Portal de Periódicos da CAPES

The Danger of Nuclear Terrorism: The Indian Case

2009; Taylor & Francis; Volume: 33; Issue: 4 Linguagem: Inglês

10.1080/09700160902907050

1754-0054

Reshmi Kazi,

Nuclear Issues and Defense

Abstract The concept of nuclear terrorism is possibly the least understood of all dangers emanating from nuclear weapons. However, certain drivers like the nuclear black market (the AQ Khan Network), proliferation of nuclear technology, and the increasing demand for nuclear energy can make it easier for terrorist organizations like Al Qaida to acquire fissile material. The threat of nuclear terrorism cannot be ignored any longer. Nuclear terrorism is a plausible phenomenon that deserves adequate consideration, substantial countermeasures, expertise, and competence to combat it. Notes 1. Speech delivered by Prime Minister Manmohan Singh at the International Conference on ‘Towards a World Free of Nuclear Weapons’, jointly organized by the Centre for Strategic and International Studies and Indian Council of World Affairs, June 9–10, 2008, New Delhi. 2. Gavin Cameron, ‘Nuclear Terrorism Reconsidered’, Current History, April 2000, p. 154. 3. Carson J. Mark, Theodore Taylor, Eugene Eyster, William Maraman, and Jacob Wechler, ‘Can Terrorists Build Nuclear Weapons’, in Paul Leventhal and Yonah Alexander (eds.), Preventing Nuclear Terrorism, The Report and Papers of the International Task Force on Prevention of Nuclear Terrorism, Lexington Books, Lexington, MA, 1987. 4. See Gavin Cameron, ‘WMD Terrorism in the United States: The Threat and Possible Countermeasures’, The Nonproliferation Review, 7(1), Spring 2000, p. 172; Jerrold M. Post, ‘Differentiating the Threat of Radiological/Nuclear Terrorism Motivations and Constraints’, Paper presented at the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), Symposium on International Safeguards: Verification and Nuclear Material Security, Vienna, Austria (2001, October 29–November 1) as stated in Morten Bremer Mærli, Annette Schaper and Frank Barnaby, ‘The Characteristics of Nuclear Terrorist Weapons’, American Behavioral Scientist, 46(6), February 2003, p. 743; DC Rapoport, ‘Then and Now: What Have We Learned?’, Terrorism and Political Violence, 13(3), Autumn 2001, pp. xi–xvi. 5. Bernard Anet, Ernst Schmid, and Christoph Wirz, ‘Nuclear Terrorism: A Threat to Switzerland?’ Spiez Laboratory, Defence Procurement Agency, at http://www.vbs.admin.ch/acls/e/current/fact_sheet/nuklearterrorismus/pronto (Accessed October 30, 2003). 6. Karl-Heinz Kamp, ‘An Overrated Nightmare’, Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, 52(4), July/August 1996, pp. 30–34. 7. Morten Bremer Maerli, Atomterrorisme [Atomic Terrorism], Norwegian Institute of International Affairs, Oslo, 1999, p. 24. Though this is a narrow definition of nuclear terrorism, it has several implications. First, by referring to non-state actors, this study excludes the dynamics of nuclear politics and the appurtenant nuclear terror as an instrument of control and suppression in the inter-state domain. Second, this definition recognizes the severity of credible nuclear threats or nuclear hoaxes in unleashing psychological terror on the targets by installing fear and devastation. 8. See Francesco Calogero, ‘Nuclear Terrorism: Likely Scenarios, Preventive Actions’, Paper presented at the Annual Pugwash Conference, Halifax, Nova Scotia, July 2003; and Tonya L. Putnam, ‘Communicating Nuclear Risk: Informing the Public about the Dangers of Nuclear Terrorism’, Workshop Report, Center for International Security and Cooperation, May 20, 2002, at http://www.ciaonet.org/wps/put01/put01.html (Accessed March 2, 2007). 9. David Albright, ‘Secrets that Matter’, Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, 56(6), November/December 2000, p. 58. 10. The limited effects of the chemical attacks by the Aum Shinrikyo cult in 1995 and the US anthrax attacks of 2001 are often cited as examples by this school. 