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The myth of the ‘German Way’: German foreign policy and transatlantic relations

2005; Taylor & Francis; Volume: 47; Issue: 1 Linguagem: Inglês

10.1080/00396330500061802

1468-2699

Peter Rudolf,

European Union Policy and Governance

Abstract Those critics who warn of a new German unilateralism have read too much into the Iraq crisis. The core components of Germany's traditional foreign policy conception include a general strategic preference for embedding German foreign policy into multilateral frameworks; the goal of a civilised international order; and a preference for non-military means and strong aversion to the use of military force. German policies regarding the Iraq war may have been at odds with one or more of these core components; however, there were cross-cutting pressures that made it very difficult to be entirely faithful to those traditions. Neither the foreign-policy discourse in Germany with respect to the transatlantic relationship nor actual policies in the wake of the Iraq crisis indicate a profound change in the orientation of German foreign policy. But we can expect the strains of further adjustment and non-adjustment to a changing transatlantic framework. Notes Henry A. Kissinger, ‘German-US Relations Thrown Into Crisis’ Korea Times, 23 October 2002. Richard Bernstein, ‘The German Question’ The New York Times Magazine, 2 May 2004. Reading about this clash between the allies in Henry Kissinger's memoirs, in which he offers a harsh critique of the European allies distancing themselves from the United States, opposing American policy on an issue of utmost importance without offering a convincing alternative, puts the Iraq crisis and some of more exaggerated readings of German behaviour into historical perspective. See Henry A. Kissinger, Years of Upheaval, (Boston and Toronto: Little Brown and Company 1982), chapter 16; in German translation, Memoiren, 1973-1974: Band 2 (München: C. Bertelsmann Verlag, 1982), pp. 820- 875. See Rajan Menon, ‘The End of Alliances’ World Policy Journal, vol. 20, no. 2, summer 2003, pp.1-20 (4). See Peter Viggo Jakobsen, ‘Mythmaking and Germany's Unilateral Recognition of Croatia and Slovenia’ European Security, vol. 4, no. 3, autumn 1995, pp. 400-416. Speaking of a new paradigm does not imply that elements do not have old roots or have not been part of American foreign policy. But taken together and in contrast to American foreign policy in the second half of the twentieth century, we certainly can talk about a new paradigm. In more detail, see John Ikenberry, ‘America`s Imperial Ambition’ Foreign Affairs, vol. 81, no. 5, September/October 2002, pp. 44-60; Robert Jervis, ‘Understanding the Bush Doctrine’ Political Science Quarterly, vol. 118, no. 3, fall 2003, pp. 365-388; David C. Hendrickson, ‘Toward Universal Empire: The Dangerous Quest for Absolute Security’ World Policy Journal, fall 2002, pp. 1-10; Ken Jowitt, ‘Rage, Hubris, and Regime Change’ Policy Review, April/May 2003, no. 118, pp. 33ff.; Edward Rhodes, ‘The Imperial Logic of Bush's Liberal Agenda’ Survival, vol. 45, no. 1, spring 2003, pp. 131-154; John Lewis Gaddis, Surprise, Security, and the American Experience (Cambridge, Massachusetts, and London, England: Harvard University Press, 2004). For a variety of perspectives on the problems and developments in transatlantic and German-American relations, see Philip H. Gordon and Jeremy Shapiro, Allies at War: America, Europe, and the Crisis over Iraq (New York: McGraw-Hill 2004); Helga Haftendorn, ‘A Poisoned Relationship? Die transatlantischen Beziehungen nach den Terrorangriffen des 11. September 2001’ in Werner Kremp and Jürgen Wilzewski (eds.), Weltmacht vor neuer Bedrohung. Die Bush-Administration und die US-Auβenpolitik nach dem Angriff auf Amerika (Trier: Wissenschaftlicher Verlag Trier, 2003), 148 Peter Rudolf pp. 249-275; Markus Kaim, ‘Friendship under strain or fundamental alienation?’ International Journal, winter 2003-2004, pp.1-17; Joachim Krause, Die transatlantischen Beziehungen seit dem Ende des Kalten Krieges (Kiel: Institut für Sicherheitspolitik an der Christian- Albrechts-Universität zu Kiel, May 2003); Gert Krell, ‘Arroganz der Macht, Arroganz der Ohnmacht. Die Weltordnungspolitik der USA und die transatlantischen Beziehungen’ in Aus Politik und Zeitgeschichte, B 31-32/ 2003, 28 July 2003), pp. 23-30; Harald Müller, ‘Das transatlantische Risiko - Deutungen des amerikanischeuropäischen Weltordnungskonflikts’ in Aus Politik und Zeitgeschichte, B 3-4/ 2004, 19 January 2004, pp. 7-17; Gustav Lindstrom (ed.), Shift or Rift? Assessing US-EU relations after Iraq, (Paris: European Unions Institute for Security Studies), 2003; John Peterson and Mark A. Pollack (eds.), Europe, America, Bush: Transatlantic relations in the twenty-first century (London & New York: Routledge, 2003); Thomas Risse, ‘Die neue Weltordnung: USamerikanische Hypermacht - europäische Ohnmacht’ in WeltTrends, summer 2003, no. 39, pp. 110-119; Peter Rudolf, ‘Die USA und die transatlantischen Beziehungen nach dem 11 September 2001’ in Aus Politik und Zeitgeschichte, B 25/2002, 21 June2002, pp. 7-13; See Gunther Hellmann, ‘Der “deutsche Weg”. Eine auβenpolitische Gratwanderung’ Internationale Politik, September 2002, pp. 1-8, in particular p. 4. Thomas Risse-Kappen, Cooperation Among Democracies: The European Influence on US Foreign Policy, (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1995), p. 223. Thomas Risse-Kappen, Cooperation Among Democracies: The European Influence on US Foreign Policy, (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1995), p. 225. Gregor Schöllgen, ‘Die Zukunft der deutschen Auβenpolitik liegt in Europa’ Aus Politik und Zeitgeschichte, B11/2004, 8 March 2004), p. 9-16, in particular p. 14. In general on strategies for dealing with American preponderance, see G. John Ikenberry, Strategic Reactions to American Preeminence: Great Power Politics in the Age of Unipolarity, United States Central Intelligence Agency, National Intelligence Council, 28 July 2003, posted online 10 October 2003, http://www.cia.gov/nic/confreports_stratreact.html Rudolf Scharping, ‘Europäische Sicherheitspolitik und die Nordatlantische Allianz’ speech on 5 July 1999 in Berlin, http://www.bundesregierung.deAnlage250884/Sicherheitspolitik+Juli+1999.pdf In addition, see the speech by Joschka Fischer, 10 May 1999 in Presse- und Informationsamt der Bundesregierung [Office for the Press and for Information of the Federal Government], Bulletin, 26 May 1999, p. 335. See Karsten D. Voigt, ‘The Labor Pains of a New Atlanticism’ in Internationale Politik (transatlantic edition), vol. 1, no. 2, summer 2002, pp. 3-10. For this characterisation of German foreign policy, see Wolfram F. Hanrieder, Germany, America, Europe: Forty Years of German Foreign Policy (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 1989). Michael Brenner and Phil Williams, Europa und die Vereinigten Staaten. Amerikanische Sicherheitspolitik in den neunziger Jahren (Sankt Augustin: Forschungsinstitut der Konrad- Adenauer-Stiftung, Mai 1992) p. 13. Ernst-Otto Czempiel, ‘Nicht von gleich zu gleich? Die USA und die Europäische Union’ in Europa oder Amerika?, pp. 901-915, quote on p. 910. See Peter Rudolf, ‘US Leadership and the Reform of Western Security Institutions: NATO Enlargement and ESDP’ in Bernhard May and Michael Hönicke Moore (eds.), The Uncertain Superpower: Domestic Dimensions of US Foreign Policy after the Cold War, (Opladen: Leske+Budrich, 2003), pp. 93-101. See the speech by the US ambassador to NATO, R. Nicolas Burns, at the conference ‘NATO and the Greater Middle East’ Prague, 19 October 2003; http://nato.usmission.gov/ambassador/2003/s031019a.htm. Charles Grant, ‘Reviving European defence cooperation’ in NATO Review, winter 2003, http://www.nato.int/docu/review/2003/issue4/english/art2.html. See John Vinocur, ‘Germany rejects a US rivalry,’ International Herald Tribune, 18 July 2003. See the foreign-policy guidelines passed by the CDU Vorstand [party committee] on 28 April 2003, in Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung, 6 May 2003, p. 9. Speech by Chancellor Gerhard Schröder, ‘Grundsätze und Instrumente deutscher Sicherheitspolitik’ Berlin, 19 March 2004, http://www.bundesregierung.de/Reden-Interviews/Reden-,11636.624649/rede/Rede-von-Bundeskanzler-Schroed.htm; in addition, see the speech on ‘Europe and the Future of Transatlantic Relations’ by Foreign Minister Joschka Fischer at Princeton University, 19 November 2003, http://www.auswaertiges-amt.de/www/en/ausgabe_archiv?archiv_id=5089. Bundesministerium der Verteidigung [German Defence Ministry], Verteidigungspolitische Richtlinien für den Geschäftbereich des Bundesministers der Verteidigung [Defence Policy Guidelines], Berlin, May 2003, p. 22 (translation by the author). Speech by Foreign Minister Fischer before the German parliament during a debate on transatlantic relations on 27 June 2002, available at www.auswaertiges-amt.de; translations by the author. According to a survey