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A gentle occupation: unravelling the Dutch approach in Iraq, 2003–2005

2012; Routledge; Volume: 23; Issue: 1 Linguagem: Inglês

10.1080/09592318.2012.632856

1743-9558

Thijs Brocades Zaalberg, Arthur Ten Cate,

Military, Security, and Education Studies

Abstract This article examines the so-called ‘Dutch approach’ to conducting stabilisation operations. The term is mostly used in relation to the mission carried out by the Netherlands armed forces in Afghanistan's Uruzgan province from 2006 to 2010, but actually originates in the Iraqi province of Al Muthanna. Here, a 1350-strong battle group operated from July 2003 until March 2005 as part of the US-led coalition, after which the Dutch forces left Iraq relatively unscathed and self-confident of their ability in dealing with this type of conflict. On the basis of archival research and interviews, the authors unravel the ‘Dutch approach’ in southern Iraq by tracing its roots and by examining the Dutch operation in the context of the American and British experiences. They argue that despite predominantly effective tactical reflexes and an overall adequately broad interpretation by battle group commanders of a too narrowly defined political mandate, stability in Al Muthanna was conditions-driven rather than the result of a unique and effective approach. The term ‘Dutch approach’ turned out to be a convenient fabrication which, after the relatively successful mission in Al Muthanna, became increasingly politicised in the run-up to a dangerous new operation in southern Afghanistan. Keywords: Netherlands Armed ForcesIraqDutch approachoccupationpeacekeepingcounterinsurgencystate-buildingcomprehensive approach Acknowledgements The authors wish to thank Isabelle Duyvesteyn and Gijs Rommelse for helpful comments on an earlier version of this article. Notes 1. CitationOnoshi, ‘Dutch Soldiers Find Smiles Are More Effective Protection’ (Arabic translations of this article appeared in Tareeq al Shaab (Irak), Al Riyadh Tareeq (Saudi Arabia), and Al Sharqalawsat (London)); CitationOnoshi, ‘Dutch Soldiers Find Smiles Protect As Well As Armor’; Citation‘Nederlanders in Irak tonen respect’. 2. CitationBlanford, ‘Dutch Take a “Slowly” Tact in Iraq’. 3. Interview with Colonel Nico van der Zee (22 December 2010). Van der Zee was the leading army information officer who helped shape this media approach at the instigation of the Commander of the Royal Netherlands Army. For the Srebrenica legacy, see: CitationNetherlands Institute for War Documentation (NIOD), Srebrenica, een ‘Veilig’ Gebied; CitationParlementaire Enquêtecommissie Srebrenica, Missie zonder Vrede. 4. For suggestions of a causal link by Minister of Defence Kamp and CHOD Berlijn, see Herinneringsboek SFIR 4, July–November 2004; NRC Handelsblad, 8 March 2005. 5. Citation‘Iraq Province Power Transferred’. 6. The Dutch operation in Iraq would temporarily resurface in the media as a result of the aftermath of the trial of Sergeant Major Eric O. and after revelations by de Volkskrant about abuse of Iraqis during interrogations by Dutch military intelligence personnel. 7. CHOD General Dick Berlijn, Speech at the departure of F-16 detachment to Afghanistan, 9 January 2006 (available at: http://www.mindef.nl); CitationDerix, ‘Zonder troepen blijft de nodige hulp uit’. In an editorial in the daily newspaper Trouw, the claim was repeated that the Al Muthanna experience was proof of the righteousness of the ‘Dutch Approach’ in Uruzgan: Citation‘Nederlandse “watjes” hadden succes in Irak’. 8. For the political debate surrounding the Dutch mission in Uruzgan, see CitationDimitru and de Graaf, ‘The Dutch COIN approach’. 