11. Center for Counterproliferation Research, ‘Chemical, Biological, Radiological and Nuclear Terrorism: The Threat According to the Open Literature’, National Defense University, May 31, 2002, at http://www.ndu.edu/centercounter/CBRN_Annotated_Bib.pdf. 12. Paul J. Smith, The Terrorism Ahead: Confronting Transnational Violence in the Twenty-first Century, ME Sharpe, New York, 2008, p. 104. 13. In 1996, Osama bin Laden asked Khaled Sheikh Mohammed, the principal planner behind the 9/11 deadly attack, ‘Why do you use an axe when you can use a bulldozer?’ See Graham Allison, Nuclear Terrorism: The Ultimate Preventable Catastrophe, Henry Holt, New York, 2004, p. 19. Mohammed, during his interrogation revealed that by ‘axe’ bin Laden referred to a proposal to charter a small plane filled with explosives and crash it into the CIA headquarters in Langley, Virginia. Bin Laden gave instructions to Mohammed to devise a more dramatic, devastating blow against the ‘hated enemy’. See Georg Mascolo and Holgar Stark, ‘Operation Holy Tuesday’, New York Times, October 27, 2003. The possibility of nuclear terrorism is becoming more salient in international affairs with the growing sophistication and lethality of conventional forms of terrorism, the vulnerability of nuclear power and research reactors to terrorist attack, and of weapons-usable nuclear materials to pilferage activities. 14. Gavin Cameron, n. 2. 15. ‘The Nth Country experiment showed that three post-docs with no nuclear knowledge could design a working atom bomb.’ Dan Stober, ‘No Experience Necessary’, Bulletin of Atomic Scientists, March/April 2003, pp. 57–63. 16. Richard G. Lugar, ‘The Lugar Survey Proliferation Threats and Responses’, Washington, DC, June 2005, p. 16. 17. Forty-five out of 82 respondents. Ibid. 18. Ibid., p. 17. 19. Survey conducted by means of a questionnaire on nuclear terrorism that was circulated to experts based all over India. Names of the experts cannot be disclosed due to organizational restraints. See Annexure 1. 20. ‘IAEA Releases Latest Illicit Trafficking Database Statistics’, at http://un.by/en/news/world/2006/28-08-06-13.html (Accessed June 16, 2008). 21. Ibid. A few of these incidents involved seizures of kilogram quantities of weapons-usable nuclear material, but most involved very small quantities. 22. ‘UN Atomic Watchdog Agency Reports Cases of Illegal Trafficking in Nuclear Materials’, UN News Centre, at http://www.un.org/apps/news/story.asp?NewsID=21409&Cr=nuclear&Cr1=iaea (Accessed June 16, 2008). 23. This is not to say that all this diverted material has been appropriated by Al Qaida but it can be presumed that they have been a major client seeking fissile materials. 24. IAEA statement of the incidents, which were reported by the states involved with the Office's Illicit Trafficking Database (ITDB), UN News Centre, at http://www.un.org/apps/news/story.asp?NewsID=21409&Cr=nuclear&Cr1=iaea (Accessed June 16, 2008). 25. ‘Keeping Tabs on Nuclear Material’, International Herald Tribune, November 2, 2008. 26. D. MacKenzie and G. Sinardi, ‘Tacit Knowledge, Weapons Design and the Uninvention of Nuclear Weapons’, American Journal of Sociology, 101(1), July 1995, pp. 44–99. 27. It involves little more than slamming two pieces of HEU together at high speed and can produce a powerful explosion. See Luis Alvarez, The Adventures of a Physicist, Basic Books, New York, 1987. 28. Matthew Bunn and Anthony Wier, ‘Terrorist Nuclear Weapon Construction: How Difficult’, The ANNALS of the American Academy of Political and Social Science, 607(1), 2006, pp. 133–149; Carson J. Mark, Theodore Taylor, Eugene Eyster, William Maraman and Jacob Wechler, ‘Can Terrorists Build Nuclear Weapons’, in P. Leventhal and Y. Alexander (eds.), Preventing Nuclear Terrorism, The Report and Papers of the International Task Force on Prevention of Nuclear Terrorism, Lexington Books, Lexington MA, 1987, n. 3, at http://www.nci.org/k-m/makeab.htm (Accessed August 7, 2007). 