Artigo Revisado por pares

Moral Testimony and Moral Epistemology

2009; University of Chicago Press; Volume: 120; Issue: 1 Linguagem: Inglês

10.1086/648610

ISSN

1539-297X

Autores

Alison Hills,

Tópico(s)

Free Will and Agency

Resumo

Previous articleNext article No AccessMoral Testimony and Moral Epistemology*Alison HillsAlison Hills Search for more articles by this author PDFPDF PLUSFull Text Add to favoritesDownload CitationTrack CitationsPermissionsReprints Share onFacebookTwitterLinkedInRedditEmail SectionsMoreDetailsFiguresReferencesCited by Ethics Volume 120, Number 1October 2009 Article DOIhttps://doi.org/10.1086/648610 Views: 1464Total views on this site Citations: 163Citations are reported from Crossref © 2009 by The University of Chicago. 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