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Islamic radicalisation and violent extremism in Nigeria

2013; Taylor & Francis; Volume: 13; Issue: 2 Linguagem: Inglês

10.1080/14678802.2013.796205

1478-1174

Abiodun Alao,

Religion and Sociopolitical Dynamics in Nigeria

Abstract This article examines the issues underlining Islamic radicalisation and violence in Nigeria, a phenomenon whose latest manifestation through the activities of the Jamā'atu Ahlis Sunnah Lādda'awatih wal-Jihad (widely known as Boko Haram), has attracted considerable concern. It traces the evolution of the phenomenon and identifies the key issues that have explained its pattern of expression. The paper advances three main arguments: first, that Islamic radicalisation and its link to violence in Nigeria is, contrary to the often-held opinion, a phenomenon that transcends socio-economic deprivation and the mutual suspicion that underlines inter-group relations in the country, but also extends to a string of external considerations that intertwine with religion and identity in Nigeria; second, that there are aspects of the country's historical past, including the link with colonialism, that explain aspects of Islamic radicalisation and violence; and third, that greater clarity will come into the understanding of the Boko Haram phenomenon when considered against the background of the country's radicalisation history. Notes 1. After Northern Mali's descent into anarchy, Nigeria was one of the countries that sent in troops to restore order and there is now established proof that there are collaborations between Islamic militant groups in the Sahel region and Boko Haram. 2. 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Jamestown Foundation, Washington, DC [Google Scholar], Northern Nigeria's Boko Haram; Zenn, 'Boko Haram's Dangerous Expansion into Northwest Nigeria'; and Zenn, 'Boko Haram's International Connections'. 3. As indicated in the above note, this was initially focused on the activities of the Maitatsine militant group that plagued the country in the early 1980s and recently Boko Haram. 4. In my discussion with an expert on the history of the Islamic religion in Nigeria, Hakeen Danmole, he pointed out that 'facts about Islamic radicalisation in Nigeria, if not placed within contexts, may amount to falsehood'. Interview, Lagos, 7 May 2008. 5. For a more detailed discussion of this, see Morgan K.W., Morgan, ed. 1958. Islam, the Straight Path: Islam Interpreted by Muslims, New York: Ronald Press. [Google Scholar], Islam, the Straight Path, 247. 6. The only sections of Northern Nigeria that escaped the jihad were Bornu and certain non-Muslim areas that were inaccessible to the Fulani Cavalry. See Crowther Crowther, Michael. 1962. The Story of Nigeria, London: Faber and Faber. [Google Scholar], Story of Nigeria. 7. CIA World Fact Book CIA World Fact Book. Available at: https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook [Accessed 14 March 2013] [Google Scholar]. It must also be pointed out that this has been an issue of controversy in Nigeria. Christians have always disputed these figures and have persistently argued that Muslim figures have been influenced by the Hausa/Fulani oligarchy that has ruled Nigeria for most of the post-independence period. 8. Not long after colonisation, some minorities in the North, including some ancient ones like the Gbagyi in the Kaduna area, converted to Catholicism and various Protestant sects, although the Emir of Zaria continued to assert his jurisdiction over Middle Belt minorities. 9. Kenny Kenny, Joseph, 2001. 'The Spread of Islam in Nigeria: A Historical Survey'. Paper delivered at a Conference on Sharia in Nigeria, Enugu, 22–24 March [Google Scholar], 'Spread of Islam in Nigeria', 9. 10. This is discussed at some length in Uzoma Uzoma, Rose. 2004. Religious Pluralism, Cultural Differences and Social Stability in Nigeria. Brigham Young University Law Review, Summer: 651–664. [Google Scholar], 'Religious Pluralism'. 11. Discussions I had with many Muslims from the southern part of the country confirm that there is a sort of hierarchy in the minds of Hausa Muslims, with the Arab Muslims coming out on top, the Hausa Muslims coming a close second and the Yoruba Muslims coming a distant third. 12. Falola Falola, Toyin. 1999. Violence in Nigeria: The Crisis of Religious Politics and Secular Ideologies, Rochester: University of Rochester Press. [Google Scholar], Violence in Nigeria, 5. 13. The holder of the office of Sultan of Sokoto is often considered as the spiritual head of Muslims, if not in the whole of Nigeria, at least in Northern Nigeria. The respect that has been given to the holder of the office has, however, varied. The current holder of the office was a former army officer and he has not been treated with the same venerable reference as his predecessor. 14. John Shiklam, 'Nigeria: Sultan We Must Counter Christians'. Daily Champion, 3 July 2007. 15. In late 2005/early 2006, a Danish cartoonist published 12 cartoons of Prophet Mohammed which many Muslims across the world found blasphemous. 16. See 'Israeli State Would Crumble, Says Zakzaky'. Leadership Newspaper (Abuja), 21 May 2008. 17. Sheik Ibrahim Zakzaky was speaking during a one day symposium, organised by the Resource Forum of the Islamic Movement in Nigeria, titled 'The Creation of the Illegal State of Israel', which was held at Arewa House Kaduna. Leadership Newspaper (Abuja), 21 May 2008. 18. The exact number of those who died in the riots may never be known. The official figure released by the government was about 4,000, but many people believed it could have been considerably higher. The name Maitasine was given to Marwa because he often ended his preaching with the Hausa word Wanda bata yarda ba Allah tatsine (meaning 'May God curse whosoever disagrees with me'). 