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State Ideology and the Kurds in Turkey

2010; Taylor & Francis; Volume: 46; Issue: 4 Linguagem: Inglês

10.1080/00263206.2010.492987

1743-7881

Neophytos Loizides,

Jewish and Middle Eastern Studies

Abstract This article evaluates theories of nationalism by examining the formation of Kurdish nationalism in Turkey. It deals particularly with the various manifestations of the contemporary Kurdish minority question and provides an account of the late development of Kurdish nationalism in Turkey. It situates the Kurdish experience within the broader experience of the post-Ottoman world and analyzes the awakening of Kurdish national identity among broader segments of the population. It provides an alternative to Ernest Gellner's functionalist account of nationalism and industrialization by stressing the link between state policies and minority nationalism. It considers the political, social and other implications of state repression as well as the opportunities created in the diaspora or through external intervention. It argues that state policies in Turkey did not prevent and even contributed to the rise of Kurdish minority nationalism. Finally, the article raises two interrelated questions: what types of nationalism have Kurds developed under conditions of limited expression and what options for conflict resolution are present particularly in light of Turkey's democratization and EU accession process. Notes 1. For a summary of the relevant literature focusing on social movement theories and how these apply to the Kurds see D. Romano, The Kurdish Nationalist Movement: Opportunity, Mobilization and Identity (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2006). 2. M. Hroch, Social Preconditions of National Revival in Europe: A Comparative analysis of the Social Composition of Patriotic Groups among the Smaller European Nations (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1985), p.9. 3. E. Kedourie, Nationalism in Asia and Africa (London: Weidenfeld and Nicolson, 1971), p.92 4. Arguably, the distinction between nations with and nations without history can be subject to criticism. Few contemporary nations can make an exclusive claim to the glorious past of an ancient or medieval empire. Does multiethnic Byzantium belong only to modern Greeks? Can Venice be the heritage of all Italians? In the pre-modern era, the 'nation' was not the basic element for the formation of polities. The general pattern of social organization was the city (Venice, medieval German estates, and so on), a fraction of what was later seen as the nation or empire that embraced different nationalities and was ruled by ethnically mixed aristocracies. In only a few cases did the modern nationalist principle of one culture–one polity exist as a result of geography (Japan, Korea, Thailand, Iceland. See Brendan O'Leary, 'A Critical Overview', in John A. Hall (ed.), The State of the Nation: Ernest Gellner and the Theory of Nationalism (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1998), p.82. These superficially related phenomena should not be confused with the modern phenomenon of nationalism associated with citizenship through education, group differentiae in terms of the language of instruction, and unmediated membership in mass co-cultural societies (ibid., p.44). 5. Like many nations, Kurds claim a glorious ancient past. The search for and discovery of glorious ancestors, in this case Medes, serves current political and identity needs during times of oppression. While not necessarily historically accurate, they are instrumental in the formation of modern national consciousness. The Kurds have indeed created empires, such as the Shaddadids who ruled predominantly Armenian populations in the Ani and Ganja districts of Transcaucasia (951–1174); the Marwanids of Diyarbakir (990–1096); and the Hasanwaihids of Dinavar in the Kermanshah region (959–1015). However, there is no memory of statehood from these empires. 6. D. McDowall, A Modern History of the Kurds (London: I.B. Tauris, 1997), p.23. 