Interviews with Killers: Six Types of Combatants and Their Motivations for Joining Deadly Groups
2011; Taylor & Francis; Volume: 34; Issue: 10 Linguagem: Inglês
10.1080/1057610x.2011.604830
ISSN1521-0731
Autores Tópico(s)Leadership, Courage, and Heroism Studies
ResumoAbstract Interviews conducted with leaders, combatants, witnesses, and victims in central Nigeria provide insight into the processes of volunteerism, recruitment, and indoctrination within armed groups. Identified are numerous avenues by which previously nonviolent citizens become willing perpetrators in deadly grass-roots conflict. Despite a commonly advertised motive for joining, narrative analyses reveal several diverse and underlying motivations. Six distinct combatant typologies are described: the Follower, the Pragmatist, the Criminal, the Soldier, the Basic Needs, and the Ideologue. The characteristics of each type, the timing of their entry into the conflict, and the implication for select intervention strategies are discussed. Notes 1. See John Horgan, "Interviewing the Terrorists: Reflections on Fieldwork and Implications for Moving Terrorism Data Beyond the Anecdote." 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Prominent examples include Mancur Olsen, The Logic of Collective Action (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1965); Elmer Schattschneider, The Semi-Sovereign People: A Realist's View of Democracy in America (Belmont: Wadsworth Publishing, 1975); James Wilson, Political Organizations (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1973); Ted R. Gurr, Why Men Rebel (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1970); Mark Lichbach, The Rebel's Dilemma (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 1998), pp. 22–27; Stathis N. Kalyvas, The Sociology of Civil Wars: Warfare and Armed Groups (New Haven: Department of Political Science, Yale University, 2003) and The Logic of Violence in Civil War (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2006); Charles Tilly, The Vendee: A Sociological Analysis of the Counter-Revolution of 1793 (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1964) and Identities, Boundaries, and Social Ties (Boulder: Paradigm Publishers, 2006); Sidney Tarrow, Power in Movement: Social Movements and Contentious Politics (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1998). 6. See Macartan Humphreys and Jeremy M. Weinstein, "What the Fighters Say: A Survey of Ex-Combatants in Sierra Leone, June–August 2003," Center for Globalization and Sustainable Development Working Paper (New York: Columbia University, 2004); Jeremy Weinstein, "Resources and the Information Problem in Rebel Recruitment," Journal of Conflict Resolution, 49(4) (2005), pp. 598–624; Jeremy Weinstein, Inside Rebellion: The Politics of Insurgent Violence (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2006). Also see Elisabeth J. Wood, Insurgent Collective Action and Civil War in El Salvador (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2003); and James Pugel, "What the Fighters Say: A Survey of Ex-combatants in Liberia, February–March 2006," United Nations Development Program (2007). Available at http://www.lr.undp.org/UNDPwhatFightersSayLiberia_Finalv3.pdf 7. Elisabeth J. Wood, Insurgent Collective Action and Civil War in El Salvador (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2003); Mats Utas, Sweet Battlefields: Youth and the Liberian Civil War (Uppsala: Uppsala University Press, 2003); David Kilcullen, The Accidental Guerilla: Fighting Small Wars in the Midst of a Big One (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2009); Rachel Brett and Irma Specht, Young Soldiers: Why the Choose to Fight (Boulder: Lynne Rienner, 2004). 8. Ibid. 9. Ibid. 10. Ishmael Beah, A Long Way Gone: Memoirs of a Child Soldier (New York: Sarah Crichton Books, 2007). 11. Humphreys and Weinstein, "What the Fighters Say"; Pugel, "What the Fighters Say." 12. The title and central theme of both the Humphreys and Weinstein and Pugel articles. 13. According to local Nigerian scholars, the number of deaths has not been adequately confirmed. Reports communities do not agree on casualties although both describe the death toll as being in "the thousands." See Judicial Commission of Inquiry into Inter-Communal Conflicts in Benue, Nasarawa Plateau and Taraba States (Nasarawa State: Bassa Community of Toto Local Government Area, April 2002) and Egbura, The Judicial Commission of Enquiry into Inter-Communal Conflicts in Benue, Nasarawa Plateau and Taraba States (Nasarawa State: Egbura Community of Toto Local Government Area of Nasarawa State, 29 March 2002). 