Choosing Sides in the Horn of Africa: Wikileaks, the Ethiopia Imperative, and American Responses to Post-9/11 Regional Conflicts
2012; Taylor & Francis; Volume: 23; Issue: 4 Linguagem: Inglês
10.1080/09592296.2012.736338
ISSN1557-301X
Autores Tópico(s)African history and culture analysis
ResumoAbstract The United States has faced at times the policy dilemma of seeing conflict erupt between two countries with which it maintains friendly diplomatic relations. The bureaucratic biases of relevant agencies can play an important role in determining whether to choose sides or remain neutral in these conflicts. In the early 1960s the Africa Bureau adopted a pro-Ethiopia bias that shaped American policy in the Horn of Africa. With the insights provided by the 2010 Wikileaks cables, this analysis explores how the “Ethiopia imperative” affected three inter-related American policy decisions in the Horn of Africa in the early twenty-first century: the decision to support Ethiopia despite its refusal to abide by a legally binding decision that favoured Eritrea following the 1998–2000 Eritrea–Ethiopia border war; to give Ethiopia what amounted to a “blank cheque” to invade Somalia in December 2006 and overthrow the Council of Islamic Courts (CIC); and to confront and isolate Eritrea diplomatically for waging proxy war against Ethiopia in Somalia. Notes 1. See G. Allison, The Essence of Decision: Explaining the Cuban Missile Crisis (Boston, 1971); M. Halperin, Bureaucratic Politics and Foreign Policy (Washington, DC, 1974); H. Seidman, Politics, Position, and Power, 2nd edition (London, 1976). 2. All of the Wikileaks American. diplomatic cables (2006–2010) cited in this article can be accessed at http:/wikileaks.org/. Besides the Department of State, these cables were sent to the Central Intelligence Agency, National Security Council, Defense Intelligence Agency, and Combined Joint Task Force-Horn of Africa. One of the problems with these cables is that who read them, whether they provoked internal policy debates, or whether they affected American policy guidelines is unknown. 3. See C. Hermann, “International Crisis as a Situational Variable,” in James Rosenau, ed., International Politics and Foreign Policy (New York, 1969), pp. 409–21. 4. The core countries of the Horn of Africa are Djibouti, Eritrea, Ethiopia, and Somalia. The “greater” Horn includes Kenya, Sudan, South Sudan (since July 2011), and Yemen. 5. “The basic strategic importance of the Horn is not copper deposits, or the fate of the democracy, or the fate of the Ethiopian monarchy, it is simple geography.” See J.B. Bell, The Horn of Africa: Strategic Magnet in the Seventies (New York, 1973), pp. 8–9. 6. See E. Keller, “Black Americans and U.S. Policy Toward the Horn of Africa,” Transafrica Forum, 2(Fall 1984), pp. 15–25. 7. International Cooperation Agency, “Report to the President of the Vice-President's Visit to Africa (February 28–March 21, 1957,” Declassified Documents Quarterly Catalog (hereafter DDQC), 1978, 3(1979), p. 133A. 8. See J. Harbeson, “Revolution, Class and the National Question: The Case of Ethiopia,” Northeast African Studies, 2/3(1980–1981), 3/1(1981), pp. 43–68. 9. See B. Habte-Selassie, Conflict and Intervention in the Horn of Africa (New York 1980), pp. 48–73 10. See J.A. Lefebvre, Arms for the Horn: U.S. Security Policy in Ethiopia and Somalia, 1953–1991 (Pittsburgh, PA, 1991), pp. 55–74; T.M. Vestal, The Lion of Judah in the New World: Emperor Haile Selassie of Ethiopia and the Shaping of American's Attitudes Toward Africa (Westport, CT, 2011), pp. 40–47. 11. See Vestal, Lion of Judah. 12. See “History of the Peace Corps in Ethiopia”: www.peacecorpswiki.org/Ethiopia. 