IRA operational intelligence: the heartbeat of the war
2010; Routledge; Volume: 21; Issue: 2 Linguagem: Inglês
10.1080/09592318.2010.481429
ISSN1743-9558
Autores Tópico(s)Politics and Conflicts in Afghanistan, Pakistan, and Middle East
ResumoAbstract This article will seek to provide a detailed examination of the IRA's operational intelligence methodologies. Providing not only a lengthy discussion on the organization's intelligence collection protocols, it will also examine the interplay between intelligence and IRA decision-making. It will be contended that intelligence's influence resided in its ability to introduce a strong element of predictability into the IRA's decision-making process. This depended on an ability to construct a detailed intelligence picture of the target and its geographical milieu so as to minimize the likelihood of volunteers encountering unforeseen circumstances that could adversely affect planned or anticipated outcomes. Keywords: terrorismintelligenceIrish Republican Army (IRA) Notes 1. Brendan Hughes, interview with author, 17 July 2001. 2. CitationKeegan, Intelligence in War; CitationHerman, Intelligence Power in Peace and War; CitationLaqueur, A World of Secrets. 3. CitationTroy, 'The "Correct" Definition of Intelligence', 443, 449. 4. CitationShulsky, Silent Warfare, 1–2; CitationTaplin, 'Six General Principles of Intelligence', 476–7; CitationBozeman, Strategic Intelligence and Statecraft, 9–10. 5. Troy, 'The "Correct" Definition of Intelligence'; Taplin, 'Six General Principles of Intelligence'. 6. CitationGodfrey, 'Ethics and Intelligence'. 7. Herman, Intelligence Power in Peace and War; CitationKent, Strategic Intelligence for American World Policy; Keegan, Intelligence in War. 8. CitationWohlstetter, Pearl Harbor; CitationHughes-Wilson, Military Intelligence Blunders. 9. CitationCharters, 'Intelligence and Psychological Warfare Operations in Northern Ireland'; CitationMotley, 'International Terrorism'; CitationPrince, 'Is There a Role for Intelligence in Combating Terrorism'. 10. CitationWilkinson, Terrorism and the Liberal State, 136–42; CitationWardlaw, Political Terrorism, 131–46; CitationBenjamin and Simon, The Age of Sacred Terror, 350–83. 11. CitationGunaratna, Inside Al Qaeda, 233. 12. CitationKrause, 'Insurgent Intelligence', 291. 13. CitationBowyer Bell, 'The Armed Struggle and Underground Intelligence', 149. 14. CitationMaguire, 'The Intelligence War in Northern Ireland'. 15. The author is grateful to Dr John Horgan for his guidance and advice on the IRA's intelligence structure through personal communication during July 2004. Some of the observations contained in this section are drawn from this advice and the research conducted by him into these matters. 16. CitationBowyer Bell, The IRA: 1968–2000, 252. 17. The blueprint for these reforms became known as 'the Twomey report', named after the IRA's Chief of Staff, who had the document in his possession at the time of his arrest in late 1977. It appears, however, that Gerry Adams may have been the author after having been tasked by the Army Council to design the reorganisation plan. CitationMoloney, A Secret History of the IRA, 156. 18. Coogan, The IRA, 576–81; CitationProvisional IRA, 'There Will Be No More Ceasefires Until the End', 14. 19. CitationCoogan, The IRA, 579. 20. See, for example, CitationDrake, 'The Provisional IRA', 47; Moloney, A Secret History of the IRA, 156. 21. CitationHorgan and Taylor, 'The Provisional Irish Republican Army', 19–20. 22. See, for example, Collins, Killing Rage, 18–19. 23. CitationMacStiofain, Memoirs of a Revolutionary, 103, in which he made the decision to keep the number of intelligence files to a minimum, instead encouraging local intelligence officers to retain information in their heads. 24. Anonymous IRA volunteer 'A', interview with author, 5 August 2004. It has also been suggested that the ASU itself was meant to reflect this notion of specialisation of labour, with the ASU containing a quartermaster, an intelligence officer, and at least two operatives. Eamon Collins, however, observes that in reality, this arrangement was also not adhered to. Collins, Killing Rage, 82–3. 