The Other Side of the COIN: Perils of Premature Evacuation from Iraq
2010; Taylor & Francis; Volume: 33; Issue: 2 Linguagem: Inglês
10.1080/01636601003661787
ISSN1530-9177
AutoresKenneth M. Pollack, Irena L. Sargsyan,
Tópico(s)Politics and Conflicts in Afghanistan, Pakistan, and Middle East
ResumoClick to increase image sizeClick to decrease image size Notes 1. See Office of the Press Secretary, The White House, “Responsibly Ending the War in Iraq,” Camp Lejeune, North Carolina, February 27, 2009, http://www.whitehouse.gov/the_press_office/Remarks-of-President-Barack-Obama-Responsibly-Ending-the-War-in-Iraq/ (hereinafter Obama's remarks on Ending the War in Iraq). 2. See Donald L. Horowitz, The Deadly Ethnic Riot (Berkley, CA: University of California Press, 2001); Stathis N. Kalyvas, The Logic of Violence in Civil War (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2006); David A. Lake and Donald Rothchild, “Containing Fear: The Origins and Management of Ethnic Conflict,” International Security 21, no. 2 (Autumn 1996): 41–75; Erik Melander, “The Geography of Fear: Regional Ethnic Diversity, the Security Dilemma and Ethnic War,” European Journal of International Relations 15, no. 1 (2009): 95–124; Barry R. Posen, “The Security Dilemma and Ethnic Conflict,” Survival 35, no. 1 (Spring 1993): 27–47; Barbara Walter and Jack Snyder, eds., Civil Wars, Insecurity, and Intervention (New York: Columbia University Press, 1999); Barbara Walter, “Does Conflict Beget Conflict? Explaining Recurring Civil War,” Journal of Peace Research 41, no. 3 (May 2004): 371–388. 3. See “Obama's Remarks on Iraq and Afghanistan,” New York Times, July 15, 2008, http://www.nytimes.com/2008/07/15/us/politics/15text-obama.html and “Obama Calls Situation in Afghanistan ‘Urgent,’” CNN.com, July 21, 2008, http://www.cnn.com/2008/POLITICS/07/20/obama.afghanistan/. 4. See James T. Quinlivan, “Coup-Proofing: Its Practice and Consequences in the Middle East,” International Security 24, no. 2 (Fall 1999): 131–165. 5. For details on Uruguay, see James A. Miller, “Urban Terrorism in Uruguay: The Tupamaros,” in Bard E. O'Neill, William R. Heaton, and Donald J. Alberts, eds., Insurgency in the Modern World (Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1980) and James Kohl and John Litt, Urban Guerrilla Warfare in Latin America (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 1974). 6. For details on Ecuador, see Anita Isaacs, Military Rule and Transition in Ecuador, 1972-92 (Pittsburgh, PA: University of Pittsburgh Press, 1993). 7. For details on Pakistan, see Stephen P. Cohen, The Pakistan Army (Karachi: Oxford University Press, 1998) and Fazal Muqeem Khan, The Story of the Pakistan Army (Karachi: Oxford University Press, 1963). 8. For details on Algeria, see Steven A. Cook, Ruling But Not Governing: The Military and Political Development in Egypt, Algeria, and Turkey (Baltimore, MD: Johns Hopkins University Press, 2007) and Martin Stone, The Agony of Algeria (New York: Columbia University Press, 1997). 9. See Mats Berdal and David M. Malone, eds., Greed and Grievance: Economic Agendas in Civil Wars (Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner, 2000); Paul Collier and Nicholas Sambanis, “Understanding Civil War: A New Agenda,” The Journal of Conflict Resolution 46, no. 1 (February 2002): 3–12; James D. Fearon, “Why Do Some Civil Wars Last So Much Longer than Others?” Journal of Peace Research 41, no. 3 (May 2004): 275–301; Charles King, “The Benefits of Ethnic War: Understanding Eurasia's Unrecognized States,” World Politics, 53, no. 4 (July 2001): 524–552; Michael L. Ross, “How Do Natural Resources Influence Civil War? Evidence from Thirteen Cases,” International Organization 58, no. 1 (Winter 2004): 35–67. 