7. Ibid., p.4 8. Kurd (2009), in Encyclopædia Britannica, Encyclopaedia Britannica Online: http://www.britannica.com/EBchecked/topic/325191/Kurd (accessed 29 April 2009); McDowall estimates approximately 24–27 in his 1996 edition of his book. McDowall, A Modern History of the Kurds, p.3. 9. This contrasts with the first wave of nationalism in the Ottoman Empire that affected the Serbs and Greeks living in areas with frequent commercial contacts with the West, or the second wave in the second half of the nineteenth century (Bulgarian, Albanian, Turkish and Arabic). 10. McDowall. A Modern History of the Kurds, p.3. 11. In this article 'ethnic group' is used interchangeably with 'ethnographic' in contrast to 'nations' or 'nationalities'. For Paul Magocsi, 'nationality' refers to a group of people who are aware of sharing certain characteristics, such as distinct territory, common historical and ethnographic traditions, and the same language or series of related dialects. An ethnographic group also possesses the characteristics of a nationality but its members are not necessarily aware of belonging to a larger people, nor do they have the will to be a nationality. See P. Magocsi, The End of the Nation-State? The Revolution of 1989 and the Future of Europe (St Catharine's, Ontario: Kashtan, 1994), p.13. Christopher Hann points out that we can speak of national identity (nationality) only when this forms part of an actor's own consciousness. Characteristics that we typically call 'ethnic' (ethnographic) may provide a sort of objective 'raw material' for the formation of nation or nationality, but they do not in themselves guarantee that it will be formed. See C. Hann, 'Introduction', in Paul Magocsi (ed.), Of the Making of Nationalities there is No End, East European Monographs (New York: Columbia University Press, 1999), p.xvii. 12. The link between the formation of modern national consciousness and language is a major theme in both Karl Deutch's and Benedict Anderson's work. Deutch argues that a larger group of persons linked by complementary habits and facilities of communication may be called a people. See K. Deutch, Nationalism and Social Communication (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 1966), p.96. Benedict Anderson, in his widely cited Imagined Communities, sees print capitalism as a main element in the formation of modern nations: 'the creation of monoglot mass reading publics, a result of the invention of print and capitalism, displaced the axiomatic grip of script languages on men's mind and eroded the transcontinental solidarities of Christendom, the Islamic Ummah and the rest. Print capitalism made it possible for rapidly growing numbers of people to think about themselves, and to relate themselves to others, in profoundly new ways' (nationalism). B. Anderson, Imagined Communities: Reflections on the Origin and the Spread of Nationalism (London: Verso, 1983), p.36. 13. M. van Bruinessen. 'Shifting National and Ethnic Identities: The Kurds in Turkey and the European Diaspora', Journal of Muslim Minority Affairs, Vol.18, No.1 (1998), pp.39–53. 14. L. Karmela, 'Ethnic Identity – Challenging the Boundaries of Social Psychology', in G.M. Breakwell (ed.), Social Psychology of Identity and the Self Concept (Surrey, UK: Surrey University Press, 1992), pp.150–51. 15. McDowall, A Modern History of the Kurds, p.419. 16. Z. Gökalp, 'The Ideal of Nationalism: Three Currents of Thought', in Kedourie, Nationalism in Asia and Africa, p.135; N. Berkes, The Development of Secularism in Turkey (New York: Routledge, 1963). 17. A. Mango, 'Atatürk and the Kurds', in S. Kedourie (ed.), Seventy-five Years of the Turkish Republic (London: Frank Cass, 2000), pp.1–26. 18. An earlier expression of proto-nationalist feelings can be found in the work of the seventeenth-century poet Ahmat-i Khani. However, his view of a distinct Kurdish people surrounded by oppressive neighbours did not receive attention from a wider circle of intellectuals until two centuries later. For a relevant discussion see McDowall, A Modern History of the Kurds. 19. Ibid., pp.4–5. 