29. James C. Warf, one of the leaders of the chemical processing programmes in the Manhattan Project, has argued that the steps needed to get HEU from research reactor fuel in which it is mixed with other materials ‘are not difficult procedures, particularly for someone intent on acquiring an atomic explosive; one might say, in fact, that they are not beyond the ability of moststudents in introductory chemistry classes at the college level’. See Committee on Science, Space, and Technology, ‘Conversion of Research and Test Reactors to Low-Enriched Uranium (LEU) Fuel’, US Congress, House of Representatives, 98th Congress, 2nd Session, September 25, 1984, pp. 514–516. 30. US Department of Energy, Office of Arms Control and Nonproliferation, Nonproliferation and Arms Control Assessment of Weapons-Usable Fissile Material Storage and Excess Plutonium Disposition Alternatives, DOE/NN-0007, DOE, Washington, DC, 1997, at http://www.osti.gov/bridge/servlets/purl/425259-CXr7Qn/webviewable/425259.pdf (Accessed January 2, 2007), pp. 37–39. 31. Graham Allison, n. 13, p. 97. 32. Morten Bremer Mærli, Annette Schaper, and Frank Barnaby, ‘The Characteristics of Nuclear Terrorist Weapons’, American Behavioral Scientist, 46(6), February 2003, p. 732. 33. Ibid. 34. Dan Stober, n. 15, pp. 57–63. 35. International Panel on Fissile Material, ‘Global Fissile Material Report 2007’, Second Report of the International Panel on Fissile Material, IPFM, Princeton, 2007, p. 2. 36. Russia and the US own some 95 per cent of these weapons; the remaining are distributed among Israel, India, Pakistan, and, most recently, North Korea. US nuclear weapons are also reportedly located in Britain, Germany, the Netherlands, Belgium, Italy, and Turkey. There are other states that are near to joining the nuclear club like Iran and presumably Syria, Taiwan, Japan, and Saudi Arabia. Robert S. Norris and Hans S. Kristensen, ‘NRDC Nuclear Notebook: Global Nuclear Stockpiles, 1945–2006’, Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, 62(4), July/August 2006, pp. 64–66. 37. International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), ‘Safeguards Glossary’, IAEA, Vienna, 2001, at http://www-pub.iaea.org/MTCD/publications/PDF/nvs-3-cd/Start.pdf (Accessed July 9, 2007). 38. During 2006, the international community continued to make steady progress in reducing HEU stocks but made virtually no efforts in cleaning of excess weapons plutonium or slowing the production of separated civilian plutonium. International Panel on Fissile Material, n. 35, p. 7. 39. In 2006, Russia blended down 30 tonnes of excess weapon HEU and at least 1.5 tonnes of excess civilian HEU, and the United States blended down approximately 10 tonnes of HEU. This is a huge amount of material but it corresponds to only about 10 per cent of the remaining HEU assigned for blend down and 3 per cent of the global HEU stockpile. See International Panel on Fissile Material, n. 35, p. 7. 40. Sixteen out of 56 countries that have hosted HEU-fuelled reactors have had their civilian HEU removed. 41. Half of these reactors are in Russia which still does not have a policy of converting HEU-fuelled reactors into LEU fuel. See Ole Reistad and Styrkaar Hustveit, ‘HEU Fuel Cycle Inventories and Progress on Global Minimization’, The Nonproliferation Review, 15(2), July 2008, pp. 265–287. 42. US Congress, Government Accountability Office, Nuclear Nonproliferation: DOE Needs to Take Action to Further Reduce the Use of Weapons-Usable Uranium in Civilian Research Reactors, GAO-04–807, GAO, Washington, DC, 2004, at http://www.gao.gov/new.items/d04807.pdf (Accessed July 10, 2007), p. 28. 43. Z. Mian, A.H. Nayyar, R. Rajaramana, and M.V. Ramana, ‘Fissile Material in South Asia and the Implications of the US India Nuclear Deal’, Science and Global Security, 14, 2004, pp. 117–143. 44. These machines have the potential to significantly accelerate Pakistan's inventory and production rate of weapons-grade HEU more than previously estimated. This material will be highly attractive for Al Qaida as it will not require further enrichment or processing; it is not highly radioactive and can be easily handled by the terrorists and can be easily transportable. See M. Hibbs, ‘Pakistan Developed More Powerful Centrifuges’, Nuclear Fuel, 32(3), January 29, 2007, p. 4 and H.M. Hibbs, ‘P-4 Centrifuge Raised Intelligence Concerns about Post 1975 Data Theft’, Nucleonics Week, 48(7), February 15, 2007 pp. 1, 13. 