19. Sanusi Sanusi, Lamido Sanusi, 2004. 'Fundamentalist Groups and the Nigerian Legal System'. Available at: www.wluml.org/sites/wluml.org/files/import/english/pubs [Accessed 14 March 2013] [Google Scholar], 'Fundamentalist Groups'. 20. Sharia states are Zamfara, Kano, Sokoto, Katsina, Bauchi, Borno, Jigawa, Kebbi and Yobe. Three states have also instituted Sharia in some parts with large Muslim populations. These are: Kaduna, Niger and Gombe. 21. 'Death Sentence for Islamist Militant Murderers'. The Punch (Lagos), 8 October 2007. 22. Atika Balal, 'Inside Bello Masaba's Household'. Daily Trust (Abuja), 22 September 2008. 23. Boko Haram, 'Kano Attacks: 215 Confirmed Dead'. This Day (Abuja), 23 January 2012. 24. Donu Kogbara, 'Nigeria Underestimated Boko Haram's Brutal Power'. The Guardian (London), 28 February 2013. 25. In February 2013, seven French citizens, including four Children, were kidnapped in Cameroon. See 'French Children Kidnapped by Boko Haram in Cameroon'. Daily Telegraph (London), 19 February 2013. 26. The Guardian (London), 11 March 2013. 27. See Olalekan Adetayo, 'Boko Haram has Infiltrated my Government—Jonathan'. The Punch (Lagos), 9 January 2012. 28. Focus Group Discussions (FGDs) on the Project on Religious Radicalisation and Violence took place in two phases: the first between April and May 2008 and the second in October 2008. The first was held in six locations: Lagos, Ibadan/Ife, Abuja, Jos, Kano and Maiduguri, while the second was conducted in three additional locations: Kaduna, Sokoto and Makurdi. All these locations were selected to satisfy Nigeria's geographical spread of the areas where Islamic radicalisation has been identified, even if in a somewhat crude sense, with Lagos, Ibadan/Ife representing the South-West; Kano and Kaduna the North-Central; Sokoto and Maiduguri representing North-West and North-East respectively; Abuja for the Federal capital; and Jos and Makurdi capturing the opinions of the Middle Belt. With the exception of Ibadan, where one of the two FGD was exclusively for Hausa Muslims, discussions were mixed and participants were selected by the author. 29. FGD, Ile-Ife, 29 April 2008. There were 21 participants, cutting across gender, religious and ethnic divides—14 Males and 7 Females, and 12 Christians and 9 Muslims. 30. Many of these riots occurred in 2010 and, more than any other city in Nigeria, Jos has recorded most conflicts largely because of the broader issues involved in the politics of religion in the city. 31. Many of the governors who introduced Sharia were later indicted for corruption by the country's Economic and Financial Crime Tribunal, including the initiator, Governor Yerima. 32. Balarabe Mua was a left wing politician and former governor of Kaduna State. 33. Danbazau Danbazau, Mallam Lawan. 1991. Politics and Religion in Nigeria, Kano: Tofa Commercial Press. [Google Scholar], Politics and Religion, vii. 34. FGD, Sokoto, 17 October 2008. The discussion was attended by 15 participants, 13 males and two females, all Muslims Hausas. Another discussion, attended by 11 participants was composed of mainly Christians based in the city. There were seven males and four females, with nine Yorubas and two Ibos. 35. FGD, Makurdi, 24 October 2008. The discussion was attended by 10 people, five males and five females, There were six Muslims and four Christians. 36. FGD, Abuja, 2 May 2008. The discussion had 15 participants cutting across gender, religious and ethnic boundaries. There were nine Muslims and six Christians, and nine males and six females. 37. See United States Department of State United States Department of State, 2008. 'Terrorism Report on Nigeria for 2007'. Washington, DC, April [Google Scholar], 'Terrorism Report on Nigeria'. 38. Jide Ajani, 'Nigeria: Trial of Mohammed Ashafa-The Making of another Mohammed Yusuf, Boko Haram Leader'. Vanguard (Lagos), 11 March 2012. 39. Interviews, Jos, 13 May 2008. 40. Somini Sengupta, 2003, 'Kaduna Journal; Piety and Politics Sunder a Riot-Torn Nigerian City'. New York Times, 21 February 2003. 41. See USAID United States Agency for International Development (USAID), 2008. 'Fifth Report on the Implementation of USAID Disability Policy'. Available at: www1.usaid.gov/about_usaid/disability/modules/fifth_report_msword.doc [Assessed 14 March 2013] [Google Scholar], 'Fifth Report on the Implementation'; and DfID Department for International Development, UK (DfID), 2009. 'Programme in Nigeria'. International Development Committee. Available at: http://www.publications.parliament.uk/pa/cm200809/cmselect/cmintdev/840/840i.pdf [Assessed 14 March 2013] [Google Scholar], 'Programme in Nigeria'. 42. National Mirror (Lagos), 14 February 2009. 43. See Falola, Violence in Nigeria, 27. 44. An Islamic scholar, who owns and directs one of Abuja's biggest Islamic schools, was empathic in his conviction that Britain stands indicted for the anti-Islamic policies it took during its administration of Nigeria after 1914. Interview, Abuja, 11 May 2008. 45. Interview with Alhaji Suleiman Baba Ali, former Commissioner for Health, Kogi state, 11 May 2008. 46. Interview with Alhaji Suleiman Baba Ali, former Commissioner for Health, Kogi state, 11 May 2008 47. See Bello Bello, Abdul-Rahoof Adebayo, 2009. 'Jos Crisis and Ethnic Animosity in Nigeria: A Historical Perspective'. Unpublished Manuscript [Google Scholar], 'Jos Crisis and Ethnic Animosity'. 48. See Bello Bello, Abdul-Rahoof Adebayo, 2009. 'Jos Crisis and Ethnic Animosity in Nigeria: A Historical Perspective'. Unpublished Manuscript [Google Scholar], 'Jos Crisis and Ethnic Animosity'