Let's get lost: On the importance of ltineraries, detours and dead-ends
2006; Taylor & Francis; Volume: 10; Issue: 4 Linguagem: Inglês
10.1080/13642520600960607
ISSN1470-1154
Autores ResumoAbstract This article is inspired by Carlo Ginzburg and Adriano Prosperi's book Playing Patience [Giochi di pazienza]. It argues that narratives written by historians about past events should be presented as the result of a process, including all the false leads, dead ends and misunderstandings passed through along the way. Historians journey through archives, and should lay out the course of their itineraries. A case study involving seventeenth-century Venetian spies illustrates this argument. Keywords: SpiesVeniceNarrativeArchivesResearchItineraries Notes This article is dedicated to Alex, who showed me the way out of the maze. Research was undertaken during a British Academy Post-doctoral Fellowship and during a Sesqui post-doctoral fellowship funded by the University of Sydney. The following abbreviations used in the notes refer to material from the Archivio di Stato di Venezia. X, Consiglio dei Dieci, followed by Sec., Secreti; Inq., Inquisitori di Stato; Sen., Senato, followed by Sec.; Deliberazioni, Secreta; Coll., Collegio, followed by Esp. Prin., Espositioni Principi; Comm., Communicazioni dal Consiglio dei Dieci; b., busta; bb., buste; r, recto; v, verso; fo., folio; fos, folios. [1] Ginzburg and Prosperi Citation1975, p. 3. [2]Ginzburg and Prospero Citation1975, pp. 178 – 183. [3] The joint authorship of the book also challenges the still predominant social scientific model of collaboration. Rather than being assembled from homogenous pieces of information provided by a team of researchers working according to a shared protocol, the argument proceeds dialectically, as the result of an active meeting of minds with different areas of expertise and interest. Compare Walker, De Vivo and Shaw Citation2006. [4] Walker Citation2004; Walker, De Vivo and Shaw Citation2006; Walker Citation2007. [5] There is also a vast amount of supplementary material, collected in various other file series but only the registers were specifically intended to serve as the Ten's official, institutional memory. The rest is more like the contents of the Inquisitors' archive. [6] This simplified summary is based on work in progress. I have been making systematic comparisons of handwriting to try to determine who was involved in the physical production and circulation of documents, and also considering how secretaries of the Inquisitors treated material inherited from their predecessors. [7] There are similar file series in the Ten's archive, but the text of outgoing correspondence was also double-entered in the core registers, where it was ‘officially’ available for consultation. [8] A few of the early reports have been diverted for no apparent reason to File 638. Besides Vano's reports, Inq., b. 636 contains those of numerous other informants from various epochs whose surnames begin with ‘V’, each set slipped within a separate cover sheet. Nonetheless, the fact that the extant reports survive as a group together suggests that they were originally stored that way. Vano's reports were not bound and indexed, as were those of his fellow spy Alessandro Grancini, for example (see Inq., bb. 607 – 609). At least some of the original reports are missing (see e.g. Inq., b. 201, fo. 194r, which lists a report dated 24 Apr. 1620 that predates the first report in b. 636). [9] Much of the material now in Inq., b. 1214, no. 57 does, however, correspond to entries in a seventeenth-century index now extant in Inq., b. 201, so again it may originally have been stored together. [10] The cabinet [collegio] set the agenda for the Senate, who in turn voted on the resolutions that determined foreign policy. Foreign ambassadors resident in Venice also appeared before the cabinet for their formal audiences. [11] In May 1620, for example, Bravo suspected Zappata of collusion in the arrest of one Lodovico Rhò, a.k.a. Lodovico da Lodi, a.k.a. Lodovico the soldier, a.k.a. Alonso or Alfonso the Moor. This arrest was actually (of course) another of Vano's coups. [12] Inq., b. 636. According to the Mantuan resident in Venice (see Luzio Citation1918, p. 142), Bravo and his wife were convinced after Minotto's arrest that Zappata was a Venetian spy, but there is no evidence that Zappata was working for either the French or the Venetians at this stage. [13] The relevant clause—complete with obscure grammar—reads: Don fr[ances]co spag[no]l é ha s[an]to iopo in convento con le sue robe voleva far tosicar il sec[retari]o, li dava, 50, cechini la ditto al s[e]r Amb[assado]r, per questo la tiene. The Mantuan resident also refers to Zappata's intention to poison the secretary (Luzio Citation1918, p. 142). [14] Vano retrospectively offers a partial explanation for these outbursts on 23 July, but I have omitted it to simplify an already very complicated narrative. [15] Inq., b. 636, reports dated 19, 21, 27, 28 and 29 July 1620. [16] For all the above, see Inq., b. 636, reports dated 1 August 1620 and 13, 21 October 1620. [17] It is not clear if these were formal, legal safe conducts. The petition says simply that the Inquisitors granted a ‘patent for their security’. This may have been an informal, unregistered guarantee. [18] See X Sec., registro 17, fos. 15r – v. The explanation is true in so far as the Colonna brothers were expecting to find Zappata with Rismeldi and Ris. Zappata had by his own account absconded from Venetian police under circumstances similar to those described by Ris (see the interview dated 29 September 1620 in Inq., b. 522). [19] The file series is currently classified as Collegio, Communicazioni