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Major Combat Operations and Counterinsurgency Warfare: Plan Challe in Algeria, 1959–1960

2010; Taylor & Francis; Volume: 19; Issue: 3 Linguagem: Inglês

10.1080/09636412.2010.503509

1556-1852

Christopher Griffin,

Communism, Protests, Social Movements

Abstract In 1959–60, the French Army in Algeria achieved a major tactical and operational military success under the command of General Maurice Challe, in which the French destroyed half of the combat capability of the Algerian insurgency. Rather than adopting a population-centric, or “hearts and minds,” approach to coin, the French Army created an innovative method for military success based on the use of major combat operations against the military power of the insurgency. The success of major combat operations in Plan Challe is omitted or dismissed in most of the Algerian War historiography, which focuses instead on French pacification. An analysis of Plan Challe, however, provides lessons and examples for the conduct of a successful sustained counterguerrilla campaign, a coercive method seldom discussed in current debates over coin warfare. Acknowledgments The author would like to acknowledge the Center for International Studies and the School of International Relations at the University of Southern California for the research support provided for this project. I would also like to thank the staff of the Service Historique de l’Armée de Terre at the Chateau de Vincennes, Paris, for their help in locating archival documents. Aurélie Griffin provided advice on French translations and citation format, as well as many comments and suggestions. I would like to thank Laurie Brand, Patrick James, Jarrod Hayes, and the anonymous reviewers and the editors of Security Studies, especially William Wohlforth, for all of their comments and advice. Notes Gen. Maurice Challe, “Note d’orientation: procédés tactiques pour la recherche et la destruction des bandes rebelles,” 25 January 1960, shat, 1H 1931/1, Chateau de Vincennes, Service Historique de l’Armée de Terre (shat), Paris, France. Alistair Horne, A Savage War of Peace: Algeria 1954–1962 (New York: Viking Press, 1977), 28–30. The u.s. Army Counterinsurgency Field Manual is highly critical of the French in Algeria. u.s. Department of the Army Field Manual (fm) 3-24 and Marine Corps Warfighting Production 3-33.5, Counterinsurgency (Washington dc: u.s. Department of the Army, December 2006), sections 1-7, 7-9, hereafter noted as fm 3-24. See also Lou DiMarco, “Losing the Moral Compass: Torture and Guerre Révolutionnaire in the Algerian War,” Parameters 36 (Summer 2006): 63–76; Thomas E. Ricks, The Gamble: Gen. Petraeus and the Untold Story of the American Surge in Iraq, 2006–2008 (London: Allen Lane, 2009), 137. Historians agree that Challe achieved a decisive military success against the aln in April 1960. Martin S. Alexander and J.F.V. Keiger, “France and the Algerian War: Strategy, Operations and Diplomacy,” in France and the Algerian War 1954–1962: Strategy, Operations and Diplomacy, ed. Martin S. Alexander and J.F.V. Keiger (London: Frank Cass, 2002), 18; Ian F.W. Beckett, Modern Insurgencies and Counter-Insurgencies: Guerrillas and their Opponents since 1750 (London: Routledge, 2001), 164–65; Douglas Porch, “French Imperial Warfare 1945–1962,” in Counterinsurgency in Modern Warfare, ed. Daniel Marston and Carter Malkasian (Oxford: Osprey Publishing, 2008), 109. Carl von Clausewitz distinguishes between tactical success and victory in war. Carl von Clausewitz, On War, trans. Michael Howard and Peter Paret (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1984), 