13. In February 1956, Kagnew Station was described as one of “the most important radio facilities in the world [and] the greatest factor in security in the whole area.” United States House of Representatives, The Middle East, Africa and Inter-American Affairs, Vol. XVI, Selected Executive Session Hearings of the Committee on Foreign Affairs, 1951–56 (Washington, DC, 1980), pp. 335–36. Also see Vestal, Lion of Judah, pp. 40–47. 14. Department of State, “Memorandum for the President—Acknowledgement of Message from the Emperor of Ethiopia,” DDQC, 1982, 8(1983), p. 162. 15. See H. Marcus, Ethiopia, Great Britain, and the United States, 1941–1974: The Politics of Empire (Los Angeles, CA, 1983), pp. 133–35. 16. “Memorandum From the Assistant Secretary of State for African Affairs (Williams) to the President's Deputy Special Assistant for National Security Affairs (Komer),” 11 February 1966, Department of State, Foreign Relations of the United States (hereafter FRUS), 1964–1968, Volume 24: Africa, p. 310. 17. “Memorandum From the President's Deputy Special Assistant for National Security Affairs (Komer) to Assistant Secretary of State for African Affairs (Williams), Subject: Ethiopia Situation,” 18 February 1966, Ibid., p. 311. 18. See “Circular Airgram From the Department of State to Certain African Posts,” 21 March 1966; and 312. “Special Memorandum Prepared in the Central Intelligence Agency, Subject: Prospects for Ethiopia, No. 5–66.” 31 March 1966, Ibid., p. 290. 19. Memorandum From the Assistant Secretary of State for African Affairs (Williams) to the Undersecretary of State for Political Affairs (Harriman), 21 February 1964, Ibid., p. 284. 20. “Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Ethiopia,” 21 February 1964, Ibid., p. 286; “Memorandum for the Files, Subject: The Horn of Africa,” 17 March 1964, Ibid., p. 288. 21. See J.A. Lefebvre, “The United States, Ethiopia and the 1963 Somali–Soviet arms deal: containment and the balance of power dilemma in the Horn of Africa,” Journal of Modern African Studies, 36(1998), pp. 611–43. 22. See Vestal, Lion of Judah, pp. 171–85. 23. See “Telegram 22877 From the Department of State to the Embassy in Ethiopia,” 7 February 1973, FRUS, 1969–1976, Volume E-6: Documents on Africa, 1973–1976, p. 80; Lefebvre, Arms for the Horn, pp. 131–48 24. “Briefing Memorandum From the Assistant Secretary of State for African Affairs (Newsom) to the Deputy Secretary of State (Rush),” 28 April 1973, FRUS, 1969–1976, p. 86. 25. See E. Drew, “Brzezinski,” New Yorker (1 May 1978), 110; Z. Brzezinski, Power and Principle (New York, 1983), pp. 178–82; C. Vance, Hard Choices (New York, 1983), pp. 47–48, 72–92. 26. See A. Scott, “The Department of State: Formal Organization and Informal Culture,” International Studies Quarterly, 13(March 1969), p. 1–18. 27. For analysis of an inter/intra-agency clash on a decolonisation issue—EUR versus NEA and AF—within the Department of State, see J.A. Lefebvre, “Kennedy's Algeria Dilemma: Containment, Alliance Politics and the ‘Rebel Dialogue,’” Middle Eastern Studies, 35/2(1999), pp. 61–82. 28. C. Krause, “Ethiopia Says All Jews Free to Leave for Israel,” New York Times (2 November 1990). 29. Idem., “Ethiopia Talks to Resume, Under U.S. Leadership,” Ibid. (30 January 1991). 30. See T.M. Vestal, Ethiopia: A Post–Cold War African State (Westport, CT, 1999), pp. 5–9; J. Perlez, “New View of Ethiopia,” New York Times (31 May 1991). 31. See J.A. Lefebvre, “Post–Cold War Clouds on the Horn of Africa: The Eritrea–Sudan Crisis,” Middle East Policy, 4/1–2(1995), pp. 34–49. 32. See T. Lyons, Avoiding Conflict in the Horn of Africa: U.S. Policy Toward Ethiopia and Eritrea, Council on Foreign Relations, CSR NO. 21 (December 2006), pp. 6–8. 