dal Consiglio dei Dieci, but it is physically marked with an erroneous nineteenth-century archival etiquette of Senato, Secreta. Almost all of the material ‘communicated’ in this manner concerned foreign policy and relations with other states, since this was officially the responsibility of the Senate. Hence it normally came from the Ten's ‘Secret’ registers and files, and not from the ‘Ordinary’ or ‘Criminal’ series. The entries in the ‘Communications’ file series always begin with a copy of the text of the Ten's decision to pass on the information, followed by supporting documentation, presumably the same documentation used by the Ten when drawing up the resolution. Some, but not all, of this supporting documentation is duplicated in the Ten's files. The handover of a duplicate probably implied that the Ten retained an interest in the matter, or control over the source, whereas the transferral of original documents was probably intended to symbolize a surrender of jurisdiction to the cabinet. [20] Hence there is no necessary correspondence between the contents of a given communicazione, and the material eventually entered in the Senate's records for reference. [21] X Sec., filza 34, insert within entry dated 14 July 1620. [22] The grammar here is a little obscure: io volesti interporm[i], che poteste condurla con lui, perche di questa maniera sarebbe stato pagato. [23] et retirati tutti li miei servitori, procurendo, che ciò ordinariamente segue in quanto maggiormente rimane, perm[esso] dalle molte [numere] di essi, et come ordinario aviene in tutte le case de Ministri de Prencipi [si bene in fine sono anco huomini, ne sono Capuccini ne Zocolanti]. The last phrase is a marginal insert whose intended location is uncertain. Capuccini and Zoccolanti were both specific religious orders with an ascetic rule of conduct. ‘Friars or saints’ is less expressive, but more easily comprehensible for a modern English audience. The phrase in brackets in the translation is an uncertain paraphrase. [24] Coll., Esp. Prin., b. 28, under what appears to be 11 July 1620, but the correct date is presumably 14 July 1620. This account of the audience has been substantially cut, and at times translated rather loosely. [25] The report is also duplicated in Coll., Comm., b. 11, fos. 329r – 330v, and the copy at this location is accompanied by the following account, which does not appear in X Sec., filza 34: ‘I, Salvador Secco, was sent by Secretary Padavin … to the Spanish Ambassador with two gentlemen from his household, who were [accidentally] imprisoned yesterday evening [that is, Rismeldi and Ris] … . Shaking all over, and with a trembling hand (I do not know if this is normal with him) [the ambassador] described to a Spaniard who was with him an incident that happened the other evening, saying to me that I must be patient while the tale was told, just as the men with me had been patient in prison. He said that … a certain woman had asked him for help. The insolent police had made no attempt to discover what was really going on, [but instead] fired four harquebus rounds that just missed his secretary and chaplain … . He asked, “If a woman asks me for help, not only as the Spanish Ambassador, but as a Gentleman, what can I do?” I replied that I had no information on the matter, and that my only orders were to pass on the apologies of Your Excellencies [the Heads of the Ten] regarding the mistaken arrest of these gentlemen … ’. [26] The Italian phrasing echoes the kind of language used in the exchange of challenges initiating or inviting a duel—a clear indication of Bravo's obsession with honour, and his insistence on conceptualizing personal and diplomatic exchanges in these terms. [27] Again, literally, ‘Capuchin friars’. [28] Vera 1649, p. 321. See also pp. 203, 247 – 248. [29] Inq., b. 636, under 20 August 1620. [30] X Sec., registro 17, fos. 20v – 21r. [31] X Sec., registro 17, fo. 19r; filza 34, insert within entry dated 12 September 1620. I rechecked to make sure I had transcribed the figure ‘43’ correctly. [32] An uncertain translation of have[n]do [pi[ugrave]] bocche di fuogo. [33] Coll., Comm., b. 11, fos. 264r – 267v. [34] Except by one of the witnesses interviewed, who stated that ‘I heard that Colonna took this man prisoner a while ago’. This line of enquiry was not pursued by the interrogator. [35] Sen., Sec., registro 117, fos. 37r – v, and a similar communication to Venetian ambassadors abroad at fos. 37v – 38r. An account of the incident precedes the phrases quoted here. [36] In the light of recent revelations concerning intelligence failures in the run-up to the invasion of Iraq in 2003, the account here has become unexpectedly topical. On a more technical note, De Vivo Citation2002 points out that communication ‘was not necessarily a way of sharing the knowledge of secret matters with wider assemblies … . On the contrary, it might well have been a way for the Council of Ten and Collegio to put pressure on the Senate through the communication of particular [that is, highly selective] pieces of information’. (I do not have access to a full text of this thesis as I write, and so cannot provide a page reference.) De Vivo argues that there were precise formulae whereby the Ten could indicate that they wanted the cabinet to withhold specific pieces of information from the Senate. I am less convinced of this—the formulae quoted seem inconsistent and perhaps interchangeable. In effect the cabinet always had discretionary powers. However, since the cabinet and Senate are almost invariably specified as possible recipients of communications by the Ten, those occasions when the Senate is not mentioned may be taken to imply that the information