Portal de Periódicos da CAPES

The Mafia in Havana: A Caribbean Mob Story

2005; Duke University Press; Volume: 85; Issue: 3 Linguagem: Inglês

10.1215/00182168-85-3-543

1527-1900

Andrew Grant Wood,

Caribbean history, culture, and politics

Judging from the photograph of Meyer Lansky that graces the cover of The Mafia in Havana, the mobster was not an attractive guy. Nevertheless, he was an extremely powerful man who—in cahoots with an assortment of other organized criminals, businessmen, the Cuban government, and U.S. intelligence officials—ruled over the infamous “Empire of Havana” from 1933 until the triumph of the 1959 revolution. They ran a vast criminal operation that operated a variety of tourist venues (hotels, casinos, nightclubs, and cabarets), smuggled cocaine, heroin, and other drugs, managed assorted gambling operations (horse and dog racing, jai alai, boxing, numbers, slots, bingo), traded precious gems, facilitated widespread prostitution, trafficked in contraband (furs, gold, electronics), and involved itself in mass communication, international finance (including money laundering), and a range of other dubious business operations too numerous and complex to account for.The history of organized crime in Cuba is a dark and fascinating topic. The subject of numerous films and page-turning novels, Havana during this “golden age” of corruption was full of intrigue: violence, sex, drugs, and nightclub rumba. Although we will probably never know the full details, this history often implicates in the illegal doings of the powerful Mafia bosses not only the highest-ranking Cuban officials but also U.S. politicians. A close working relationship between the U.S. government and the Mafia in Cuba crystallized, Cirules writes, during Franklin Delano Roosevelt’s term, “with the unrestricted support of General Batista” (p. 28).Complementing Rosalie Schwartz’s fine Pleasure Island (Univ. of Nebraska Press, 1997), Cirules concentrates his detailed analysis on the close ties between the U.S. Mafia and the Cuban government. Using material available in the Cuban National Archive, he documents U.S. control over Cuba’s banking, hotel, and sugar industries. Cirules discusses rising concerns about organized crime in the United States generated by the 1950–52 Kefauver Commission. In response, Mafia operations in a number of cities moved to protect their interests. Meanwhile in Cuba, dissident member of the Auténtico Party and aspirant to the presidency Eduardo R. Chibás initiated a reform campaign to expose government corruption and Mob connections. Soon, however, a successful conspiracy was hatched to discredit him. With Chibás out of the way and political forces on the island splintered into a number of competing factions, Cirules describes how “the alliance of U.S. financial-Mafia-intelligence groups” orchestrated the coup d’état of March 10, 1952, which brought Batista to power (p. 75).Explaining U.S. backing for Batista at this time is a challenging undertaking. Cirules asserts that secretary of state John Foster Dulles, along with his brother Allen Dulles (who ran the newly established CIA), had financial ties to Cuban nickel and other businesses in the eastern provinces. Sensing that growing instability on the island posed a threat to U.S. investment, the brothers “exercised a decisive role in the arrangements for Washington’s authorization of the coup d’état, taking advantage of situations that provided them with the pretext for their covert operations” (p. 79). According to Cirules, the CIA engaged in many activities attempting to manipulate the situation in Cuba and help Batista assume power. At their most basic was a desire to promote an atmosphere of confusion, fear, and violence—to which the coup would then present a strong-arm solution.Following the relatively bloodless 1952 coup, the Mafia enjoyed an unprecedented period of prosperity in Cuba. As Cirules writes, “The empire of Havana functioned as a giant corporation, with multiple specialized departments, which differed greatly from the traditional structures of the Sicilian Mafia during its early establishment in the United States” (p. 95). Batista played a critical role in working to legalize many of the Mafia businesses; Cirules uses the Banco de Desarrollo Económico y Social (BANDES) as a detailed case to document this claim. He presents continued evidence for U.S. meddling in nearly all Cuban political and economic affairs, even as the revolutionary movement gained ground in late 1958. Despite the near-desperate maneuverings of the CIA and U.S. ambassador Earl E. T. Smith to stave off a rebel victory, their efforts proved too little, too late.Cirules occasionally remarks on the still relatively unknown and difficult nature of much of this dark history. For future historians with the necessary courage, there is much still to uncover. In the meantime, The Mafia in Havana provides an interesting overview of U.S.-Cuban criminal collaboration—an imperial con game played at the expense of the Cuban people.