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Research Note: Hassan al-Turabi, Osama bin Laden, and Al Qaeda in Sudan

2006; Taylor & Francis; Volume: 18; Issue: 3 Linguagem: Inglês

10.1080/09546550600752022

1556-1836

Max Taylor, Mohamed E. Elbushra,

Terrorism, Counterterrorism, and Political Violence

Abstract This research note explores the events and circumstances surrounding Osama bin Laden's stay in Sudan from 1991 to 1996. In particular, it discusses the role that the Sudanese politician, Hassan al-Turabi may have played in the development of bin Laden and al Qaeda. It draws particular attention to the role of the Popular Arab and Islamic Congress (PAIC) in the emergence of a distinctive form of Radical Islam and offers a preliminary discussion of the emergence of particular qualities of al Qaeda ideology. Keywords: al-TurabiOsama bin LadenSudanal QaedaPAIC This paper arises from research undertaken whilst the author held an Irish Council for the Humanities and Social Sciences Senior Research Fellowship. Notes 1. In writing this, the authors recognize that the concept of ideological influence may be unclear. Ideology in the sense used here, is broadly consistent with Hall's view that "ideologies are the framework of thinking and calculations about the world—the 'ideas' that people use to figure out how the social world works, what their place is in it and what they ought to do" (Stuart Hall, "Signification, Representation, Ideology: Althusser and the Post-Structuralist Debates," Critical Studies in Mass Communication 2 (1985: 91–114.) The origins of ideology in this context relate to the expression of theological or political ideas. It is interesting to speculate whether the sources of ideology might reflect situational factors, as well as political or theological. See also Taylor and Horgan (2005) for a further discussion of the relationship between ideology and behaviour (Max Taylor and John A. Horgan "Conceptual Framework for Addressing Psychological Process In The Development of The Terrorist," Terrorism and Political Violence, in press). 2. For a discussion of this see Abdelwahab El-Affendi, Turabi's Revolution: Islam and Power in Sudan, (London, Grey Seal, 1991). 3. Ronald A. T. Judy. "Islamiyya and the Construction of the Human Being," in Ahmad S. Moussalli, ed., Islamic Fundamentalism: Myths & Realities (Reading, UK: Ithaca Press, 1998), 106. 4. These details are given in C-L. L. Sorenson. The Islamic Movement in Sudan: External Relations and Internal Power Struggle after 1989," Unpublished Master's Thesis, Dept. of Political Studies and Public Administration, American University of Beirut, 2002. 5. Al-Turabi's doctoral thesis was written in French with the title "States of Emergency in Constitutional Jurisprudence." 6. See Mohamed Elhachmi Hamdi, The Making of an Islamic Political Leader: Conversations with Hasan al-Turabi, English Translation by Ashur A. Shamis, (Boulder, CO and Oxford: Westview Press, 1998). 7. His best known works are: al-salat 'imad al-din [Prayer, the Principal Pillar of Religion] (1972/77), al-iman wa atharuhu fi hayat al-insan [Faith and its Role in Man's Life] (1974), and al-harakat al-islamiyya fi al-Sudan [The Islamic Movement in the Sudan] (1989). His best known pamphlets are collected in Misawi Hamdi, Qadaya attajdid: nahwa manhaj usuli [Issues of Renewal: Towards an Authentic Approach] (1990) See Sorenson (see note 4 above). None of these appear to be currently readily available to non-Arabic speaking audiences. An English translation of "On the position of women in Islam and in Islamic Society" is available online at http://www.islamfortoday.com/turabi01.htm 8. Recently al-Turabi has advocated several critical issues that put him in confrontation with conservative and traditional Muslim scholars, particularly concerning Prophetical reports (Hadith). In a lecture in the Red Sea University, Sudan, in December 2005, Turabi emphasized the right of women in Islam (see note 7 above for details of an earlier account of his views on women). He advocated that women should hold seats in political organizations in Islamic countries, as well as their potential to become Imams. Furthermore, he has rejected Prophetic accounts that refer to the return of Jesus at the end of the world. See also Hassan al-Turabi, Al-Siyasa wa al-Hukum, Politics and Governing, 2nd edition, Beirut, 2004. 