9. Rene Moelker, researcher at the Netherlands Defence Academy, correctly states that the term is not reserved for the military domain and states that ‘there is a “Dutch Approach” to almost anything including the internationally renowned cannabis policies of the Netherlands.’ However, he fails to demonstrate an actual link between the ‘Dutch approach’ in Iraq and Afghanistan when he argues that its roots can traced to a tradition of community policing introduced in the Netherlands in the 1960s ‘after a decade of repressive police operations in the 1950s’ and to the relatively subtle Dutch counter-terrorism policies of the 1970s. CitationMoelker, ‘The “Dutch Approach” and the Expeditionary Formula’, 89. 10. In an interview with the authors, Colonel Nico van der Zee, who had been the leading army information officer preparing the New York Times interview, confirmed that he drew the term directly from the title of a documentary on Dutch counter-terrorism in the 1970s. He had seen CitationRené Roelofs's four-part documentary Dutch Approach in the preceding weeks. Interview with Colonel Nico van der Zee (21 December 2010). See also CitationBootsma, De Molukse Acties. For the post hoc fabrication of the ‘Dutch approach’ to counter-terrorism, see Citationde Graaf, Evaluating Counterterrorism Performance, chapter 2. 11. Interview with Lieutenant Colonel Matthijssen, Netwerk TV, 28 June 2004. 12. CitationMak, ‘Een kleine geschiedenis van een Novembermaand’, 34; CitationLammers, Vreemde overheersing; For criticism on the Dutch Iraq policy, but appraisal for the tactical level operations, see CitationHofland, ‘Nederland in Irak’; CitationNoordervliet, ‘Loyaliteit houdt een keer op’. 13. UNSCR 1483 of 22 May 2003 welcomed ‘the willingness of Member States to contribute to stability and security in Iraq by contributing personnel, equipment, and other resources under the Authority’ and appealed ‘to assist the people of Iraq in their efforts to reform their institutions and rebuild their country’. 14. Verkenningsmissie naar Zuid-Irak i.v.m. mogelijke uitzending Nederlands bataljon mariniers (24–28 May 2003), in Archive of the Netherlands Ministry of Foreign Affairs, The Hague (Semi-Statisch Archief Ministerie van Buitenlandse Zaken, Directie Veiligheidsbeleid; hereafter SSA BuZa, Archief DVB), inv.nr. 02857 (May 2003). 15. CitationInternational Crisis Group Iraq: Can Local Governance Save Central Government?; CitationWard, ‘The Coalition Provisional Authority's Experience with Governance in Iraq’. 16. Citation‘Nederlandse militairen vieren kerst in Irak’; CitationKamp et al., Herinneringsboek SFIR 1, 17. 17. Verslag 5e vergadering Planningsteam 1 (NL) Det Irak d.d. 2 May 2003, in SSA BuZa, Archief DVB, dossier 815603 (May 2003); Verslag 7e vergadering Planningsteam 1 (NL) Det Irak d.d. 15 May 2003, in SSA BuZa, Archief DVB, dossier 815603 (May 2003); Interview with Colonel (ret.) T.G.J. Damen (11 March 2010). 18. Minutes of the Dutch House of Representatives 2003–2004, 86–4993, no. 86. 19. The Hague Convention IV Concerning the Laws and Customs of War on Land, 18 October 1907, Article 43. The Fourth Geneva Convention of 1949 confirmed these responsibilities toward the people of a vanquished nation. 20. DVB aan DGPZ, ‘Brits verzoek: militaire bijdrage en civiele liaison’, 19 June 2003, in: SSA BuZa, Archief DVB, inv.nr. 03060 (June 2003); DJZ/IJB aan DJZ, ‘Governorate Teams’, 8 August 2003, in Archive of the Netherlands Ministry of Defence, Rijswijk (Semi-Statische Archiefdiensten Ministerie van Defensie; hereafter SSA MinDef), Archief DJZ, dossier 2003/206. 21. Interview with Bulmer. 