25. The IRA's security unit, also known as the 'Nutting Squad', was also an intelligence unit of sorts, although its functions extended beyond purely intelligence matters. Anonymous IRA volunteer 'A', interview with author, 5 August 2004. 26. There are indications that the Director of Intelligence was also entrusted with other tasks. For example, the IRA's Chief of Staff in the early 1970s, Sean McStiofain, has indicated that he used his Director of Intelligence on missions to meet explosives suppliers. Sean McStiofain, interview with Anthony McIntyre, 3 October 1995. 27. Anonymous IRA volunteer 'D', personal communication, 15 July 2004. 28. Anonymous IRA volunteer 'D', personal communication, 10 June 2004; Horgan and Taylor, 'The Provisional Irish Republican Army', 20. 29. Collins, Killing Rage, 95, 100. Eamon Collins is an example of the idiosyncratic and opportunistic nature of the intelligence officer's role within the IRA. It would appear that Collins was a member of the Newry ASU, but demonstrated such aptitude for intelligence collection that he assumed the role of intelligence officer, in addition to his other functions. 30. Anonymous IRA volunteer 'A', interview with author, 5 August 2004. 31. Anonymous IRA volunteer 'A', interview with author, 5 August 2004 32. The Operations Officer functioned within the brigade and was responsible for planning operations. CitationHarnden, Bandit Country, 53. 33. Anonymous IRA volunteer 'D', interview with author, 15 July 2004. 34. Anonymous IRA volunteer 'C', interview with author, 26 September 2002. 35. Anonymous IRA volunteer 'A', interview with author, 5 August 2004. 36. CitationBowyer Bell, IRA Tactics and Targets, 76. 37. Anonymous IRA volunteer 'A', interview with author, 5 August 2004. 38. Horgan and Taylor, 'The Provisional Irish Republican Army', 15. 39. Brendan Hughes, interview with author, 17 July 2001. 40. Anonymous IRA volunteer 'D', interview with author, 15 July 2004. 41. MacStiofain, Memoirs of a Revolutionary, 103. 42. Brendan Hughes, interview with author, 17 July 2004. 43. These local influences also diminished, but by no means eliminated, the need to disseminate intelligence or demonstrate its accuracy for the benefit of commanders whose role it was to approve operations. Local commanders, simply because they lived and operated in a relatively confined area, were sometimes aware of potential targets without needing to be informed of this by intelligence officers. In describing the process whereby local commanders provided approval for an operation, one volunteer explained that verifying the identity of the target was unnecessary. According to one volunteer, '[t]he Battalion leadership, because they came from the area, locally, it wasn't as if you were reporting to somebody three cities away, "we have identified a target and we're trying to verify it." There was a shared assumption, a shared pool of knowledge. You were talking to people who were your commanders but who were also local'. Anonymous IRA volunteer 'D', interview with author, 26 September 2002. 44. MacStiofain, Memoirs of a Revolutionary, 103. 45. CitationCollins, Killing Rage, 105. 46. Anonymous IRA volunteer 'A', interview with author, 24 September 2002. 47. Citation'Behind the Mask'. 48. CitationUrban, Big Boys Rules, 19, 188. McKittrick et al. observe that from 1972 the number of Army killed by such attacks decreased rapidly (from 108 in 1972, to 15 in 1975), while the number of other security force deaths experienced a corresponding, albeit less dramatic increase. CitationMcKittrick et al., Lost Lives, 1473–4. 49. For instance, Urban observes that of the 159 members of the Ulster Defence Regiment killed between its formation in 1970 and the end of 1986, 129 were off duty. Urban, Big Boys Rules, 187. 50. Anonymous IRA volunteer 'A', interview with author, 15 August 2004. 51. Collins, Killing Rage, 131. 52. Harnden, Bandit Country, 53. 53. Citation'Engineer Put Finger on Victim'. 54. Citation'Provos Have Spies in Government'. 55. Collins, Killing Rage, 89. 56. CitationProvisional IRA, Untitled. 57. Collins, Killing Rage, 89. 58. Brendan Hughes, interview with author, 17 July 2001. 