9. Cited in Mohamed Elhachmi Hamdi, The Making of an Islamic Political Leader: Conversations with Hasan al-Turabi, (see note 6 above), 62. 10. Cited without attribution in J. Millard Barr and Robert O. Collins, Revolutionary Sudan: Hasan al-Turabi and the Islamist State, 1989–2000. (Leiden: Koninklijke Brill, 2003), 68. 11. Sageman (Mare Sageman, Understanding Terror Networks Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 2004, 39) also refers to bin Laden visiting al-Turabi and implies this took place in 1989 or 1990. He makes no reference to the earlier contacts referred to by Burr and Collins (see note 10 above). 12. Burr and Collins (see note 10 above). 13. Al-Turabi did not appear to have played a direct role in the military coup that brought down al-Mahdi's government, but he was a central figure in the background. This is a role al-Turabi frequently played. 14. See the U.S. Embassy Bombings Transcript Day 5 Feb. 2001 for details of the use made of the Wadi Aqiqi accounts, http://www.ict.org.il/documents/documentdet.cfm?docid=46 15. Trial testimony of Jamal al-Fadl: United States v. Usama bin Laden, No. S(7) 98 Cr. 1023 (S.D. N.Y.), Feb. 6, 2001 (transcript pp. 220–224). 16. There are reports that under the direction of bin Laden the airport was used to move arms shipments. This seems likely to be untrue, because at least at that time there were no planes available to ship such arms. Saddam Hussein did provide arms to the Khatmiya leader Al Mirghany (who was Al Mahdi's partner in the democratic government in 1987) to help that government fight against the southern insurgents. 17. Al-Turabi has always been concerned to maintain the current regime in Saudi Arabia, because he saw it as the backbone of Islamisation and the most favorable environment for breeding Muslim scholars and maintaining Islamic teachings. He was of the opinion that any regime that might replace the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia might be against Islamisation, both regionally and globally. 18. The Popular Arab and Islamic Congress (also known as the General Assembly) was created by al-Turabi as a movement to develop and co-ordinate the Islamic revolution. The first congress was held in Khartoum, April 25–28, 1991. 200 delegates from various Islamic States and movements attended the Congress, including Yasser Arafat. A permanent secretariat was established, with al-Turabi as its Secretary-General. Al-Turabi was already well-known in the Islamic world by this time, and his books and tape recordings of his speeches were widely circulated. This appointment confirmed al-Turabi's stature in the world of radical Islam, and offered him opportunities to extend his influence well beyond Sudan. Significantly, the PAIC included both Sunni and Shia activists (facilitating links to reduce some of the religious and ideological tensions between them), and even included Iranian and Iraqi delegates (Iraqi and Iranian intelligence officers reportedly met during the Congress, a point of some significance given the Iran-Iraq war). Perhaps the greatest outcome of the Congress, however, was the links it enabled to be develop between radical Islamic movements and groups across the world, from the Philippines to Algeria. Al-Turabi played a central role in the facilitation of these links. The second PAIC General Assembly was held in Khartoum in December 1993. During this Assembly, al-Turabi developed links with al-Zawahiri that resulted in a plan to confront U.S. Military activity in Somalia, which may have later influenced planning for more general attacks against the U.S. In an interview by Muriel Mirak-Weissbach in Executive Intelligence Review in 1994 (http://www.aboutsudan.com/interviews/hassan_al_turabi.htm) al-Turabi said: "PAIC has assembled Muslims from all over the world, America and Canada and the Caribbean, white and black, Japanese and Europeans, of European stock and European nationalities, Asians, Africans and the Middle East—Arabs mostly. For the first time, from all over the world, we assembled one meeting after the other. We have overcome the internal divisions, Shia, Sunna, differences in jurisprudence or spiritual orders, they now speak together; the dialogue between Christianity and Islam, we were behind it, and trying to develop a dialogue between governments in Muslim countries and societies, whether in Algeria or other countries. And differences between two Muslim countries, Iran and Iraq, what were formerly Southern and Northern Yemen, and the settlement