Persons, Perspectives, and Full Information Accounts of the Good
1995; University of Chicago Press; Volume: 105; Issue: 2 Linguagem: Inglês
10.1086/293702
ISSN1539-297X
Autores Tópico(s)Philosophical Ethics and Theory
ResumoPrevious articleNext article No AccessPersons, Perspectives, and Full Information Accounts of the GoodConnie S. RosatiConnie S. Rosati Search for more articles by this author PDFPDF PLUS Add to favoritesDownload CitationTrack CitationsPermissionsReprints Share onFacebookTwitterLinkedInRedditEmailPrint SectionsMoreDetailsFiguresReferencesCited by Ethics Volume 105, Number 2Jan., 1995 Article DOIhttps://doi.org/10.1086/293702 Views: 28Total views on this site Citations: 78Citations are reported from Crossref Copyright 1995 The University of ChicagoPDF download Crossref reports the following articles citing this article:Johan Brännmark Means Paternalism and the Problem of Indeterminacy, Moral Philosophy and Politics 10, no.11 (Dec 2021): 47–67.https://doi.org/10.1515/mopp-2021-0032Donald Franklin Respecting equality in economic option appraisal: valuing the time of your life, Economics and Philosophy 38, no.33 (Aug 2022): 416–449.https://doi.org/10.1017/S0266267122000128Alex Horne Too many cooks, Synthese 200, no.44 (Jul 2022).https://doi.org/10.1007/s11229-022-03799-4Peter Königs Why Be a Subjectivist about Wellbeing?, Canadian Journal of Philosophy 3 (Jul 2022): 1–15.https://doi.org/10.1017/can.2022.26João V. 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