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Sentencing white-collar criminals: when is shaming viable?

2012; Taylor & Francis; Volume: 13; Issue: 3 Linguagem: Inglês

10.1080/17440572.2012.705431

1744-0580

James Kostelnik,

Crime, Illicit Activities, and Governance

Abstract When does shaming work as an alternative to incarceration and fines in sentencing white-collar criminals? In the light of recent economic downturn and highly publicised instances of white-collar crime, public opinion has demanded harsher sentences for white-collar criminals. In order to appease this demand, as well as consider the pressing problem of prison overpopulation, alternative sanctions, such as formal shaming, have been increasingly studied. Through examination of the costs and consequences of incarceration and shaming, this article will explain that since the costs of shaming sanctions are largely fixed, shaming sanctions are most viable when used in conjunction with alternative sanctions so that courts can impose sanction bundles of costs commensurate with the level of offense committed by an offender. Keywords: white-collar crimeshamingeconomics of crimesocial sanctionsalternative sanctions Acknowledgement The author thanks the editors, referees, and David Skarbek for helpful comments. Notes 1. Alexei Barrionuevo, 'Judge Sentences Former Enron Chief to 24 Years in Prison', New York Times, October 23, 2006. 2. Carrie Johnson, 'Ebbers Gets 25-Year Sentence for Role in WorldCom Fraud', Washington Post, July 14, 2005. 3. Barrionuevo, 'Judge Sentences Former Enron Chief to 24 Years in Prison'. 4. Peter J. Henning, 'White Collar Sentences after Booker: Was the Sentencing of Bernie Ebbers too Harsh?', McGeorge Law Review 37 (2006). 5. Ellen S. Podgor, 'The Challenge of White Collar Sentencing', The Journal of Criminal Law & Criminology 97, no. 3 (2007): 731–60. 6. White-collar crime can cause physical harm to victims, as demonstrated by Owens, who points to instances of computer hackers erasing hospital records (Scott Charney and Kent Alexander, 'Computer Crime', Emory Law Journal 45, 1996), a corporation mishandling hazardous materials and causing a commercial airline crash (Martha Brannigan, 'SabreTech Convicted of 9 Charges in Trial Related to ValuJet Crash', Wall Street Journal, December 7, 1999), or sham HIV tests sold over the Internet (Bogus HIV Tests, Gray Sheet, February 22, 1999). 7. Jayne O'Donnell and Richard Willing, 'Prison Time Gets Harder for White-Collar Crooks', USA Today, May 11, 2003. 8. There is a significant literature that discusses the definition of white-collar crime. Generally, definitions are either offender-based (Edwin H. Sutherland, White-Collar Crime (New York: Holt, Rinehart and Winston, 1949); Vernon C. Branham and Samuel B. Kutash, Encyclopedia of Criminology (New York: Philosophical Library, 1949)), offense-based (Herbert Edelhertz, The Nature, Impact and Prosecution of White-Collar Crime (Washington, DC: National Institute of Law Enforcement and Criminal Justice, 1970); Susan P. Shapiro, 'Collaring the Crime, Not the Criminal: Reconsidering the Concept of White-Collar Crime', American Sociological Review 55 (1990): 346–65; and Jay S. Albanese, White-Collar Crime in America (Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice Hall, 1995), or a reconciliation of both approaches (Benson and Simpson, White-Collar Crime). Government agencies also offer different definitions of white-collar crime (Podgor, 'Challenge of White Collar Sentencing'). The debate concerning how white-collar crime should be defined is, however, outside the scope of this article. For the purposes of this article, the only distinction made between white-collar crime and other types of crime is that the offenders may have different social, behavioural, and socio-economic characteristics. 9. L. Touby, 'In the Company of Thieves', Journal of Business Strategy 15, no. 3 (1994): 24–35. 