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The Price of Rights: Constitutionalism and East Asian Economic Development

1998; Johns Hopkins University Press; Volume: 20; Issue: 2 Linguagem: Inglês

10.1353/hrq.1998.0014

1085-794X

Michael C. Davis,

International Development and Aid

The Price of Rights: Constitutionalism and East Asian Economic Development Michael C. Davis1 (bio) This ceaseless agitation which democratic government has introduced into the political world influences all social intercourse. . . . [T]his is . . . the greatest advantage of democracy. . . . Democracy does not give the people the most skillful government, but it produces what the ablest governments are frequently unable to create: namely, an all-pervading and restless activity, a superabundant force, and an energy which is inseparable from it. —Alexis de Tocqueville, Democracy in America 2 Among the many challenges to the universality of human rights, none have been more persistent than those related to economic development. In no place has this challenge been more consistently advanced than in East Asia. Both scholars and ordinary citizens have confronted the claim that authoritarianism is an essential component of East Asia's "economic miracle." Those who advance this thesis argue that Western style democracy and human rights are dispensable and sometimes may prove positively harmful to the development effort. 3 The alleged price of human rights is the [End Page 303] destruction of the Asian social fabric and the resultant political and economic chaos. This article challenges this claim and offers constitutionalism as the venue for East Asia's continued economic development. As economic development proceeds, increased social diversification produces continued developmental problems for which constitutionalism and its human rights content are a proper response. The notion of constitutionalism employed in this article looks beyond mere formal institutions to consider the dynamic processes of representation and empowerment attached to human rights institutions. In considering both the fundamentals of constitutionalism as well as the indigenization of constitutional practices, this analysis offers a venue for addressing relativist arguments without undermining universal commitments. I. Introduction Questions surrounding the relationship between constitutionalism and economic development have been among the most vexing in East Asia's recent decades of development. Central to the assertion that authoritarianism is an essential component of East Asia's "economic miracle" are the claims first, that human rights and the rule of law are dispensable in pursuit of economic development, and second, that human rights are not only dispensable, but may be positively harmful to the kind of society East Asian peoples prefer. While the economic crises of the 1990s have taken some of the luster out of East Asia's alleged economic miracle, this authoritarian developmental challenge to democratic and human rights reform can be expected to persist. This article will challenge this authoritarian developmental claim and will affirmatively offer constitutionalism as an avenue for East Asia's continuing economic development. 4 While authoritarian regimes, under favorable circumstances and with proper institutions, are sometimes compatible with and may even produce the conditions necessary for successful economic development, such circumstances are not invariably present and increasingly are lacking in East [End Page 304] Asia. This appears to be a question of the stage of economic development in which a country finds itself. The circumstances that seem to have been favorable to authoritarian development are more likely to be present in the early stages of development. 5 At an early stage, proper economic policy sometimes may be more important than whether a regime is authoritarian or democratic. 6 This article argues that under the present, specific circumstances of a relatively high level of development in the East Asian region, authoritarianism is less likely to be a viable regime option, as the circumstances where it had been successful have now faded. In this respect, economically successful authoritarianism may be its own grave digger. 7 This assertion is not made in absolute terms; ultimately, the success of a regime depends on its ability to generate the conditions favorable to economic development. This article argues that establishing such conditions is dependent on the creation of favorable state institutions. The institutions that are favorable to economic development in a free market system are generally believed to be those that afford a degree of order, reliability, and participation sufficient enough to inspire confidence and thereby encourage entrepreneurial activity. 8 Both those who promote authoritarianism as the route to economic success and advocates of liberal [End Page 305] democracy increasingly stress the importance of institutionalization. It is generally argued...