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Selective Engagement with Islamist Terrorists: Exploring the Prospects

2009; Taylor & Francis; Volume: 32; Issue: 1 Linguagem: Inglês

10.1080/10576100802563370

1521-0731

James K. Wither,

Middle East and Rwanda Conflicts

Abstract Despite claims to the contrary, governments have frequently talked to groups branded as terrorists in their efforts to find peaceful solutions to longstanding armed conflicts. The rhetoric of the so-called War on Terror has tended to portray an uncompromising and extreme, monolithic Islamist enemy with whom such accommodation is unthinkable. Therefore, it is not surprising that the potential for dialogue and negotiation with Islamist terrorist groups has been relatively neglected. This article examines the character of the contemporary Islamist threat and explores the prospects for selective engagement with terrorist groups that may not share Al Qaeda's global jihadist agenda. Notes 1. “Government Will Not Sit at Negotiation Table with PKK,” Agence France-Presse, 10 April 2006. 2. President G. W. Bush, Remarks to Press, 4 April 2002, available at http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2002/04/20020404–1.html 3. Efforts were made to re-classify some Sunni insurgent groups as “rejectionists” or “Saddamists” rather than terrorists before talks began. See Paul Martin, “Secret Parleys Ensured Vote Peace,” Washington Times, 21 December 2005, p. 15. 4. James A. Baker III and Lee H. Hamilton, Co Chairs, The Iraq Study Group Report: The Way Forward—A New Approach, 6 December 2006, Recommendation 34, p. 46, available at http://www.usip.org/isg/ 5. Brian Michael Jenkins, lecture to the Program in Terrorism and Security Studies, George C. Marshall European Center for Security Studies, 25 January 2008. 6. Islamism refers to political ideologies derived from those Muslims who believe that Islam is not only a religion but also a holistic system that provides the political, legal, economic, and social foundations for society. “Islamist” is a term often used by Western analysts to denote radicals at the extreme end of the fundamentalist spectrum that have resorted to terrorism. However, “Islamism” is not synonymous with “Terrorism.” Many Islamist groups have renounced or avoided violence. Politics rather than violence gives mainstream Islamist groups their growing influence in many parts of the world. The jihadis who engage in terrorism share an ideology with the broader Sunni fundamentalist movement known as Salafism, although most Salafists do not advocate or support such violence. 7. White House, National Strategy for Combating Terrorism (Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, February 2003), available at http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2003/02/counter_terrorism/counter_terrorism_strategy.pdf 8. See, for example, Jeffrey Record, Bounding the Global War on Terrorism (Carlisle, PA: Strategic Studies Institute, December 2003); Tarak Barkawi, “On the Pedagogy of Small Wars,” International Affairs 80(1) (January 2004), pp. 19–37 and Adam Roberts, “The War on Terror in Historical Perspective,” Survival 47(2) (Summer 2005), pp. 101–130. 9. Quoted by Associated Press, “War Turns to Islamic Fascism,” Washington Times, 31 August 2006, p. 4. 10. See, for example, Roger Cohen, “Sacrificing a Democracy While Supporting an Ally,” International Herald Tribune, 29 July 2006; Leslie L. Gibb, “Time To Talk (To the Bad Guys),” Wall Street Journal, 28 July 2006, p. 14; Max Hastings, “Bush's Belief in a Worldwide Islamist Conspiracy is Foolish and Dangerous,” The Guardian, 14 August 2006; Andrew Koch, “War on Terror Floundering Say Military Officials,” Jane's Defence Weekly, 7 September 2006; and Jonathan Stevenson, “Demilitarizing the War on Terror,” Survival 48(2) (Summer 2006), pp. 37–54. 11. Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, National Military Strategic Plan for the War on Terrorism, 1 February 2006, p. 13, available at http://www.au.af.mil/au/awc/awcgate/dod/gwot_stratplan.pdf 12. The White House, National Strategy for Combating Terrorism, September 2006. Online edition, available at http://www.state.gov/s/ct/rls/wh/71803.htm 13. See Anne Aldis and Graeme Herd, The Ideological War on Terror: Worldwide Strategies for Counter-Terrorism (London: Routledge, 2007). 14. See, for example, U.S. Undersecretary of Public Diplomacy and Public Affairs, Karen Hughes, Remarks at the Council on Foreign Relations, 10 May 2006, available at http://www.state.gov/r/us/66098.htm 15. U.S. Department of Defense, Quadrennial Defense Review Report (Washington, DC: Government Printing Office), 6 February 2006, p. 22, available at http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/library/policy/dod/qdr-2006-report.pdf. See also National Security Advisor Stephen Hadley's speech to the United States Institute of Peace regarding the National Security Strategy delivered on 16 March 2006, available at http://www.state.gov/r/pa/ei/wh/63257.htm 16. “Mind Tour Language,” The Economist, 17 June 2006, p. 15. 17. See, for example, Andrew Kohut, “Arab and Muslim Perceptions of the United States,” Pew Research Center, 10 November 2005, available at http://pewresearch.org/obdeck/?ObDeckID=6 and Richard Wike, “Karen Hughes’ Uphill Battle: Foreign Policy, not Public Diplomacy, Mostly Determines How the World Views America,” Pew Research Center Publications, 1 November 2007, available at http://pewresearch.org/pubs/627/karen-hughes 18. See, for example, John Hughes, “Winning the War of Words in the Campaign Against Terrorism,” Christian Science Monitor, 17 May 2006 and Sherifa Zuhur, A Hundred Osamas: Islamist Threats and the Future of Counterinsurgency, US Strategic Studies Institute monograph, December 2005, available at http://www.StrategicStudiesInstitute.army.mil/ 19. Bill Gertz, “Hughes’ Strategic Communication for Mideast Called Loser in the War of Ideas,” GeoStrategy Direct, 14 November 2007. 20. William McCants, ed., Militant Ideology Atlas: Executive Report, Combating Terrorism Center, November 2006, p. 10. See also United Nations Alliance of Civilizations, Final Report of the High Level Group, Section 4.16, 13 November 2006, available at http://www.unaoc.org/ 21. Foreign Policy & The Center for American Progress, “The Terrorism Index,” September/October 2007, available at http://www.foreignpolicy.com/story/cms.php?story_id=3924 22. David J. Kilcullen, “Countering Global Insurgency,” The Journal of Strategic Studies 28(4) (August 2005), pp. 597–617. 23. Ian Shapiro, Containment; Rebuilding a Strategy against Global Terror (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2007). Ian Shapiro is not the only political scientist to advocate some form of containment strategy for U.S. foreign policy. See Walter Russell Meade, Power, Terror, Peace and War: American Grand Strategy in a World at Risk (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 2004) and James Fellows, “Success Without Victory,” The Atlantic, January/February 2005. 24. Sebastian L. v. Gorka, unpublished conference report on Swedish and UK COIN symposia, 26 March 2008. 25. Jonathan Powell, Great Hatred, Little Room: Making Peace in Northern Ireland (London: Bodley Head, 2008), p. 66. 