Collateral relief and adequate alternative remedies in constitutional litigation in the Commonwealth Caribbean
2011; Taylor & Francis; Volume: 37; Issue: 1 Linguagem: Inglês
10.1080/03050718.2011.548142
ISSN1750-5976
Autores Tópico(s)Multicultural Socio-Legal Studies
ResumoAbstract This article examines the proviso to the ‘alternative remedies’ provision/clause in Commonwealth Caribbean constitutions. It does so from two perspectives emerging from the jurisprudence of the Judicial Committee of the Privy Council in this area. In the first, exemplified by Harrikissoon v Attorney General, the applicant brings a constitutional motion for infringements of his fundamental rights or freedoms in circumstances where he may have an alternative remedy at common law or under statute. In that decision, the Privy Council delineated the scope of this proviso under the Constitution of Trinidad and Tobago, effectively importing an ‘alternative remedies’ clause from the use of the word ‘may’ in section 14(2) of the Constitution. This article examines, first, what Harrikissoon decided; second, whether its reasoning is acceptable given the wording of the section; and, third, the limitations accepted by subsequent decisions of the Privy Council. In the second perspective, the applicant makes a similar application for infringements of his fundamental rights or freedoms arising from or occurring during the course of proceedings already begun. The locus classicus is the decision of Chokolingo v Attorney General and forms part of the wider concern of the courts to prevent its processes being abused where the applicant makes a collateral constitutional challenge rather than pursuing an ordinary appeal. This article also aims to examine the decisions that pre‐dated Chokolingo in order to understand its jurisprudential underpinnings; to explore that decision to determine what the Privy Council in Chokolingo decided; to consider the similarities and differences between the reasoning therein and that of the Privy Council in Harrikissoon; and to consider the extent to which the principle enunciated in Chokolingo has been extended or limited in subsequent decisions of the Privy Council. Notes 1For example, section 24(1) of the Constitution of Barbados. 2For example, section 105(1) of the Constitution of St Lucia. 3 Inniss v Attorney General of Saint Christopher and Nevis [2008] UKPC 42 (St Christopher and Nevis). 4 Ramanoop v Attorney General [2005] UKPC 15; [2006] 1 AC 328, [2005] 2 WLR 1324 at [23] (Trinidad and Tobago). 5Ibid. 6[1980] AC 265 (Trinidad and Tobago). 7See Eddy Ventose, ‘Vindicatory Damages for Infringements of Constitutional Rights in the Commonwealth Caribbean’ [2009] 125 LQR 247. 8[1981] 1 WLR 106. 9 Attorney‐General of Trinidad and Tobago v McLeod [1984] 1 WLR 522, 530 and Hinds v Attorney General of Barbados [2002] 1 AC 854 at [24]. 10Ibid at 268 (emphasis added). 11Ibid. 12Ibid. 13Ibid at 269. 14Ibid. 15Ibid at 270. 18Ibid (emphasis original). 16[1981] 1 WLR 1468. 17Ibid at 1470. 19[2002] UKPC 5; [2002] 1 AC 871, PC; 16 [2003] 2 WLR 420. 20Ibid at [29]. 21Ibid at [31]. 22Ibid. 23Ibid at [32]. 24Ibid. 28Ibid at [36]. This paragraph was cited with approval by Lord Brown of Eaton‐under‐Heywood in Naidike v Attorney General [2004] UKPC 49; [2005] 1 AC 538 at [56], stating that, ‘In the present case, however, as has already been made clear, the lawfulness of Dr Naidike’s arrest and detention turns entirely on the true construction of the legislation. In any event it is now far too late for the respondent to assert abuse of process. If such a point is to be taken, it must be taken at the outset of proceedings, not as here at a comparatively late stage’ (at [57]). 