10. Tomson H. Nguyen and Henry N. Pontell, 'Mortgage Origination Fraud and the Global Economic Crisis: A Criminological Analysis', Criminology & Public Policy 9, no. 3 (2010): 591–612; and Braithwaite John, 'Diagnostics of White-Collar Crime Prevention', Criminology & Public Policy 9, no. 3 (2010): 621–26. 11. William L. Anderson and Candice E. Jackson, 'It's the Economy, Stupid: Rudy Giuliani, the Wall Street Prosecutions, and the Recession of 1990–91', Journal of Libertarian Studies 19, no. 4 (2005): 19–36. For further discussion of the impact of white-collar crime prosecution on the American economy in the early 1990s, see Daniel R. Fischel, Payback: The Conspiracy to Destroy Michael Milken and His Financial Revolution (New York: HarperBusiness, 1995). 12. C. Alexander and M.A. Cohen, 'New Evidence of the Origins of Corporate Crime', Managerial and Decision Economics 17, no. 4 (1996): 421–35; Schnatterly Karen, 'Increasing Firm Value through Detection and Prevention of White-Collar Crime', Strategic Management Journal 24, no. 7 (2003): 587–614. 13. Jack Katz, 'The Social Movement against White-Collar Crime', in Criminology Review Yearbook, ed. Egon Bittner and Sheldon L. Messinger (Beverly Hills, CA: Sage, 1980), 161–84. 14. Francis T. Cullen, Richard A. Mathers, Gregory A. Clark, and John B. Cullen, 'Public Support for Punishing White-Collar Crime: Blaming the Victim Revisited?', Journal of Criminal Justice 11 (1983): 481–93. 15. Andrea Schoepfer, Stephanie Carmichael, and Nicole Leeper Piquero, 'Do Perceptions of Punishment Vary between White-Collar and Street Crimes?', Journal of Criminal Justice 35 (2007): 151–63. 16. Michael Levi, 'Policing Financial Crimes', in International Handbook of White-Collar and Corporate Crime, ed. Henry N. Pontell and Gilbert Geis (New York: Springer, 2007). 17. J. Hagan, Introduction to Criminology (Chicago: Nelson Hall, 1990); J. Coleman, The Criminal Elite: The Sociology of White-Collar Crime (New York: St. Martins Press, 1985). 18. Jamie L. Gustafson, 'Cracking Down on White-Collar Crime: An Analysis of the Recent Trend of Severe Sentences for Corporate Officers', Suffolk University Law Review 40 (2006): 685–702; Chad Bray and Rob Barry, 'Long Jail Terms on Rise', The Wall Street Journal, October 13, 2011; O'Donnell and Willing, 'Prison Time Gets Harder for White-Collar Crooks'. 19. US Sentencing Commission, 'Federal Sentencing Statistics by State, District & Circuit', 2012. 20. John L. Hagan and Illene H. Nagel, 'White-Collar Crime, White-Collar Time: The Sentencing of White-Collar Offenders in the Southern District of New York', 20 American Criminal Law Review, 1982. The use of fines over incarceration before the era of the Federal Sentencing Guidelines has been shown to be efficient (Joel Waldfogel, 'Are Fines and Prison Terms Used Efficiently? Evidence on Federal Fraud Offenders', Journal of Law and Economics 38 (1995). 21. Jennifer S. Recine, 'Examination of the White Collar Crime Penalty Enhancements in the Sarbanes-Oxley Act', American Criminal Law Review 39 (2002):1535–70. 22. US Sentencing Commission, 'Sentencing Commission Toughens Penalties for White Collar Fraudsters', News Release, April 18, 2003. 23. Gustafson, 'Cracking Down on White-Collar Crime'. 24. Kristy Holtfreter, Shanna Van Slyke, Jason Bratton, and Marc Gertz, 'Public Perceptions of White-Collar Crime and Punishment', Journal of Criminal Justice 36 (2008): 50–60. 25. Cullen et al., 'Public Support for Punishing White-Collar Crime'. 26. Francis T. Cullen, Gray Cavender, William J. Maakestad, and Michael L. Benson, Corporate Crime under Attack: The Fight to Criminalize Business Violence (Newark, NJ: LexisNexis, 2006). 27. John M. Ivancevich, Robert Konopaske, and Jacqueline A. Gilbert, 'Formally Shaming White-Collar Criminals', Business Horizons 51, no. 5 (2008): 401–10. 28. Ilene Nagel Bernstein, William R. Kelly, and Patricia A. Doyle, 'Societal Reaction to Deviants: The Case of Criminal Defendants', American Sociological Review 42 (1977): 743–55. 