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Is the Westernization Process Losing Pace in Turkey: Who’s to Blame?

2009; Taylor & Francis; Volume: 10; Issue: 4 Linguagem: Inglês

10.1080/14683840903384836

1743-9663

Тарик Огузлу, Mustafa Kibaroğlu,

Middle East and Rwanda Conflicts

Abstract The logic of interest, which has gained considerable ground in foreign policy formulation in Turkey, is not rooted in Western identity, nor is it contingent upon the degree of interaction exclusively with the Western world. The entire world has equal prominence in Turkey's foreign policy orientation. Whether the prevalence of the logic of interest in the formulation of Turkish foreign policy under the "post‐Islamist" AKP government signifies a deviation from the Westernization process or whether it is simply a reaction to the conjunctural developments in the international arena in order to preserve Turkey's national interests is seriously debated. This paper aims to contribute to this debate by shedding light on the background of developments both inside and outside Turkey. Notes 1. Most authors use the term "war of independence" to define the period of a series of Turkish military campaigns against occupying powers from 1920 to 1922. It is possible for there to be no difference between a "war of liberation" and a "war of independence" as long as both lead the way to the liberation of a territory from foreign occupation. Yet "war of independence" is a more suitable term for people fighting for their freedom against colonial powers who have ruled for extended periods. In the case of the Turkish War of Liberation one must bear in mind that the Turks, who built empires (the Seljuks, the Ottomans), have never been colonized or ruled by outside powers. One exception is a short period of foreign occupation of the last pieces of Ottoman lands (mostly in Anatolia) as a result of the surrender of the defeated Ottoman Sultan at the end of the World War I. His decision was by no means accepted by the Ottoman military officer of the time, Mustafa Kemal, and his like‐minded comrades and followers, who launched a national resistance movement at first and then an all‐out offensive over the Turkish territory delineated by Treaty of Sevres (dated August 10, 1920). Mustafa Kibaroğlu and Ayşegül Kibaroğlu, Global Security Watch – Turkey: A Reference Handbook (Westport, CT: Praeger Security International, 2009), pp. 1–2. 2. Ali L. Karaosmanoğlu, "The Evolution of the National Security Culture and the Military in Turkey," Journal of International Affairs, Vol. 54, No. 1 (2000), pp. 199–217. 3. The Tanzimat movement (1839–1871) introduced reforms to the Ottoman administration and society under pressure from the European powers by Sultan Abdülmecid‐I (1839–1861) and Sultan Abdulaziz (1861–1876). Accordingly, the Ottoman army was reorganized according to the Prussian model, the taxation system was overhauled, and representative assemblies from the provinces were created. As part of the reforms, French criminal and commercial laws inspired the Ottoman administration to introduce a penal code applicable in the new state courts, which were separate from the religious courts. See, for instance, Ethem Eldem, "Ottoman Financial Integration with Europe: Foreign Loans, the Ottoman Bank and the Ottoman Public Debt," European Review, Vol. 13, No. 3 (2005), pp. 431–45. 4. The use of the acronym "AKP" for the Adalet ve Kalkınma Partisi (Justice and Development Party) has become a controversial issue in Turkey, with a powerful statement made by Prime Minister Erdoğan, who is also the leader of the party, condemning those who continue to use AKP as their adversaries. Erdoğan asked everybody to use "AK Parti" instead, which, however, does not make much sense to those who do not understand Turkish. The authors of this article acknowledge the right of the members of the Justice and Development Party as well as those in its cadre of leadership to ask for a particular acronym to be used concerning their party's name and respect their decision. However, for the sake of simplicity and convenience for foreign readers "AKP" will be used throughout the text without any other secondary political or other considerations. 5. Philip Robins, "Turkish Foreign Policy since 2002: Between a 'Post‐Islamist' Government and a Kemalist State," International Affairs, Vol. 83, No. 1 (2007), pp. 289–304. 6. Mustafa Aydın, "The Determinants of Turkish Foreign Policy, and Turkey's European Vocation," Review of International Affairs, Vol. 3, No. 2, pp. 306–31. 7. Fuat Keyman, "Modernity, Secularism and Islam," Theory, Culture & Society, Vol. 24, No. 2, pp. 215–34. 8. Tarık Oğuzlu, "Middle Easternization of Turkey's Foreign Policy: Does Turkey Dissociate from the West?" Turkish Studies, Vol. 9, No. 1 (2008), pp. 3–20. 9. Bary Buzan and Thomas Diez, "The European Union and Turkey," Survival, Vol. 41, No. 1 (1999), pp. 41–57. 10. Ole Wæver, "Integration as Security: Constructing a Europe at Peace," in: Charles A. Kupchan (ed.), Atlantic Security Contending Visions (Washington DC: Council on Foreign Relations, 1998), pp. 45–63. 11. The EU's position in this regard can be found in the Negotiation Framework Document prepared by the European Commission on the eve of the initiation of accession talks with Turkey in October 2005. See http://ec.europa.eu/enlargement/pdf/turkey/st20002_05_tr_framedoc_en.pdf. 12. Richard Youngs, Europe's Flawed Approach to Arab Democracy (London: Centre for European Reform Essays, 2006). 13. Antonio M. Ruiz‐Jimenez, "European Public Opinion and Turkey's Accession: Making Sense of Arguments For and Against," European Policy Institute Network, Working Paper No. 16 (2007). 