88, 90, 143. Ibid., 143. Andrew J. Birtle, u.s. Army Counterinsurgency and Contingency Operations Doctrine, 1942–1976 (Washington, dc: Center of Military History, u.s. Army, 2006), 162–63. For the absence of u.s. military operations in coin theory, see Larry E. Cable, Conflict of Myths: The Development of American Counterinsurgency Doctrine and the Vietnam War (New York: New York University Press, 1986), 96–97. For coin studies in the context of Maoist theories of people's war, see Birtle, u.s. Army Counterinsurgency, 25–26. See also the Malayan and early Vietnamese experiences in the context of Maoist theories of people's war in Robert Thompson, Defeating Communist Insurgency: Experiences from Malaya and Vietnam (London: Chatto & Windus, 1966). Thompson was a British military advisor in both Malaya and Vietnam. Birtle, u.s. Army Counterinsurgency, 225. Ibid., 163. Peter Paret, French Revolutionary Warfare from Indochina to Algeria: The Analysis of a Political and Military Doctrine (New York: Praeger, 1964); Christopher Cradock and M.L.R. Smith, “‘No Fixed Values’: A Reinterpretation of the Influence of the Theory of Guerre Révolutionnaire and the Battle of Algiers, 1956–1957,” Journal of Cold War Studies 9, no. 4 (Fall 2007): 68–105. Col. Nemo [pseud.], “La guerre dans le milieu social,” Revue de Défense nationale 12 (May 1956): 605–28; Ximenes [pseud.], “Essai sur la guerre révolutionnaire,” Revue Militaire d’information 281 (February/March 1957): 11–22. Gen. Jacques Hogard, “Guerre révolutionnaire ou révolution dans l’art de la guerre,” Revue de Défense Nationale, 12 (December 1956): 1498. Ibid., 1510. Birtle, u.s. Army Counterinsurgency, 180, note 72. Gen. Paul Aussaresses, Services Spéciaux, Algérie 1955–1957: Mon témoignage sur la torture (Paris: Perrin, 2001), trans. Gen. Paul Aussaresses, The Battle of the Casbah: Terrorism and Counter-Terrorism in Algeria, 1955–1957 (New York: Enigma Books, 2002). David Galula, Counterinsurgency Warfare: Theory and Practice (Westport, ct: Praeger Security International, 1964); David Galula, Pacification in Algeria: 1956–1958 (1963; repr., Santa Monica: rand Corporation, 2006). Another little-known study was written at rand in 1964 by Constantine Melnik, who was in the military cabinet of French Prime Minister Michel Debré from 1958–1962. See Constantine Melnik, Insurgency and Counterinsurgency in Algeria (Santa Monica: rand Corporation, 23 April 1964). Galula, Pacification in Algeria, ix. Galula, Counterinsurgency Warfare, 51. Ibid., 71–72. Ibid., 76–78. Ibid., xii. Ximenes, “Essai sur la guerre révolutionnaire,” 11–12, 14, 19. Galula, Counterinsurgency Warfare, 75–95. Gen. Joseph-Simon Gallieni, Neuf Ans à Madagascar (Paris: Hachette, 1908), esp. 47; Joseph-Simon Gallieni, Gallieni Pacificateur : écrits coloniaux de Gallieni, ed. Hubert Deschamps and Paul Chauvet (Paris: Presses Universitaires de France, 1949). In English, see J. Kim Munholland, “‘Collaboration Strategy’ and the French Pacification of Tonkin, 1885–1897,” The Historical Journal 24 no. 3 (September 1981): 630–41; Douglas Porch, “Bugeaud, Gallieni, Lyautey: The Development of French Colonial Warfare,” in Makers of Modern Strategy from Machiavelli to the Nuclear Age, ed. Peter Paret (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1986), 376–407. Roger Trinquier, Modern Warfare: A French View of Counterinsurgency, trans. Daniel Lee (Westport, ct: Praeger Security International, 1964); Gen. Marcel Bigeard, Pour une Parcelle de gloire (Paris: Plon, 1975). Trinquier, Modern Warfare, 37–41. Bigeard, Pour une Parcelle de gloire, 276–86. Counterinsurgency Warfare was not translated into French