of problems in Afghanistan, some African countries, Muslim minorities all over the world, and dealing with Christian minorities also. This is the first time in world history that Muslim societies have met, not at the diplomatic level, because the Organization of Islamic Conference (OIC) is not representative of the people and is not active." Another General Assembly meeting was held in April 1995, which further developed the programme of links between radical activist organizations. By 1997, PAIC had offices in Fifty-five Western and Islamic countries including Tehran and Karachi (Sorenson (see not 4 above)). The organization was shut down in February 2000. The PAIC was essentially a decentralized organization, reflecting al-Turabi's views about the conditions that would facilitate the emergence of Islamic revolution. In an interview conducted in 1992, Joyce Davis reports al-Turabi's saying "It's an organization rather than a single conference…. All over the world there was a consensus of public opinion and we thought that the official international organizations like the Arab League or the Conference of Islamic States is not truly representative of them all…and it convenes not only Muslims, but also Arabs, even Christians. Not only Islamic attitudes, but also even nationalist attitudes." (Joyce M. Davis, Between Jihad and Salaam: Profiles in Islam (New York: St Martins Griffin 1999), 12). It may be interesting to speculate if experience of this organizational structure contributed to the eventual development of Al Qaeda's distributed structure. 19. Burr and Collins (see note 10 above), 70. 20. Al-Turabi was assaulted by a Sudanese expatriate on his arrival at Ottawa airport, resulting in serious injuries. He was admitted into a Canadian Hospital, and subsequently transferred to a clinic in Switzerland. A secret report on the assault was produced for the Canadian Government that has never been released, but there were some suggestions that the assault was committed by an SPLA officer. Al-Turabi (in Davis (see note 18 above), 26) implies that this assault was the result of a conspiracy involving the Canadian Government, because only the Canadian authorities knew of his travel arrangements. Al-Turabi now appears to blame the Sudanese Government for this assault (see Gamal Nkrumah. Hasan Al-Turabi: Remaking History). News article from Al-Ahram posted May 18 2006 at http://www.sudan.new/news/posted/12940. This seems to be an example of a more general attempt by al-Turabi to attribute blame for some of the failings of Sudan on the current Sudanese Government and to distance himself from his own role in events. 21. Peter Bergen, Holy Terror, Inc.: Inside the Secret World of Osama bin Laden (New York: Free Press, 2001), 47–49. 22. Ibid. 23. http://www.ict.org.il/articles/articledet.cfm?articleid=387. 24. Referred to in U.S. Embassy Bombing Transcript Day 3, Transcript of the trial of suspected al-Qaida militants in connection with the bombings of the American embassies in Kenya and Tanzania on 7 August 1998, http://www.ict.org.il/documents/documentdet.cfm?docid=44. 25. Referred to in U.S. Embassy Bombing Transcript Day 7, Transcript of the trial of suspected al-Qaida militants in connection with the bombings of the American embassies in Kenya and Tanzania on 7 August 1998, http://www.ict.org.il/documents/documentdet.cfm?docid=48. 26. See U.S. Embassy Bombing Transcripts documents at http://www.ict.org.il/ 27. http://www.ict.org.il/articles/articledet.cfm?articleid=387 28. Shaul Shay, The Red Sea Terror Triangle: Sudan, Somalia, Yevuea, and Islamie Terror (New Brunswick, NJ, Transaction Publishers, 2005). Shay lists the following as commercial organizations developed or owned by bin Laden in Sudan: Wadi al-Aqiq—an international commerce company; Ladin International Company—an international commerce company; Al-Hijra Construction; Al-Themar Agricultural company; Taba Investments—a commercial company that held a monopoly over the export of agricultural products including rubber, corn, and sunflowers; The Blessed Fruit Company; Al-Ikhlas—a candy manufacturer; Al-Qudurat—a shipping company; A leatherwork company (unnamed); A bakery (unnamed); A furniture factory (unnamed). Shay's source for this list is given as Fever 2001 (A. Fever, "Bin Laden Group had extensive network of companies, witness says," New York Times, 13 February, 2001). 29. Reference to this is made in Burr and Collins (see note 10 above), 121. 