33. See R. Herbert, “The End of the Eritrean Exception?” South African Institute for International Affairs, SAIIA Country Report No. 8(2002); L. Lata, ed., The Search for Peace: The Conflict Between Ethiopia and Eritrea, (Oslo, 2006), pp. 8–11 34. See B. Woldegabriel, “Eritrea: A War for National Unity,” in Lata, Search for Peace, pp. 31–39. 35. See International Crisis Group (ICG), Ethiopia and Eritrea: War or Peace? (Nairobi/Brussels, 2003). 36. See F. Steves, “Regime Change and War: Domestic Politics and the Escalation of the Ethiopian–Eritrean Conflict,” Cambridge Review of International Affairs, 16/1(2003), pp. 119–33; D.N. Sarbo, “Ethiopia and Eritrea: Short-Sighted Solutions, Long-Term Problems,” in Leenco, Search for Peace, pp. 41–52. 37. ICG, War or Peace? 38. See Herbert, “Eritrea Exception?”; Royal African Society (RAS), “The Rise and Fall of the Sudan Alliance Forces (2),” African Arguments (October 2009); and B.H. Selassie, “Dreams that turned to nightmares: The Ethio–Eritrean War of 1998–2000 and its Aftermath,” in Leenco, Search for Peace, pp. 25–30. 39. ICG, War or Peace? 40. See Herbert, “Eritrean Exception?”; Selassie, “Dreams that turned to Nightmares”; RAS, “Sudan Alliance Forces (2).” American diplomatic intervention proved unnecessary as the Eritreans held their ground on the battlefield. 41. See Lyons, Horn of Africa, pp. 7–8; S. Healy, Lost Opportunities in the Horn of Africa: How Conflicts Connect and Peace Agreements Unravel, Horn of Africa Group Report (London, 2008), pp. 13–15. 42. See United States Senate, Evaluating U.S. Policy Objectives and Options in the Horn of Africa, Hearings before the Subcommittee on Africa of the Committee on Foreign Relations (Washington, DC, 11 March 2008). 43. Healy, Horn of Africa, pp. 13–15. 44. Lyons, Horn of Africa, pp. 8–10. 45. American Embassy Asmara, Subject: Eritrea and the EECC Final Award, 26 August 2009. 46. J. Bolton Surrender Is Not an Option: Defending America at the United Nations (New York, 2007), p. 347. 47. American Embassy Asmara, Subject: President Isaias Excriates US and “Terrorism Fantasy” in Martyrs’ Day Speech, 21 June 2006. 48. See American Embassy Addis Ababa, Subject: Meeting with U.S. Assistant Secretary of State for African Affairs, 26 June 2006. 49. See Lefebvre, Arms for the Horn, Appendix, Tables 3 and 4, pp. 280–281. 50. For discussion of Somali clan politics and the “MOD connection,” see D. Laitin and S. Samatar, Somalia: Nation in Search of a State (Boulder, CO, 1987), pp. 88–99. 51. See T. Lyons and A.I. Samatar, Somalia: State Collapse, Multilateral Intervention, and Strategies for Political Reconstruction (Washington, DC, 1995). 52. Healy, Horn of Africa, p. 20. 53. See Ibid., pp. 20–24. 54. Ibid., p. 21. 55. See D.H. Shinn, “Al-Qaeda in East Africa and the Horn,” Journal of Conflict Studies, 27 (Summer 2007), pp. 47–75. 56. See D.H. Shinn, “Terrorism in East Africa and the Horn: An Overview,” Journal of Conflict Studies, 27(Fall 2003), pp. 79–91. 57. See J. Scahill, “Blowback in Somalia,” Nation (26 September 2011); and idem., “The CIA's Secret Sites in Somalia,” Ibid. (1–8 August 2011). 58. See American Embassy Addis Ababa, Subject: Ethiopia: Foreign Minister Tells Abizaid Ethiopia's Prepared Respond To UIC Provocation, 22 June 2006. 59. See Scahill, “Blowback in Somalia.” 60. President Bush's statement was broadcast in Islamist Control of Mogadishu Rises Concern if extremist future for Somalia, PBS Newshour (8 June 2006). 61. See Political Transcript, Assistant Secretary of State for African Affairs, Jendayi Frazer, State Department Special News Briefing, 16 June 2006. 62. Ibid. 63. See American Embassy Addis Ababa, Subject: Ethiopia: Samora Reiterates GOE Policy on Somalia to General Abizaid, 21 June 2006; American Embassy Addis Ababa, Subject: Ethiopia: Foreign Minister Tells Abizaid Ethiopia's Prepared Respond To UIC Provocation, 22 June 2006. 