29. John Hagan and Patricia Parker, 'White-Collar Crime and Punishment: The Class Structure and Legal Sanctioning of Securities Violations', American Sociological Review 50 (1985): 302–16; Alan J. Lizotte, 'Extra-Legal Factors in Chicago's Criminal Courts: Testing the Conflict Model of Criminal Justice', Social Problems 25 (1978): 564–80. 30. Stanton Wheeler, David Weisburd, and Nancy Bode, 'Sentencing the White-Collar Offender: Rhetoric and Reality', American Sociological Review 47 (1982): 641–59. 31. Michael L. Benson and Esteban Walker, 'Sentencing the White-Collar Offender', American Sociological Review 53, no. 2 (1988): 294–302. 32. William W. Wilkins, Phyllis J. Newton, and John R. Steer, 'The Sentencing Reform Act of 1984: A Bold Approach to the Unwarranted Sentencing Disparity Problem', Criminal Law Forum 2, no. 2 (1991): 355–80; Jon J. Lambiras, 'White-Collar Crime: Why the Sentencing Disparity despite Uniform Guidelines?', Pepperdine Law Review 30 (2003): 459–528. For further discussion of the Federal Sentencing Guidelines, see generally Stephen Breyer, 'The Federal Sentencing Guidelines and the Key Compromises upon Which They Rest', Hofstra Law Review 17 (1988): 1–50; and Charles J. Ogletree, 'The Death of Discretion? Reflections on the Federal Sentencing Guidelines', Harvard Law Review (1988). 33. Lambiras, 'White-Collar Crime'. 34. Podgor, 'Challenge of White Collar Sentencing'; see United States v. Booker, 'Decision. Supreme Court of the United States', January, 2005; Apprendi v. New Jersey, 'Decision. Supreme Court of the United States', June, 2000; and Blakely v. Washington, 'Decision. Supreme Court of the United States', August, 2004. 35. K. Mann, S. Wheeler, and A. Sarat, 'Sentencing the White Collar Offender', American Criminal Law Review 14 (1980): 479–500; H. Pollack and A.B. Smith, 'White-Collar v. Street Crime Sentencing Disparity: How Judges See the Problem', Judicature 67 (1983): 175–82; and C.B. Renfrew, 'The Paper Label Sentences: An Evaluation', Yale Law Journal 86 (1977): 590–618. 36. Michael L. Benson and Francis T. Cullen, 'Special Sensitivity of White-Collar Offenders to Prison: A Critique and Research Agenda', Journal of Criminal Justice 16, no. 3 (1988): 207–15. Individuals from lower socio-economic backgrounds may also find that their criminal ties on the street influence their incarceration experience (David Skarbek, 'Governance and Prison Gangs', American Political Science Review 105, no. 4 (2011): 702–16; and David Skarbek, 'Prison Gangs, Norms, and Organizations', Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization 82, no. 1 (2012): 96–109). 37. David Weisburd, Elin Waring, and Ellen Chayet, 'Specific Deterrence in a Sample of Offenders Convicted of White Collar Crimes', Criminology 33, no. 4 (1995): 587–607. 38. J. Braithwaite and T. Makkai, 'Testing an Expected Utility Model of Corporate Deterrence', Law and Society Review 25 (1991): 7–40. 39. T. Makkai and J. 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Barnard, 'Reintegrative Shaming in Corporate Sentencing', Southern California Law Review 72, 1999. 46. John B. Owens, 'Have We No Shame?: Thoughts on Shaming, White Collar Criminals, and the Federal Sentencing Guidelines', American University Law Review 49 (2000): 1047–58. 47. Michael L. Benson and Sally S. Simpson, White-Collar Crime: An Opportunity Perspective (New York: Routledge, 2009). 48. Ibid. 49. A. Mitchell Polinsky, 'Should Employees Be Subject to Fines and Imprisonment Given the Existence of Corporate Liability?', International Review of Law and Economics 13 (1993): 239–57; and Phillip Balsmeier and Jennifer Kelly, 'The Ethics of Sentencing White-Collar Criminals', Journal of Business Ethics 15, no, 2 (1996): 143–52. 50. Michael L. Benson and Francis T. Cullen, Combating Corporate Crime: Local Prosecutors at Work (Boston, MA: Northeastern University Press, 1998). 51. A. Etzioni, 'The U.S. Sentencing Commission on Corporate Crime: A Critique', The Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science 525 (1993): 147–57. 52. L. Reynolds, 'Washington Gets Tough on White-Collar Crime', Management Review 79, no. 12 (1990): 27–8. 