14. Lauren M. McLaren, "Explaining Opposition to Turkish Membership of the EU," European Union Politics, Vol. 8, No. 2 (2007), pp. 251–78. 15. Jorg Monar, "The EU's Approach Post‐September 11: Global Terrorism as a Multidimensional Law Enforcement Challenge," Cambridge Review of International Affairs, Vol. 20, No. 2 (2007), pp. 267–83. 16. Oğuzlu. "Middle Easternization of Turkey's Foreign Policy." 17. Ibid. 18. George E. Gruen, "Turkey's Role in Peacekeeping Missions," American Foreign Policy Interests, Vol. 28, No. 6 (2006), pp. 435–49. 19. Ronald D. Asmus, Larry Diamond, Mark Leonard and Michael McFaul, "A Transatlantic Strategy to Promote Democratic Development in the Broader Middle East," The Washington Quarterly, Vol. 28, No. 2 (2005), pp. 7–21. 20. Kemalists are staunch believers in and followers of the principles of Mustafa Kemal Atatürk and the reforms that he introduced to the Turkish nation during the state‐building process, which has resulted in the modern Republic of Turkey from the ashes of the Ottoman Empire. 21. Ömer Taşpınar, "An Uneven Fit? The 'Turkish Model' and the Arab World," Brookings Project on U.S. Relations with the Islamic World, Analysis Paper No. 5 (2003). 22. For instance, despite Turkey's aspirations to be fully involved in the emerging European Security and Defense Policy (ESDP) decision‐making mechanisms, the goal on the part of the EU was to make use of Turkey's military and strategic capabilities allocated to NATO as if it were a member of the EU while at the same time avoiding the possibility of Turkey affecting the ultimate decisions of the European powers. However, Turkey resisted that proposal and pursued a policy of conducting tough negotiations with the EU that also involved the United States at later stages. 23. Hasan Kösebalaban, "The Rise of Anatolian Cities and the Modernization Paradigm," Critique: Critical Middle Eastern Studies, Vol. 16, No. 3 (2007), pp. 229–40. 24. Oğuzlu, "Middle Easternization of Turkey's Foreign Policy." 25. Joshua W. Walker, "Learning Strategic Depth: Implications of Turkey's New Foreign Policy Doctrine," Insight Turkey, Vol. 9, No. 3 (2007), pp. 32–47. 26. Kemal Kirişçi, "Turkey's Foreign Policy in Turbulent Times," Institute for Security Studies, Chaillot Papers 92 (2006), pp. 38–49. 27. Michael Rubin, "Green Money, Islamist Politics in Turkey," Middle East Quarterly, Vol. 12, No. 1 (2005), pp. 13–23. 28. Hasan Kosebalaban, "The Permanent 'Other'? Turkey and the Question of European Identity," Mediterranean Quarterly, Vol. 18, No. 4 (2007), pp. 101–8. 29. Turkish Foreign Minister Ali Babacan's statement during a press conference in Ankara in September 2007. 30. Tarik Oğuzlu and Mustafa Kibaroğlu, "Incompatibilities in Turkish and European Security Cultures Diminish Turkey's Prospects for EU Membership," Middle Eastern Studies, Vol. 44, No. 6 (2008), pp. 945–62. 31. Bill Park, "Between Europe, the United States and the Middle East: Turkey and European Security in the Wake of the Iraq Crisis," Perspectives on European Politics & Society, Vol. 5, No. 3 (2004), pp. 493–516. 32. The Annan Plan was a United Nations proposal to settle the dispute of the divided island nation of Cyprus by creating the United Cyprus Republic. 33. Michelangelo Guida, "The Sevres Syndrome and Conspiracy Theories in the Islamist and Secular Press," Turkish Studies, Vol. 9, No. 1 (2008), pp. 37–52. 34. Fatos Tarifa and Benjamin Adams, "Who's the Sick Man of Europe? A Wavering EU Should Let Turkey," Mediterranean Quarterly, Vol. 18, No. 1 (2007), pp. 53–74. 35. "The Absorption Puzzle," Economist, Vol. 380, No. 8484 (July 1, 2006), p. 50. 36. Fareed Zakaria, Özgürlüğün Geleceği, Yurtta ve Dünyada Illeberal Demokrasi [The Future of Freedom, Illiberal Democracy at Home and Abroad] (İstanbul: Kirmizi Yayinlari, 2007). 37. Hakan M. Yavuz and Nihat Ali Özcan, "The Kurdish Question and Turkey's Justice and Development Party," Middle East Policy, Vol. 13, No.1 (2006), pp. 102–19. 38. Jonathan Eric Lewis, "Replace Turkey as a Strategic Partner?" Middle East Quarterly, Vol. 13, No. 2 (2006), pp. 1–8. 39. Philip Gordon and Ömer Taşpınar, "Turkey on the Brink," The Washington Quarterly, Vol. 29, No. 3 (2006), pp. 57–70. 40. Turkish Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdoğan made a statement along these lines during the Security Conference, which convened in Munich, Germany on February 9, 2008. 41. "Color revolutions" denote the popular movements in the former Soviet republics, namely Georgia and Ukraine, that paved the way for the pro‐Western parties in these countries to come to power through general elections. The results of the Georgian elections in 2003 are called the "Rose Revolution" and the results of the Ukrainian elections are called the "Orange Revolution," as these colors are associated with the colors of the flags and banners carried by the supporters of the parties that won the elections with the overwhelming majority of votes. 42. Suat Kınıklıoglu, "The Anatomy of Turkish–Russian Relations," http://www.brookings.edu/comm/events. 43. Retired General Tuncer Kılınç, former secretary general of the then powerful National Security Council (MGK), was on record in March 2002 for suggesting, among other things, forming an alliance with Russia, Iran, and China. 44. The findings of the poll can be found at http://www.transatlantictrends.org. Nearly 80 percent of Turks think that Turkey and the United States are not allies anymore. Similar findings are observed regarding the EU. The number of people supporting Turkey's membership in the EU has fallen from its peak of around 75 percent in 2005 to 55 percent as of early 2008. http://www.gmfus.org/trends/2009/docs/2009_English_Key.pdf.