until 2008. Trinquier, however, wrote Modern Warfare in French and is also known in the French literature for several other books on coin. See Roger Trinquier, Guerre, Subversion, Revolution (Paris: Robert Laffont, 1968); Roger Trinquier, Notre Guerre au Katanga (Paris: Pensée Moderne, 1963). Most coin analysts argue that interest in the subject dropped in the United States in the early 1970s. Birtle, u.s. Army Counterinsurgency, 480; Douglas S. Blaufarb, The Counterinsurgency Era: u.s. Doctrine and Performance (New York: The Free Press, 1977), 288–98. For examples of the new theories of war and coin, see Col. Thomas X. Hammes, The Sling and the Stone: On War in the 21st Century (St. Paul: Zenith Press, 2006), 2–14; Gen. Rupert Smith, The Utility of Force: The Art of War in the Modern World (New York: Knopf, 2007). For a comparison of coin strategy in Malaya and Vietnam, see John Nagl, Learning to Eat Soup with a Knife: Counterinsurgency Lessons from Malaya to Vietnam (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2002); Thomas R. Mockaitis, “The Iraq War: Learning from the Past, Adapting to the Present, and Planning for the Future,” (Carlisle, pa: u.s. Army War College, Strategic Studies Institute, February 2007); Robert M. Cassidy, “Winning the War of the Flea: Lessons from Guerrilla Warfare,” Military Review (September-October 2004): 41–46. See the influential article by Kalev I. Sepp, “Best Practices in Counterinsurgency,” Military Review (May-June 2005): 8–12; John R. Ballard, “Civil Affairs Engagement in Iraq,” in War in Iraq: Planning and Execution, ed. Thomas G. Mahnken and Thomas A. Keaney (New York: Routledge, 2007), 198–205. Nagl, Learning to Eat Soup with a Knife, 176, 191. Alistair Horne's A Savage War of Peace, a classic history of the war, was republished in 2006 and has been widely read, including by President George W. Bush. For Galula's influence, see fm 3-24, esp. sections 1-30–1-35, 1-4–1-51. See Gian Gentile, “A Strategy of Tactics: Population-Centric coin and the Army,” Parameters (Autumn 2009): 5, 8–9. Lt. Col. Gian Gentile, “Eating Soup with a Spoon,” Armed Forces Journal (September 2007). For Gentile's critiques of fm 3-24 and the manual's effects on the army, see, in particular, Gentile, “A Strategy of Tactics,” 5-16; Lt. Col. Gian Gentile, “Let's Build an Army to Win All Wars,” Joint Force Quarterly 52 (First quarter 2009): 27–33. For the value of offensive operations, see fm 3-24, 1-29, table 1–1, sections 1–14, 2-2–2-22. fm 3-24, sections 5-52–5-58, and in Department of the Army, Field Manual Interim 3-24.2 (fm 90-8, fm 7-98), Tactics in Counterinsurgency (Washington, dc: Department of the Army, March 2009), sections 3-106–3-128. Ibid., sec. 3-106. Ibid., sections 3-110–3-112. On strike operations, see Ibid., sections 3-147–3-150. Ibid., sec. 3-147. See Ricks, The Gamble, 132-33, 296-98; Col. David Kilcullen, The Accidental Guerrilla: Fighting Small Wars in the Midst of a Big One (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2009), 129–30. Another contributing factor to the reduction of violence in Iraq was the decision of a number of tribes in Anbar province in late 2005 and 2006 to cooperate with coalition forces in fighting Al Qaeda. See Austin Long, “The Anbar Awakening,” Survival 50, no. 2 (April-May 2008): 67–94. Donald P. Wright and Col. Timothy R. Reese, On Point ii: Transition to the New Campaign: The United States Army in Operation iraqi freedom, May 2003-January 2005 (Fort Leavenworth: Combat Studies Institute Press, 2008), 313–63. Jim Garamone, “Odierno Describes Operation Phantom Thunder,” American Forces Press Service (22 June 2007). “Start of ‘Arrowhead