45. Matthew Bunn, ‘Securing the Bomb 2007’, Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs, September 2007, p. 13. 46. Ibid. 47. Elena Sokova, William C. Potter, and Cristina Chuen, ‘Recent Weapons Grade Uranium Smuggling Case: Nuclear Materials Are Still on the Loose’, Center for Nonproliferation Studies, Monterey Institute of International Studies, January 26, 2007, at http://cns.miis.edu/pubs/week/070126.htm (Accessed July 9, 2007). 48. The Pelindaba nuclear facility is one of South Africa's most heavily guarded ‘national key points’—defined by the government as ‘any place or area that is so important that its loss, damage, disruption or immobilization may prejudice the Republic’. See Micah Zenko, ‘A Nuclear Site Is Breached’, Washington Post, December 20, 2007, p. A29. 49. Micah Zenko, Ibid. 50. ‘Mortar Attack on Pak N-Facility’, Rediff.com, May 17, 2003. 51. Matthew Bunn, n. 45, p. 12. 52. Matthew Bunn, n. 45, pp. 12–13. 53. See Graham Allison, n. 13; Matthew Bunn, n. 45. 54. Matthew Bunn, n. 45, p. 16. 55. The Associated Press, ‘Nuclear Powers Must Do More to Prevent Terrorists Getting Nukes, Expert Says’, June 18, 2007, at http://www.iht.com/articles/ap/2007/06/18/news/UN-GEN-UN-Nuclear-Terrorism.php (Accessed January 23, 2008). 56. International Atomic Energy Agency, ‘Incidents Involving HEU and Pu Confirmed to the ITDB, 1993–2006’, IAEA, Vienna, 2007, at http://www.iaea.org/NewsCenter/Focus/NuclearSecurity/pdf/heu-pu_1993-2006.pdf (Accessed September 10, 2007). 57. US National Intelligence Council, Annual Report to Congress on the Safety and Security of Russian Nuclear Facilities and Military Forces, Central Intelligence Agency, Washington, DC, 2006, at http://www.fas.org/irp/nic/russia0406.html (Accessed May 16, 2007). 58. Nuclear facilities typically employ large numbers of people, and certain employees must have access to vital areas of the facility in order to perform their work. Some employees could take advantage of that access to perform acts of sabotage or theft that could be immensely destructive. Daniel Hirsch, ‘The Truck Bomb and Insider Threats to Nuclear Facilities’, at http://www.nci.org/g-h/hirschtb.htm (Accessed October 23, 2008). 59. At http://www.terrorismanswers.org/terrorism/media.html. 60. Walter Luer, ‘Weapons of Mass Destruction’, in Pamela L. Griset and Sue Mahan (eds.), Terrorism in Perspective, Sage, London, 2003, pp. 239–240. 61. John V. Parachini, ‘Comparing Motives and Outcomes of Mass Casualty Terrorism Involving Conventional and Unconventional Weapons’, Studies in Conflict and Terrorism, 24(5), September–October 2001, pp. 390–391. The three cases are Rajneesh religious cult that attempted to influence a local election by poisoning the local people with Salmonella typhymurium; the usage of chlorine gas by the Liberation of Tamil Eelam against the Sri Lankan military, which led to the injury of approximately 60 armed personnel; and the use of sarin gas by the Aum Shinrikyo cult against commuters in a Tokyo subway in 1995. 62. Richard K. Betts, ‘The New Threat of Mass Destruction’, Foreign Affairs, 77(1), January–February 1998, p. 27. 63. Ibid., p. 28. 64. Andrew H. Kydd and Barbara F. Walter, ‘The Strategies of Terrorism’, International Security, 31(1), Summer 2006, p. 50. 65. Ibid., p. 51. 66. Richard A. Falkenrath, Robert D. Newman, and Bradley A. Tayer, America's Achilles' Heel: Nuclear, Biological and Chemical Terrorism and Covert Attack, MIT Press, Cambridge, MA, 1998, p. 167. 67. Jessica Stern, The Ultimate Terrorists, Harvard University Press, Cambridge, MA, 2000, p. 6. 68. Ibid. 69. Ibid. 70. US Department of State, Patterns of Global Terrorism 1996, US Department of State, Washington, DC, April 1997, at http://www.state.gov/global/terrorism (Accessed May 27, 2007), p. 1. 