1700) and Vattel (1758) in Wright, Theory and Practice, 39, 41, 71–72; and the quotations from Rousseau, Montesquieu, and Voltaire in Hinsley, Power and the Pursuit of Peace, 57–58, 162, 163. Note also Niklas Vogt, Über die europäische Republik [On the European republic], 5 vols. (Frankfurt, 1787–92). Vogt is of particular interest because he was one of Metternich's teachers. This general idea, it should be noted, was not new to the eighteenth century: note, for example, the extract from Botero (1605) in Wright, Theory and Practice, 21; it in fact has roots in the Middle Ages and indeed
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