was definitely not to be passed on. [37] Sen., Sec., registro 119, fos. 43r – v. Lio was shortly to be promoted to the post of secretary to the Ten, and thence to secretary for the Inquisitors, in which capacity he presided over the trial of Gerolamo Vano for perjury in September 1622. His annotations can be seen on Vano's later reports. In September 1620, however, Lio would not have been aware of Vano's existence. [38] The servant in question may have been one of Vano's numerous informants in the embassy, trying to provoke Bravo into indiscretion. In any case, note that the man was eavesdropping. [39] Coll., Esp. Prin., b. 28. I have substantially edited this long quotation. [40] The investigating magistrate may have been forbidden to interview embassy staff to avoid giving offence. [41] X Sec., registro 17, fo. 19v. [42] Or so the Ten reported to the cabinet. See ibid., 22 Sept. 1620, 20v – 21r. [43] One might ask why Zappata did not just surrender himself to the Venetians in the first place, avoiding the complication of involving the French. The answer is fairly simple. If he had done so, he would have had nothing to negotiate with. The Venetians could simply have prosecuted him and got whatever they needed to know during interrogation. By going through the French, he could sell his information in exchange for his safety. [44] X Sec., registro 17, fos. 21r – v. The full text of the passport issued to Zappata was registered on 6 November (see fo. 28r). On 20 September, Mazi had tried to outflank the Ten by involving the cabinet in the negotiations. During a visit by the Senate secretary Roberto Lio, who was at the French embassy to deliver an unrelated communication from the Senate, Mazi complained of the Ten's handling of the situation. In particular, he insisted that the Colonna brothers had really been appointed to spy on him. Lio refused to be drawn on the matter, insisting on the principle of compartmentalization: ‘the affairs of … the Revered Council of Ten, were not brought before either the most excellent cabinet, or the Most Excellent Senate’. See Coll., Esp. Prin., b. 28, under 20 September 1620. [45] The transcript of both interviews can be found in Inq., b. 522. [46] The letters can be found unattributed in X Sec., filza 34, insert in entry under 2 November 1620, with copies in Coll., Comm., b. 11, fos. 27r – v and the same date. A marginal annotation on Zappata's interview in b. 522 confirms their provenance. There are subsequent communications on 6 November and 12 November relating to the Valtelline, which may also have originated with Zappata. [47] Inq., b. 488, despatches dated 18 October, 1 and 22 November 1621. The latter has various inserted documents of Spanish provenance, presumably supplied by Zappata. Some of these inserted documents postdate the despatch. From Turin, Zappata also sent an ingratiating letter to the Inquisitors' ex-secretary, Zuan Battista Padavin, in which he rehearsed the events surrounding his escape to the French embassy. This letter is disturbing in that it opens up an incomprehensibly complex (or perhaps merely confused) picture of double-dealing. Because of this, and because I am not sure I have understood all of it correctly, I prefer to give a simplified outline in a note rather than attempt to incorporate it in the main narrative. First of all, we should note that there are two secretaries in the French embassy who are relevant in what follows: Mazi, who was Zappata's go-between with the Venetians, and Soboret. Zappata's letter to Padavin claims that Soboret was working for the Spanish. This would not in itself be so surprising, except I know from other sources that Soboret was passing information to the Venetians. Whether or not Zappata also knew this (and he certainly gives no hint of it in his letter) depends on whether he was making this accusation in good faith or trying to discredit Soboret on Spanish instructions. If his accusation was true, then it opens the possibility that Soboret was doctoring the information passed to the Venetians. Or maybe Soboret was just, as Zappata puts it, ‘an easy friend of money’, who sold indifferently to many customers. Zappata's letter also appears to accuse Mazi of collusion with the Mantuan resident in Venice. [48] Inq., b. 450, despatches dated 12 and 19 January 1622. [49] There is also a possible sighting in Mantua in 1622. See Luzio Citation1918: 146 and Inq., b. 636, report dated 6 March 1622. Members of the Ten were sworn to secrecy as part of the terms of their office, but those present at particularly secret deliberations were additionally subjected to more specific oaths. Similar oaths were also often applied during the transmission of information from the Ten to the cabinet. [51] Elton Citation1969, p. 30. Elton is a soft target by now, but this part of his argument is still generally accepted, even if the terms in which he expresses it are not. [52] Davis and Marvin argue that tourists who view the city ‘as a maze waiting to confound them, are really saying less about Venice's topography than about the fact that they experience it the wrong way round, not as it was built over the centuries, as a commercial, industrial, and social site for human use, but as a site of pleasure designed for themselves’ (Davis and Marvin Citation2004, p. 104). The dichotomy of tourist and native here is the same as that of novice or amateur and professional posited by Elton. Both are problematic. [53] This point is underlined by Davis and Marvin (Citation2004)—that Venice ceases to be ‘labyrinthine’ as soon as you start thinking of it as a city intended to be negotiated by boat, and not on foot.
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