30. Ilich Ramirez Sanchez (known as Carlos the Jackal), is thought to have arrived in Sudan during 1993; he entered the Sudan bearing a Jordanian passport with an Arab name Abdalla Barakat. Sudanese officials denied his presence in the country, but he was identified participating in the PIAC General Assembly held in Khartoum 2–4 December 1993 (see note 18 above). Abu Nidal was also living in Sudan at that time. Sanchez appears to have participated in training activities in Sudan, but his relationship with senior Sudanese officials rapidly deteriorated. The French Government had a particular interest in the capture of Sanchez (amongst other things, as a result of his bombing the Saint-Germaine Drugstore in Paris in 1974, and the murder of two French intelligence operatives in 1975) and they put pressure on the Sudanese Government to extradite him to France. This was refused, but after negotiations, Sanchez was effectively "sold" to France for "French military equipment, intelligence, training for Sudanese police, financial assistance to Sudan Airways, and a desalination plant for Port Sudan" (Burr and Collins (see note 10 above)). Al-Turabi allegedly visited Paris in July 1994, and Sanchez was abducted in August 1994. According to al-Turabi, the departure of Sanchez was justified because he "did not represent an ideology, he sold himself to various customers." Whilst Sanchez's behaviour in Sudan gave offence to many (he openly drank alcohol, and was a known womanizer) and he was not a Muslim, it is likely that the pragmatic benefits of gaining favor with the West and the French material and aid was of greater value at that time to the Sudanese authorities than his terrorist background. There is also some suggestion that potential French oil interests were a factor. These events may also be illustrative of what to many people has been thought of as a cynical willingness on al-Turabi's part to use events to develop his own interests, and to seek favour with the West. A further example of this may be seen in the apparent offers to "give" bin Laden to the U.S. (see note 33 below). There are other examples of militants being initially given refuge in Sudan, but subsequently leaving after pressure on the Sudanese government (for example, Rachid al Ghannouchi, a leader of Hizb al-Nahdah, the Tunisian Islamic Party). 31. http://cns.miis.edu/research/wmdme/sudan.htm. See also http://www.eretzyisroel.org/~jkatz/wmd.html—this details a number of assertions and allegations about the storage of Iraqi weapons (including chemical, biological and nuclear materials) most of which are unproveable and probably unfounded. 32. This attack was arguably the first directly initiated co-ordinated Al Qaeda attack. Reports implicating the Sudanese authorities seem to be misplaced. 33. On 3 March 1996 the Sudanese Minister of State for Defense, al-Fatih Urwah, reportedly held a secret meeting in Washington with Timothy M. Carney, the U.S. ambassador to Sudan, and David Shinn, Director of East African Affairs at the State Department (Richard Miniter, Losing Bin Laden: How Bill Clinton's Failures Unleashed Global Terror. (Washington, D.C.: Regnery Publishing, 2004). At this and at subsequent meetings, Sudan's willingness to arrest and transfer bin Laden to the U.S. was discussed. It is not clear if this initiative came from al-Turabi, or whether it was instigated by President Bashir without al-Turabi's consent or knowledge. The U.S. Government declined this offer, but it seems likely that these events provided the incentive to al-Turabi to initiate steps to facilitate bin Laden's departure from Sudan to Afghanistan, and on 18 May 1996 bin Laden left Sudan for Afghanistan. It seems likely that the principal motive behind this offer was not in fact to improve relations with the U.S., but rather with Saudi Arabia—Saudi officials were kept informed of discussions and bin Laden's eventual departure. Subsequently, the Sudanese Government made available to the U.S. authorities details of Al-Qaeda personnel who were in Sudan. 34. Burr and Collins (see note 10 above), 223. 35. D. M. Jones, M. L. R. Smith, and M. Weeding. "Looking for the Pattern: Al Qaeda in South East Asia: The Genealogy of a Terror Network." Studies in Conflict and Terrorism, 26; 2003, 443–457. 