Ripper’ Highlights Iraq Operations,” American Forces Press Service (19 June 2007). Gerry J. Gilmore, “Counter-Insurgency Expert Sees Progress in Iraq,” American Forces Press Service (29 June 2007). “Start of ‘Arrowhead Ripper’”; Fred W. Baker iii, “Iraqi Security Forces Make Progress in Northern Iraq,” American Forces Press Service (18 September 2007). See Thompson, Defeating Communist Insurgency, 105–06. Brig. Frank Kitson, Low Intensity Operations: Subversion, Insurgency, Peace-Keeping (London: Faber & Faber, 1972), 132–33. Ibid., 106. fm 3-24, sec. 5-39. Ibid., sec. 1-142. Galula mentions this goal as well. Galula, Counterinsurgency Warfare, 76. This was also part of Galula's plan. Ibid., 55–58. For an example of some of the initial work by Anglophone scholars in the French archives, see Alexander and Keiger, France and the Algerian War 1954–1962. Alexander and Keiger, “France and the Algerian War,” 21–23. Jean-Charles Jauffret and Maurice Vaïsse, eds., Militaires et Guérilla dans la guerre d’Algérie (Paris: Editions Complexe, 2001). Yves Courrière, La Guerre d’Algérie 1954–1957. Tome I, Les Fils de la Toussaint (1968 : Paris: Fayard, 2001), 27–31, 156–57. Courrière, a French journalist, is one of the only French historians who had access to the testimonies of fln leaders. Courrière, La Guerre d’Algérie, 319–40. Ibid., 24. Ibid., 383–90. Henri Le Mire, Histoire Militaire de la guerre d’Algérie (Paris: Albin Michel, 1982), 27–36. Etat-Major, 3ème Bureau (Operations), “Evolution de la situation du début de la Rébellion à l’été 1960,” n.d., shat 1H 1933/1. Ibid. Horne, A Savage War of Peace, 185–87. Gen. Jacques Massu, La Vraie bataille d’Alger (Paris: Plon, 1971), 31. Raoul Salan, Mémoires, Fin d’un Empire : Tome iii, Algérie française, 1er novembre 1954–6 juin 1958 (Paris: Presses de la Cité, 1972), 57. Paul Henissart, Wolves in the City: The Death of French Algeria (New York: Simon & Schuster, 1970), 27–33. Salan, Mémoires: Tome iii, 147, 149–50. Massu, La Vraie bataille d’Alger, 32–33. For more on torture in English, see Rita Maran, Torture: The Role of Ideology in the French-Algerian War (New York: Praeger, 1989). Etat-major, 3ème Bureau, “Les opérations militaires en Algérie de novembre 1954 à l’été 1960,” n.d., shat 1H 1933/3. Salan, Mémoires: Tome iii, 245. Challe, Notre Révolte, 91–92; Porch, “French Imperial Warfare,” 106. Gen. Maurice Challe, “Directive n°1,” 24 December 1958, shat 1H 1930/1. In a 2005 article, Paul Staniland argues that the Morice Line was such a success that the same model should be used to build barriers on the Syrian and Iranian borders of Iraq. Paul Staniland, “Defeating Transnational Insurgencies: The Best Offense is a Good Fence,” Washington Quarterly 29, no. 1 (Winter 2005–06): 35. Horne, A Savage War of Peace, 273–313. Gen. Jacques Massu, Avec de Gaulle: du Tchad 1941 à Baden 1968 (Monaco: Editions de Rocher, 1998), 109. Challe, Notre Révolte, 38. Challe, “Directive n°1,” shat 1H 1930/1. Ibid. Alexander and Keiger, “France and the Algerian War,” 15–16. Challe, “Directive n°1,” shat 1H 1930/1. For French military cas and zones, see Guy Pervillé, Atlas de la Guerre d’Algérie : de la conquête à l’indépendance (Paris: Éditions Autrement, 2003), 30–31. For the Sahara region, see ibid., 44–45. Horne, A Savage War of Peace, 83. Pervillé, Atlas de la Guerre d’Algérie, 22–25. Gen. Jean-Claude Allard, “Instruction préparatoire pour les généraux commandant les Corps d’Armée d’oran et d’alger,” 13 January 1959, shat 1H 1930/1. Etat-major, 3ème Bureau, “Evolution de la situation du début de la Rébellion à l’été 1960,” n.d., shat 1H 1933/1. According to a recent article on the harkis, this