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A Mereological Challenge to Endurantism

2007; Routledge; Volume: 85; Issue: 4 Linguagem: Inglês

10.1080/00048400701728541

1471-6828

Nikk Effingham, Jon Robson,

Quantum Mechanics and Applications

Abstract In this paper, we argue that time travel is problematic for the endurantist. For it appears to be possible, given time travel, to construct a wall out of a single time travelling brick. This commits the endurantist to one of the following: (a) the wall is composed of the time travelling brick many times over; (b) the wall does not in fact exist at all; (c) the wall is identical to the brick. We argue that each of these options is unsatisfactory. Notes 1By composite we mean more precisely 'properly composite' as objects always 'compose' themselves but never 'properly compose' themselves, analogous to how an object is always a part of itself but never a proper part of itself. We use 'composite' for the sake of expediency. 2Note that these responses leave open the possibility of an empirical falsification of endurantism: if we go back and build a wall out of time travelling bricks then it is a possibility and ipso facto endurantism would be false. 3We would like to thank Ross Cameron, George Darby, Mark Effingham, Walden Effingham, Robin le Poidevin, Jonathan Tallant, Duncan Watson, Robbie Williams, the Leeds Work In Progress seminar, and the anonymous referees and editor for their advice and help with this paper. We give a special thanks to Joseph Melia for his invaluable help and aid.