59. CitationMcGartland, Fifty Dead Men Walking, 174. 60. CitationMcGartland, Fifty Dead Men Walking, 183. 61. Collins, Killing Rage, 99. 62. CitationMacCarthaigh, 'Master Spy Keeps the Troubled Peace Alive'. 63. McGartland, Fifty Dead Men Walking, 220–1. 64. CitationMcCrystal, 'Teenagers Who Enlist for Terror'. 65. Citation'IRA Knew of Envoy's Secret Trip'. 66. Citation'Queen's Schedule Obtained by Ira'. 67. Anonymous IRA volunteer 'D', interview with author, 26 September 2002. 68. Anonymous IRA volunteer 'B', interview with author, 26 September 2002. 69. CitationGilmour, Dead Ground, 127. 70. Cited in CitationParker, Death of a Hero, 65. Indeed, the author experienced the efficiency and ubiquity of this system during research travels to Northern Ireland. After walking in the vicinity of the Protestant stronghold of Sandy Row, the author was cautioned by a member of the Republican movement to keep clear of this location after indicating that his movements in this area had been observed and reported back to him. On another occasion while shopping in a small grocery store on the Falls Road, the author was identified by a female attendant as a visiting Australian researcher who was staying at the house of a local resident. Within this community, news travels fast and often reached the IRA after passing through a number of individuals. 71. Brendan Hughes, interview with author, 72. Parker, Death of a Hero, 29. 73. Cited in Harnden, Bandit Country, 88–9. 74. Anonymous IRA volunteer 'B', interview with author, 26 September 2002. 75. Collins, Killing Rage, 73. 76. Anonymous IRA volunteer 'A', interview with author, 5 August 2004. Indeed, this volunteer, in reference to the deleterious effects of inactivity on the Nationalist community observed that, '… it is corrosive to do nothing.' 77. CitationToolis, 'Bookworms Who Burrow For IRA'. 78. CitationWatt and Hopkins, 'IRA Has Target List of Tories – Police'. 79. Provisional IRA, Untitled. 80. Gilmour, Dead Ground, 138. 81. Anonymous IRA volunteer 'A', interview with author, 5 August 2004. 82. Provisional IRA, Untitled. 83. Anonymous IRA volunteer 'A', interview with author, 24 September 2002. 84. Collins, Killing Rage, 88–9, 99. 85. Urban, Big Boys Rules, 103; Collins, Killing Rage, 79. 86. Citation'Maze Officer Who Helped IRA Kill Colleague Gets Life'. IRA intelligence also provided the organization accessibility to off-duty prison officers. Knowledge of these capabilities among prison staff allowed Republican prisoners to intimidate guards in order to receive preferential treatment. According to one IRA volunteer, '… if they [prison staff] messed around with the IRA… there were people on the outside who could get to them very easily'. Gilmour, Dead Ground, 261. Intelligence, therefore, provided credibility to IRA threats. 87. CitationDoherty, 'SIGINT used by Anti-State Forces'. 88. CitationDoherty, 'Provo Computer Monitors British Intelligence'. 89. CitationRyder, The RUC 1922–2000, 216–20; Urban, Big Boys Rules, 114. 90. CitationMcKenna, 'IRA Bug Britain's Top Spy Catcher!'; Citation'Big British Army Inquiry Follows IRA Bugging'; CitationDillon, The Dirty War, 71–4. 91. Citation'IRA May Have Tapped Calls Between Major and Hume'. The IRA's interest in acquiring political intelligence led the organization in the mid-1980s to establish a black propaganda department under the control of the Director of Intelligence. Its main function was to gather intelligence on politicians, including through the use of telephone intercepts, to discredit politicians and undermine voters' faith in the established political system and parties. CitationO'Callaghan, The Informer, 255. 92. Watt and Hopkins, 'IRA Has Target List of Tories – Police'. 93. CitationLister, 'IRA Spy Ring Infiltrates £2m Ulster Police Fund'. 94. CitationDaley, 'Peace Doubts over IRA Files'. 95. CitationMyers, 'the War in Ulster Is over. The IRA Just Won'. The stolen disks were reportedly accessed from the temporarily relocated offices of the source handling unit. The relative insecurity of these relocated offices represented the vulnerability that IRA intelligence often seeks. 96. CitationCowan, 'Peace Process at Risk over "Spy Ring" Raids'. 