in late 1995 on the foreign policy views of the German elite, only 29% held this view. See Das Meinungsbild der Elite in Deutschland zur Auβen- und Sicherheitspolitik, Eine Studie von Infratest Burke Berlin im Auftrag des Liberalen Institutes der Friedrich- Naumann-Stiftung in Kooperation mit der RAND Corporation, Berlin, March 1996. See speech by Defence Minister Peter Struck before the German parliament on 20 December 2002, http://www.bmvg.de/archiv/reden/minister/021220_isaf_mandat.php. Speech by Foreign Minister Fischer at the Munich Conference on Security Policy, 7 February 2004, http://www.auswaertiges-amt.de/www/en/ausgabe_archiv?archiv_id=5338. In 2002, nearly two-thirds of a German survey told pollsters that the US was pursuing only its own interests when it intervened in the word's crisis regions. In 1993, only 58% expressed this opinion. See the public opinion data in Der Spiegel, 18 May 2002, pp. 26-31. In 2002, nearly two-thirds of a German survey told pollsters that the US was pursuing only its own interests when it intervened in the word's crisis regions. In 1993, only 58% expressed this opinion. See the public opinion data in Der Spiegel, 18 May 2002, pp. 26-31. In 2002, nearly two-thirds of a German survey told pollsters that the US was pursuing only its own interests when it intervened in the word's crisis regions. In 1993, only 58% expressed this opinion. See the public opinion data in Der Spiegel, 18 May 2002, pp. 26-31. Transatlantic Trends 2003. A Project of the German Marshall Fund of the United States and the Compagnia di San Paolo, p. 8. Transatlantic Trends 2003. A Project of the German Marshall Fund of the United States and the Compagnia di San Paolo, p. 9. In September 2003, 49% of Germans polled considered France to be more important, 46% the United States. Transatlantische Beziehungen. 150 Peter Rudolf Ergebnisse einer repräsentativen Bevölkerungsumfrage im Auftrag des Bundesverbandes deutscher Banken, (Mannheim: Institut für Praxisorientierte Sozialforschung, November 2003), p. 6. 82% believe that the US only pursues its own interests without regard for the interests of European allies. See Transatlantische Beziehungen, p. 9. Transatlantic Trends 2003, p. 10. The Pew Research Center for the People & the Press, Mistrust of America in Europe Ever Higher, Muslim Anger Persists, Washington, March 2004, p. 28, http://people-press.org/reports/display.php3?ReportID=206. According to another poll taken in 2003, 81% supported the view that a common European stand is more important for German foreign policy than close relations with the United States. Transatlantische Beziehungen, p. 5. Transatlantische Beziehungen, p. 12. Transatlantische Beziehungen, p. 13. In general on this issue, see Mary N. Hampton, ‘NATO, Germany, and the United States: Creating Positive Identity in Trans-Atlantia’ in Security Studies, vol. 8, no. 2/3, winter 1998-99. If NATO had participated in the war, the public view of the organisation would most likely have deteriorated. This certainly holds true for the German ‘East’ where, as the Kosovo War made plain, there is lingering uneasiness about NATO missions going beyond collective self-defence. See Renate Köcher, ‘Das Kosovo spaltet Deutschland in Ost und West’ Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung, 16 June 1999, p.5. Hanns W. Maull, ‘Germany and Japan: The New Civilian Powers’ Foreign Affairs, winter 1990/91; and ‘Germany and the Use of Force: Still a “Civilian Power”?’ Survival, vol. 42, vol. 2, summer 2000. In general, on the basic elements of German political-military culture, see Thomas U. Berger, Cultures of Antimilitarism: National Security in Germany and Japan (Baltimore and London: The Hopkins University Press, 1998). For the following interpretation in detail, see Peter Rudolf, ‘Germany and the Kosovo Conflict’ in Pierre Martin and Mark R. Brawley (eds.), Alliance Politics, Kosovo, and NATO's War: Allied Force or Forced Allies? (New York: Palgrave, 2001). See Jeffrey Record, Bounding the Global War on Terrorism (Carlisle, PA: Strategic Studies Institute, US Army War College, 2003), quote on p. v. For the view that the fault for the ‘breakdown’ (‘Zerrüttung’) of German-American relations lies with the red-green coalition, see see Nikolas Busse, ‘Die Entfremdung vom wichtigsten Verbündeten. Rot-Grün und Amerika’ in Hanns Maull, Sebastian Harnisch and Constantin Grund (eds.), Deutschland im Abseits? Rot-Grüne Auβenpolitik 1998-2003 (Baden-Baden: Nomos, 2003). For an elaborate explanation focusing on ‘the domestic political consideration of preserving the Red-Green Government in the face of considerable opposition within the coalition government to foreign military interventions in general and early military action against Iraq in particular’ see Sebastian Harnisch, Bound to Fail? - Germany's Policy in the Iraq Crisis 2001-2003, paper presented at the 27th Annual Conference of the German Studies Association in New Orleans, 18-21 September 2003, quote on p. 4. Remarks by the Vice President to the Veterans of Foreign Wars 103rd National Convention, Office of the Press Secretary, The White House, 26 August 2002, http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2002/08/20020826.html See, for example, the interview with Foreign Minister Fischer in Frankfurter Rundschau, 7 August 2002. Steven Erlanger, ‘German Leader's Warning: War Plan Is a Huge Mistake’ The New York Times, 5 September 2002. See ‘Interview mit Bundeskanzler Gerhard Schröder’ in Die Zeit, 15 August 2002. This is obviously the yardstick of Christian Hacke, ‘Deutschland, Europa und der Irakkonflikt’ Aus Politik und Zeitgeschichte, B24-25/2003, 10 June 2003. See Stephen F. Szabo, ‘Germany and the United States Safter Iraq: From Alliance to Alignment’ Internationale Politik und Gesellschaft, January 2004. For further detail on the crisis in German-American relations, see Stephen F. Szabo, Parting Ways: The Crisis in German-American Relations (Washington DC: Brookings Institution Press, 2004). Philip H. Gordon and Jeremy Shapiro, Allies at War, pp. 102-103, based upon interviews with ‘senior administration officials’ in October 2003. Philip H. Gordon and Jeremy Shapiro, Allies at War, p.103. Bob Woodward, Plan of Attack (New York: Simon & Schuster 2004), p. 129. The bitterness between Berlin and Washington worsened after Justice minister Herta Däubler-Gmelin reportedly spoke of Bush using the coming war as a diversion from domestic problems - a classic tactic also used by Hitler. This alleged remark infuriated the Bush administration; for Condoleezza Rice it had ‘poisoned’ German-American relations. In a letter to President Bush, Schröder expressed his regrets that Bush's feeling were deeply wounded through the alleged remarks, adding that the minister had assured him not to have made the remarks. But the White House was not satisfied. Bush, believing that the Chancellor had contributed to the atmosphere that allowed that kind of remark, expected a clear apology and the dismissal of the justice minister. See Philip H. Gordon and Jeremy Shapiro, Allies at War, pp.101-102. Philip H. Gordon and Jeremy Shapiro, Allies at War, pp. 175-176. For an account, see Philip H. Gordon and Jeremy Shapiro, Allies at War, pp. 136-141. The authors ignore the domestic problems for the German government related to the decision. Quoted in James Kitfield, ‘Damage Control’ National Journal, 19 July 2003, http://nationaljournal.com. Sebastian Harnisch, Bound to Fail?, pp. 20-21, emphasises this domestic factor. Stefan Kornelius, ‘Der Rosenkrieg’ Süddeutsche Zeitung, 2-3 November 2002, p. 4. Gunther Hellmann, ‘Von Gipfelstürmern and Gratwanderern: “Deutsche Wege” in der Auβenpolitik’ Aus Politik und Zeitgeschichte, B 11/2002, 8 March 2004, p. 37. Hanns W. Maull, ‘Editorial: Deutschland auf Abwegen?’ in Hanns Maull, Sebastian Harnisch and Constantin Grund (eds.), Deutschland im Abseits? Rot-Grüne Auβenpolitik 1998-2003, p. 16. On these ‘core components’ see Ulrich Klotz, National Role Conceptions and Foreign Policies: France and Germany Compared (Cambridge, MA: Minda de Gunzburg Center for European Studies, Working Paper 2002). For a similar view, see Thomas Risse, ‘Kontinuität durch Wandel: Eine “neue” deutsche Auβenpolitik?,’ Aus Politik und Zeitgeschichte, B11/2004, 8 March 2004, pp. 24-31. Additional informationNotes on contributorsPeter Rudolf *Peter Rudolf is a senior research associate at Stiftung Wissenschaft und Politik (SWP), the German Institute for International and Security Affairs in Berlin. He worked as an APSA Congressional Fellow in Washington, DC and held research posts at the Frankfurt Peace Research Institute and Harvard's Center for Science and International Affairs. Peter Rudolf is a senior research associate at Stiftung Wissenschaft und Politik (SWP), the German Institute for International and Security Affairs in Berlin. He worked as an APSA Congressional Fellow in Washington, DC and held research posts at the Frankfurt Peace Research Institute and Harvard's Center for Science and International Affairs.