estimate is well below that of “180,000 Muslims served in the French security forces at any one time during the conflict. Yoav Gartzak, “Using Indigenous Forces in Counterinsurgency Operations: The French in Algeria, 1954–1962,” Journal of Strategic Studies 32, no. 2 (April 2009): 308. Challe, Notre Révolte, 106. Gartzak also cites the figure of 50 percent casualties in Oranie. Gartzak, “Using Indigenous Forces,” 315. Gen. Jacques Massu, “Directive particulière N°3 pour les Commandants du zna, zsa, zea, zoa, 10°D.P.,” 10 April 1959, N°965/caa/3/ope, shat 1H 2754/1. Ibid. Gen. Jacques Massu, “Bilan des opérations en Wilaya 4,” 4 July 1959, N°1989/caa/3/ope, shat 1H 2754/1. Challe, Notre Révolte, 111; Le Mire, Histoire Militaire de la guerre d’Algérie, 266–67. Gen. Challe, “Instruction pour la conduite des opérations contre la Wilaya iii,” 6 June 1959, N°1.384/emi/3.ope/E.153/TS, shat 1H 1951/1. Etat-major, 3ème Bureau, “Modes d’action des Réserves Générales—au cours de l’opération ‘Jumelles,’” 3 March 1960, shat 1H 1951/1. Ibid. Challe, Notre Révolte, 41. Etat-Major, 3ème Bureau, “Modes d’action des Réserves Générales,” shat 1H 1951/1. Gen. Jean Gracieux, “Compte rendu des opérations contre la Wilaya N°3 “Opération Jumelles” (22 juillet au 17 octobre 1959),” 3 December 1959, N°2086/3/ops, shat 1H 1952/1. Ibid. A similar approach to the hold and build phases of u.s. operations is described in fm 3-24 and fmi 3-24-2. Challe, Notre Révolte, 41. This official estimate from the prime minister's office seems very high given the numbers of insurgent casualties cited for individual operations. Premier ministre, Etat-Major Général de la Défense Nationale, Plans et Opérations militaires, “Note d’information sur les opérations de pacification en Algérie,” 22 April 1960, N°0146/emgdn/pom/E/sc, shat 1H 2026/1. Fellaghas is a fairly general term for guerrilla fighters and was generally in more common usage in Tunisia. French officers referred more often to the fln/aln fighters as “outlaws,” “rebels,” or “terrorists.” Challe, Notre Révolte, 41–42. Gen. Challe, “Directive n°1,” shat 1H 1930/1; Henri Le Mire, Histoire des Parachutistes français : la guerre para de 1939 à 1979 (Paris: Albin Michel, 1980), 342. Gen. Maurice Challe, “Instruction pour la conduite des opérations contre la Wilaya iii,” shat 1H 1951/1. Le Mire, Histoire des Parachutistes français, 342–43. Gen. Delepierre, Commandant de la Zone Ouest (Constantine) et la 19° D.I., “Instruction pour les operations en Wilaya iii,” 1 July 1959, N01499/20C/3/ops/S, shat 1H 1951/1. Challe, Notre Révolte, 126. Porch, “French Imperial Warfare,” 109. Ibid., 109. Challe, Notre Révolte, 126. Anthony James Joes, Resisting Rebellion: The History and Politics of Counterinsurgency (Lexington: University of Kentucky, 2004), 1. Alexander and Keiger, “France and the Algerian War,” 15–16. Bigeard, Pour une Parcelle de gloire, 378. Le Mire, Histoire Militaire de la guerre d’Algérie, 65. Constantine Melnik offers the translation “sectioning off.” Melnik, Insurgency and Counterinsurgency, 43. Gen. Henri Lorillot, “Répartition du territoire du point de vue de contrôle des personnes et des biens,” 30 March 1956, N°1268rm/10/3/ope, shat 1H 2033/1. Quentin Pichelin, “Vaincre une guérilla? Le cas français en Algérie,” Cahier de la recherche doctrinale (Paris: Centre de Doctrine d’Emploi des Forces, Armée de Terre, 4 July 2007), 23–24, http://www.cdef.terre.defense.gouv.fr/publications/cahiers_drex/cahier_recherche/vaincre_guerilla.pdf. Pichelin, “Vaincre une guérilla?” 22–23. Melnik, Insurgency and Counterinsurgency, 173. Ibid., 175. Pichelin, “Vaincre une guerilla?” 