22. CitationSynnott, Bad Days in Basra, 129. The Italians and Danes were more pragmatic and provided civilian personnel to the CPA. 23. Minutes of the Dutch House of Representatives 2002–2003, 23432, no. 116, Brief van de ministers van Buitenlandse Zaken en Defensie, 6 June 2003. 24. CitationBrocades Zaalberg and Ten Cate, Missie in Al Muthanna, 15, 51. 25. Kamp et al., Herinneringsboek SFIR 1; Interview with Swijgman. 26. D.A. Swijgman, ‘Verslag verkenning Irak’, rapportage aan de Commandant Groep Operationele Eenheden Mariniers (CGOEM) 15 May 2003, in SSA MinDef, Archief Contingentscommando Stabilisation Force Iraq 1, CD-Rom 1: OC∖oc∖nldetirak∖Vastlegger∖SF IRAK∖5 planning∖ontplooiing∖Verslag verkenning Irak1.doc. 27. Report 12 Infantry Company ‘Camp Smitty As Samawah’ (1 August 2003), available on the cd-rom with the book: Kamp et al. eds. Herinneringsboek SFIR 1. 28. Interview with Swijgman; Interview with Michel Rentenaar (7 June 2008); Email from Rentenaar to authors, 21 February 2008; Sitrep Polad, 4 August 2003, SSA MinDef, Archief SFIR backup bestanden SFIR-1 t/m SFIR-5, harde schijf nr. 156, F:∖SFIR 051012∖Rapportages∖NLBG∖Polad. 29. ‘First impression report / Rapport resultaten verkenningsteam Irak’, versie 10 June 2003, in SSA BuZa, Archief DVB, inv.nr. 03060 (June 2003); Email DVB aan nl Ambassade Londen, 29 May 2003, in SSA BuZa, Archief DVB, inv.nr. 02857 (May 2003); Rentenaar, ‘Verkenningsmissie naar Zuid-Irak i.v.m. mogelijke uitzending Nederlands bataljon mariniers (24–18 May 2003)’, in SSA BuZa, Archief DVB, inv.nr. 02857 (May 2003); Minutes of the Dutch House of Representatives 2002–2003, 23432, no. 121, verslag van de hoorzitting van de vaste commissies voor Buitenlandse Zaken en voor Defensie over de Nederlandse bijdrage aan de multinationale troepenmacht voor Irak, 3–8. Reports of O'Donahue installing and firing government employees had caused much concern within the walls of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. 30. Interview with Swijgman; Verkenningsmissie naar Zuid-Irak i.v.m. mogelijke uitzending Nederlands bataljon mariniers (24–28 May 2003), in SSA BuZa, Archief DVB, inv.nr. 02857 (May 2003). 31. Interview with Swijgman. On the basis of this interview and additional sources the authors do not agree with the official inquiry on this particular topic. See CitationCommissie-Van den Berg, Onderzoek ondervragingen Irak. 32. CitationRobberson, ‘Calm in a sea of calamity’. 33. Sitrep Contingent Command SFIR (Hereafter: Sitrep Contco) 45/2003, 15 February 2004. in SSA MinDef, Archief SFIR backup bestanden SFIR-1 t/m SFIR-5, harde schijf nr. 156, F:∖SFIR 051012∖Rapportages∖Situatierapporten Contco. 34. Blanford, ‘Dutch take a “slowly” tact in Iraq’. See also: CitationR.G. Oppelaar, ‘Het Tweede Mariniersbataljon / SFIR 2’. 35. Sitrep Contco 157/2003, 29 December 2003. 36. Operational Diary of C-Contco, 8 February 2004; Sitrep 015/2004, 15 January 2004. 37. Citation‘Letterlijke tekst brief’, NRC Handelblad 26 February 2004; Verdict of the Arnhem Court in the case against Eric O., 4 May 2005, Verdict of the Military Chamber of the Arnhem District Court in the case against Eric O., 18 October 2004. 38. Brocades Zaalberg and Ten Cate, Missie in Al Muthanna, 172–3. 39. Document ‘Op Swatter briefing’, in SSA MinDef, Archief SFIR backup bestanden SFIR-1 t/m SFIR-5, harde schijf nr. 156, F:∖SFIR 051012∖Operaties∖Alfabetisch∖Swatter; Email from Colonel Van Harskamp to authors, 22 September 2007; Sitrep Contco 094/2004; Nieuwsberichten Ministerie van Defensie, http://www.mindef.nl, 1 April 2004. The Americans released 12 out of 21 suspects soon after their arrest and transferred 9 to a British detention facility in Shaiba. See the file ‘detainees.xls’, in SSA MinDef, Archief SFIR backup bestanden SFIR-1 t/m SFIR-5, harde schijf nr. 156, F:∖SFIR extra∖SFIR mnd-se legal files∖mail nl. 40. Interview with Swijgman; Interview with Rentenaar. 