Conceptualizing Nuclear Deterrence: Pakistan's Posture
2005; Routledge; Volume: 4; Issue: 2 Linguagem: Inglês
10.1080/14736480500225632
ISSN1557-3036
Autores Tópico(s)Global Peace and Security Dynamics
ResumoAbstract Notes 1. Some Pakistanis have argued that the United States had given verbal assurances to support Pakistan against Indian aggression. But such assurances, if they were ever given, could not be trusted without a treaty commitment. The questions of who would define aggression and how the commitment would be transferred to the successive executive leaders in the US were left fuzzy. There is no evidence to suggest that Pakistan took these assurances seriously. 2. Saeeduddin Ahmad Dar, Ideology of Pakistan (Islamabad: National Institute of Historical and Cultural Research, 1998), pp. 1–48. 3. Paul H. Nitze, “Assuring Strategic Stability in an Era of Détente,” in Wolfram Hanrieder, ed., Arms Control and Security: Current Issues (Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1979), pp. 48–49. 4. Paul H. Nitze, “Assuring Strategic Stability in an Era of Détente,” p. 48. 5. Sumit Ganguly, “Indo-Pakistani Nuclear Issues and the Stability/Instability Paradox,” Studies in Conflict and Terrorism Vol. 18, No. 4 (1995), pp. 325–34. 6. See discussion on this point in Ashley J. Tellis, India's Emerging Nuclear Posture: Between Recessed Deterrent and Ready Arsenal (Santa Monica: Rand Corporation, 2001), pp. 39–54. 7. See detailed analysis of Indian and Pakistani defense spending relating to conventional forces in Rodney W. Jones, “Strategic Stability and Conventional Force Imbalance: Case of South Asia” (Bradford: South Asian Strategic Stability Unit, n.d.), http://www.bradford.ac.uk; See also a report by Siddharth Srivastava, “India's military hungers for more,” Asia Time Online, February 15, 2005; IISS, Military Balance (London: IISS, 20004). 8. The Military Balance 1997–98 (London: The International Institute of Strategic Studies, 1997), pp. 294–98. 9. Former Pakistani Chief of Army Staff, General Mirza Aslam Beg claims that from 1975 to 1990 Pakistan did not spend more than $250 million on its nuclear program. General Mirza Aslam Beg, “Pakistan's Nuclear Propriety,”http://www.friends.org.pk. 10. On the question of stability–instability problem see Peter Lavoy, “The Strategic Consequences of Nuclear Proliferation,” Security Studies Vol. 4, No. 4 (Summer 1995):, pp. 739–40. 11. Rodney W. Jones, “Pakistan's Nuclear Posture: Quest for Assured Nuclear Deterrence – A Conjecture,” Regional Studies Vol. 18, No. 2 (Spring 2000), pp. 3–39. 12. Rodney W. Jones, Minimum Nuclear Deterrence Postures in South Asia: An Overview (Reston, VA.: Policy Architects International, October 12, 2001). 13. On Indian nuclear doctrine, see Tellis, India's Emerging Nuclear Posture; George Perkovich, India's Nuclear Bomb: The Impact on Global Proliferation (New Delhi: Oxford University Press, 1999). 14. Robert Jervis, “Why Nuclear Superiority Doesn't Matter,” Political Science Quarterly Vol. 94, No. 4 (Winter 1979–1980), pp. 617–33. 15. See a detailed discussion on the question of “sufficiency” in Tellis, India's Emerging Nuclear Posture, pp. 251–400. 16. Rodney W. Jones, “Pakistan's Nuclear Posture,” Dawn, September 14, 1999; Rodney W. Jones, “Pakistan's Nuclear Posture: Arms Race Instabilities in South Asia,” Asian Affairs Vol. 25, No. 2 (Summer 1998), pp. 67–87. 17. David Albright and Kimberly Kramer, “Fissile Material: Stockpiles Still Growing,” http://www.isis-online.org. 18. “Pakistan's Indigenous Nuclear Reactor Starts Up,” The Nation (Islamabad), April 13, 1998. 19. Mark Hibbs, “US Now Believes Pakistan to use Khushab Plutonium in Bomb Program,” Nucleonics Week, July 16, 1998. 20. Albright and Kramer, “Fissile Material: Stockpiles still Growing.” 