23–24. This also resembles the hold and build phases of operations in fm 3-24 and fmi 3-24-2 See note 46 above. Gen. Jean Gracieux, “Rapport sur les opérations qui se sont déroulées sous la responsabilité de la 10ème d.p. entre 18 avril et le 19 juin 1959 dans le cadre assigné par le Corps d’Armée d’Alger,” n.d., N°1018/3/ope/S, shat 1H 2754/1. Bigeard, Pour une Parcelle de gloire, 226. Groupements d’Intervention were established in December 1956 as mobile reserves. “Les opérations militaires en Algérie de novembre 1954 à l’été 1960, shat 1H 1933/3.” Bigeard, Pour une Parcelle de gloire, 226. Gen. Paul Ely to Gen. Raoul Salan, “Directive générale pour le Général Commandant Supérieur Interarmées et la 10ème Région Militaire à Alger,” 26 June 1957, shat 1H 1261/4. Ibid. Salan, Mémoires : Tome iii, 215. Ibid., 221. The Groupements de Commandos Mixtes Aéroportés (gcmas) were created for operations behind enemy lines during the later stages of the Indochina War. Fall, Street Without Joy, 241–50. Gen. Jean-Claude Allard, “Instruction particulière pour les Commandants du Secteur sur les Commandos de Chasse,” December 1958, shat 1H 1930/1. Ibid. François-Marie Gougeon, “The Challe Plan: Vain yet Inglorious Victory,” Small Wars and Insurgencies 16, no. 3 (December 2005): 302. fm 3-24, esp. sec. 2-5. Gougeon, “The Challe Plan,” 308. Gen. Challe, “Directive n°1,” shat 1H 1930/1. Gartzak, “Using Indigenous Forces,” 326. Long, “The Anbar Awakening,” 67–94. For more on local forces in Algeria, see Gartzak, “Using Indigenous Forces,” 307–33. “Les opérations militaires en Algérie de novembre 1954 à l’été 1960,” shat 1H 1933/3. Challe, Notre Révolte, 136–37. Alexandre Kinnen, “alat et stabilisation : l’aviation légère de l’armée de terre en Algérie,” Cahier de la recherche doctrinale (Paris : Centre de Doctrine d’Emploi des Forces, Armée de Terre 23 July 2007), 33–34, http://www.cdef.terre.defense.gouv.fr/publications/cahiers_drex/les_cahiers_recherche.htm. “Rapport du général de Corps d’Armée Gambiez Commandant le Corps d’Armée d’Oran concernant de la conduite des opérations et les résultats obtenus en Oranie pendant la période d’engagement des Réserves régionales,” 6 April 1959, N°293/emoc/3/TS, shat 1H 3197/4. Pichelin, “Vaincre une guerilla?” 23. Col. Henri Cousteaux, “Ordre de Bataille établi par Corps d’Armée, à la date du 10 Mars 1960,” 10 March 1960, shat 1H 1881/1. Ibid. See, for example, Col. Albert Brothier, commander 1st REP, “Compte-rendu d’opération région partie est du secteur de cherchell Jour ‘J,’” 22 April 1959, shat 1H 2753/1. Under Challe, tactical air support was centralized in the headquarters of the Tenth Paratroop Division to provide a central hub for fire support requests. Gen. René Bonnet, Commander 3rd Tactical Air Group, “Ordre d’opérations du G.A.tac N°3 (période d’avril à juin 1959) Opération Ouarsenis- Couronne,” 18 April 1959, N°11/g.a.tac.3/cdt/T.S., shat 1H 2754/1. Commandement en chef des forces en Algérie, Etat-major interarmées, “Procès-verbal du briefing bi-mensuel du 10 janvier 1959,” 10 January 1959, shat 1H 1932/1. Porch, “French Imperial Warfare,” 109. Commandement en chef des forces en Algérie, Etat-major interarmées, “Procès-verbal de la réunion des C.A. du samedi 4 avril 1959,” 7 April 1959, shat 1H 1932/1. The hold and build tactics described in fm 3-24 and fmi 3-24-2 reflect at least the main principles of Challe's pacification operations. Charles de Gaulle, Mémoires d’Espoir: le renouveau, 1958–1962 (Paris: Plon, 1970), 67, 77–79. Bigeard, Pour une Parcelle de gloire, 378. See note 6 above. In his writings after the 1961 coup attempt, Challe criticizes de Gaulle's government for giving too much