97. This position receives support from an IRA Army Council member who shortly after the breakdown of the 1996 ceasefire observed that intelligence would be fundamental to the IRA's continued ability to maintain pressure on the British through what he refers to as 'quality operations'. Cited in CitationHorgan, The Psychology of Terrorism, 72–3. 98. Watt and Hopkins, 'IRA Has Target List of Tories – Police'. 99. Anonymous IRA volunteer 'D', interview with author, 26 September 2002. 100. Anonymous IRA volunteer 'D', interview with author, 26 September 2002 101. Collins, Killing Rage, 133–4. 102. It was not uncommon for the IRA volunteer entrusted with the task of carrying out an operation to confirm the intelligence for himself. O'Callaghan, The Informer, 104–5. 103. Collins, Killing Rage, 104–13. 104. Local IRA commanders, for instance, were meant to act as a mechanism by which to limit purposeless or uncontrolled violence. One volunteer explained that before carrying out an attack on a member of the UVF, he was required to seek the approval of local IRA commanders. 'If I had said to them, "I will be shooting an innocent person in Donegal Pass", they would've said to me, "No, you aren't"'. Anonymous IRA volunteer 'D', interview with author, 26 September 2002. See also CitationSarma, 'Defensive Propaganda and IRA Political Control in Republican Communities', 1073–94 for a discussion on how the IRA engaged in smear and disinformation campaigns to discredit those members of their sympathetic community targeted for execution. These campaigns were designed to retain the support of the Republican community by establishing these targets as 'legitimate'. 105. See, for example, McGartland, Fifty Dead Men Walking, 145. 106. Collins, Killing Rage, 20. 107. Anonymous IRA volunteer 'D', interview with author, 26 September 2002. 108. Harnden, Bandit Country, 77. 109. Provisional IRA, Untitled. 110. Anonymous IRA volunteer 'D', interview with author, 26 September 2002; McGartland, Fifty Dead Men Walking, 178. 111. Brendan Hughes, interview with author, 17 July 2001. 112. Anonymous IRA volunteer 'A', interview with author, 24 September 2002. 113. Provisional IRA, Untitled. 114. McGartland, Fifty Dead Men Walking, 147. 115. Citation'IRA Held Rehearsals of Checkpoint Bombings'. 116. Brendan Hughes, interview with author, 23 September 2002. 117. Brendan Hughes, interview with author, 17 July 2001. 118. CitationSilke, 'Beyond Horror', p. 56. 119. CitationBloch and Fitzgerald, British Intelligence and Covert Action, 230. 120. Horgan and Taylor, 'The Provisional Irish Republican Army', 23. Similar observations have also been made by those studying fundamentalists. For instance, Pape has observed that a reduction in the confidence levels of suicide terrorists can also deter attacks where the likelihood of success is reduced. CitationPape, 'The Strategic Logic of Suicide Terrorism', 2. 121. CitationSilke, 'Beating the Water'. 122. Maguire, 'The Intelligence War in Northern Ireland', 152. Perceptions of the relative power of the terrorist organisation to that of the State creates further opportunities for the terrorists to assert control over their local communities. For instance, where these local communities believe that the formal apparatuses of the State are unable to meet some of its essential needs, especially those normally taken on by the criminal justice system, then the terrorist organisation can take on a vigilante role. The result is an increase in the power and control of the terrorist organisation, with a corresponding weakening of the position and credibility of the State. Silke is correct when he observes that, '[s]o long as the PIRA engages in a significant vigilante role, it is inevitably usurping many of the traditional functions of the RUC, and in the process it usurps much of the RUC's authority and influence. The PIRA's vigilante role increases the degree of power the Provisionals' have within the community and acts as a powerful motivation for the community to remain supportive of them'. Silke, 'Beating the Water', 88–9. 123. CitationPape, Dying to Win, 30; Horgan, The Psychology of Terrorism, 14. 