26. “Meshaal Offers Military Deal with Israel,” The News International, 1 April 2008. The Israeli authorities have been justifiably skeptical about this offer as it would severely constrain military operations against Hamas fighters. 27. Anne Speckhard and Khapta Akhmedova, “Talking to Terrorists,” Journal of Psychohistory (Fall 2005), available at http://www.uwmc.uwc.edu/alumni/news_items/speckhard/talking_to_%20terrorists.pdf 28. P. Terence Hopmann, The Negotiation Process and the Resolution of International Conflicts (Columbia: University of South Carolina Press, 1998), pp. 126–127. 29. For useful review articles covering earlier literature see: Richard E. Hayes, Stacey R. Kaminski, and Steven M. Beres, “Negotiating the Non-Negotiable: Dealing with Absolutist Terrorists” and Bertram I. Spector, “Negotiating with Villains Revisited,” International Negotiation 8(3) (2003), pp. 451–467 and pp. 613–621. 30. See, for example, Peter R. Neumann, “Negotiating with Terrorists,” Foreign Affairs 86(1) (January– February 2007), pp. 128–134; Daniel Byman, “The Decision to Begin Talks with Terrorists: Lessons for Policymakers,” Studies in Conflict and Terrorism 29(5) (June 2006), pp 403–414; Thomas Scheffler, “Negotiating with Extremists: Why, When and How?” Dialogue with the Islamic World (Berlin: Auswärtiges Amt), 13 April 2005, available at http://www.auswaertiges-amt.de/diplo/en/Aussenpolitik/Kulturpolitik/DialogIslam/Islamdialog.html. Deborah Goodwin, “A Poison Chalice?: Negotiating with Extremists,” Analysing Conflict and its Resolution, Conference Papers, Oxford UK, 28–30 June 2004, available at http://www.ima.org.uk/conflict/papers/Goodwin.pdf; Bertram I. Spector, “Negotiating with Villains Revisited,” International Negotiation 8(3) (2003), pp. 613–621, and I. William Zartman, “Negotiating with Terrorists,” International Negotiation 8(3) (2003), pp. 443–450. 31. Zartman, “Negotiating with Terrorists,” pp. 446–447. 32. See, for example, Scheffler, “Negotiating with Extremists,” and Goodwin, “A Poison Chalice?” 33. Mohammad-Mahmoud Ould Mohamedou, “Non-Linearity of Engagement: Transnational Armed Groups, International Law, and the Conflict between Al Qaeda and the United States,” Program on Humanitarian Policy and Conflict Research, Harvard University, July 2005, pp. 17–25. 34. Hayes et al., “Negotiating the Non-Negotiable: Dealing with Absolutist Terrorists,” p. 456 and Byman, “The Decision to Begin Talks with Terrorists,” p. 406. 35. Louise Richardson, “Britain and the IRA,” in Democracy and Terrorism: Lessons from the Past, edited by Robert Art and Louise Richardson (Washington, DC: United States Institute of Peace Press, 2006), p. 91. 36. Byman, “The Decision to Begin Talks with Terrorists,” p. 408. 37. Ewen MacAskill, “UK Ponders Talking with Hamas and Hizbullah,” The Guardian, 20 May 2005. 38. Neumann, “Negotiating with Terrorists.” 39. Powell, Great Hatred, Little Room, pp. 309–332. 40. Anand Gopal, “Afghan Opposition Courts Taliban,” Christian Science Monitor, 3 April 2008. 41. Michael Ancram, “Dancing with Wolves: The Importance of Talking to Your Enemies,” Middle East Policy 14(2), pp. 22–30. 42. “Report Says German Secret Service Held Talks With Taliban,” Deutsche Welle, 20 August 2007. Another example of German intelligence activity in this context is the German agent known as “Mr. Hezbollah” who has acted as a negotiator between Israel and Hezbollah. See Georg Mascolo and Holger Stark, “German Mediates Between Israel and the Shiite Militants,” Spiegel Online, 23 October 2006. 43. Louise Richardson, What Terrorist Want: Understanding the Enemy, Containing the Threat (New York: Random House, 2007), p. 215. 