25Ibid at [34]. 26Ibid. 27Ibid at [35]. 33Ibid at [39] (emphasis added). 29Ibid. 30Ibid. 31Ibid at [37]. 32Ibid at [38]. 34Ibid at [40] 37Ibid (emphasis original). 35[1998] 1 WLR 68. 36Ibid at 73. 38[2005] UKPC 15; [2006] 1 AC 328, [2005] 2 WLR 1324 at [23] (Trinidad and Tobago). 39See generally, ED Ventose, ‘“Vindicatory Damages” for infringements of Constitutional Rights in the Commonwealth Caribbean’ (2009) 125 LQR 247. 40[2005] UKPC 15 at [21]. 41Ibid. 42Ibid at [22]. 43Ibid. 46Ibid at [25]. 44Ibid at [23]. 45Ibid (emphasis added). 47Ibid at [26]. 48Ibid at [27], citing Chokolingo v Attorney General of Trinidad and Tobago [1981] 1 WLR 106, 111–12, and Attorney General of Trinidad and Tobago v McLeod [1984] 1 WLR 522, 530, and Hinds v Attorney General of Barbados [2002] 1 AC 854, 870, para 24. 49Ibid at [28], citing Hamel‐Smith JA in Attorney General of Trinidad and Tobago v George 8 April 2003. 50Ibid. 51Ibid at [29]. 52Ibid. 53Ibid. 54Ibid at [30]. 55Ibid at [30]. The Board also pointed out that ‘Where appropriate, directions should also be given for expedition and a timetable set for the further steps in the proceedings’ (ibid). 56Ibid. 57Ibid. 58Ibid. See also Surratt v Attorney General [2007] UKPC 55 [2008] 1 AC 655, [2008] 2 WLR 262 at [47]. 59Ibid. 60Ibid at [31]. 61Ibid at [33]. 62[2008] UKPC 55. 63 Hinds v Attorney General [2001] UKPC 56; [2002] 1 AC 854 (Barbados). 64[2008] UKPC 55 at [22]. 65Ibid. 66Ibid. 67Ibid. 68Ibid at [21]. 69[2008] UKPC 59. 70Ibid at [28]. 71Ibid. 72Ibid at [29] citing Durity v Attorney‐General of Trinidad and Tobago (2002) 60 WIR 448, [2003] 1 AC 405. 73Ibid at [31]. 74Ibid at [32]. 75Ibid. 76Ibid. 77These issues were already canvassed but not decided on when the Privy Council gave its first judgment: Durity v Attorney‐General of Trinidad and Tobago (2002) 60 WIR 448, [2003] 1 AC 405 at [34]–[36]. 81Ibid at 81–82. 78[1999] 1 WLR 68. 79Ibid at 80. 80Ibid at 81. 85Ibid at [17]. 82[2004] UKPC 21. 83Ibid at [15]. 84Ibid at [16]. 86Ibid. 87Ibid, citing Lord Steyn said in Ahnee v Director of Public Prosecutions [1999] 2 AC 294 at 307. 88[2004] UKPC 21 at [17]. 91[1979] AC 385 at 399 (emphasis added). See also Abbott v Attorney General [1979] 1 WLR 1342. 89[1979] AC 385. 90[2009] UKPC 11. 92Ibid. 96Ibid (emphasis added). 93[1981] 1 WLR 106. 94Ibid at 110. 95Ibid at 111. 97Ibid. 100Ibid. 98[1996] AC 842. 99Ibid at 854. 105Ibid. 101Ibid. 102Ibid. 1031984) 15 DLR (4th) 218, reversed by the Supreme Court: (1988) 50 DLR (4th) 385. 104[1996] AC 842 at 855. 106Ibid. 107[2001] UKPC 56 [2002] 1 AC 854. 108Ibid at [22]. 109Ibid at 857. 110Ibid at [22]. 112Ibid at [24]. 111Ibid at [23]. 113Ibid. 114[2002] UKPC 21. 115Ibid at [13]. 116Ibid at [18]. 117Ibid at [18]. 118Ibid. 119[2004] UKPC 26 [2005] 1 AC 190 (Trinidad and Tobago). 125Ibid at [53]. 120Ibid at [74]. 121Ibid. 122Ibid. 123Ibid at [75]. 124[2001] UKPC 11. 126[2004] UKPC 26 [2005] 1 AC 190 at [75]. 127Ibid. 134Ibid at [82]. 128Ibid at [77]. 129Ibid at [80]. 130Ibid at [78]. 131Ibid at [81]. 132Ibid. 133Ibid at [78]. 136Ibid at [87]. 135Ibid at [83]. 137Ibid at [88]. 138Ibid. 139Ibid. 140Ibid. 141Ibid at [89]. 143Ibid at [93]. 142Ibid at [92]. 144[2007] UKPC 7. 145Ibid at [21]. 146Ibid. 147[2006] 1 WLR 1623 (The Bahamas). 148[2007] UKPC 7 [27]. 149Ibid at [28]. 150Ibid at [29]. 151Ibid at [30]. 152Ibid at [31]. 153Ibid. 154Ibid at [32].
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