71. Bruce Hoffman, ‘Terrorism and WMD: Some Preliminary Hypotheses’, Nonproliferation Review, 4(3), Spring–Summer 1997, p. 47. 72. Eric Schmitt, ‘Attacks in Pakistan Rising, State Department Reports’, at http://www.nytimes.com/2008/05/01/washington/01terror.html?_r=1&scp=5&sq=nuclear&st=nyt&oref=slogin (Accessed May 2, 2008). 73. US Department of State, Country Reports on Terrorism 2007, US Department of State Publication Office of the Coordinator for Counterterrorism, April 2008, at http://www.state.gov/documents/organization/105904.pdf (Accessed June 1, 2008), p. 7. 74. Robin M. Frost, ‘Nuclear Terrorism after 9/11’, Adelphi Paper 378, Routledge, The International Institute for Strategic Studies, 2005, p. 55. 75. See David Bukay, ‘The Religious Foundations of Suicide Bombings: Islamist Ideology’, Middle East Quarterly, 13(4), Fall 2006, pp. 27–36. 76. John Kelsay, Arguing the Just War in Islam, Harvard University Press, Cambridge, MA, 2007, p. 204. 77. Ahmed Rashid, ‘Jihadi Suicide Bombers: The New Wave’, The New York Review of Books, 55(10), June 12, 2008, at http://www.nybooks.com/articles/21473 (Accessed June 13, 2008). 78. Ibid. 79. Most of the respondents believe that with the rapid globalization of technology, relevant information, and societal transformation, the probability of terrorist accessing sensitive material and technology has increased. 80. In December 1999, Nazeer Ahmed Mujjaid, the military advisor of Al Qaida, in a fax message to the Voice of America in Washington, proclaimed that the goal of these groups is to fight against ‘Americans, Russians and Indians’. In April 2006, during President Bush's visit to South Asia, Bin Laden projected global jihad against the ‘anti-Islam conspiracy of the Crusaders (Christians), the Jewish people and the Hindus’. B. Raman, ‘Al Qaeda's Shadow over India’, International Terrorism Monitor, Paper No. 242, South Asia Analysis Group, at http://www.saag.org/paper23/paper2267.html (Accessed June 13, 2008). Al Qaida's name floated in the Indian media in the aftermath of the Godhra carnage in Gujarat. 81. Joby Warrick, ‘U.S. Cites Big Gains against Al-Qaeda’, Washington Post, May 30, 2008, p. A01. 82. ‘Al Qaeda Not Weakening – BBC Poll’, BBC News, September 29, 2008, at http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/americas/7638566.stm (Accessed September 30, 2008). 83. See Nuclear Black Markets: Pakistan, Khan and the Rise of Proliferation Networks, International Institute for Strategic Studies, 2007, p. 130. 84. ‘Uranium Sting Nets 2 in India’, United Press International (UPI), April 11, 2005. 85. ‘India: Smugglers Caught’, Nucleonics Week, November 3, 1994. 86. ‘CBI to Go Ahead with Uranium Theft Case Probe’, The Indian Express, July 30, 1998. 87. ‘Uranium Seized’, The Statesman (India), August 25, 2001. 88. ‘Pakistani Links Military to Failed Plot to Kill Him’, The New York Times, May 28, 2004. 89. ‘Pakistan's N-arsenal Called Risk-prone’, Daily Times, June 14, 2008, at http://www.dailytimes.com.pk/default.asp?page=2008\06\14\story_14-6-2008_pg7_13 (Accessed June 16, 2008). 90. Making political appointments in such strategic institutions would be extremely dangerous. Entertaining such requests would not only result in lowering of selection standards but would also adversely affect the working environments/efficiency of strategic organizations. This will also result in politicizing the strategic organizations which is not desirable. Ansar Abbasi, ‘SPD Also Under Pressure Over Political Appointments’, The News, at http://www.thenews.com.pk/top_story_detail.asp?Id=17614 (Accessed October 1, 2008). 91. Adrian Levy and Catherine Scott-Clark, Deception: Pakistan, the United States, and the Secret Trade in Nuclear Weapons, Penguin Books, New Delhi, 2007, p. 448. 92. Joseph Cirincione, ‘The Greatest Threat to Us All’, The New York Review of Books, 55(3), March 6, 2008, at http://www.nybooks.com/articles/21054 (Accessed March 7, 2008). 