10. For details on Nicaragua, see Michel Gobat, Confronting the American Dream: Nicaragua Under U.S. Imperial Rule (Durham, NC: Duke University Press, 2005); Richard Millet, Guardians of the Dynasty: A History of the U.S. Created Guardia Nacional De Nicaragua and the Somoza Family (Maryknoll, NY: Orbis Books, 1977); Major Julian C. Smith et al., Nicaragua: A Review of the Organization and Operations of the Guardia National de Nicaragua (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Marine Corps Headquarters, 1974), available at the Alfred M. Gray Research Center archives in the U.S. Marine Corps base at Quantico, VA. 11. For details on Cuba, see Louis A. Perez Jr., Cuba and the United States: Ties of Singular Intimacy (Athens, GA: University of Georgia Press, 2003) and Rafael Fermoselle, The Evolution of the Cuban Military: 1492-1986 (Miami, FL: Ediciones Universal, 1987). 12. See Julian E. Barnes and Peter Spiegel, “Fallback Strategy for Iraq: Train Locals, Draw Down Forces,” Los Angeles Times, March 11, 2007, http://fairuse.100webcustomers.com/fairenough/latimes885.html and Tom Gibb, “‘Salvador Option’ Mooted for Iraq,” BBC News, January 27, 2005, http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/programmes/from_our_own_correspondent/4209595.stm. 13. For details on El Salvador, see Andrew J. Bacevich et al., American Military Involvement in Small Wars: The Case of El Salvador (Washington, D.C.: Pergamon Brassey's, 1988); Todd Greentree, Crossroads of Intervention: Insurgency and Counterinsurgency Lessons from Central America (Westport, CT: Praeger Security International, 2008); Benjamin C. Schwartz, “American Counterinsurgency Doctrine and El Salvador: The Frustrations of Reform and the Illusions of Nation Building,” 1991, http://www.rand.org/pubs/reports/2006/R4042.pdf 14. For details on Vietnam, see William Colby, Lost Victory: A Firsthand Account of America's Sixteen-Year Involvement in Vietnam (Chicago, IL: Contemporary Books, 1989); Lewis Sorley, A Better War: The Unexamined Victories and Final Tragedy of America's Last Years in Vietnam (New York: Harcourt Brace and Company, 1999); Thomas C. Thayer, War Without Fronts: The American Experience in Vietnam (Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1985). 15. Sir Robert Thompson as quoted in W. Scott Thompson and Donaldson D. Frizzell, eds., The Lessons of Vietnam (New York: Crane, Russak & Company, 1977), p. 105. Emphasis is in the original. 16. For details regarding the Iraqi Sunni insurgency and the strategies U.S. forces used to counter them, see John A. McCary, “The Anbar Awakening: An Alliance of Incentives,” The Washington Quarterly 32, no. 1 (January 2009): 43–59, http://www.twq.com/09winter/docs/09jan_McCary.pdf. 17. Stephen Biddle, “Afghanistan, Iraq, and U.S. Strategy in 2009,” testimony before U.S. House Armed Services Committee, February 12, 2009, http://www.cfr.org/publication/18545/prepared_testimony_on_us_strategy_in_afghanistan_and_iraq_before_the_house_armed_services_committee.html?breadcrumb=%2Fbios%2F2603%2Fstephen_biddle%3Fgroupby%3D3%26amp%253Bhide%3D1%26amp%253Bid%3D2603%26filter%3D2009. Also see Stephen Biddle, Michael E. O'Hanlon, and Kenneth M. Pollack, “How to Leave a Stable Iraq: Building on Progress,” Foreign Affairs 87, no. 5 (September/October 2008): 40–58. 18. Obama's remarks on Ending the War in Iraq. Additional informationNotes on contributorsKenneth M. PollackKenneth M. Pollack is the director of the Saban Center for Middle East Policy at the Brookings InstitutionIrena L. SargsyanIrena L. Sargsyan is a research analyst at the Saban Center and a doctoral candidate in the Department of Government at Georgetown University
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