Deconstructing the myth of the Tatar Yoke
2008; Taylor & Francis; Volume: 27; Issue: 1 Linguagem: Inglês
10.1080/02634930802213916
ISSN1465-3354
Autores Tópico(s)Soviet and Russian History
ResumoAbstract Analysing and comparing the various conventional and revisionist narratives on what is known as the ‘Tatar Yoke’, this article aims to show that Western historiography has long been critical of the dominant negative view on the Tatar–Mongol rule over Russian principalities and that in Russia we find similar revisions in history – with some exceptions – only in post-Soviet times. This article aims to demonstrate how the revisionist views on the Tatar–Mongol rule contributed to the political and cultural transformation of contemporary Russia. In the part which analyses the revisionist discourse in Russia the emphasis lies on the new Tatar narrative. For Tatars the new interpretation of the Tatar–Mongol rule is of outstanding importance because it functions as a means to enhance Tatar national pride, and it contributes to Tatarstan's sovereignty project. Keywords: ‘Tatar Yoke’East and Westchanging Tatar nationalismreviving Tatar national prideRussian–Tatar relations Notes 1. For the complex history of the ethnonym ‘Tatar’, see Iskhakov and Izmailov (Citation2001a, pp. 41–42). 2. According to Donald Ostrowski (Citation1998, p. 244), the term ‘Tatar Yoke’ first appeared in the middle of the sixteenth century. Halperin (Citation1985, p. 17) dates it back to the seventeenth century. 3. G. Rempel, The Tatar Yoke, Available at http://mars.wnec.edu/∼grempel/courses/russia/lectures/07tartar.htmlhttp://mars.wnec.edu/∼grempel/courses/russia/lectures/07tartar.html [Accessed 17 February 2008]. 4. Yemelianova is of Russian origin. She is here included in the Western perspective because she is a researcher at CREES in Birmingham (UK). 5. For the complicated history of the ethnogenesis of the titular-nation of Tatarstan, see Chamidullin (Citation2000, pp. 62–67); Iskhakov and Izmailov (Citation2001a, pp. 42–44); Tatarskii Ėntsiklopedicheskii Slovar' (Citation1999, pp. 566–567). 6. Meaning that Tatars and scholars in Russia of another ethnic background took part. 7. Shlapentokh (Citation2001) characterizes Dugin as follows: ‘In fact, Russia's best-known Eurasianist, Dugin, has become an increasingly prominent figure in Russia. A polyglot autodidact who once worked in the archives of the Soviet intelligence services, Dugin dabbled in esoteric extremism in the early 1990s. As the decade wore on, he adopted a Eurasianist ideology and started to make contacts with the political establishment. In 1998, he became an adviser on strategic and geopolitical questions to the speaker of Russia's parliament. With Putin's ascent, Dugin broke into the mainstream. Today, he runs the International Eurasian Movement, appears on national television, and publishes in big-name newspapers.’ 8. To mention some examples: Abdullin (Citation1990, Citation1996, Citation1998, Citation1996, Citation2000), Chalikov (Citation1993a, Citation1993b, Citation1994), Iskhakov (Citation1995, Citation1997a, Citation1997b, Citation1999), Khakimov (Citation1993, Citation2002). 9. For the various peoples known as ‘Tatars’, used as an ektonym, see Boeschoten (Citation1998), Iskhakov (Citation1995, p. 56), Izmailov (Citation2002a, p. 245), Zakiev (Citation1995). 10. See the description of the Chernigov Dynasty in: http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Prince_of_Chernigov http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Prince_of_Chernigov [Accessed 3 March 2008]. Additional informationNotes on contributorsMarlies Bilz-Leonhardt *Email: marlies.bilz@t-online.de
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