124. Anonymous IRA volunteer 'A', interview with author, 24 September 2002. See also The Green Book's comments about the need for the IRA to remain a credible force by attaining each of its stated objectives. Credibility comes from a capacity to do what it claims it can and will do. Coogan, The IRA, 688. 125. Not all those recorded as being killed at these locations necessarily met their deaths at these places. For example, a number of people were abducted from their homes and subsequently killed at another location. 126. 'Work' is defined as a regular place of employment. It includes not only those killed at work, but also those killed or abducted and subsequently killed while travelling to or from their place of employment. On the other hand, it excludes members of the security forces killed in military barracks or police stations, or leaving or arriving at these locations. These instances are not necessarily indicative of the identification of a routine through surveillance or other intelligence collection methods. 'Home' simply refers to the victim's principal or a secondary residential location. 'Places Frequented' includes locations other than work or home that the victim attended on a relatively regular basis. This may include the homes of associates (family, friends, girlfriends), hotels/pubs, parks, churches, and public transport. 127. This category includes indiscriminate bombings, the killing of members of the security forces while on patrol, and accidental deaths. While excluded from among those categories indicative of the IRA's identification of a routine, it is likely that many of these deaths also resulted from the IRA's ability to isolate some pattern or routine in their victims' activities. For example, attacks on some security force patrols involved some surveillance to identify routines, including routes travelled and operational procedures. Gilmour, Dead Ground, 205. 128. Collins, Killing Rage, 295. See also, Horgan, The Psychology of Terrorism, 16. 129. Anonymous IRA volunteer 'A', interview with author, 5 August 2004. 130. Brendan Hughes, interview with author, 17 July 2001. 131. Of course not all intelligence collected by the IRA had operational utility. Given the scale of the IRA's capacity to collect intelligence, it would seem that the organization gathered more than it was ever able to use. It has been observed that the number of operations relative to the amount of intelligence collected was small. Anonymous IRA volunteer 'A', interview with author, 24 September 2002. For instance, not all intelligence proved reliable or was capable of providing a basis from which to instigate an operation. In this way, the target failed to make the transition from one intelligence phase to the next. Alternatively, the IRA might have uncovered detailed intelligence, but not enough to proceed with an attack. Eamon Collins, in reference to one individual he was targeting explained, 'I had built up a huge amount of information about him, enough to kill him ten times over, but could not find a way of getting to him'. Collins, Killing Rage, 94. 132. Of course not all intelligence collected by the IRA had operational utility. Given the scale of the IRA's capacity to collect intelligence, it would seem that the organization gathered more than it was ever able to use. It has been observed that the number of operations relative to the amount of intelligence collected was small. Anonymous IRA volunteer 'A', interview with author, 24 September 2002. For instance, not all intelligence proved reliable or was capable of providing a basis from which to instigate an operation. In this way, the target failed to make the transition from one intelligence phase to the next. Alternatively, the IRA might have uncovered detailed intelligence, but not enough to proceed with an attack. Eamon Collins, in reference to one individual he was targeting explained, 'I had built up a huge amount of information about him, enough to kill him ten times over, but could not find a way of getting to him'. Collins, Killing Rage, 21. 133. Gilmour, Dead Ground, 235. 134. CitationAdams, Exploring the New Frontiers of Espionage, 199.
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