64. See American Embassy Addis Ababa, Subject: Meeting with US Assistant of State for African Affairs, 26 June 2006. 65. Ibid. 66. American Embassy Addis Ababa, Subject: PM Meles: Ethiopia Will Contain the Islamic Courts by Force If No UNSC Action, 12 October 2006. 67. American Embassy Addis Ababa, Subject: The Islamists Battle for Baidoa and Beyond, 2 November 2006. 68. Department of State, State Department Country Reports on Terrorism, 2006 (Washington, DC, April 2007), p. 24. 69. See American Embassy Addis Ababa, Subject: Ethiopia Grids for High-Risk in Somalia, 6 December 2006; American Embassy Addis Ababa, Subject: Ethiopia: Parliament Considers Authorization of War on CIC, 28 November 2006. 70. Americsn Embassy Addis Ababa, Subject: Ethiopia: Meles Alters Stance on Military Action on Somalia, 8 December 2006. 71. American Embassy Addis Ababa, Subject: Ethiopia: Sen. Feingold Talks Somalia, Human Rights With PM Meles, 4 December 2006. 72. Ibid. 73. See Shinn, “Al-Qaeda in East Africa.” 74. V. Crawley, “U.S. Does Not Plan To Send Troops Against al-Qaida in Somalia,” American.gov Archive (15 December 2006). 75. See C. Rice, No Higher Honor: A Memoir of My Years in Washington (New York, 2011), pp. 619–20. In her 700-plus page memoir, Rice devotes less than one page to the December 2006 Ethiopian invasion of Somalia writing, incorrectly: “Shortly after Christmas 2006, the Islamic Courts … had started to take over strategic parts of the country … (and on 29 December Ethiopian Prime Minister Meles called me saying) … “I will make this quick, and I want to be out as soon as possible” . … I knew exactly what he meant—he planned to deploy Ethiopian forces across the border into Somalia to rout out the militants.” 76. See UN Security Council (UNSC), S/2006/913, Monitoring Group on Somalia Report (MGSR), 22 November 2006. 77. Ibid. and “Analysis; the Arabs and the Great Game in Somalia,” BBC Monitoring Africa—Political, 31 October 2006. 78. See S. Edwards, “Somalia risks becoming another Iraq, UN experts say: Iran said to be arming country's Islamic militias,” National Post (16 November 2006). 79. See UNSC, S/2007/436, MGSR, 18 July 2007. 80. American Embassy Asmara, Subject: Somali Opposition in Eritrea: Hanging Out and Speaking Up, 13 April 2007. 81. American Embassy Asmara, Subject: UN SRSG Gives Views on Eritrea and Somalia, 11 October 2006. 82. See American Embassy Asmara, Subject: Eritrea Will Vote Against Iran's UN Human Rights Council Bid, 2 May 2006; American Embassy Asmara, Subject: Eritrea and Iran Discuss Diplomatic Ties, 19 December 2006; American Embassy Asmara, Subject: Time To Speak Up: A New Strategy For Eritrea, 11 January 2007. 83. See United States Congress, House of Representatives, Ethiopia and the State of Democracy: Effects on Human Rights and Humanitarian Conditions in the Ogaden and Somalia, Hearings before the Subcommittee on Africa and Global Health of the Committee on Foreign Affairs, 2 October 2007. 84. Eritrea's co-operation in the GWOT continued to be noted in American Embassy Asmara, Subject: Eritrea: 2008 Country Report on Terrorism, 22 December 2008; American Embassy Asmara, Subject: Eritrea: 2009 Country Report on Terrorism, 21 December 2009. 85. See Frazer's testimony in United States Congress, Ethiopia and the State of Democracy. 86. See “Sources of Terror Defy Logic of a U.S. Blacklist; Declaring a Country a Sponsor of Terror is a Hollow Gesture, Says Lionel Beehner,” West Australian, (23 October 2008). 87. American Embassy Asmara, Subject: Somali Parliamentarians Say Somali Conference Is On, 24 August 2007. 88. American Embassy Asmara, Subject: Somali Congress in Asmara Forms New Political Entity, 13 September 2007. 89. American Embassy Asmara, Subject: PFDJ Chief Views on Sudan, the Border and Somalia, 14 November 2007. 