36. In a visit to the ruined plant by the first author shortly after the attack, there was no obvious evidence of anything that appeared to be associated with chemical warfare. Indeed, there now seems to be a broad acceptance that this plant was not involved in the production of any chemical weapons. For a discussion of this see Karl Vick, "Sudan Plant's Tie With bin Laden Disputed," Washington Post Foreign Service, Thursday, 22 October, 1998, A29. 37. Taylor and Horgan (see note 1 above). 38. See for example K. Hundeide, "Becoming a Committed Insider," Culture and Psychology 9 (2003): 107–127. 39. Bin Laden does not have religious authority as a recognized member of the Ulama. 40. Coll (Steve Coll, "Young Osama: How He Learned Radiealism, and May Have Seen America," The New Yorker December 12, 2005) describes how radical Islamic teachers in his secondary school may have influenced bin Laden. The evidence presented is largely from interviews with fellow pupils at the Al Thagher Model School, which bin Laden is reported to have attended from 1968 until 1976. It is difficult to judge whether bin Laden's experiences were particularly different from other children, or if indeed (as Coll claims), he was introduced to and was influenced by teachers with backgrounds in the Ikwhan. 41. John L. Esposito and John O. Voll, Makers of Contemporary Islam. (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2001, 120. 42. It should be noted that it is not always clear whether this is a reference to the Ulama as traditionally understood, or some other broader populist or different category. 43. M. Viorst, "Sudan's Islamic Experiment," Foreign Affairs, 74, no. 3, (May/June 1995): 53. 44. Not all these comments are necessarily accepted by observers as being truthful representations of al-Turabi's views; or at least there is a discrepancy between practice and rhetoric. Certainly the experience in Sudan of member of religious faiths other than Islam do not seem to be as positive as this quotation might suggest (see for example G. Lusk, Show of Tolerance, MEI, 5 February 1993, 14–15). On the other hand, there may indeed be a deliberate discrepancy between practice and rhetoric as much for local political reasons as anything else. 45. M. Viorst (see note 43 above). 46. Hamdi, (see note 6 above). 47. Hassan al-Turabi, "On the position of women in Islam and in Islamic Society," available online at http://www.islamfortoday.com/turabi01.htm. See also an interview with Wisal Sadiq Abdel Rahman al Mahdi, al-Turabi's wife, reported by Davis, (see note 18 above) 129–46. 48. Davis (see note 18 above) 27–8. 49. The Training Manual can be found at http://www.usdoj.gov/ag/trainingmanual.htm 50. Ibid, Manual Part 1, 15. 51. See also http://english.aljazeera.net/NR/exeres/A78B0598-F7D6-48BF-90B3-CC04-4767C7BF.htm 52. Manual Part 1 (see note 49 above). 53. See http://www.multimedia.belointeractive.com/attack/military/1203book.html 54. K. Hundeide, "Becoming a Committed Insider," Culture and Psychology 9 (2003): 107–127. 55. See the discussion by Anatol Lieven: http://www.carnegieendowment.org/files/Remarks_on%20Chechnya%20and%20War%20on%20Terror.doc. From a different perspective, Johnson (James Turner Johnson, The War to Oust Saddam Hussein: Just War and the New Face of Conflict. (Lanham, MD: Rowman and Littlefield Publishers, 2005) makes the point that assumptions about contemporary politics that have no regard for the influence of religion "when these factors are indeed central to the motivations behind actions of people intent on harming us…and when those people are not in fact organized into a state with its own "interests," then assumptions that allow no room for this are clearly inadequate," (page 5). Taylor and Horgan (2001) made similar points (Taylor, M. and Horgan, J. The Psychological and Behavioural bases of Islamic Fundamentalism. Terrorism and Political Violence, 2001, 13, 37–71). 56. Taylor and Horgan (see note 1 above). Additional informationNotes on contributorsMax TaylorMax Taylor is Professor in International Relations at the CSTPV, University of St. Andrews. He is a forensic psychologist with particular interests in ideology and behavioural approaches to understanding terrorism.Mohamed E. ElbushraMohamed Elamin Elbushra holds a PhD in Criminal law and Criminal Justice from Keio University Japan. He is a former Major General of Police and Director of the CID, Sudanese Police. He was a Professor of Criminal Law at the Naif University, Riyadh, Saudi Arabia, and is Senior Consultant in Criminal Justice and Crime Prevention at the Ministry of the Interior, UAE.