20. D. Stefanovic, 'Seeing the Albanians through Serbian Eyes: The Inventors of the Tradition of Intolerance and their Critics, 1804–1939', European History Quarterly, Vol.35, No.3 (2005), pp.465–92. 21. A. Rossos, Macedonia and the Macedonians: A History (Stanford, CA: Hoover Institution Press, 2008). 22. McDowall, A Modern History of the Kurds, p.404. 23. Ibid., p.403; see also multiple comparable examples in A. Mango, 'Turks and Kurds: Review Article', Middle Eastern Studies, Vol.30, No.4 (Oct. 1994), pp.975–97. 24. Van Bruinessen, 'Shifting National and Ethnic Identities'. 25. Mango, 'Turks and Kurds: Review Article', p.988; Kurdish activists deny that Apo had applied for a Turkish military scholarship. Personal communication with Hadi Elis, Spokesperson for Kurdish Community in Toronto, 10 Sept. 2009. 26. 'Abdullah Ocalan: "We are Fighting Turks Everywhere"', Middle East Quarterly, Vol.2 (June 1998). Available online at http://www.meforum.org/399/abdullah-ocalan-we-are-fighting-truks-everywhere (accessed 27 June 2010). 27. For comparable examples across the developing world see Kedourie, Nationalism in Asia and Africa. Also, Norman Davies describes how in Prussia, where illiteracy was virtually eliminated, 'universal state education may have taught Polish children to read German, but it did not stop them from transferring their skills to Polish matters'. See N. Davies, Heart of Europe: A Short History of Poland (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1984), p.268. Similarly, Andrew Rossos says the small Macedonian intelligentsia began its education in schools operated by outside propaganda institutions in Macedonia and continued with their support in Athens, Belgrade and Sofia. Some members embraced the ideologies of their host countries but others 'rejected this road partially or totally and assumed leadership positions in both Macedonian national and revolutionary movements'. See A. Rossos, 'Macedonianism and Macedonian Nationalism on the Left', in I. Banac and K. Verdery (eds.), National Character and National Ideology in Interwar Eastern Europe (New Haven, CT: Yale Center for International and Area Studies, 1995), p.225. 28. Kedourie, Nationalism in Asia and Africa, p.112. 29. E. Gellner, Nations and Nationalism (Oxford: Blackwell, 1983), pp.48–62. 30. Gellner engaged in a debate with his student Anthony Smith and co-national Miroslav Hroch. The issue was the importance of pre-existing ethnic identities in the formation of modern national identities. Were certain pre-modern sentiments better equipped than others to become national cultures? For Hroch, the basic condition for the success of any national movement is that its argument at least roughly corresponds to the reality perceived by those at whom it is directed. See 'The Nature of the Nation', in J.A. Hall (ed.), The State of the Nation: Ernest Gellner and the Theory of Nationalism (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1988), p.99. 31. P.R. Magocsi, 'Adaptation Without Assimilation: The Genius of the Greco-Catholic Eparchy of Mukachevo', Logos: A Journal of Eastern Christian Studies, Vol.38, No.1–4 (1997), p.277. 32. E. Gellner, Nations and Nationalism (Oxford: Blackwell, 1983), p.61. 33. Looking primarily at ground-level interactions, Swante Cornell has criticized the Western view of Turkey's Kurdish problem as oppression of a minority ethnic group and argues that a Kurd can even become President of Turkey, something unimaginable for minorities in Rwanda, Kosovo, or Chechnya. See S. Cornell, 'The Kurdish Question in Turkish Politics', Orbis: A Journal of World Affairs, Vol.45, No.1 (Winter 2001), pp.31–46. However, in response to this one could argue that no Kurd has ever become President 'as a Kurd', and even though Kurds have occupied high posts in the government, voicing support of even moderate multicultural policies remains difficult. Moreover, sociologist Nilüfer Narli notes that the Turkish majority lacks a reason to mobilize against politicized Kurds because most Turkish citizens know that state repression of Kurdish ethnonationalism will be nonetheless overwhelming. Interview with Nilüfer Narli, 28 Dec. 2001. 