93. The build-up, monitored constantly with Intelligence inputs, revealed that at least 500 terrorists are hiding along the border plotting to strike. The TV channel Times Now managed to access thermal images of the militant build-up, which provides more proof of Pakistan's constant provocation. ‘Proof of Terrorist Build-up along J&K Border’, The Times of India, September 3, 2008. 94. Vishwa Mohan, ‘Al Qaeda Tech Used in Bangalore, Surat Bombs’, The Times of India, July 31, 2008. 95. The Department of Atomic Energy proclaims that the safety mechanism of ‘radiation protection infrastructure in India is on very sound footing and is constantly being strengthened’. See ‘Success Stories – Radiation Protection’, at http://www.barc.ernet.in/rcaindia/4_7.html. 96. Charles D. Ferguson, ‘Assessing the Vulnerability of the Indian Civilian Nuclear Program to Military and Terrorist Attack’, in Henry Sokolski (ed.), Gauging US-Indian Strategic Cooperation, March 2007, at http://www.npec-web.org?Essays/20060913-Ferguson-AttacksOnFacilities.pdf (Accessed May 23, 2008). 97. Rajesh M. Basrur and Hasan-Askari Rizvi, ‘Nuclear Terrorism and South Asia: Cooperative Monitoring’, Center Occasional Paper No. 25, Sandia National Laboratories, SAND 98–0505/February 25, 2003. The government's official website acknowledges ‘CISF is increasingly being called upon to perform important duties beyond its charter such as internal security, airport security and security of highways, election duty, etc’. It also protects steel plants, oil refineries, ports and airports, and many vital installations. The CISF website states that its seven training institutions are ‘trying to keep the force abreast of the latest trends in threat perception and its management vis-à-vis the technological advancement in the field’. See http://www.cisf.nic.in/. Perhaps this accounts for the major security failure involving one or more insiders in the theft of as many as 29 aluminium alloy titanium rings (used in rocket engines) from the high-security ISRO's Liquid PropulsionSystems Centre in Bangalore in February 2004. ‘Titanium Rings Stolen from ISRO’, Deccan Herald, February 14, 2004. There have been other organizational failures that raise concerns about India's nuclear establishment. In October 2003, a major security breach occurred when 18 to 20 computers containing highly classified data, including communication codes vital for ensuring secrecy of intragovernmental communications, were stolen from a Delhi office of the Defence Research and Development Organization (DRDO), an integral part of the nuclear weapons establishment. Lalit Kumar and Rajat Pandit, ‘Secret Military Codes Stolen from DRDO’, The Times of India, June 3, 2004. The codes remained unchanged for nearly nine months after the incident. In September 2004, a senior scientist at the Remote Sensing Applications Center (RSAC) in Lucknow was arrested along with his wife, a former employee at the centre, for selling classified satellite pictures and data. Aman Sharma, ‘Scientist Couple Held for Selling Data’, Indian Express, September 25, 2004. Nuclear facilities also face vulnerabilities from cyber-security threats. Information on any aspect of a nuclear facility from bomb design to security measures can be misappropriated by an insider. Nuclear facilities face potential risks from insiders. This can range from theft of material, support to outsiders by disruption of the alarm systems, sabotage of facilities or specific processes (such as cooling systems), and simple acts of assistance, such as providing building layouts or access codes to terrorists. Daniel Hirsch, n. 58. Disgruntled insiders can also resort to cutting electrical cables, setting fires, and damaging surveillance cameras. 98. The containment buildings of the CANDU-type reactors have approximately 4-foot thick concrete walls built around the main reactors. 99. Rajesh M. Basrur and Friedrich Steinhausler, ‘Nuclear Terrorism and Radiological Terrorism Threats for India: Risk Potential and Countermeasures’, at http://jps.anl.gov/vol1_iss1/3-Threats_for_India.pdf (Accessed March 22, 2008). 