power to civilians, but he did not, however, attempt to appropriate more political power for himself during the 1959–60 offensives. Challe, Notre Révolte, 46. Challe, Notre Révolte, 112. Le Mire, Histoire Militaire de la guerre d’Algérie, 259. Challe, Notre Révolte, 113. Alexander and Keiger, “France and the Algerian War,” 16. de Gaulle, Mémoires, 77. See the account of the meeting with Massu above. fm 3-24, sec. 1-26. von Clausewitz, On War, 107, 108. Gen. Raoul Salan, “Directive générale n°6 au sujet de l’activité des Forces du Maintien de l’Ordre en Algérie,” 5 March 1957, shat 1H 1929/1. For a similar recommendation in Galula, Counterinsurgency Warfare, see note 18 above. Ibid. Gen. Jean Olié, “Directive N°7 : pour la phase de consolidation de la pacification,” 12 October 1959, shat 1H 2026/1. “Guide pour l’action : Opération Jumelles, 3ème phase,” P.C. Artois, n.d., shat 1H 1952/1. Captain André Souyris, “Un procédé efficace de contre-guérilla : l’autodéfense des populations,” Revue de Défense Nationale 12 (June 1956): 686–99. Etat-major interarmées, “Instruction pour la pacification en Algérie,” 13 March 1960, shat 1H 1930/1. Premier Ministre, Etat-Major Général de la Défense Nationale, Plans et Opérations Militaires, “Note d’information sur les opérations de pacification en Algérie,” 22 April 1960, N°0146/emgdn/pom/E/sc, shat 1H 2026/1. Gen. André Beaufre, La Guerre révolutionnaire : les formes nouvelles de la guerre (Paris: Fayard, 1972), 263. Gougeon, “The Challe Plan,” 312. Paret, French Revolutionary Warfare, 42–45. “Compte-rendu de l’opération en Géryville, 250W°117 June-November 1959,” n.d., shat 1H 1943/2. Ibid. Ibid. Noara Omouri, “Les sections administratives spécialisées et les sciences sociales,” in Militaires et Guérilla, 383–84. Ibid., 385. Jacques Frémeaux, “Les sas (Sections Administratives Spécialisées),” Guerres Mondiales et conflits contemporains, no. 208 (October-December 2002) : 57, 59. Ibid., 64. Paret, French Revolutionary Warfare, 50. Le Mire, Histoire Militaire de la guerre d’Algérie, 66–67. Paret, French Revolutionary Warfare, 61; Lt. Col. Frédéric Guelton, “The French Army ‘Centre for Training and Preparation in Counter-Guerrilla Warfare’ (cipcg) at Arzew,” in France and the Algerian War 1954–1962, 35–53. Gen. Raoul Salan, “Note de Service : Objet/Campagne ‘RENSEIGNEZ-NOUS,’” 4 August 1957, N°3778/em.10/psy/gp, shat 1H 1117/2. Ministère des Armées, Service d’Information et d’Etudes, “Eléments d’une campagne pour le Plan Français—Pièce n°5, Détermination des slogans en fonction des milieux à toucher,” 24 November 1959, shat 1H 1117/5. Marie-Catherine Villatoux and Paul Villatoux, “Le 5e Bureau en Algérie,” in Militaires et Guérilla, 405. Gen. Raoul Salan, “Note de Service : Objet : Centres d’éducation et de reéducation,” 6 March 1958, N°0551/em.10/5/GP/S, shat 1H 1117/3. Lt. Commander Vasilios Tasikas, “The Battlefield Inside the Wire: Detainee Operations under Major General Douglas Stone,” Military Review (September-October 2009): 66–67. Porch, “French Imperial Warfare,” 109; Alexander and Keiger, “France and the Algerian War,” 18. Charles de Gaulle, “Allocution radiodiffusée et télévisée prononcée au palais d’Élysée, 16 septembre 1959,” in Charles de Gaulle, Discours et Messages iii : avec le renouveau, mai 1958-juillet 1962 (Paris: Plon, 1970), 118–21. de Gaulle, Mémoires, 86. Horne, A Savage War of Peace, 381. de Gaulle, Mémoires, 102. Challe, Notre Révolte, 46–47. Ibid., 64. Ibid., 23. Henissart, Wolves in the City, 142–48. Horne, A Savage War of Peace, 520–21. Ibid., 530–33. Alexander and Keiger, “France and the Algerian War,” 18–20. Courrière, La Guerre d’Algérie, 127–34.