34. Communication with Hadi Elis, 10 Sept. 2009. 35. M. Yeğen, 'The Kurdish Question in Turkish State Discourse', Journal of Contemporary History, Vol.34, No.4 (Oct. 1999), pp.555–68, at p.568; M. Yeğen, Devlet Söleyminde Kurt Sorunu[The Kurdish Question in State Discourse] (Istanbul: İletişim Yayınları, 1999). 36. See for example article by leading Turkish diplomat and CHP parliamentarian, S. Elekdag, 'A Master Plan for the Southeast?', Milliyet, 21 Feb. 2000; see also Romano, The Kurdish Nationalist Movement, p.26. 37. American Kurdish Information Network and Human Rights Alliance (eds.), The Fast For Peace in Kurdistan and the Freedom of Leyla Zana (Spring 1998), p.89; M. Gunter, The Kurds and the Future of Turkey (London: Palgrave Macmillan, 2006), pp.68–72. 38. It was unusual, given that ethnic Kurdish representatives who claimed to be 'Kurds' did not make it to parliament before or after Kurdish HEP. For failed efforts to discuss the Kurdish issue, see Turkish Parliament Debates, 31 Oct. 1985; Turkish Parliament Debates, 19 Jan. 1988. Cumhur Keskin argues that one could have been beaten up for saying the words 'Kurdish problem' in parliament. See C. Keskin, 'Türkiye'nin Kürt Politikasi ve Resmi İdeoloji'[Turkey's Kurdish Policy and Official Ideology], in Seyfettin Gürsel et al. (eds.), Türkiye'nin Kürt Sorunu[Turkey's Kurdish Problem] (Istanbul: TÜSES, 1996), p.78. 39. See TBMM Tutanak Dergisi, 3 March 1994, p.375. 40. Ibid., p.368. 41. See speech by Kurdish MP Mehmet Evin Sever, TBMM Tutanak Dergisi, 3 March 1994, p.383. 42. TBMM Tutanak Dergisi, 18 Dec. 1994, pp.960–61; TBMM Tutanak Dergisi, 21 Dec. 1994, pp.396, 406, 416; for similar discussions in the Turkish parliament see also N. Loizides,. 'Elite Framing and Conflict Transformation in Turkey', Parliamentary Affairs, Vol.62, No.2 (2009), pp.278–97. 43. In August 1920, the Sèvres Treaty was signed between the defeated Ottoman Empire and the victorious First World War allies. The short-lived agreement called for the dismemberment of the Ottoman Empire in favour of Christian, Kurdish, and Arab populations, as well as the imperial great powers. See B. Jelavich, History of the Balkans: Twentieth Century, Vol.2 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996), pp.130–31. 44. E. Aydinli, 'Between Security and Liberalization: Decoding Turkey's Struggle with the PKK', Security Dialogue, Vol.33 (2002), pp.209–25. Specific references to Sèvres are primarily (but not exclusively) made by the Kemalist politicians emphasizing the legacy and importance of Atatürk's legacy. For a contemporary comparison of Kemalist and non-Kemalist approaches to history, see M. Guida, 'The Sèvres Syndrome and "Komplo" Theories in the Islamist and Secular Press', Turkish Studies, Vol.9, No.1 (2007), pp. 37–52. 45. See more on TBMM Tutanak Dergisi, 27 Nov. 2001. 46. İ. Beşikçi, Doğu Anadolu'nun Düzeni. Sosyo-ekonomik ve Etnik Temeller[The Order of East Anatolia: Socioeconomic and Ethnic Foundations] (Istanbul: E. Yayınları, 1969). For a detailed analysis of Beşikçi's work, see M. van Bruinessen, 'Turkish Sociologist, Critic of Kemalism, and Kurdologist', Paper presented at the conference Kemalismus als Herrschafts- und Staatsideologie, Kampagne Freiheit für Ismail Besikçi, Berlin, Humboldt-Universität, 24–25 Oct. 1997, available online at http://www.let.uu.nl/∼martin.vanbruinessen/personal/publications/ismail_besikci.htm (accessed 27 June 2010), p.17. 47. Ibid., p.18. 48. Ergil served as the president and director of the Centre for the Research of Societal Problems (TOSAV), an Ankara-based non-governmental organization created to address tensions between Turks and Kurds. In different studies, such as the 'TOBB report' he shows that Kurds demand human rights, not secession. See D. Ergil, Türkiye Odalar Birligi: Doğu Sorunu Teshisler ve Tespitler[The Eastern Question: Diagnosis and Findings] (Ankara: TOBB, 1995); Interview with Doğu Ergil, 22 Dec. 2001; D. Ergil, 'The Kurdish Question in Turkey', Journal of Democracy, Vol.11, No.3 (July 2000), pp.122–35; see also Ü. Cizre, 'Turkey's Kurdish Problem: Borders, Identity, and Hegemony', in B. O'Leary, I. Lustick and T. Callaghy (eds.), Right-sizing the State: The Politics of Moving Borders (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2001), p.222. 