14. The activities were exposed during interviews. 15. See Bassa and Egbura, Judicial Commission of Inquiries. 16. See IRIN, "Nigeria: Plateau State Violence Claimed 53,000 lives"—report (8 October 2004). Available at http://irinnews.org 17. Judicial Commission of Inquiry into Inter-Communal Conflicts in Benue, Nasarawa, Plateau and Taraba States and The Judicial Commission of Enquiry into Inter-Communal Conflicts in Benue, Nasarawa Plateau and Taraba States. 18. Agena Torese Jonathon, The Settler Phenomenon in Nigeria: A History of the Experience of the Lower Benue Valley, 1800–2001 (Keffi: Nasarawa State University Doctoral Dissertation, 2007). 19. Ibid. 20. Jonathon, The Settler Phenomenon in Nigeria. 21. Brett and Specht, Young Soldiers. 22. The coding manual and coding schedule were used to sort simple data. 23. An example of this would be an interviewee who stated that he or she volunteered but where statements may have indicated obvious social coercion. In this case, what the subject says and what the subject experienced, would be different. 24. Opinions differed on the issue of police involvement. Some interviewees claimed that the vehicles and uniforms were stolen. Others claimed that the presence of police hardware and uniforms suggested that the police were involved on the side of the politically connected Egbura. 25. Some claimed that combatants were motivated by their ability to profit from selling body parts to be used in ritual ceremonies. Regarding "partial" executions, there were several witnesses to this form of trauma. 26. Atran, Talking to the Enemy; Post, The Mind of the Terrorist; Reich, Origins of Terrorism; Sageman, Disengagement from Radical Extremist Movements; Kilcullen, The Accidental Guerilla. 27. This statement is based on insight provided by Nigerian professors. Also, see Mancur Olson, The Logic of Collective Action (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1965). 28. Harvey C. Mansfield. The Prince: Niccolo Machiavelli, Second Edition (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1998); Martha Crenshaw, The Consequences of Counterterrorism (New York: Russell Sage Foundation, 2010); Horgan, "Interviewing the Terrorists"; Brett and Specht, Young Soldiers. 29. Weinstein, "Resources and the Information Problem in Rebel Recruitment" and Inside Rebellion. 30. William Zartman, Ripe for Resolution: Conflict and Intervention in Africa (New York: Oxford University Press, 1989); Fen Osler Hampson, "Why Orphaned Peace Settlements are More Prone to Failure," in Chester A. Crocker and Fen Osler Hampson (eds.), Managing Global Chaos: Sources of and Responses to International Conflict (Washington: United States Institute of Peace Press, 1996); Jeffrey Z. Rubin, "The Timing of Ripeness and the Ripeness of Timing," in Louis Kriesberg and Stuart J. Thorson, eds., Timing the De-Escalation of International Conflicts (Syracuse, NY: Syracuse University Press, 1991); Peter T. Coleman, "Fostering Ripeness in Seemingly Intractable Conflict: An Experimental Study," International Journal of Conflict Management 11(4) (2000), pp. 300–317; Louis Kriesberg Louis, "Timing Conditions, Strategies, and Errors," in Louis Kriesberg and Stuart J. Thorson, eds., Timing the De-Escalation of International Conflicts (Syracuse: Syracuse University Press, 1991). 31. See Stephen John Stedman, "Spoiler Problems in Peace Processes," International Security 22(2) (1997), pp. 5–53; Juliette R. Shedd, "When Peace Agreements Create Spoilers: The Russo-Chechen Agreement of 1996," Civil Wars 10(2) (2008), pp. 93–105; Edward Newman, The Impact of Spoilers on Peace Processes and Peacebuilding (New York: United Nations University, 2006). 32. "Stages" in this case refers to the commonly cited Conflict Cycle. See Michael Lund, What Kind of Peace is Being Built? Taking Stock of Post-Conflict Peacebuilding and Charting Future Directions (2003). Available at www.irdc.org 33. See NATO, "NATO's Response to Terrorism," NATO Review. North Atlantic Treaty Organization (2005). Available at www.nato.int/docu/review/2005; NATO Crisis Management. North Atlantic Treaty Organization (2007). Available at www.nato.int/issues
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