53. Podgor, 'Challenge of White Collar Sentencing'. 54. Ibid. 55. Cullen et al., Corporate Crime under Attack. 56. Ellen S. Podgor, 'White Collar Innocence: Irrelevant in the High Stakes Risk Game', Chicago-Kent Law Review 85 (2010): 77–88. 57. Podgor, 'Challenge of White Collar Sentencing'. 58. Benson and Simpson, White-Collar Crime. 59. Juan A. Lozano, 'Texas Firm to Pay Millions in Medicare Fraud Case', Bloomberg Businessweek, June 7, 2012. 60. Chris Wilkerson, 'Tampa Authorities Work on Tax and Medicare Epidemic', Tampa Bay Business Journal, June 8, 2012; Jeffrey Young, 'Tenet Healthcare "Proud" to Settle Medicare Charges for $43 Million', Huffington Post, April 11, 2012; and Katie Thomas, 'Seven Charged in Health Care Fraud', New York Times, February 28, 2012. 61. Benson and Simpson, White-Collar Crime; and A. Mitchell Polinksy and Steven Shavell, 'The Optimal Use of Fines and Imprisonment', Journal of Public Economics 24 (1983): 89–99. Polinksy and Shavel show that identical fines for individuals of varying wealth carry a weaker deterrent effect for wealthier individuals; when fines and imprisonment are used together, sanctions are most effective when fines are maximized. 62. Ezra Ross and Martin Pritikin, 'The Collection Gap: Underenforcement of Corporate and White-Collar Fines and Penalties', Yale Law & Policy Review 29 (2011): 453–526. 63. J. Andeneas, Punishment and Deterrence (Ann Arbor, MI: University of Michigan Press, 1974); and M. Gottfredson and T. Hirschi, A General Theory of Crime (Palo Alto, CA: Stanford University Press, 1990). 64. Kahan and Posner, 'Shaming White-Collar Criminals'. 65. Benson and Simpson, White-Collar Crime. 66. Alex Floum, 'Goldman Sachs Alumni Hold Many of the Top Government Positions', Examiner, May 6, 2009. 67. Doreen McBarnet, 'After Enron: Corporate Governance, Creative Compliance and the Uses of Corporate Social Responsibility', in Governing the Corporation, ed. Justin O'Brien (New York: John Wiley, 2005). 68. Benson and Simpson, White-Collar Crime. 69. Kahan and Posner, 'Shaming White-Collar Criminals', 368; and Kahan, Dan, 'What Do Alternative Sanctions Mean?', University of Chicago Law Review 63 (1996). 70. Ibid., 367; and Dan M. Kahan, 'What Do Alternative Sanctions Mean?', 63 University of Chicago Law Review (1996b). 71. Kahan and Posner, 'Shaming White-Collar Criminals'. 72. Ibid. For further discussion of the signaling model, see Posner Eric A., 'Symbols, Signals, and Social Norms in Politics and the Law', Journal of Legal Studies 27 (1998). 73. Ivancevich et al., 'Formally Shaming White-Collar Criminals'. 74. Kahan and Posner, 'Shaming White-Collar Criminals'. 75. Wilmington Morning Star. 10B, March 23, 1989; Kahan and Posner, 'Shaming White-Collar Criminals', 385; and Joseph G. Block, 'Environmental Criminal Enforcement in the 1990's', Villanova Environmental Law Journal 33 (1992). 76. J. Braithwaite and P. Drahos, 'Zero Tolerance, Naming and Shaming: Is There a Case for It with Crimes of the Powerful?', Australian and New Zealand Journal of Criminology 35, no. 3 (2002): 269–88. 77. Dan M. Kahan, 'Social Influence, Social Meaning, and Deterrence', Virginia Law Review 83 (1997): 349–95. The costs imposed to the offender can also be considered 'benefits' of a sanction type, as will be discussed later. 78. Benson and Simpson, White-Collar Crime. 79. John R. Lott, 'Do We Punish High-Income Criminals Too Heavily?', Economic Inquiry 30 (1992): 583–608. Lott shows that the failure to include the effects of criminal prosecution on later earning potentially leads a drastic underestimation of the costs of financial sanctions on high-income criminals. 80. John Braithwaite, Crime, Shame, and Reintegration (Cambridge: Cambridge University, 1989). 81. Jeffrey K. Liker, 'Wage and Status Effects of Employment on Affective Well-Being among Ex-Felons', American Sociological Review 47, no. 2 (1982): 264–83; and C. Uggen, J. Manza, and A. Behrens, 'Stigma, Role Transition, and the Civic Reintegration of Convicted Felons', in After Crime and Punishment: Ex-offender Reintegration and Desistance from Crime, ed. S. Maruna and R Immarigeon (New York: State University of New York Press, 2003). 