90. American Embassy Asmara, Subject: Somali Congress in Asmara Forms New Political Entity, 13 September 2007. 91. American Embassy Asmara, Subject: Eritrean Foreign Minister on Bilateral Relations, Regional Dynamics, 4 December 2007. 92. American Embassy Asmara, Subject: Blunt Talk With Yemane Gebreab On Terrorism, 20 December 2007. 93. Subject: Eritrean Foreign Minister on Bilateral Relations, Regional Dynamics, 4 December 2007. 94. The question of pressing the Meles regime on democracy promotion and human rights goes back to 3 July 2001 (two months before the 9/11 attacks) when a group of senior Democratic American Senators wrote to Secretary of State Colin Powell urging the Bush Administration to pressure Ethiopia to improve its human rights record. See P. Milkias, “Ethiopia, the TPLF and the Roots of the 2001 Political Tremor,” Paper presented to the International Conference on Contemporary Development Issues in Ethiopia, Western Michigan University, Kalamazoo, MI, 18 August 2001. 95. American Embassy Asmara, Subject: ARS on Al-Shabaab, Somali Reconciliation, 24 March 2008. One ARS representative observed that Ethiopia's presence in Somalia “is like raindrops that nourish al-Shabaab and cause it to grow.” 96. See American Embassy Asmara, Subject: ARS Hardliners Select Sheikh Aweys, 23 July 2008; American Embassy, Asmara, Subject: ARS Hardliners Finalize A New Identity, 16 September 2008. 97. See UNSC, MGSR, 18 July 2007; UNSC, S/2008/274, MGSR, 24 April 2008; UNSC, S/2008/769, MGSR, 10 December 2008. 98. American Embassy Asmara, Subject: An Eritrean Overture to the United States, 9 February 2009. 99. American Embassy Asmara, Subject: Eritrea Feeling the Squeeze on Somalia, 12 June 2009. 100. Ibid. and American Embassy Asmara, Subject: Eritrea and Sudan, 6 April 2009. 101. American Embassy Berlin, Subject: Europeans Track U.S. on East Africa But Remain Reluctant to Sanction Eritrea, 18 November 2009. 102. See S. Healy, Eritrea's Regional Role and Foreign Policy: Past, Present and Future Perspectives, The Horn of Africa Group (London, 11 January 2008). 103. See R. Iyob, “International Relations in the Horn: Non-Conformity and Defiance,” L'Africa nelle relazioni internazionali: sfida al passato, 10(Maggio 2009), pp. 58–66. 104. U.S. Embassy Tripoli, Subject: AU Summit, Eritrea Defends Somalia Policy, 12 July 2009. 105. See American Embassy Asmara, Subject: Bio Notes on Eritrean President Isaias Afwerki, 12 November 2008; American Embassy Asmara, Subject: Is Eritrea Unraveling?, 5 March 2009. 106. American Embassy Asmara, Subject: Eritrea's Flat Denial and What To Do About It, 18 June 2009. 107. Ibid. 108. See UNSC, S/2010/91, MGSR, 10 March 2010; UNSC, S/2011/433, MGSR, 18 July 2011. 109. “Sudan: Ambassador Rice at U.N. on Somalia, Syria, Eritrea, Sudan,” Africa News (10 August 2011). 110. See UNSC, MGSR, 10 March 2010. 111. See J.A. Lefebvre, “Iran in the Horn of Africa: Outflanking U.S. Allies,” Middle East Policy, 19/2(Summer 2012), pp. 117–33. 112. L. Ploch, Africa Command: U.S. Strategic Interests and the Role of the U.S. Military in Africa, Congressional Research Service (Washington, DC, 22 March 2011), pp. 5–7. 113. See L. Ploch et al., Piracy off the Horn of Africa, report to Congress, Congressional Research Service (Washington, DC, 27 April 2011), pp. 4–5. 114. Department of State, National Strategy for Combating Terrorism—Goals and Objectives, February 2003. 115. Ploch, Africa Command, pp. 5–7. 116. National Strategy for Combating Terrorism—Goals and Objectives, February 2003. 117. See Shinn, “Al-Qaeda in East Africa.” 118. See Scahill, “Secret Sites.” 119. Ibid. 120. See T. Dagne, Africa: U.S. Foreign Assistance Issues, Congressional Research Service (CRS) Report to Congress (Washington, DC, 15 September 2011), pp. 7–8.
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