49. See for instance O. Encarnación, Spanish Politics. Democracy after Transition (Cambridge: Polity, 2008). 50. İ. Kafesoğlu, Türk-İslâm Sentezi (İstanbul: Aydınlar Ocağı, 1985); G. Bacik, 'The Transformation of Muslim Self and the Development of a New Discourse in Europe: the Turkish Case', International Review of Sociology, Vol.13, No.1 (2003), pp.21–38; F. Çalmuk, Erbakan'in Kürtleri[The Kurds of Erbakan] (Istanbul: Metis Yayinlari, 2001). For a comprehensive study of Turkish political parties and their positions towards political Islam and the Kurdish question, see B. Rubin and M. Heper, Political Parties in Turkey (London: Frank Cass, 2002). 51. D. Laitin, 'Language, Conflict and Violence', Archives Européennes de Sociologie, Vol.41, No.1 (2001), 97–137. Reprinted in D. Druckman and P. Stern (eds.), International Conflict Resolution After the Cold War (Washington, DC: National Academy Press, 2000). 52. See K. Kirişçi, 'The Kurdish Question and Turkish Foreign Policy', in L. Martin and D. Keridis (eds.), The Future of Turkish Foreign Policy (Cambridge: MIT Press, 2004), pp.277–320; M. Gunter, 'The Continuing Kurdish Problem in Turkey after Öcalan's Capture', Third World Quarterly, Vol.21, No.5 (2000), pp.849–69. 53. '1999 Country Reports on Human Rights Practices Released by the Bureau of Democracy, Human Rights, and Labor', US Department of State, 25 Feb. 2000, available online at http://www.egroups.com/message/balkanhr/165 (accessed 27 June 2010); on HADEP see Romano, The Kurdish Nationalist Movement, pp.62, 175, http://www.state.gov/www/global/human_rights/1999_hrp_report/turkey.html. 54. W. Gamson and D. Meyer, 'The Framing of Political Opportunity', in D. McAdam, J.D. McCarthy and M.N. Zald (eds.), Comparative Perspectives on Social Movements: Political Opportunities, Mobilizing Structures, and Cultural Framings (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996), pp.275–90, at p.287. For a more general analysis of spirals as positive feedback, see R. Jervis, System Effects Complexity in Political and Social Life (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1997), pp.174–5. 55. In the summer of 1988, Birand interviewed Öcalan, causing a major uproar in Turkey. Birand's comment appeared in Sabah, 25 April 1992, cited in H. Poulton, Top Hat, Grey Wolf and Crescent: Turkish Nationalism and the Turkish Republic (New York: New York University Press, 1997), p.226. 56. Former Chief of Staff and President, leader of the 12 September 1980 military coup. 57. 'Opposition DYP Leader Backs Evren', Turkish Daily News, 6 March 2007. 58. 'Yet Another Taboo Dies in Kurdistan', Hurriyet, 25 March 2009. 59. The case of MED-TV suggests some of the limitations of communication theory in the study of nationalism. What matters in this case is not only the ability to communicate but the type of communication that certain technologies allow. If communication per se matters, then the bilingual segment of the Kurdish population of Turkey will be equally vulnerable to the influence of Turkish media. It could be argued that communication in one's mother tongue and trust that information available is not censored by a repressive state explains the popularity of satellite television. For background information on MED-TV see Romano, The Kurdish Nationalist Movement, pp.153–9. 60. 'Turkish Parliament Passes Bill Allowing Kurdish Campaigning', Hurriyet Daily News, 8 April 2010. 61. For a relevant discussion in parliament see N. Loizides and E. Ersin, 'The EU Challenge: A View from the Turkish Grand National Assembly', in J.S. Joseph (ed.), Turkey and the European Union: Internal and External Challenges (London: Palgrave Macmillan, 2006), pp.71–83. 62. 'Rasmussen Hedges on Roj TV "mea culpa"', Hürriyet, 6 April 2009. 63. N. Düzel, 'Ahmet Türk: "Operasyon Konferansı Engellemez"', Taraf, 27 April 2009. 64. Personal communication with Zafer Üskül, President of the Parliamentary Committee on Inspection of Human Rights, July 2009.