41. International Crisis Group, Iraq: Can Local Governance Save Central Government?; Ward, ‘The Coalition Provisional Authority's Experience with Governance in Iraq’. 42. Email from L. Paul Bremer, ‘Subject: Local Government Plan, Post-November 15’, 27 November 2003, in Netherlands Institute of Military History, The Hague (hereafter NIMH), Collection SFIR, box 1; Email July Chappell, ‘Subject: Transitional Government / big Role for Councils’, 15 November 2003, in NIMH, Collection SFIR, box 1; Email Howard Pittman, ‘Subject: refreshment’, in NIMH, Collection SFIR, box 1. See also CitationStewart, The Prince of the Marshes, 246; Synnott, Bad Days in Basra, 94–5. 43. Sitrep Polad, 30 November 2003, in NIMH, Collection SFIR, doos 1. 44. International Crisis Group, Iraq: Can Local Governance Save Central Government? 45. Sir Hilary Synnott calls the CPA governorate coordinator ‘Jim Saliero’. Synnott, Bad Days in Basra, 94–5; E-mail from Soriano, ‘Al Muthanna caucuses’, 31 December 2003, in NIMH, Collection SFIR, doos 1. For Rentenaar's dominant role see also interviews with Bulmer, Swijgman, and Oppelaar; Sitrep Contco 011/2004, 11 January 2004. 46. Email from Howard Pittman, ‘Subject: refreshment’, in NIMH, Collection SFIR, doos 1. Pittman writes about the CPA in Al Muthanna: ‘you guys are our poster child for refreshment’. 47. Brocades Zaalberg and Ten Cate, Missie in Al Muthanna, 248. 48. Brocades Zaalberg and ten Cate, Missie in Al Muthanna, 248–9. 49. DOC/J3B to C-3 (NL) Contco Irak, ‘Diversen’, 14 June 2004, in SSA MinDef, Archief SFIR backup bestanden SFIR-1 t/m SFIR-5, harde schijf nr. 156, F:∖SFIR 051012∖Correspondentie doc (aldaar: DCBC0536); ‘Actiepunten’, 28 July 2004, in SSA MinDef, Archief SFIR backup bestanden SFIR-1 t/m SFIR-5, harde schijf nr. 156, F:∖Backup. 50. Alex Alderson describes a similar tendency to underestimate the value of ‘buying consent’ in his dissertation. CitationAlderson, ‘The Validity of British Army Counterinsurgency Doctrine after the War in Iraq’, 149. 51. The claim in The New York Times that Dutch platoon commanders had a $25,000 CIMIC budget at their disposal is unrealistic. Onoshi, ‘Dutch Soldiers Find Smiles Are More Effective Protection’. 52. Brocades Zaalberg and Ten Cate, Missie in Al Muthanna, chapters 4 and 6; Interview with Colonel Maurice Bulmer. 53. Stewart, The Prince of the Marshes; Etherington, Revolt on the Tigris. 54. Brocades Zaalberg and Ten Cate, Missie in Al Muthanna, chapter 5. 55. Sitrep Polad, 30 April 2004, NIMH, Collection SFIR, doos 4. 56. Interview with Rentenaar. 57. Brocades Zaalberg and Ten Cate, Missie in Al Muthanna, 256–8. 58. Brocades Zaalberg and ten Cate, Missie in Al Muthanna, 256–8 59. Shortly before the attack, the NLBG had reported very positively about the performance of the local security forces, but neither the local authorities, not the local population had warned the Dutch. Assessment C-4(NL)BG in Sitrep Contco 221/2004, 8 August 2004. 60. CitationHeinrichs, ‘Ik schaam me dat we de bevolking in de steek gelaten hebben’, 270–1; Citation‘Thuisfront wil meer bescherming in Irak’; Citation‘Steun je militair en loop niet te zeiken’; Citation‘Kamp wil voor thuisfront risico's niet wegpoetsen’; CitationBoom, ‘Voor de Irakezen is Nederland een vijand’. 61. CitationBoogaard, ‘Britten kiezen zekere voor onzekere in Al-Muthanna’; CitationGooren, ‘Soldiering in Unfamiliar Places’, 59; CitationKoelé. ‘Nieuwe commandant door de wol geverfd’; Mak, ‘Een kleine geschiedenis van een Novembermaand’; Onoshi, ‘Dutch Soldiers Find Smiles Are More Effective Protection’. 62. Brocades Zaalberg and Ten Cate, Missie in Al Muthanna, 297–9. 