82. Paul Butler, 'Much Respect: Toward a Hip-Hop Theory of Punishment', Stanford Law Review 56, no. 983 (2004). 83. Darryl K. Brown, 'Third-Party Interests in Criminal Law', 80 Texas Law Review, 2002. 84. Kahan, 'What's Really Wrong with Shaming Actions?'; Kahan and Posner, 'Shaming White-Collar Criminals'. Owens also contests Kahan and Posner's supposition that white-collar criminals are not effectively deterred by short prison terms, arguing that 'the one thing "white collar" offenders dread the most is prison' (p. 1053); and Kahan et al., 'Culture and Identity-Protective Cognition'. 85. Owens, 'Have We No Shame?'. 86. Ibid.; and James B. Stewart, Den of Thieves (New York: Simon & Schuster, 1991). 87. Braithwaite, Crime, Shame, and Reintegration; and Ahmed Eliza, Nathan Harris, John Braithwaite, and Valerie Braithwaite, Shame Management through Reintegration (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2001). 88. Ahmed et al., Shame Management through Reintegration, 17. 89. Ibid.; and Shadd Maruna and Heith Copes, 'What Have We Learned from Five Decades of Neutralization Research?', Crime and Justice 32 (2005): 221–320. 90. Kahan, 'Social Influence, Social Meaning, and Deterrence'. 91. Owens, 'Have We No Shame?'. 92. Owens cites several cases in which courts restricted white-collar defendants' access to professional tools: United States v. Mitnick, wherein a computer hacker was restricted access to 'computers, computer-related equipment, and telecommunication devices, including cellular phones', and United States v. Johnson, wherein a defendant was prohibited from 'incurring new credit charges or opening additional lines of credit without approval from probation officer' (p. 1055). Podgor also cites Touche Ross & Co. v. Sec & Exch. Comm'n, which discusses 'the right of the SEC to censure and suspend individuals from practicing before the SEC' (p. 739); and the ABA Model Rules of Professional Conduct, which holds that lawyers' professional misconduct can result in their losing 'their ability to practice law' (p. 739). 93. Owens, 'Have We No Shame?'. 94. John Schmitt, Kris Warner, and Sarika Gupta, 'The High Budgetary Cost of Incarceration', Center for Economic and Policy Research (2010). 95. Francis T. Cullen, Cheryl Lero Jonson, and Daniel S. Nagin, 'Prisons Do Not Reduce Recidivism: The High Cost of Ignoring Science', The Prison Journal, 2011. 96. Smith and Botehlo v. Doe et al., 'Decision. Supreme Court of the United States', March, 2003. 97. Ibid. 98. Femedeer v. Haun, 'Decision. United States Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit', August, 2000; Hatton v. Bonner, 'Decision. United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit', October, 2003; and United States v. W.B.H., 'Decision. United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit', December, 2011. 99. United States v. Gementera, 'Decision. United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit', August, 2004. 100. Gary S. Becker, 'Crime and Punishment: An Economic Analysis', Journal of Political Economy 78 (1968): 526–36. 101. Mann et al., 'Sentencing the White Collar Offender'; Pollack and Smith, 'White-Collar v. Street Crime Sentencing Disparity'; Renfrew, 'Paper Label Sentences'; Benson and Francis Cullen, 'Special Sensitivity of White-Collar Offenders to Prison'; and Weisburd et al., 'Specific Deterrence in a Sample of Offenders Convicted of White Collar Crimes'. 102. Kahan and Posner, 'Shaming White-Collar Criminals'; and Clifford J. Levy, 'Cracking Down in a Drinking Town: Hoboken Battles Public Urination', New York Times, July 9, 1994. 103. Kahan and Posner, 'Shaming White-Collar Criminals'; and New York Times, Editorial, February 18, 1988. 104. Kahan and Posner, 'Shaming White-Collar Criminals', 372. 