21. See Afzal Mahmood, “US agenda for nuclear restraint,” Dawn, November 24, 1998. 22. M. Ziauddin “Who passed our nuclear secrets to Iran,” Dawn, December 23, 2003. 23. Estimates of Pakistani nuclear warheads vary. Carnegie Endowment for Peace sources quote 35–55 warheads, while the National Resources Defence Council gives lower figure of 24–48, http://www.fas.org/nuke/guide/pakistan/nuke/index.html. 24. Hasan Akhtar, “Pakistan test-fires Ghauri missile,” Dawn, April 7, 1998. 25. Perkovich, India's Nuclear Bomb: Impact on Global Proliferation, pp. 410–11. 26. “Pakistan tests its longest-range missile,” Dawn, March 10, 2004. 27. See a statement of Dr. Samar Mubarakmund, the scientist who led the Pakistan team in designing and detonating nuclear devices on May 28. “Defence strengthened, says Samar,” The New, March 10, 2004. 28. Wolfram F. Hanrieder, “Introduction,” Arms Control and Security (Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1979), p. 6. 29. On this debate, see Bernard Brodie, “The Development of Nuclear Strategy,” International Security Vol. 2, No. 4 (Spring 1978), pp. 65–83. 30. For instance, see statement of former Indian Minister of Defense George Fernandes. He asserted that India would “wipe out Pakistan” in a massive retaliation, if Pakistan ever tried to use nuclear weapons. In his opinion, India would take two or three Pakistani nuclear bombs but as a result of Indian strikes there would be no Pakistan left. “Pakistan to be wiped out in nuclear war: India,” The News, January 8, 2003. 31. The Natural Resources Defence Council (NRDC) estimates Pakistan's warheads at 48 higher than India's 30–35; from Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, http://www.ceip.org. This author's interviews with Pakistani experts reveal much higher figures of Pakistani nuclear warheads. 32. Five terrorists disguised as Indian security personnel entered the Indian parliament building and fought with the security forces on December 13, 2001. India accused Pakistan-based militants who support Kashmiri groups in the Indian-administered state of Jammu and Kashmir and threatened Pakistan with a massive attack if it failed to control these groups and their crossing into the Kashmir state. “Gunmen storm Indian parliament, 12 dead,” The News, December 14, 2001. 33. Gaurav Kampani, “India's Compellance Strategy: Calling Pakistan's Nuclear Bluff Over Kashmir,” http://sns.miis.edu. 34. “Musharraf bans extremists, warns India,” The News January 13, 2002. 35. India views Pakistan's measures as half-hearted, incomplete, and not enough to control infiltration of Kashmiri militants from its territory. 36. “India was warned of unconventional war: Musharraf,” The News, December 31, 2002. 37. Praful Bidwai, “Chilling nuclear disclosure,” The News, January 2, 2003. 38. Figures about Indian troops in the State of Jammu and Kashmir greatly vary from source to source. Pakistan puts the figure around half a million including support personnel and other security outfits besides the regular army. 39. For an Indian story of Pakistan's involvement in Kashmir, see Tara Kartha, “Mujahideen and the Covert War,” in Air Commodore Jasjit Singh, ed., Kargil 1999: Pakistan's Fourth War for Kashmir (New Delhi: Knowledge World and Institute for Defence Studies and Analyses, 1999), pp 89–117. 40. In the Indian official and non-official assessment, Pakistan has used its nuclear capability for low-intensity conflict in Kashmir and was encouraged by the nuclear factor when it engaged in Kargil conflict. See From Surprise to Reckoning: The Kargil Review Committee Report (New Delhi: Sage Publications, 2000), pp. 183–1999. 41. See critiqueof India's Kashmir policy in Sumantra Bose, The Challenge in Kashmir: Democracy, Self-Determination and a Just Peace (New Delhi: Sage Publications, 1997). 