100. Helmut Hirsch, ‘Vulnerability of VVER-1000Nuclera Power Plants to Passenger Aircraft Crash’, World Information Service on Energy (WISE), November 2001, at http://www.antenna.nl/wise/terrorism/112001vver.html (Accessed January 23, 2008). 101. Every nuclear power plant is surrounded by a double-layer security arrangement with a distance of 1.5 km of sterilized zone from the nuclear facility deployed with sophisticated surveillance systems. Habitation is restricted in the sterilized zone which expands up to 5 km. The sterilized zone is again surrounded by an emergency planning zone of 16 km. The Nuclear Power Corporation India Ltd. is a member of the World Association of Nuclear Operators (WANO) that conducts peer reviews of all the atomic power stations progressively. 102. A more dedicated policy framework would essentially compose a comprehensive supporting infrastructure capable of delivering expertise and immediate response in coping with the challenge of nuclear terrorism. 103. The revision of DBT is of crucial importance, especially since India is planning to expand its nuclear establishment. The credibility of the security infrastructure needs to be reassessed. The growing power and influence of Taliban and Al Qaida in Afghanistan and Pakistan is a strong reason to review the DBT. 104. See Statement by Congressman Adam Schiff, Hearing on H.R. 2631, Nuclear Forensic and Attribution Act House Committee on Homeland Security Subcommittee on Emergency Threats, Cyber Security, and Science and Technology, October 10, 2007, at http://homeland.house.gov/SiteDocuments/20071010175127-33681.pdf (Accessed June 1, 2008). 105. This approach coordinates IAEA activities concerned with the physical protection of nuclear material and nuclear installations, nuclear material accountancy, detection of and response to trafficking in nuclear and other radioactive material, the security of radioactive sources, security in the transport of nuclear and other radioactive material, emergency response and emergency preparedness measures in member states and at the IAEA, and the promotion of adherence by states to relevant international instruments. The IAEA also helps to identify threats and vulnerabilities related to the security of nuclear and other radioactive material. See ‘Engineering Safety Aspects of the Protection of Nuclear Power Plants against Sabotage’, IAEA Nuclear Security Series No. 4, Technical Guidance, International Atomic Energy Agency, Vienna, 2007. 106. The personnel reliability programme should be reassessed periodically to meet the challenges of the insider problem in countering the threat of nuclear terrorism. 107. Preservation of vital information at every stage of nuclear mining is of vital importance to prevent any leakage of sensitive information. This necessitates periodic reassessment of research information storage systems for managing sensitive nuclear information. 108. The medical establishment should have adequate preparedness to respond to any incident of nuclear attack. It would be prudent on the part of the Indian Government to include necessary courses to respond to such emergency in the medical syllabus of the country. In addition, the fire brigade systems, the police training units, and the trauma control centres need to be developed to cope with a nuclear disaster. 109. The aim of the World Institute for Nuclear Security is to promote the best security practices, eliminate weak links in the global security chain, and, ultimately, keep terrorists from getting the bomb. William J. Broad, ‘New Security Organization Will Try to Prevent Nuclear Theft’, The New York Times, September 29, 2008, at http://www.nytimes.com/2008/09/29/world/europe/29nuke.html?ref=world (Accessed September 30, 2008). 110. See Z. Mian, A.H. Nayyar, R. Rajaraman, and M.V. Ramana, ‘Fissile Material in South Asia: The Implications of the US-India Nuclear Deal’, Research Report of the International Panel on Fissile Materials, No. 1, September 2006, pp. 9–15.