105. David A. Jr. Skeel, 'Shaming in Corporate Law', University of Pennsylvania Law Review 149 (2001): 1811–68. For further discussion of the private provision of justice, see generally Benson, Bruce L., The Enterprise of Law (Oakland, CA: Independent Institute, 1990). 106. David F. Greenberg, 'The Cost-Benefit Analysis of Imprisonment', Social Justice 17, no. 4 (1990): 49–75; Edwin W. Zedlewski, 'When Have We Punished Enough?', Public Administration Review 45 (1985): 771–9; and Edwin W. Zedlewski, Making Confinement Decisions (Washington, DC: U.S. Department of Justice, National Institute of Justice, 1987). 107. Zedlewski, 'When Have We Punished Enough?'; and Schmitt et al., 'High Budgetary Cost of Incarceration'. 108. While the inclusion of costs to prisoners may seem controversial, Philip J. Cook, 'Costs of Crime', in Encyclopedia of Crime and Justice, Volume 1, ed. Sanford H. Kadish (New York: Free Press, 1983), 373–8. Cook points out that the value of prisoners' freedom is still a cost, and for a cost–benefit analysis to be complete, it must be included in the total cost of imprisonment, the understanding being that costs imposed on the offender are an intended consequence of a sanction type, and thus desirable. 109. Frank J. Prial, '$1.93 Million Awarded to Man Wrongly Jailed', New York Times, October 19, 1989. 110. Jeffrey K. Liker, 'Wage and Status Effects of Employment on Affective Well-Being among Ex-Felons'; and Uggen et al., 'Stigma, Role Transition, and the Civic Reintegration of Convicted Felons'. 111. Cost to the state and cost to the prisoner are dependent only on time, all else being equal; that is, for the same prisoner in the same prison, cost to the state and cost to the prisoner increase over time. Social cost and professional cost are fixed and are not dependent on time. 112. Benson and Cullen, Combating Corporate Crime: Local Prosecutors at Work. 113. Kahan and Posner, 'Shaming White-Collar Criminals'. 114. Ibid. 115. The assumption is made here that increased penalties of shaming, that is, harsher shaming, do not cost more to carry out than lesser penalties, in contrast with imprisonment, where cost increases invariably with sentence length. 116. Kahan and Posner, 'Shaming White-Collar Criminals'. 117. Eric A. Posner, Law and Social Norms (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2000). He describes the difficulty of measuring social norms and their associated costs. 118. Zedlewski, 'When Have We Punished Enough?'; and Schmitt et al., 'High Budgetary Cost of Incarceration'. 119. Kahan and Posner, 'Shaming White-Collar Criminals'. 120. Liker, 'Wage and Status Effects of Employment on Affective Well-Being among Ex-Felons'; and Uggen et al., 'Stigma, Role Transition, and the Civic Reintegration of Convicted Felons'. 121. See Owens' discussion of United States v. Mitnick and United States v. Johnson; and Podgor's discussion of Touche Ross & Co. v. Sec & Exch. Comm'n and the ABA rules of conduct, for example, of legal restrictions placed on the employment opportunities open to convicted offenders. 122. Kahan and Posner, 'Shaming White-Collar Criminals', 373. 123. Lott (1992) discusses the underestimation of the reputational costs of white-collar criminals. 124. Kahan and Posner, 'Shaming White-Collar Criminals', 373. 125. Gustafson, 'Cracking Down on White-Collar Crime'; Bray and Barry, 'Long Jail Terms on Rise'; and O'Donnell and Willing, 'Prison Time Gets Harder for White-Collar Crooks'. 126. Benson and Cullen, 'Special Sensitivity of White-Collar Offenders to Prison'; Weisburd et al., 'Specific Deterrence in a Sample of Offenders Convicted of White Collar Crimes'; and Braithwaite and Makkai, 'Testing an Expected Utility Model of Corporate Deterrence'. 127. William J. Stuntz, The Collapse of Criminal Justice (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2011). 128. Kahan, 'What's Really Wrong with Shaming Actions?'; and Kahan and Posner, 'Shaming White-Collar Criminals'. 129. Owens, 'Have We No Shame?'. 130. Braithwaite, Crime, Shame, and Reintegration; and Ahmed et al., Shame Management through Reintegration, 17.