44. Scheffler, “Negotiating with Extremists,” p. 2. 45. National Military Strategic Plan for the War on Terrorism, p. 13. 46. Boaz Ganor, The Counter Terrorism Puzzle (Somerset, NJ: Transaction Publishers, 2005), chapter 1, p. 24. 47. See, for example, Thomas Friedman, The World is Flat: A Brief History of the Globalized World in the 21st Century (London: Allen Lane, 2005), pp. 393–395; Robert R. Reilly, “The Roots of Islamist Ideology,” Centre for Research into Post Communist Economies (CRCE) February 2006, p. 9 and John Gray, Al Qaeda and What it Means to be Modern (London: Faber & Faber, 2003), pp. 3–4. 48. Lawrence Wright, The Looming Tower: Al Qaeda and the Road to 9/11 (New York: Alfred A Knopf, 2007), p. 95. 49. Source Al-Jazirah Net in Arabic, 23 April 2006, translated by the Open Source Center. 50. “Letter to the American People” (Internet) Waaqiah, text in English, 26 October 2002. Al-Zawahiri made similar comments about the complicity of the British people following the London bombings of July 2005. 51. Barkawi, “On the Pedagogy of Small Wars.” For a comprehensive review of causes of conflict in the Muslim world see Derek S Reveron and Jeffrey Murer, eds., Flashpoints in the War on Terrorism (New York: Routledge, 2006). 52. “Qaeda's Zawahri (sic) Criticizes Hamas Over Mecca Deal,” Reuters, 11 March 2007. 53. See comments by Hezbollah leader Hassan Nasrallah quoted in the Middle East Media Research Institute (MEMRI) Special Dispatch Series No. 867, 22 February 2005, available at http://memri.org/bin/opener.cgi?Page=archive&ID=SP86705 and Robin Wright, “Inside the Mind of Hezbollah,” Washington Post, 16 July 2006, p. B1. 54. Daniel Kimmage, “Al-Qaeda Addresses the Jihad-Versus-Resistance Conflict,” Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty, 31 July 2006 and Terrorism Open Source Intelligence Report (TOSIR), No. 239, 10 August 2006, p. 15. 55. R. A. Pape, “The Strategic Logic of Suicide Bombing,” American Political Science Quarterly no. 3 (2003), pp. 20–32. 56. Robert J. Brym and Bader Araj, “Suicide Bombing as a Strategy and Interaction: The Case of the Second Intifada,” Social Forces 84(4) (June 2006), pp. 1969–1986, p. 1979. Hamas leaders such as Osama Hamdan and Muhammad Nazzal have justified suicide attacks as a means of achieving strategic parity with Israel. 57. Robert W. Kurz and Charles K. Bartles, “Chechen Suicide Bombers,” The Journal of Slavic Military Studies 20(4) (October 2007), pp. 529–547. 58. For analyses of the different strains of Islamism, see Quintan Wiktorowicz, “Anatomy of the Salafi Movement,” Studies in Conflict and Terrorism 29(3) (May 2006), 207–239 and Nathan J. Brown, Amr Hamzawy, and Marina Ottaway, Islamist Movements and the Democratic Process in the Arab World Carnegie Papers, No. 67, March 2006. 59. The International Crisis Group, Understanding Islamism, Middle East/North Africa Report No. 37, 2 March 2005, page ii. 60. Mona Yacoubian, Engaging Islamists and Promoting Democracy: A Preliminary Assessment, US Institute of Peace Special Report No. 190, August 2007, available at www.usip.org 61. “Nationalist Embrace Co-opts Algerian Islamism,” Jane's Islamic Affairs Analyst, 1 November 2006. 62. Stephen Gray, “Let's Talk: Ex-MI6 Man Plans Terror Summit,” The Sunday Times, 12 December 2004. 63. “Former Taliban Spokesman Calls for Dialogue,” Sud West Rundfunk (SWR) Online, 23 May 2006 and Isambard Wilkinson and Ashraf Ali, “Taliban Unveils Hardline Afghan Constitution,” The Daily Telegraph, 29 September 2007. 64. Craig Timberg, “Somali Militias Decry Terrorists,” Washington Post, 16 June 2006, p. 14 and “Somalis Wary of Bin Laden Tape,” BBC News, 2 July 2006. 