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Conventional vs Nuclear Deterrence: Are the Lessons Transferable?

1987; Wiley; Volume: 43; Issue: 4 Linguagem: Inglês

10.1111/j.1540-4560.1987.tb00267.x

1540-4560

Richard Ned Lebow,

Infrastructure Resilience and Vulnerability Analysis

Journal of Social IssuesVolume 43, Issue 4 p. 171-191 Conventional vs Nuclear Deterrence: Are the Lessons Transferable? Richard Ned Lebow, Corresponding Author Richard Ned Lebow Cornell UniversityPeace Studies Program, Uris Hall, Cornell University, Ithaca, NY 14853Search for more papers by this author Richard Ned Lebow, Corresponding Author Richard Ned Lebow Cornell UniversityPeace Studies Program, Uris Hall, Cornell University, Ithaca, NY 14853Search for more papers by this author First published: Winter 1987 https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1540-4560.1987.tb00267.xCitations: 7AboutPDF ToolsRequest permissionExport citationAdd to favoritesTrack citation ShareShare Give accessShare full text accessShare full-text accessPlease review our Terms and Conditions of Use and check box below to share full-text version of article.I have read and accept the Wiley Online Library Terms and Conditions of UseShareable LinkUse the link below to share a full-text version of this article with your friends and colleagues. Learn more.Copy URL Share a linkShare onEmailFacebookTwitterLinkedInRedditWechat REFERENCES Allison, G. 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