42. Muhammad Amir Rana, A to Z of Jehadi Organizations in Pakistan, translated from Urdu by Saba Ansari (Lahore: Mashal Books, 2004). 43. Explanations for why Pakistan sent troops into the Kargil-Dras region remain a point of controversy. The author's interviews with Pakistani defense experts suggest that it was meant to control movements of Indian troops to Siachen and in this way force India to negotiate an agreement on troop pull out. 44. Former Pakistani Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif met former US President Bill Clinton on July 4, 1999 in Washington and after three hours of talks issued a statement terming the Kargil war as dangerous and agreeing on the need to restore the Line of Control. Dawn, July 5, 1999. 45. American policy-makers and experts on nonproliferation understood the logic of Pakistan's efforts to develop nuclear capability as a means to counter India's huge advantage in conventional weaponry. See Leonard S. Spector with Jacqueline R. Smith, Nuclear Ambitions: The Spread of Nuclear Weapons 1989–1990 (Boulder: Westview Press, 1990), p. 90. 46. See report on how the US failed to influence Pakistan's nuclear program in the 1980s. Richard P. Cronin et al., Pakistan's Nuclear Proliferation Activities and the Recommendations of the 9/11 Commission: US Policy Constraints and Options Washington, DC: The Library of Congress, Congressional Research Service, January 25, 2005, http://www.nara.gov. 47. Hedrick Smith, “A Bomb Ticks in Pakistan,” New York Times Magazine, March 6, 1988, p. 38. 48. Adopted 1985. Sec. 620E[e] of the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961 as amended. See Robert M. Hathaway, “Confrontation and Retreat: The U.S. Congress and the South Asian Nuclear Tests,” Arms Control Today (January–February 2000), http://www.armscontrol.org. 49. “US Informed Pakistan about Khan's network in early 2001”, Dawn, October 27, 2004. 50. Since the eruption of the Dr. A.Q. Khan nuclear scandal, the Pakistan Nuclear Regulatory Authority has been created to oversee non-military nuclear activity. 51. See report by Ziauddin “Who passed our nuclear secrets to Iran.” 52. See story by William J. Broad, David Rohde, and David E. Sanger, “Pakistanis sold nuclear secrets,” New York Times, December 22, 2003. 53. Patrick E. Tyler and David E. Sanger, “Pakistan Called Libyans’ Source of Atomic Design,” New York Times, January 6, 2004. 54. Press reports in Pakistan indicated that the some scientists associated with Khan Research Laboratories were arrested by the government and they were investigated for their role in passing on the nuclear secrets to Iran. Ziauddin, “Who passed our nuclear secrets to Iran.” 55. A spate of early writings on Pakistan's nuclear program suggested that it was developing an Islamic bomb, which implied that other Islamic countries could share Pakistan's nuclear technology, material, and ability to manufacture nuclear devices. See for instance Major General D. K. Palit and P. K. S. Namboodiri, Pakistan's Islamic Bomb (New Delhi: Vikas Publishing House Pvt. Ltd, 1979). 56. Pakistan “has stockpiled sufficient number of nuclear weapons and the fissile material.” General Mirza Aslam Beg, “Pakistan's Nuclear Propriety,” http://www.friends.org.pk. 57. Peter D. Feaver, “Command and Control in Emerging Nuclear Nations,” International Security Vol. 17, No. 3 (Winter 1992/93), pp. 174–78. 58. Joseph S. Nye Jr., “Washington's role in nuclear South Asia,” Dawn, November 27, 1998. Additional informationNotes on contributorsRasul Bakhsh RaisRasul Bakhsh Rais is Professor of Political Science at the Lahore University of Management Sciences (Lahore, Pakistan).
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