63. Stewart, Prince of the Marshes; Etherington, Revolt on the Tigris; Synnott, Bad Days in Basra. See also CitationHolmes, Dusty Warriors; and CitationKnights and Williams, ‘The Calm Before the Storm’. 64. Verkenningsmissie naar Zuid-Irak i.v.m. mogelijke uitzending Nederlands bataljon mariniers (24–28 May 2003), in SSA BuZa, Archief DVB, inv.nr. 02857 (May 2003); Interview with Bulmer. 65. Alderson, ‘The Validity of British Army Counterinsurgency Doctrine’, 181. 66. Boogaard, ‘Britten Kiezen Zekere voor het Onzekere in Al-Muthanna’; Koelé, ‘Het is nog niet veilig in Al Muthanna’; Interview with Colonel Frits van Dooren. 67. Alderson, ‘The Validity of British Army Counterinsurgency Doctrine’, 146; Holmes, Dusty Warriors, 100. 68. CitationHess, ‘A Peaceful Iraqi Town, Far from Baghdad’. See also CitationAxe, ‘The Brit Way’; American Forces Press Service, Citation‘Coalition Troops to Leave Muthanna Province’. 69. Interview with Rentenaar; CitationBurke, ‘British Tread Softly to Win the Peace’. 70. CitationAylwin-Foster, ‘Changing the Army for Counterinsurgency Operations’; Mockaitis, The Iraq War, 11; Alderson, The Validity of British Army Counterinsurgency Doctrine, 150–1. See also Knights and Williams, ‘The Calm Before the Storm’. 71. Alderson, The Validity of the British Army Counterinsurgency Doctrine, 270; CitationMalkasian, ‘Counterinsurgency in Iraq’; CitationRicks, The Gamble. 72. Alderson, ‘The Validity of British Army Counterinsurgency Doctrine’, 180; Brocades Zaalberg and Ten Cate, Missie in Al Muthanna, 325. 73. CitationBrocades Zaalberg, Soldiers and Civil Power. 74. Brocades Zaalberg and Ten Cate, Missie in Al Muthanna, 321–3. 75. CitationCommissie-Davids, Rapport commissie van onderzoek besluitvorming Irak. 76. The most elaborate study in English of the Dutch operation in Uruzgan has been written by Dimitru and De Graaf, ‘The Dutch COIN approach’. 77. Minister of Foreign Affairs CitationBernard Bot, ‘The Dutch Approach’. 78. The US diplomatic effort in 2009 was focused on getting the Dutch to prolong their stay in Uruzgan province. See: Secretary of State Washington DC confidential cable to US Embassy The Hague, Subject: SecState July 14 conversation with Dutch Foreign Minister Verhagen', 28 July 2009 (available at: http://www.nos.nl/artikel/204183-wikileaks-gesprek-clintonverhagen.html.). For Dutch politicians believing they had conceived the comprehensive or 3D approach see: US Embassy The Hague Secret cable to Secretary of State, ‘Subject: Getting to yes post-2010’, 2 November 2009 (available at http://www.wikileaks.ch/cable/2009/02/09THEHAGUE92.html). Even an influential and critical TV journalist like Frits Wester uncritically repeated this claim on the Dutch RTL4 News when explaining the Dutch government's urge to extend its stay in Uruzgan: ‘First of all there is the Dutch approach, which is not just military but also focused on development and governance. The Americans are going to copy this approach and want the Dutch, as the initiators and architects of this concept to stay in some form.’ Despite the US efforts, the Dutch started withdrawing their troops from Uruzgan in 2010. 79. Royal Netherlands Army Major General Mart de Kruif, who commanded ISAF Regional Command South throughout most of 2009, has been the most outspoken in refuting the claim of a unique and exemplary ‘Dutch approach’. Gradually the general's message found its way to a select group of Dutch journalists. See for instance CitationBemmel and Derksen, ‘Dutch Approach helemaal niet zo Dutch’; CitationVreij, ‘NAVO-Generaal: “Dutch Approach” bestaat niet’; Citation‘De Baas van Zuid-Afghanistan’. For tribal balance as part of the ‘Dutch approach’, see CitationBemmel, ‘Opvolgers in Uruzgan laten ‘Dutch Approach’ varen’.