65. Daveed Gartenstein-Ross and Kyle Dabruzzi, “Jihad's New Leaders,” Middle East Quarterly (Summer 2007 Edition). 66. See, for example, Orly Halpern, “Hamas Working on New Chapter,” The Jerusalem Post, 16 February 2006 and Robert Novak, “Olive Branch from Hamas,” Washington Post, 16 April 2007. 67. “Saudis Tell Bush Not To Isolate Hamas,” Jerusalem Post, 18 May 2006. 68. Gabrielle Rifkind, “What Lies Beneath Hamas’ Rhetoric: What the West Needs to Hear,” Oxford Research Group, March 2006, available at http://www.oxfordresearchgroup.org.uk/publications/briefing_papers/hamas.php 69. See Henry Siegman, “No Peace Possible Between Israel and Palestinians without Hamas,” Council on Foreign Relations, 7 March 2008 and editorials in The Times, 24 April 2008 and The Financial Times, 23 April 2008 following ex President Jimmy Carter's controversial meetings with Hamas leader, Khaled Meshal. 70. Jane's Terrorism and Insurgency Centre, Political Pressure Grows on Hezbollah, 18 May 2005. 71. “Egypt's Once Largest Militant Group Appeals to al Qaeda to Reconsider Its Violent Ideology,” Asharq Alawsat, 22 May 2007, available at http://aawsat.com/english/print.asp?artid=id9040. Whether this is a genuine conversion to peaceful methods of political change is hard to gauge, particularly given the numbers of militants from these organizations released from Egyptian prisons only after signing statements renouncing violence. 72. McCants, Militant Ideology Atlas, p. 6 and p. 11. 73. Letter from al Zawahiri to al Zarqawi, Office of the Director of National Intelligence, 11 October 2005. Available on the Director of National Intelligence website, http://www.dni.gov/press_releases/20051011_release.htm 74. See, for example, Bret Stephens, “How Al Qaeda will Perish,” Wall Street Journal, 25 March 2008, p. 22. 75. Robert Satloff, “Memo to: Karen Hughes Re: The Mission of Public Diplomacy,” The Weekly Standard, 28 March 2005, pp. 11–12. 76. Melanie Phillips, “Denial England,” National Review Online, 11 September 2007, available at http://article.nationalreview.com/?q=M2I4ZTIzNGY1ZjkzYjU4ZjU5NjA3NTQ4MjBlNTk3NWQ 77. Patrick Sookhdeo, Issues of Interpretation of the Qur'an and Hadith, Institute for the Study of Islam and Christianity, 26 September 2006, p. 26. 78. See, for example, J. Michael Barrett, “The Sources of Terrorist Conduct,” Strategic Insights 3(12) (December 2004), available at http://www.ccc.nps.navy.mil/si/2004/dec/barrettDec04.asp. Classical Islamic doctrine permits truces, but not permanent peaceful relations between Muslim and non-Muslim states. See Rudolph Peters, Jihad in Classical and Modern Islam (Princeton, NJ: Markus Wiener, 1996), p. 143. The concept of al-Taqiyya permits Moslems to practise deceit in certain circumstances, but as with much else described in the Koran it is a contested concept open to a number of interpretations. 79. See, for example, Farish Noor, “We Should Not Fear Being Called Radical,” Al Jazeera, 21 August 2006 and “Our Followers Must Live in Peace until Strong Enough to Wage Jihad, The Times, 9 September 2007. 80. “Terrorism Expert Calls for Ban on Hezbollah in Europe,” Interview with Alexander Ritzman by Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty, 31 August 2007. 81. Thomas L. Friedman, “Not So Smart,” New York Times, 19 July 2006. 82. Ashling O'Connor, “Kashmiri Militants Deny Carrying Out Attacks,” The Times, 13 July 2006. 83. Alyssa Ayres, “Regional Terror Goes Global,” Wall Street Journal, 18 August 2006, p. 14. 84. See, for example, “Pakistani Taliban Conditionally Agrees to Talks with the New Government,” Reuters, 30 March 2008. 85. Powell, Great Hatred, Little Room, p. 313.